

B R O A D E N I N G   V I E W S  
I N   T A B L O I D S   A N D   T A B L E T S

# Pr<sub>o</sub>p<sub>o</sub>r<sub>t</sub>ions

of Perspectives

in American and Finnish World News Articles

on South Africa and Brazil

**Kirsi Cheas**



# Broadening Views in Tabloids and Tablets

Proportions of Perspectives

in American and Finnish World News Articles

on South Africa and Brazil

Kirsi Cheas

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Arts of  
the University of Helsinki, for public examination in the Small Hall,  
University main building, on 5 January 2018, at 12 noon.

ISBN 978-951-51-3930-6 (paperback)

ISBN 978-951-51-3931-3 (PDF)

Unigrafia

University of Helsinki, 2017

## Abstract

My doctoral research creates and applies a methodology to systematically measure and compare the proportions of perspectives in world news. By perspectives, I mean news frames and the voices of people affiliated with a range of different political, cultural, and economic institutions (i.e., institutional fields), quoted or paraphrased in the news. My method also assesses the relative positivity of frames. I focus on American and Finnish world news articles concerning South Africa and Brazil as these countries prepared to host the FIFA World Cup, thereby receiving global media attention. My primary sample consists of print and online news articles published in *The New York Times* and *Helsingin Sanomat* between 2006 and 2014. In their pursuit for more global democracy, South Africa and Brazil, along with other nations in the so-called Global South, have demanded a greater voice in the international public sphere. Building on Pierre Bourdieu's field theory and concept of symbolic violence, I examine what the proportions of perspectives in American and Finnish news reveal about the power relations between Southern and Northern countries and the institutions involved. By symbolic violence, I mean a certain institution's ability to frame realities on behalf of another field, and doing so more voluminously than this object field is allowed to speak for itself. I also define other, more subtle forms of symbolic violence with a more qualitative approach.

The findings of this research challenge the prevailing claims that the Global South is voiceless or marginalized in Northern news: in both American and Finnish news, Southern sources receive up to 70–80 percent of total quoting space, on average, to express their views. However, the Southern fields are also depicted much more negatively than the Northern fields. At an overall sample level, the negative framing concerning the South African and Brazilian political fields exceeds these fields' total volume in speaking for themselves, leading to symbolic violence. My research also reveals that American journalists frame Southern institutions mostly in neutral or positive tones, while incorporating quotes from many Southern institutions that criticize realities in their own countries and the political field in particular. Moreover, I found that American journalists systematically use anonymous sources to impose negative views on the Southern political fields. While anonymous sources also abound in Finnish news, Finnish journalists still express their critical opinions toward Southern institutions more openly and explicitly than American journalists.

My research also creates a connection between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research and multiperspectival and interspectival forms of news. I argue that Finnish news resembles multidisciplinary approaches, as each Finnish news article tends to promote and contextualize the perspectives of only one or a couple of fields in a segmented way, whereas the big picture is created across different articles over time. American news is more similar to interdisciplinary approaches, due to the way that diverse perspectives are integrated already at the article level. While I found that the American form of news manages to reveal the complexity of the South African and Brazilian situations at the article level, which Finnish news does not, the views in American news articles are not developed as fully as in the Finnish news articles. My study concludes by providing concrete suggestions as to how the American and Finnish forms of news could be combined to create world news that abound in both depth and a larger quantity of diverse perspectives.



## Table of Contents

Foreword	i
Acknowledgements	v
1. Introduction: Proportions of Perspectives in Northern News on the South	1
<i>Structural Similarities between South Africa and Brazil</i>	6
<i>Creating Context in the News: Broadening the Windows on the World</i>	8
<i>American and Finnish Media Systems and the Potential for Comparative Research</i>	10
<i>Structure of the Present Study</i>	13
2. From Colonies to Complex Democracies: Historical Trajectories of South Africa and Brazil and Normative Standards for Northern Journalism	17
<i>Conquest, Colonialism, and the Formation of Unequal Societies</i>	17
<i>The 20<sup>th</sup> Century in South Africa: Apartheid, Inequality, and the Cold War</i>	22
<i>The 20<sup>th</sup> century in Brazil: Dictatorships, Inequality, and the Cold War</i>	30
<i>Building Better Societies and Reducing Inequalities in South Africa and Brazil</i>	35
<i>South Africa and Brazil on the Global Stage: Successes and Challenges</i>	38
<i>Persistent Problems in the South and Normative Standards for Northern Journalism</i>	44
3. Comparing American and Finnish World News: Media Systems and Sample	49
<i>Globally Dominant Market Economy vs. Small but Knowledgeable Welfare State</i>	50
<i>American and Finnish World News: Review of Previous Research</i>	58
<i>Sample Selection Criteria and Proportionality</i>	64
4. Frame Analysis: Measuring the Size of the Windows on the World	73
<i>The Seven Frames and Their Positive and Negative Dimensions</i>	75
<i>Overlapping Dimensions of Frames</i>	84
<i>Coding and Counting the Size of Frames</i>	88
<i>On the Reliability of Manifest-Level Frame Analysis</i>	94
5. Field Analysis: Measuring the Volume of Voices and Symbolic Violence	97
<i>Identifying and Defining Global, National, and Local Fields</i>	101
<i>Coding and Measuring the Volume of Voices and Symbolic Violence</i>	112
<i>On the Reliability of Manifest-Level Field Analysis</i>	117

6.	Findings: Proportions of Frames, Fields, and Symbolic Violence in American and Finnish World News	119
	<i>Segmented and Overlapping Windows on the World</i>	126
	<i>Negative Frames, Relative Distance, and Symbolic Violence</i>	133
	<i>Anonymous Sources: Symbolic Violence Disguised</i>	140
	<i>The Framer and the Framed: American and Finnish Rules of the Game</i>	145
	<i>South Africa and Brazil Are Off the Map! Implicit Ideas and Perilous Praise</i>	150
	<i>Context, Complexity, and Democracy: Interplay of Positive and Negative Frames</i>	154
7.	Creating Context in Northern News on the South: The American Interperspectival and the Finnish Multiperspectival Form of News	161
	<i>Multi- and Interdisciplinary Models for Creating Context in World News</i>	164
	<i>Context, Relative Distance, and Symbolic Violence</i>	167
	<i>Integrating Ideas: Interperspectivalness in American News</i>	169
	<i>Context That Benefited Brazil: Symbolic Violence on the American Political Field</i>	172
	<i>Segmenting Sentiments: Multiperspectivalness in Finnish News</i>	179
	<i>Textual Segregation in Finnish News</i>	185
	<i>Partial vs. More Complete Context: Comparison of the NYT's and HS's Coverage of the Transforming Favelas</i>	190
	<i>Depth vs. Surface: Context in News Articles and Videos by YLE and CNN</i>	197
	<i>Merging Media Systems and Intermediate Forms of News</i>	201
	<i>The Changing Vision of the World in the American Journalistic Field</i>	204
	<i>Homophonic Meets Polyphonic: Towards a Finnish-American Harmony</i>	208
8.	Dynamics and Relative Volume of Southern Subfields in Northern News	215
	<i>Dynamics and Relative Volume of Southern Political Subfields</i>	217
	<i>Contesting Ideas in the African National Congress</i>	219
	<i>Alliance of Agents in the Brazilian Workers Party</i>	227
	<i>Segmented vs. Integrated Forms of Political Debate</i>	233
	<i>Disguised Dynamics: Political Affiliation Unknown</i>	235
	<i>Dynamics and Relative Volume of Underprivileged, Middle Class, and Wealthy Southern Individuals and NGOs</i>	238
	<i>Citizens' Frustration and Gratitude toward the Political Fields</i>	247
	<i>Dynamics and Relative Volume of Southern Academic Subfields</i>	252
	<i>Media's Symbolic Violence with Academic Reason</i>	253
	<i>Inequality and Political Constraints in the Academic Field</i>	255
	<i>Dynamics and Relative Volume of Southern Journalistic Subfields</i>	261
	<i>Responsibilities and Transparency in the Global Journalistic Field</i>	264
	<i>Final Remarks: Ideas about Inequality and Distant Suffering Revisited</i>	267



9. Conclusions: Proportions of Perspectives, Context, and Transparency in Northern News on the South	269
<i>Objects of Framing, Anonymous Sources, and Symbolic Violence</i>	271
<i>The Multiperspectival and Interperspectival Forms of News</i>	275
<i>Toward Even Wider Views and Forms of Nonviolent Communication: Lessons Learned in the Research Process</i>	278
<i>Broadening Perspectives in the Field of Media Studies: Final Remarks and Suggestions for Further Research</i>	282

REFERENCES CITED	287
------------------	-----

APPENDICES	309
------------	-----

## TABLES:

<i>Table 1: Items for identifying negative and positive dimensions of frames with excerpts from the NYT</i>	80
<i>Table 2: Overlapping dimensions of frames at the paragraph level with excerpts from the NYT</i>	85
<i>Table 3: Institutional fields and subfields</i>	109
<i>Table 4: Average number of news frames and institutional fields per article in the NYT and HS</i>	119
<i>Table 5 (Appendices): Proportion of articles where different fields are quoted and negatively framed</i>	309
<i>Table 6 (Appendices): Examples of positive and negative dimensions of frames in HS</i>	311
<i>Table 7 (Appendices): Core sample: Numbered list of NYT and HS articles</i>	315

## ILLUSTRATIONS:

<i>Illustration 1: Coding at the paragraph and article level</i>	91
<i>Illustration 2: Segmented and overlapping news windows on the world</i>	129
<i>Illustration 3: Integrated link in a CNN article</i>	177
<i>Illustration 4: A story highlights box in a CNN article</i>	178
<i>Illustration 5: A news video that adds volume to the voices quoted in a CNN news article</i>	178
<i>Illustration 6: Segmented links to related coverage in a HS article</i>	183
<i>Illustration 7: Segmented links to related coverage in a HS article</i>	189
<i>Illustration 8: A story highlights box in a CNN article</i>	199
<i>Illustration 9: Polyphonic “intersperspectival” coverage</i>	209
<i>Illustration 10: Homophonic “multiperspectival” coverage</i>	209
<i>Illustration 11: The Room for Debate format in the NYT</i>	211
<i>Illustration 12: Country profiles and geographical distances</i>	325

## FIGURES:

Figure 1: Structure of a field	103
Figure 2: Proportions of Northern and Southern fields in the NYT's coverage of South Africa	122
Figure 3: Proportions of Northern and Southern fields in the NYT's coverage of Brazil	123
Figure 4: Proportions of Northern and Southern fields in HS's coverage of South Africa	124
Figure 5: Proportions of Northern and Southern fields in HS's coverage of Brazil	125
Figure 6: Proportions of news frames in the NYT's coverage of South Africa and Brazil	127
Figure 7: Proportions of news frames in the HS's coverage of South Africa and Brazil	127
Figure 8: Share of positive dimensions within frames in the NYT coverage of South Africa and Brazil	132
Figure 9: Share of positive dimensions within frames in HS's coverage of South Africa and Brazil	132
Figure 10: Proportions of symbolic violence toward the Southern political fields in the NYT	135
Figure 11: Proportions of symbolic violence toward the Southern political fields in HS	135
Figure 12: Symbolic violence toward the Brazilian political field in the NYT's spying coverage	175
Figure 13: Symbolic violence toward the American political field in the NYT's spying coverage	175
Figure 14: Relative volume of South African political subfields in the NYT and HS	216
Figure 15: Relative volume of Brazilian political subfields in the NYT and HS	216
Figure 16: Relative volume of South African NGOS and individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds in the NYT and HS	240
Figure 17: Relative volume of Brazilian NGOs and individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds in the NYT and HS.	240
Figure 18: Relative volume of South African academic subfields in the NYT and HS	251
Figure 19: Relative volume of Brazilian academic subfields in the NYT and HS	251
Figure 20: Relative volume of South African journalistic subfields in the NYT and HS	260
Figure 21: Relative volume of Brazilian journalistic subfields in the NYT and HS	260

## Foreword

This research project got its initial spark in Madrid, at the Finnish Ibero-American Cultural and Academic Institute, where I spent 12 months working as an intern in the years 2008–2009. Due to my passion for journalism, I was very excited when the Institute’s director, Professor Martti Pärssinen, asked me to produce press releases and online articles for his multidisciplinary research project focusing on the so-called geoglyphs, that is, massive pre-Columbian earthworks, of Western Amazonia.<sup>a</sup> Given the way that these earthworks revolutionized ideas about the region’s distant past, suggesting that Amazonia had, in fact, been home to complex societies prior to European conquest, the discovery soon became the object of global media attention.

As part of the Amazonia project, I generated reports from the combined perspectives of archaeology, anthropology, sociology, history, biology, and geography. The principle of multidisciplinary is that each field has its own particular logic, which needs to be developed fully, before uniting the results of any given field with those from other fields. For instance, history, archaeology, and anthropology tend to measure time in different ways – it is only through applying the methods of these fields separately, and then combining the results from each field in the end, that one can perceive the multifaceted nature of different societal, cultural, and environmental developments in Western Amazonia. But my background in Latin American Studies had also introduced me to interdisciplinarity, which brings diverse disciplines together already during the research process, creating a broader framework from the outset. Inspired by these approaches, I found myself wondering how and to what extent different viewpoints can be combined in the news.

What fascinates me about multi- and interdisciplinarity is the constant awareness of the limits of our own knowledge; the willingness to reach beyond our comfort zones and learn from others. I thought that news should have a similar function: when reading a newspaper or watching a newscast, we become aware (or at least, we should become aware) of things we did not previously know, and that we did not even know that we needed to know. As I was creating press releases at the Madrid Institute, I was not writing them for experts with an interest in Amazonia – what I had in mind was a large general audience that had subscribed to a newspaper, exposing themselves to the unexpected, while sipping their morning coffee. But I was also curious about how I could create a slightly different vision of the realities in focus by means of introducing diverse perspectives in different proportions, so as to also surprise people who were already familiar with the discovery.

---

<sup>a</sup> See Pärssinen et al. 2009.

In 2009, I became a columnist for *Zona de Obras*, an Ibero-American magazine that explicitly defines itself as “multidisciplinary”: each issue offers a profound view on the cultural scene of a particular Latin American city, in addition to containing art reviews and other genre pieces that mix and mingle many different perspectives. Taken together, the various issues present a highly complex view of Latin American cultural phenomena. This working experience had a substantial impact on me and my doctoral project. First of all, my engagement with *Zona de Obras* led me to discover a connection between academic disciplines and news frames: both provide limited views on the world. Just as researchers engaged in multi- and interdisciplinarity combine different disciplines to understand complex phenomena, *Zona de Obras* was combining various frameworks so that its audiences could comprehend Ibero-American cultures in a more multifaceted way. I became intrigued by the idea of creating a method to measure the quantity as well as the relative breadth of frames in news over time.

Despite the many possibilities provided by multi- and interdisciplinarity, my experiences and related readings suggest that these approaches usually entail a struggle, too. In academia, it is regrettably all too common to claim knowledge of a particular discipline without really making an effort to understand the concepts, methods, and theories developed in that particular field or creating connections with specialists in that area. Higher-education specialists have lamented the fact that scholars often tend to promote their viewpoints over those of others as a way to boost their own academic superiority, while belittling the abilities of others.<sup>b</sup> Likewise, media scholars have emphasized that frame analysis should essentially be concerned with questions of power.<sup>c</sup> I began to realize that, next to measuring the breadth of frames and their various combinations, it would be just as important to understand *who* had framed what, on whose behalf, and how voluminously.

Thus, at this point it was clear to me that I wanted to create a method to measure the size of frames and the volume of voices in the news and explore the connections between them. However, I still had to decide what kinds of empirical materials I would work on to elaborate such a method. My decision to examine news related to countries of the “Global South,” produced in countries that have been deemed as forming part of the so-called “First World,” was also crucially shaped by my working experience at the Madrid Institute. In addition to my Amazonia-related reporting duties, I was responsible for managing a cultural exchange project between the Finnish government and the City of Cádiz, promoting the exhibition of Andalusian art in Finland, and vice versa. As I was wandering around the narrow streets of Cádiz, the scent of the sea made me imagine how this beautiful, ancient city had been centuries ago, back when it had been one of Columbus’s starting points for

---

<sup>b</sup> See, e.g., Becher and Trowler 2001; Klein 1996.

<sup>c</sup> See, e.g., Carragee and Roefs 2004.

his voyages. Cádiz's proximity to Portugal also exposed me to descriptions concerning the discovery of Brazil. Among these was the letter of Pêro Vaz de Caminha to the King of Portugal in 1500, narrating the early encounters between Europeans and native Brazilians:<sup>d</sup>

They were dark brown and naked, and had no covering for their private parts, and they carried bows and arrows in their hands. They all came determinably towards the boat. Nicolau Coelho made a sign to them to put down their bows, and they put them down. (...) One of them gazed at the Admiral's collar and began to point towards the land and then at the collar as if he wished to tell us that there was gold in the country. And he also looked at a silver candlestick and pointed at the land in the same way, and at the candlestick, as if there was silver there too...

As part of the Latin American Studies program at the University of Helsinki, I had taken several courses on anthropology, which had introduced me to different European descriptions of people in colonized regions around the world. Vaz de Caminha's definition of native Brazilians reminded me, for instance, of Georg Hegel's claim that "what we properly understand as Africa, is the unhistorical, undeveloped spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the World's history."<sup>e</sup> Indeed, early European views were often ethnocentric and racist. But what most troubled me about these accounts was the way that the local people, who were the objects of these definitions, were given *no voice*. Instead, they were framed by Europeans, often in a contemptuous tone, as if they had nothing to say for themselves.

My earlier studies had also familiarized me with the work of Pierre Bourdieu. According to Bourdieu, symbolic power manifests itself as the ability to impose words to describe groups or the institutions that represent them.<sup>f</sup> I suddenly found Bourdieu's ideas eminently valuable for the research project I was developing. Namely, Bourdieu's definition of symbolic power provokes a serious question: To what extent have things changed since Vaz de Caminha's and Hegel's times? Are African and Latin American people now, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, allowed to define themselves with their own words in the news, or do our foreign correspondents – modern versions of the explorers of the past – still impose "First-World" perspectives on them, evaluating their "development" vis-à-vis Western standards of modernity and framing them as backward and primitive? Does the focus continue to be, as in Vaz de Caminha's account, on the vast natural resources of their countries and how they could and should be exploited by outsiders? I gradually realized I wanted to study news concerning countries in those previously colonized and subordinated regions, produced and published in more privileged countries in Europe and North America in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, that is, in a time when the world order is supposedly changing. With the method

---

<sup>d</sup> Vaz de Caminha [1500] 2010.

<sup>e</sup> Hegel [1837] 2001.

<sup>f</sup> Bourdieu 1987.

I was keen on developing, I would measure the extent to which different “Southern” people have the chance to frame their realities vis-à-vis European and North American voices or viewpoints.

In my work at the Madrid Institute, I dealt mostly with the Spanish and Finnish press, but also with the Brazilian and North American press. While engaging with these different media, I kept thinking about the differences between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinarity and the ways in that diverse news frames and voices can and could be combined in the news. My practical experience was that particular media in these countries gave rise to different expectations regarding the press releases and articles I was producing. I started to consider that by systematically comparing media content in different countries, researchers could learn alternative ways of producing coverage on complex issues. I could not be happier about my decision to venture into the path of comparative communication, for the lessons I learned during the process reach far beyond media content, enhancing my understanding about different political systems, education policies, and cultures. This path also introduced me to extremely knowledgeable scholars, whose open-mindedness, humbleness, and kindness have inspired me even more than their ingenious methods and models.

## *Acknowledgments*

During her/his research process, a doctoral candidate goes through many stages and emotions. I can most honestly say that, for quite some time now, the strongest feeling I have had has been that of immense gratitude, for I have been able to count on the support of so many talented and dedicated scholars in Finland as well as in the United States. In addition, I was fortunate to receive generous funding from several foundations. In what follows, I would like to express my gratitude to the people and institutions that made this study possible.

The first person with whom I shared my research idea was Martti Pärssinen, director of the Madrid Institute during my internship there. In 2012, Martti returned to his position as professor at the University of Helsinki, becoming my principal Ph.D. research supervisor. In Madrid, Martti was a demanding boss, and when discussing my research plans, he did not set the bar any lower. At the same time, Martti has always been extremely encouraging, strongly believing in me even at those times when I had lost faith in myself. In this way, Martti has repeatedly pushed me to accomplish tasks far more difficult than I had ever thought I could manage. I am deeply grateful to Martti and his wife, Heli Pärssinen, for all the unfailing support and warmth that have characterized our relationship for over a decade now.

I was absent from the graduation ceremony for my Master's degree in spring of 2011 because I did not want to skip a minute of the workshop on interdisciplinary methods organized by Harri Kettunen, currently an Academy of Finland Research Fellow. Harri is the incarnation of interdisciplinarity, always challenging himself to explore new angles and topics ranging from astronomy and cuisine to DNA research and ancient warfare. It was Harri who first introduced me to the work of Allen Repko, Julie Thompson Klein, and other authors on interdisciplinary theory and methods, leading me to discover the Association for Interdisciplinary Studies. Harri and the connections he spurred me to make have had an immense impact on the way I think about the production of knowledge and how different epistemological limits can be overcome. I greatly appreciate the way Harri has always listened to me and been there for me, and I hope he has not had enough of me yet, for I still need him by my side, in our ongoing pursuit to promote interdisciplinarity in Finland and beyond.

In fall of 2011, Antti Korpisaari became a university lecturer in my department and began attending the doctoral seminars where I was presenting my proposals. Antti is an exceptionally skillful teacher, who has always been able to understand my ideas and help me elaborate upon them further. For the past three years, my office space has been

practically next to Antti's, and he already knows me by the sound of my key lanyard bouncing in the corridor. I am surprised that he does not run and hide when he hears me approaching, for I have bugged him so much, with so many texts and questions that I lost count ages ago. During these years, Antti has also become one of my dearest friends – a person with whom I can share all my hopes and fears, while still being able to rely on that his feedback on my work is completely honest and critical. I am profoundly indebted to Antti for all his help and support, and hopeful that our bond will last far beyond the completion of my doctoral degree.

Antti, Harri, and Martti witnessed my enthusiasm as I came across Professor Rodney Benson's studies on press multiperspectivalness and supported my idea of going to meet him at New York University. By this time, in 2012, Benson's comparative work had been widely recognized around the world, and his calendar was quite full. As I appeared in his office, he could easily have told me – a novice doctoral student – to just leave him alone, or tried to get rid of me as fast as possible. Instead, I received a cordial invitation to attend his seminar that evening, which was the greatest burst of academic energy I had ever experienced. I was very impressed by the way that Professor Benson managed to engage his students in debate and dialogue, while also soundly justifying his own arguments.

The ASLA-Fulbright graduate grant changed my life. I say this, first of all, because it allowed me to spend the academic year of 2013–2014 in New York, working on my dissertation with Rod Benson at NYU. The interdisciplinary and theoretical way in which different texts and related ideas were discussed in his class completely transformed my mindset, making me a more critical reader, a more careful listener, and a braver speaker. As my research supervisor, he would go through my texts with extraordinary dedication and then ask me a series of questions that were always right to the point, helping me realize how I should proceed. Even after leaving New York, I have been able to rely on his valuable advice and feedback. I am simply unable to thank him enough, and I can only hope that he knows how enormously I appreciate all his support and expertise. I would like to extend my thanks to the whole staff of NYU's Department of Media, Culture, and Communication for receiving me and for being so kind to me the entire time that I was there.

When I was not at NYU, I was engaged in diverse Fulbright activities around New York City. This leads to the second, equally important reason why I find that the ASLA-Fulbright grant changed my life: it introduced me to the Fulbright community, people who, in my experience, are most whole-heartedly committed to promoting international understanding, across disciplines and all over the world. Already before I left for New York, the Fulbright Center in Helsinki became something of a breathing space for me – a place where I could discuss my ambitious goals and be taken seriously. I want to express my most sincere thanks especially to Fulbright Finland's Executive Director Terhi Mölsä and Senior



## *Acknowledgments*

Program Manager Karoliina Kokko for their continuous support and the highly important work that they are doing.

In New York, I want to thank the staff at One To World and especially Executive Director Jen Clarke as well as Deborah Clifford, Shannon Cobran, Giselle Diez, Asya Dinets, Becca Freeman, Johanna Goossens, and Marissa Munn for all the Fulbright enrichment programs that made my year so special. Thanks to One To World's programs, I was able to perceive American life from so many perspectives – one day I was leading workshops in public schools, the next day headed to a meeting with business CEOs at Park Avenue. The Fulbright programs significantly improved my communication skills, as I would always find myself surrounded by people I had never met before, with different disciplinary backgrounds, and from different countries. One to World's enthusiastic emails have often made my day back in Helsinki, and during my subsequent trips to New York I have become a regular visitor at the One To World office, which by now feels like home.

I also want to express my gratitude to Silja Sistok at the Institute for International Education for all the encouragement and advice during my Fulbright year. Last but not least, I want to acknowledge the ASLA-Fulbright Alumni Association in Finland and especially its President, Dr. Anna Kronlund, for all the exciting activities and for welcoming me onto its Board as of spring 2017. The chance to continue learning from and connecting with the international Fulbright community truly means the world to me.

I am deeply thankful to the Finnish Cultural Foundation: its three-year grant, which also supported my stay in New York, allowed me to focus on my doctoral research full time, without constantly having to worry about filling in new applications. I also appreciate the grants from the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation and the University of Helsinki, which have enabled my many travels and the completion of my dissertation.

After returning from New York to Helsinki, I was fortunate to meet Outi Hakola, currently an Academy of Finland Research Fellow, who soon volunteered to become my research advisor as well. Her multifaceted expertise on North America from the perspectives of media studies and area and cultural studies has truly helped me, as I have been trying to combine these approaches in my work. What is more, I admire her strength of mind and determination, as she has helped me convert some vague but important ideas into concrete plans, which will hopefully become a reality in the near future. Needless to say, I am very grateful to Outi and most eagerly looking forward to further cooperation with her.

Lars-Folke Landgrén, director of the Department of World Cultures, has always provided his steady support to me, for which I am very grateful. I also want to thank Professor Jussi Pakkasvirta for his encouraging comments throughout my research process and for strengthening the role of media-related research at our department.

## *Acknowledgments*

I owe special thanks to all my peers, who have commented on my papers at the Department of World Cultures and elsewhere. During our postgraduate seminars, I have gained so much from the positive energy and thoughtful feedback of Dr. Sarri Vuorisalo-Tiitinen. I especially want to thank Ave Ungro, who would consistently travel to our seminars all the way from Tallinn, Estonia. Ave also kindly offered to test my coding manual, a process which was very helpful to me. I truly cherish her company and her insightful comments, time after time. Thanks also to Dr. Pirjo Kristiina Virtanen for all the fascinating conversations which have often continued towards the small hours.

My understanding of South Africa and Brazil has been remarkably enriched by a few colleagues, to whom I am grateful. In Helsinki, I have had the pleasure to become friends with Dr. Leonardo Custódio, a specialist on Brazilian community media, who has become something of a mentor to me. Leo has generously devoted time to reading my papers, coming up with great questions and comments. The most important lessons I have learned about inequality in Brazil have been taught by Leo. In New York, my Fulbright fellows, Ana Paula Bianconcini and Christian Schallenmuller, would frequently invite me to their Brazilian get-togethers, which taught me a great deal about soccer and politics in the country. Ana and I soon became part of the regular audience at the Somethin' Jazz Club, and later at the Lincoln Center, as we were dying to hear more of Vuyo Sotashe, the immensely talented South African singer and Fulbrighter with whom we also became close friends. When Nelson Mandela passed away in December 2013, Vuyo devoted his concert to Mandela, marking my soul with his voice. I believe that was the night when I really began to understand how much pain his people have gone through.

The Association for Interdisciplinary Studies (AIS) has already been mentioned, but it deserves to be mentioned again, for this organization has lifted my spirits in a way I cannot even put to words. I especially want to thank Professor Steve Freeland, Professor Paul Hirsch, Dr. Valerie Imbruce, Professor Machiel Keestra, Professor Julie Thompson Klein, Dr. Noah Millman, Professor Werner Schäfer, Professor Heidi Upton, Professor Peter Wakefield, and last but not least, the AIS's President, Professor James Welch, for the warm reception to this unique research community and the stimulating feedback on my work.

I am of course very grateful to my pre-examiners, Professor Daniel Hallin from the University of California and Adjunct Professor Turo Uskali from the University of Jyväskylä, for taking the time and making the effort to read my work so thoroughly and for offering such insightful comments and critiques. I am especially indebted to Professor Hallin for his willingness to travel all the way from San Diego to my doctoral defense in Helsinki. I want to thank Professor Henry Bacon for acting as the faculty representative in my dissertation committee, and Dr. Erik Hieta for the dedicated English language revision of my dissertation – any remaining errors are my own. I also appreciate all the friendly advice by Jutta Kajander and Anniina Sjöblom at the postgraduate student services.

## *Acknowledgments*

In addition, a number of people have commented on my work or provided other kinds of support at one stage or another of my research. I would like to express my gratitude to Mika Aaltola, Marko Ampuja, Rani-Henrik Andersson, Beata Anton, Maria Colliander, Malte Gasche, Marjaana Hakala, Benita Heiskanen, Markku Henriksson, Karina Horsti, Minna, Sanna, Marja-Liisa, and Warren Howell, Kari Karppinen, Saara Kekki, Ullamaija Kivikuru, Anna-Leena Korpijärvi, Auli Leskinen, Mark C. Miller, Tuomo Mörrä, Laura Noreila, Ramon Oris, Hanna-Maija Pääkkönen, Mervi Pantti, Elina Piki, Elena Piñero, Saara Rautanen-Uunila, Tanja Riikonen, Mikko Saikku, Charly Saloniemi-Pasternak, Rubén Scaramuzzino, Patrick Stetter, Johanna Sumiala, Teivo Teivainen, Carlos and Tanja Tejada, Ari Torttila, Vesa Tuominen, Esa Väliaverronen, Ville Virtanen, Merle Wessel, Mikael Wigell, and Barbie Zelizer.

Finally, I want to express all my love to my husband Carlos, who has miraculously put up with me since we first met during my exchange year in the Dominican Republic in 1999. Ten years later, it became three of us, as we had a beautiful daughter, Natalia. Her endless curiosity and incredible social skills have taught me more than I believe I have been able to teach her, and her sweetness, generosity, and remarkable patience remind me of her father. Warm thanks also to my mother Seija Tuominen for dedicating so much time to Natalia around my deadlines, and to my Dominican family – Mami Fella, Papi Luis, Luchi, Katherine, José, and Edwig – for always having received me and treated me with so much affection. Without the support and persistence of my beloved family, this dissertation would not have been completed.



---

## 1. Introduction: Proportions of Perspectives in Northern News on the South

---

“Crisis? What crisis?,” Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva marveled in 2008, as the American economy contracted and Wall Street mourned the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers, one of North America’s most prominent investment banks. “Ask Bush,” Lula jeered, “it’s his crisis!” Later, in March 2009, President da Silva declared that the global financial crisis of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century had been caused “by no black man or woman or by no indigenous person or by no poor person.” Instead, he argued, the collapse of the world economy had been “fostered by the irrational behavior of some people that are white, blue-eyed” (Wigell 2011, 5). In September 2009, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury publicly thanked Brazil for helping to lead the world out of recession (Rohter 2012, 160).

Following the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Brazil and other countries in the so-called “Global South”<sup>1</sup> started becoming increasingly confident about their ability to challenge the traditional leadership of the United States of America and the European Union, and to show the way to tackle major social and economic problems around the world. This shift in global power was reflected in the formation of the BRICS group, involving the large emerging market economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.<sup>2</sup> In 2003, Brazil, India, and South Africa created the IBSA Dialogue Forum in order to develop “Southern approaches” to global issues and strengthen multilateralism (see, e.g., Laidi 2011, 3; Wigell 2011, 4). The newfound capability of these nations also led to their selection as hosts for major international sports events: South Africa was the first African country to host the soccer World Cup in 2010, while Brazil hosted the soccer World Cup in 2014 and was the first South American country to organize the Summer Olympics two years later.

---

<sup>1</sup> The term “Global South” refers to the nations of Africa, Latin America, and most of Asia; see, for instance, Kaltmeier 2015, 10.

<sup>2</sup> The name “BRICS” is formed out of the initial letters of each country involved: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The term “BRIC” was originally coined by Goldman Sachs investment banker Jim O’Neill to refer to “developing” countries that seemed to be experiencing similar kinds of economic development (see O’Neill 2001). Following a summit of Brazilian, Russian, Indian, and Chinese leaders in 2009, BRIC became a formal institution in 2010; South Africa was soon invited to join as the fifth member. Even though South Africa was Africa’s largest economy at the time, it is small compared with the other BRIC countries. South Africa’s inclusion has been deemed, above all, as a geopolitical strategy, as it offers vast opportunities for boosting BRICS’s influence on the African continent (see Papa 2013, 3).

Most North American and European citizens form their perceptions of the Global South from *world news*. The soccer World Cup is the most followed sports event in the world; thus, plenty of peak media attention (Benson 2013, 10) was focused on South Africa and Brazil in 2010 and 2014.<sup>3</sup> My research examines American and Finnish print and online news articles concerning South Africa and Brazil as the two countries were preparing for the World Cup. However, my focus is not on news related to sports, but rather, on *society*; my interest is news coverage on the transformation of these countries as they embraced the challenge of hosting the world's most popular soccer spectacle amid their important new responsibilities in global politics.

In the words of Bryant Edward Harden (2014, 14, italics added), “the BRICS stand united in their unequivocal challenge to Western hegemony as they *demand a greater voice*.” The main contribution of my research is the creation of a methodology to measure the *proportions* of South African and Brazilian (that is, “Southern”) perspectives vis-à-vis American/Finnish (that is, “Northern”) perspectives in American and Finnish world news articles. By perspectives, I mean *news frames* and the voices of individuals affiliated with a range of political, economic, and cultural institutions, that is, *institutional fields*, quoted or paraphrased in the news. By “Southern,” I also mean voices and views expressed by other countries in the Global South – Africa, Latin America, and most of Asia; regions that were previously colonized and, subsequently, symbolically subordinated by European nations and the United States and generally categorized as comprising “the developing world.” By “Northern,” I also refer to other countries in Western Europe as well as Canada, quoted or paraphrased in American and Finnish news articles related to South Africa and Brazil.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> According to *The Economist* magazine, “nearly half of humanity” was expected to watch at least part of the World Cup in Brazil in 2014. Article “Beautiful Game, Dirty Business,” June 7, 2014.

<sup>4</sup> Many scholars have opted for the term “Western” rather than “Northern.” For instance, Harden (2014, 3) defines the “West” as “individual states in Western Europe, Northern America, and Western-dominated multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The West is referred to as a collection of states and organizations that is often perceived as being hegemonic by dominating the global agenda.” While my term “North” encompasses practically the same countries as Harden’s term “West,” I see the “West” as an ambiguous term for the purposes of the present study. For instance, Reid (2014, 242–243) points out that “Brazil’s elites have traditionally seen themselves as part of the West in cultural and religious terms, and the country has a strong tradition of Western ideas about international law and society.” But he also points out (*ibid.*) that “Brazil has been shaped by the legacy of colonialism, slavery and poverty by the imperatives of development.” Thus, I find that “Southern” is a clearer concept, which I employ to refer to both the geographical and the ideological positions of South Africa and Brazil; ideological in the sense that they have been colonized and are currently challenging their former oppressors. I only use the term “Western” when I refer to the work of other scholars (for example, in Harden’s quote in the second paragraph on this page). Mexico is often seen as part of North America, but in this study it is conceptualized as a “Southern” country that is a part of Latin America.

In other words, my work assesses the relative *breadth* of frames and the relative *volume* of voices in Northern news stories on the South. This is done by counting the number of words pertaining to each frame and field at the paragraph level and proportioning their sum to the overall article length and total quoting space. My method also captures the relative *tone* of frames: the extent to which the news coverage is positive or negative in character. My research thus takes on the challenge proposed by Rodney Benson (2009, 416, *italics added*): “Future research should examine the links between multiperspectival news and rational/critical qualities of discourse, that is, not only who speaks and what aspects of an issue they raise, but *how* the speak, including *comprehensiveness* or *depth* of argumentation or critical tone.”

Kevin Carragee and Wim Roefs (2004, 214) have lamented the fact that “a number of trends in framing research have neglected the relationship between media frames and broader issues of political and social power.” In my work, such a relationship is considered by also investigating *who* the journalists and the different quoted Northern and Southern sources are framing, in what tone, and how extensively. That is to say, next to measuring how voluminously each institution has the chance to speak in the news, and the angles from which they express themselves, I also examine the extent to which Southern and Northern institutions are the *objects* of positive and/or negative framing via other fields involved. Field analysis builds on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who has argued that “what is at stake in symbolic struggles is the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world and its divisions (...) that is, essentially, power over words used to describe groups or the institutions which represent them” (Bourdieu 1987, 13). Elaborating on Bourdieu’s (1987, 13–14; 2005, 31) ideas about symbolic violence and domination, I examine what the proportions of perspectives reveal about power relations between the countries and institutions involved.

Previous studies have emphasized that the view portrayed by global world news is “exaggeratedly Western,”<sup>5</sup> and that the perspectives used are mainly North American or European (Uskali 2007, 19); “the forgotten stories” and “the voiceless” include “the Global South, the underprivileged, the subaltern, the underdog, and the disenfranchised” (see Figenschou 2010, 86). Scholars have also claimed that news concerning “the developing world” is “overwhelmingly negative,” and merely focuses on violence, conflicts, and suffering (see, e.g., Hess 1996, 28–59; Pietiläinen 1998, 104–106; Uskali 2007, 9–12). Thus, previous research would suggest that North American and European institutions do most of the framing on behalf of the Southern institutions involved, and this framing is highly negative in nature.

---

<sup>5</sup> See the definition of “Western” and its usage in the present study in footnote 4.

However, given the ways that South Africa and Brazil have striven for a louder voice in international forums, and that many of their pursuits in global politics have also been acknowledged by European and North American institutions,<sup>6</sup> my research is open to the possibility that the voices of South African and Brazilian institutions may be equally loud or even more voluminous than voices representing the Northern institutions in American and Finnish news. By identifying perspectives at the manifest level, rather than searching for latent meanings, and by measuring proportions in a concrete way by counting words, I pursue an approach that is both *transparent* and *reliable* (see Benson 2013, 5). In other words, rather than aiming to confirm the general assumption that Southern voices are silenced in Northern news, my systematic study should be able to reveal whether Northern world news actually reflects the *transformation* of North–South relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The United States and Finland are in very different geopolitical positions with respect to Brazil and South Africa, and to BRICS and the “Global South” in general. The U.S. is the super power, the hegemony of which is being explicitly challenged by these emerging powers (Harden 2014, 1–6). Mihaela Papa (2013, 3) argues that the U.S. is not likely to consent to the demands of the BRICS countries or to other Southern coalitions because it does not want to lose its unique super power status. Finland, on the other hand, is a relatively small player in international politics, at least if compared with the United States (Juutinen and Käkönen 2016, 266). While the European Union as a whole is a powerful institution, Finland has a much more limited representation within the EU than nations such as France or Germany.<sup>7</sup> My comparison of American and Finnish news explores whether the central position of the United States is reflected in a greater dominance of North American/European voices in American news than in Finnish news, given Finland’s more neutral and marginal role in global politics.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> See, for instance, the example provided in the first paragraph on page 1: the U.S. Secretary of State thanking Brazil for helping to pull the world out of recession.

<sup>7</sup> Currently, in 2017, Finland has 13 members in the European Parliament, while, for instance, France has 72, Germany 96, Italy 72, and Sweden 18. Finland has held the revolving presidency of the Council of the EU twice, in 1999 and 2006; the next time will be in 2019. See: [http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/finland\\_en](http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/finland_en).

<sup>8</sup> When referring to the central geopolitical position of the U.S., I also apply the term “hegemony,” as this term has been used by many of the scholars cited in this work (e.g., Harden 2014; Juutinen and Käkönen 2016). However, it is not my aim to elaborate upon this term from a theoretical standpoint; rather, my work conceptualizes power through the framework of field theory and the concept of symbolic violence. Still, my work has also been inspired by studies that build on Antonio Gramsci and his theories on hegemony in relation to foreign affairs reporting (especially Hallin 1994, 58–86).



My core sample consists of print and online news articles published in *The New York Times* (NYT) and *Helsingin Sanomat* (HS) between 2006 and 2014. More precisely, I examine South Africa-related coverage published between January 2006 and December 2010, culminating in the 2010 World Cup and its aftermath, and Brazil-related coverage between January 2010 and December 2014, culminating in the 2014 World Cup and its aftermath. The American Liberal media system has been found to promote *internal pluralism*, and the Finnish Democratic Corporatist media system to have tendency for *external pluralism* (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 29). Internal pluralism means that each media outlet promotes a range of diverse viewpoints, whereas in external pluralism a plurality of different viewpoints is achieved at the media system level (see also Benson 2013, 132). Inspired by these claims about internal and external pluralism in news, I also investigated, with a smaller sample, how the perspectives used in the NYT and HS were complemented in news articles produced by other American and Finnish media, such as the websites of the *Cable News Network* (CNN) and the Finnish broadcaster YLE due to their agenda-setting role in foreign news production in the U.S. and Finland,<sup>9</sup> as well as leading business papers such as *The Wall Street Journal* and *Taloussanomat*, and weekly magazines such as *Time* and *Suomen Kuvalehti*.

In a study comparing broadcast and print news in the U.S., Finland, the U.K., and Denmark, James Curran and colleagues (2009, 10–22) found that the Finnish and Danish media systems devote more attention to foreign affairs than the American system. They also found that Finnish and Danish news audiences were much more knowledgeable about foreign news topics than Americans. Their sample was limited to a period of four weeks altogether, published between February and April 2007. While my sample is thematically much narrower (including only news articles on South Africa and Brazil), this more focused sample allows my study to include a longer time span in order to also detect possible temporal *changes* in the coverage. John Maxwell Hamilton and Regina Lawrence (2010, 631) have stated that “we know from a variety of studies that U.S. foreign news, particularly coverage of the developing world, tends to be simplistic, to focus on crisis (...) and to view events through the U.S. policy interests. But most studies do not compare U.S. world news coverage systematically with other countries, and even fewer put foreign news in a temporal/historical context.” With my research, I want to contribute to filling in this gap.

---

<sup>9</sup> As my methodology has been developed to measure perspectives in news *articles*, I have excluded broadcasting. That is, in the case of content produced by CNN and YLE, only online news articles have been coded. Still, I have also analyzed, within the limits and possibilities of my method, the news videos associated with the news articles in my sample. The sampling process is explained in chapter 3.

## Structural Similarities between South Africa and Brazil

While American and Finnish news articles were chosen as the focus of my study because of the *different* geopolitical positions of the U.S. (central) and Finland (marginal) and their different media systems, the decision to examine news coverage on South Africa and Brazil was inspired by the structural *similarities* between these two Southern countries and their geopolitical positions. Such similarities facilitate the comparison of their coverage in the news and the range of diverse perspectives and historical context that we can expect to be included in news related to these countries.

Hosting the World Cup event, and involvement in organizations such as BRICS and IBSA, are only few of the aspects that unite South Africa and Brazil today. Their connections can be traced to a deeper history: Both regions were conquered by Europeans, becoming colonies whose many original inhabitants – those who survived the diseases introduced by the invaders – were subjected to slavery. Scholars have noted how the colonial system gave rise to glaring social imbalances in both regions, a problem that has persisted until today (see, e.g., Goldblatt 2014, xxii; Rohter 2012, 13; Zirin 2014, 156). The social and economic inequality in South Africa culminated in the *apartheid* system, first implemented by the Afrikaner National Party (NP), which assumed power in 1948 (see, e.g., Welsh 2009, 56). Rohter (2012, 65) notes that while there was no official apartheid policy in Brazil, “Brazil’s reality is such that there has never been a need to formalize such exclusions because they are part of an unwritten social code.”

The social divisions in Brazil deepened during the time of the military regime, which seized power in 1964. Both the National Party (NP) government, which implemented the apartheid regime, and the Brazilian military dictatorship, which has been found guilty of serious human rights violations (Reid 2014, 101–103), were initially supported by the U.S. government, which framed these abusive regimes as allies helping to prevent the spread of communism in Africa and Latin America (Meredith 2011, 412; Reid 2014, 97). Among the local groups perceived as “communist threats” were the South African National Congress (ANC) and the Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) parties, both of which were established to fight against inequality in their respective countries. During this time, the U.S.’s dominant position and Finland’s relatively marginal position in global politics were already apparent. In 1959, Finland made a statement in the United Nations concerning South African apartheid and how it violated the Finnish people’s sense of justice. However, the United States and Britain, among other powerful countries, were convinced that no economic sanctions should be imposed upon South Africa, and Finland succumbed to such a position, not pursuing the issue further (Peltola and Soiri 1999, 173).

The governments that really started to change things in South Africa and Brazil seized power in consecutive years, in 1994 and 1995, respectively. First, South Africa made a historical transition to democracy in April of 1994. Nelson Mandela became the first president, followed by Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, all representing the ANC party, which had operated in the underground during the apartheid era. Each successive ANC government has focused on tackling institutionalized racism, inequality, and poverty (see, e.g., Barber 1999, 269–298; May 2010, 5–11). In January of 1995, Fernando Henrique Cardoso became the president of Brazil, representing the Social Democratic Party (PSDB). Cardoso’s “Real Plan” stabilized the Brazilian currency, and the country’s economy began to recover. The main objective of Cardoso’s administration was to make Brazil a fairer country (Reid 2014, 117–140).

In 2003, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the PT party began his first term as the president of Brazil, managing to mitigate poverty while also providing the next generation with the means to an education (Reid 2014, 147). By the end of da Silva’s presidential term, over half of the Brazilian population was regarded as forming part of a “middle class”; by 2010, the middle classes increased by 30 million people (Zibechi 2014, 47). Likewise in South Africa, the size of the middle class has more than doubled between 2004 and 2013.<sup>10</sup> South Africa and Brazil have also become the most important economies in Africa and Latin America, assuming global responsibilities and contributing to peacekeeping operations on their respective continents and beyond (see, e.g., Cook 2013; Reid 2014; Rohrer 2012; Zirin 2014).

But these important accomplishments notwithstanding, major challenges still remain. Both countries still rank among the most unequal in the world.<sup>11</sup> Zirin (2014, 156) notes that in South Africa, the “old system of racist apartheid has been supplanted with economic apartheid, a reality visible throughout the country if you choose to see it.” Likewise, Reid (2014, 181) found that in a 2010 census, some 50 percent of Brazilians defined themselves as black or brown. On average, their income was slightly less than half of that of whites. Most South African cities are still surrounded by vast, high-density informal housing settlements known as townships, which are populated mostly by blacks and coloreds. In

---

<sup>10</sup> Statistics by the Unilever Institute, University of Cape Town, 2013. Available at: <https://www.uct.ac.za/mondaypaper/archives/?id=9565>.

<sup>11</sup> The rankings vary according to the methods and data used in different measurements. The GINI Index by the World Bank depicts a scale in which 0 represents “perfect equality,” while an index of 100 implies complete inequality. Between 2011 and 2013, South Africa’s score was 63.4, Brazil’s 52.9, Finland’s 27.1, and that of the United States 41.1. That is, out of all the countries involved in this study, Finland is clearly ranked as the least unequal and South Africa as the most unequal; the U.S. is more equal than South Africa and Brazil, but much less equal than Finland. See <https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings>.

Brazil also, the poor often reside far from jobs and economic opportunity zones (Custódio 2013).

These inequalities were highlighted in both countries as they were chosen to host the World Cup and began the construction of expensive stadiums and infrastructure for the events, rather than spending billions of dollars on improving the lives of the poor. Optimists would argue that in the long run, the infrastructure projects designed for the World Cup – improving roads and neighborhoods and attracting tourists – would benefit the whole society, including the most marginal sectors. Other voices have criticized the events as an unnecessary expenditure, and the fact that poor people were harshly evicted from their homes to make space for the stadiums. As Dave Zirin says (2014, 9), “the needs of the World Cup and Olympics reveal like nothing else the profoundly different interests of different sectors of Brazilian society.” Later in the book, he makes a similar argument about South Africa as well (*ibid.*, 155–163). It is the relative volume and breadth of these different voices and views, originating in the different sectors of South African and Brazilian societies and promoting profoundly different interests, that I want to capture and measure, vis-à-vis the volume and breadth of diverse American and European perspectives presented in American and Finnish world news.

### Creating Context in the News: Broadening the Windows on the World

In his book *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*, Michael Reid (2014, 10, 23) observes that, “as hundreds of thousands of sports fans from around the world prepare to visit Brazil, first for the World Cup and then for the Olympics, they will encounter a country that is more complicated than meets the casual eye (...) Brazil today is a complex and sophisticated democracy.” Likewise, in their book *Africa’s Moment*, Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Ray (2011, 3) emphasize that “Africa is complex. It has perhaps never been more complex than it is today.” However, a plentitude of news studies have found that Northern media have *failed* to capture complexity in international news. For instance, Jairo Lugo-Ocando (2015, 61) argues that,

[t]he majority of news reports concentrate on economic growth and foreign aid as quick solutions, rather than exploring the underlying reasons why certain countries suffer high unemployment, why so many people are poor and why some parts of the world endure crises such as famines with such frequency. The effects of globalization, the lack of sustainable industries, unfair trade agreements, and the historical legacy of colonial rule, among other root causes, are ignored or mentioned only briefly in many dispatches carried by the Western news media. Instead, the public is fed with simplistic explanations that attribute poverty to “overpopulation,” “corrupt leaders” and “tribal or religious disputes” which fuel wars, while suggesting a lack of Western “values” and the absence of modern “institutions” as a recurrent explanatory framework for those societies in which poverty is rife.

My work focuses on news frames, which serve to simplify complex issues in the news (Nisbet 2010, 47; see also Benson 2013, 4). In the words of James Hertog and Douglas McLeod (2001, 144, 148), “*news frames provide* the widely understood context for understanding new phenomena. When a topic is framed, its context is determined. (...) By categorizing phenomena as ‘in’ the frame, other phenomena are categorized as ‘out.’” Thus, in principle, the solution seems clear: the greater the number of frames, the more complexity the news should be able to reveal. Mauro Porto (2007, 312–318) has found that when people are exposed to multiple news frames, they are able to think about the situations in more multifaceted and original ways.

But here I come back to my original premise – that it is not enough to just measure the number of frames, but rather, it is fundamental to measure their relative *breadth* as well. My concern for the proportions of frames is rooted in Gaye Tuchman’s (1978, 1) classic definition of news as a window onto the world:

Through its frame, Americans learn of themselves and others, of their own institutions, leaders, and life styles, and those of other nations and peoples. (...) But, like any frame that delineates the world, the news frame may be considered problematic. The view through a window depends upon whether the window is large or small, has many panes or few, whether the glass is opaque or clear, whether the window faces a street or a backyard...

My frame analysis has also been inspired by my background in area and cultural studies; that is, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches that combine disciplinary perspectives to provide context for understanding complex phenomena in distant regions (see, e.g., Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta 2007, 105–113). In principle, academic disciplines are not so distinct from news frames. As explained by Joe Moran (2002, 14), “academic disciplines are clearly discursive constructions in that their power relations permit certain ways of thinking while excluding others.”

In multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary studies as well, different “windows” can feature different proportions. For instance, in my Master’s thesis on the structures of myths and power relations among indigenous peoples in Bolivia (Cheas 2010), the anthropology and history windows were wide open. But I was also instructed to peek, from a greater distance, through the shades of the windows provided by archaeology, geography, history, and sociology. In multidisciplinary studies, a scholar may also proceed by looking through several windows one at a time, finally drawing the big picture by carefully describing the view from each of the separate windows. Interdisciplinary studies aim at building large windows, with few or no panes – blending different frameworks, and creating new, broader ones (see, e.g., Repko 2012, 7, 20). Other research projects may feature different proportions of the same disciplines, revealing a different view of the social reality in focus.

Hence, my analysis on frame proportions is ultimately concerned with the relative size of different windows on the world, and how they contribute to the “overall vision” of South Africa and Brazil presented to American and Finnish news consumers. But as has already been emphasized, next to my analysis of the volume of voices and the objects of framing, I also examine *who* contextualizes (that is, frames) what, and *on whose behalf*, and with what tone. For instance, if European politicians are quoted as explaining why the South African government is struggling to fight poverty, they may indeed be providing important background knowledge to the reader, but they are doing so *on behalf of the South African political field*, which may have a very different perspective on the matter and which is then denied the chance to provide its own vision of the social reality it finds itself in. Detecting how realities are imposed upon diverse fields by other fields in Northern news on the South is one of the principal goals of the present study.

### American and Finnish Media Systems and the Potential for Comparative Research

Obviously, the capacity of any medium to capture the complexity of distant realities in its coverage depends on the *resources* available to each medium. The news articles under investigation in this study have been produced during what has commonly been called the *crisis of journalism* (see, e.g., McChesney and Nichols 2010, 7–56; Väliverronen 2009, 13–31), which has especially affected the production of world news (Hamilton 2009, 9). Newspaper subscriptions as well as the revenues gained from advertising have been in constant decline in both the U.S. and Finland throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century (see, e.g., Meikle and Redden 2011, 4; Sauri and Picard 2012, 49); scholars have noted that never in recent history has the field of journalism and newspapers in particular been more threatened (Folkenflik 2011, xv; see also McChesney and Nichols 2010, 11–12). According to NYT journalist David Carr (2011, 14), the year 2009 “was by far the worst in newspaper history.”

Some scholars have found that the consequences of the crisis have been felt more heavily in the American media than in the Finnish media (Väliverronen 2009, 16; see also Nielsen 2013, 399). However, when looking at the two newspapers that form my “core” sample – the NYT and HS – it is clear that the former still has substantially more resources than the latter. While the NYT maintains foreign bureaus in South Africa and Brazil as well as elsewhere in Africa and Latin America, HS has been more dependent on what Hamilton (2009, 468) calls “parachute correspondents; reporters dispatched for short-term assignments, usually to cover major breaking news,” as well as on “local foreign correspondents,” who cover the world from their home countries (in this case, Finland or the United States). For instance, HS only had one “traditional foreign correspondent” (ibid.) in Brazil during the year 2014. This relative lack of access to local sources by HS journalists should be kept in mind as I proceed with my investigation on the proportions of different Southern and Northern perspectives in the Finnish news. That is, Northern

voices and viewpoints could be more voluminous in the Finnish news, used to define realities on behalf of potential Southern sources, simply because Southern views have *not been available* to the journalist.

On the other hand, technology has facilitated access from longer distances as well. Brazilians and South Africans are among the most active users of social media in Latin America and Africa; thus, many potential voices and viewpoints are also available online.<sup>12</sup> South African and Brazilian online sites also include voices by poverty-stricken groups who have discovered community media as a way to promote their interests and needs worldwide (Custódio 2016, 47); during the protests in the summer of 2013, Tweets and Facebook posts by Brazilian citizens were quoted in media all over the world (see Custódio 2013). That is, South African and Brazilian Internet sites promote a range of voices, which American and Finnish journalists could quote or paraphrase in the news, thereby enriching the diversity of the coverage when local voices are not available by “traditional” means (interviewing local people *in situ*). The findings by Curran and colleagues (2009; discussed previously in this chapter) that the Finnish news fosters greater knowledge of international affairs than American news also suggest that greater resources do not necessarily guarantee more multiperspectival or in-depth international coverage.

In contrast to the American media, the Finnish media has previously been conceptualized primarily as a social institution and only secondarily as a private business (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 49). However, following the imposition of the value added tax on Finnish newspapers in 2012, which they were previously exempted from, the Finnish newspaper industry has increasingly been converted into a commercial enterprise, one whose very existence is determined by the revenues gained from subscriptions and advertising.<sup>13</sup> In January 2013, *HS* switched from broadsheet to tabloid format in its attempt to meet changing audience expectations.<sup>14</sup> In other words, part of my *HS* sample – the last two years out of the nine focused on in total, related to the coverage of Brazil<sup>15</sup> – has been published in a much smaller physical size, which may also have had an impact on the number and breadth of perspectives used in the coverage. Given the way that the tabloid format is generally associated with sensationalism and entertainment (see, e.g., Esser 1999; Sparks

---

<sup>12</sup> Statistics from 2015 and 2016 indicate that in 2015, 51.8% of the South African population and 56.8% of the Brazilian population had regular access to the Internet. See: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/484933/internet-user-reach-south-africa/>, <https://www.statista.com/topics/2045/internet-usage-in-brazil/>.

<sup>13</sup> An *HS* article about the impact of value added tax on the Finnish newspaper industry is available at <http://www.hs.fi/aihe/lehtien-alv/>.

<sup>14</sup> An *HS* article about its tabloidization is available at <http://www.hs.fi/talous/art-2000002548263.html>.

<sup>15</sup> As previously mentioned, my South Africa-related sample encompasses coverage published in 2006–2010, while the Brazilian sample encompasses the years 2010–2014; the purpose is to examine coverage ahead of the World Cup and the related preparation.

2000), this transformation may also indicate that *HS* has gradually started becoming more like American commercial newspapers. Already in their original comparison, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 251–259) cautiously predicted a gradual “Americanization” of European media systems. However, in a relatively recent study, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen (2013, 398) found that the Finnish media system, along with some other European systems, has *not* become more like the American model (see also Hallin and Mancini 2017, 162–164; Hellman 2010, 60).

As has been mentioned, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 29–30) have noted that the American Liberal media system is characterized by internal pluralism, whereas the Northern European Democratic Corporatist system is characterized by external pluralism. My contribution to Hallin and Mancini’s comparative analysis on media systems is to explore different kinds of pluralisms inherent in the world news produced and published in these countries, and whether such pluralisms persist throughout the coverage or become more similar over time, possibly in connection with the “tabloidization” of *HS* and increasing commercial pressures on the Finnish media. My measurement of the proportions of perspectives should help reveal the extent to which different forms of pluralism, and the media systems and formats of which they are a product, manage to produce in-depth coverage at an article and overall sample level.

“In-depth” coverage has usually been associated with “sober” and “serious” news, whereas “superficial” coverage has been linked with “sensationalism” and “entertainment” news (see, e.g., Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 95–96). Some frames have also been linked with one or the other; the *Human Interest* frame, for instance, is “a way to personalize the news, dramatize or emotionalize the news, in order to capture and retain audience interest” (ibid.). Many studies have expressed a sense of regret over the increasing “sensationalism” of media content vs. “hard news” stories in Europe, deeming the “sensationalist” frames as less desirable coverage (McNair 2011, 44). However, tabloid forms of coverage as well as sensationalism have also been associated with the potential to attract the attention of previously uninterested citizens and increase their interest in politics and other topics (Benson 2008, 2594).

In my work, the goal is not to define whether the news is “sober,” “serious,” or “sensationalist”; rather, the purpose is to systematically assess the proportions of perspectives – voices and frames – included in news stories, and how these viewpoints are combined to create context for understanding complex realities in the Global South. What is at stake is, first and foremost, the *informational value* of news and the ways in which news coverage can expose readers to a range of diverse viewpoints, deepening and expanding their conceptions of the surrounding world. In this study, the performance of news media is evaluated on the basis of the quantity and breadth of the diverse perspectives included in stories, while taking into account the specific resources with which the news has been



produced. The critical question has to do with the extent to which Northern media contribute to violent forms of communication, thereby allowing specific powerful speakers to define realities on behalf of others. Given the long-standing burden of colonialism, slavery, and the Cold War that the North has imposed on Southern nations and institutions, the high volume of Northern voices imposed upon those voices emerging from the South is examined more critically than the other way around. Still, my study does assess power relations from both perspectives – North to South, and vice versa.

Turo Uskali (2007, 38) has noted that, given the global leadership role of the U.S., it is fundamental that the American media especially would provide a diverse marketplace of thoughts and ideas and that the worldview of the Americans would be as multifaceted as possible. In his view, deficient news coverage can lead to ignorance and, consequently, increasingly selfish behavior on the part of American political and economic elites. On the other hand, Ullamaija Kivikuru (1998, 205) explains that in a peripheral but wealthy nation like Finland, foreign news coverage is a "necessity" (see also Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2009, 79); since Finland is so dependent upon the other, larger nations of the world, such as the United States, the U.S.'s behavior will have an impact on Finland as well.

In other words, both American and Finnish citizens *need* in-depth multiperspectival news coverage. At a practical level, my study contemplates what American and Finnish journalists could learn from each other to be better prepared to meet this challenge and "to make the marriage of commercialism and journalism in the public interest successful" (McChesney and Nichols 2010, 31). As for my methodology of measuring the relative size of frames and the volume of voices, my goal is not only to contribute to an understanding of how context and forms of power relations in American and Finnish coverage on South Africa and Brazil are created, but also to lay the groundwork for an approach that could be elaborated upon when studying other news topics and how other regions are covered by different media in the United States, Finland, and elsewhere.

### Structure of the Present Study

My study consists of nine chapters. Following the present introductory chapter, chapter 2 explores the structural similarities between South Africa and Brazil in more detail, focusing especially on particular phases in South Africa's and Brazil's past that have critically shaped their relations with the rest of the world, and with the United States and Europe/Finland in particular. Chapter 2 also explores the different normative theories of journalism, vis-à-vis a discussion of "Northern responsibility" – the ways in which South Africa and Brazil have been exploited for centuries by more powerful nations, and how this should be taken into account in American and Finnish world news coverage. In chapter 3, I describe the main characteristics of the American and Finnish media systems and traditions and explain

why I find that a comparison of American and Finnish coverage can be particularly fruitful. This chapter also contains a review of previous research and a description of my sampling process.

Chapters 4 and 5 present my methodology for measuring the relative size of frames and the volume of voices, as well as the share of article space wherein diverse fields are the objects of framing. In these chapters, I present my definition of news frames and institutional fields and explain how my frame and field analyses are connected, as a means of examining power relations in the news. Following an overview of previous frame analyses and the specific aspects of my own contribution, chapter 4 introduces the 42 items I created for identifying the positive and negative dimensions of the frames that I found relevant for this study. The institutional fields and how they were identified are presented in chapter 5. My presentation of the actual coding builds on a screenshot illustration, included in chapter 4, which depicts how the proportions of frames, fields, and each field's share of attention with respect to other fields were calculated at the paragraph and article level. Chapters 4 and 5 also I explain how I counted the average size of the frames, the average positivity of the frames, the average volume of voices, and the average share of negative attention regarding each field, and how such calculations allowed me to measure the proportions of symbolic violence at an article as well as overall sample level.

My findings are presented in chapters 6–8. Chapter 6 focuses on the proportions of Northern and Southern perspectives at the core sample level, elaborating on the main differences between American and Finnish forms of news and how these embody distinct forms of symbolic violence. Chapter 6 likewise considers the severity of these forms of symbolic violence in connection with the ideological and cultural distance between the “framers” and their objects. Chapter 6 also discusses the ways in which American and Finnish news stories manage to capture the complexity of the South African and Brazilian realities and how the interplay between the positive and negative dimensions of the various frames is helpful in this endeavor.

Chapter 7 focuses more specifically on the question of context and complexity and the different pluralisms inherent in American and Finnish coverage. In chapter 7, I also elaborate upon the connection between news frames and academic disciplines and explain how multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches can be helpful in creating context in world news; news coverage is examined across different American and Finnish media. While chapter 6 is rather theoretical in nature, chapter 7 adopts a more practical approach, concluding with a number of concrete suggestions on what American and Finnish journalists could learn from each other in order to create more in-depth “multiperspectival” and “interspectival” world news. Chapter 7 also explores the ways in which and the extent to which American and Finnish coverage has changed and become more similar over the time span examined.

Chapter 8, the final findings chapter, “zooms in” on the diverse Southern institutional fields quoted and framed in the American and Finnish news stories studied here and explores in more detail their internal dynamics, that is, *whose* views these fields represent and which particular agents get to impose their views on behalf of the field and/or subfield as a whole.

The study concludes with chapter 9, where I summarize the main findings of the present research project. An important goal of this final chapter is to elaborate upon the lessons learned in the research process, which may serve as practical recommendations for scholars and journalists exploring the possibilities for broadening and deepening diverse viewpoints in news presented in Finland, the U.S., and elsewhere.



---

## 2. From Colonies to Complex Democracies: Historical Trajectories of South Africa and Brazil and Normative Standards for Northern Journalism

---

At first glance, South Africa and Brazil may seem to have little in common. Brazil is a giant – almost the same size as the continental United States – in comparison with South Africa, the territory of which encompasses approximately two times the area of Texas (see Cook 2013, 3). While both countries have recently been defined as leaders of their respective continents, promoting similar goals and claims as members of BRICS and the IBSA Dialogue Forum, among other groupings (e.g., Juutinen and Käkönen 2016, 99; Laidi 2011, 1), the circumstances and pathways that have led these nations to their current situations differ in a number of ways. But there are also a great many structural similarities between the two countries, which, I argue, make their coverage particularly suitable for a study on multiperspectivalness in Northern news on the South.

This chapter aims to shed light on the structural similarities between South Africa and Brazil by examining their historical formation. My research builds on field analysis, and as Rodney Benson (2005, 87) has noted, “field dynamics can only be understood in relation to concrete historical circumstances.” However, it is not my intention to provide a comprehensive, detailed review of the two countries’ histories, as this would be an impossible task within the scope of this dissertation. Rather, this chapter focuses on particular phases in South Africa’s and Brazil’s pasts that have crucially shaped their relations with the rest of the world, Europe and the U.S. in particular. I begin this chapter with an account of the initial encounters with European powers and then proceed to more recent times. I conclude with some thoughts on normative theories about the press and specific expectations for Northern coverage of the persistent problems and the new possibilities emerging in these two Southern nations.

### Conquest, Colonialism, and the Formation of Unequal Societies

Long before discovering the Americas in 1492, Europeans had first arrived in Africa, looking for a variety of goods, gold in particular. In 1488, the Portuguese navigator Bartolomeu Dias sailed around the southern tip of Africa, paving the way for Vasco da Gama’s journey to India a decade later. Crossing the Atlantic in 1500, the Portuguese became infatuated with a certain beautiful tree, which grew in abundance along the northeastern coast of South America. They immediately saw the potential for profit in this

natural resource they called *brasil*.<sup>16</sup> The country's name thus came to symbolize great wealth, which, like in Africa, went straight into the pockets of the European colonizers and their white descendants (Rohter 2012, 11; see also Fausto 1999, 9–10).<sup>17</sup>

Currently, after centuries of exploitation, brazilwood has been listed as an endangered species.<sup>18</sup> Even less remains of Brazil's indigenous people: aside from being subjected to slavery, epidemics such as measles, tuberculosis, and influenza took a heavy toll, resulting in what has been called the genocide of the Amerindians (Fausto 1999, 17; Hawthorne 2010, 32–34; Reid 2014, 33). Already during their very first encounter, the Portuguese imposed their own world views and religion on the local inhabitants rather than making serious efforts to understand their cultures and traditions. As expressed by Pêro Vaz de Caminha ([1500] 2010, 9) in his letter to the King of Portugal, “they seem to be such innocent people that if we could understand their speech and they could ours, they would immediately become Christians (...) Any stamp we wish may be easily printed on them.” This initial friendliness soon turned to hostility, and by 1550, the Brazilian Indians were mostly being dismissed as devils by Europeans (Reid 2014, 32).

The Portuguese were not the only Europeans who ended up in the region that is today known as Brazil. The precious wood also tempted the French, who proceeded to trade directly with the indigenous peoples on the coast. In 1555, France sent 600 immigrants to the area in an effort to expand its role in the Americas. Twelve years later, the Portuguese managed to evict the French, founding the city of Rio de Janeiro on the site of the previous French settlement (Valtonen 2001, 149). But more immigrants began to arrive from other European countries. In 1630, an expedition of 7000 Dutchmen landed in Pernambuco on the northern coast, from where they began to expand their influence, while also intensifying the cultivation of sugar cane. Like the Portuguese, the Dutch relied on slave labor and, due to the scarcity of local people, more and more slaves were brought to Brazil from central Africa (see, e.g., Hawthorne 2010, 1).<sup>19</sup>

In addition to their sugar enterprise in Brazil, the Dutch were also anxious to gain profits from spices grown in the territories they had conquered and colonized in the East. In 1652, approximately 90 Dutchmen landed in Southern Africa. This Dutch colony, which would eventually develop into Cape Town, originally consisted of a fort surrounded by gardens and was created as a stopping place en route to Indonesia – the intention was to load the ships with fresh foodstuffs at the Cape. When the native Africans refused to collaborate

---

<sup>16</sup> Brazilwood was turned into crimson powder, used to color luxury fabrics such as velvet (see Rohter 2012, 11).

<sup>17</sup> See also the article “History, Slavery, and Early Colonization in South Africa,” available at: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-slavery-and-early-colonisation-south-africa>.

<sup>18</sup> See: <http://globaltrees.org/threatened-trees/trees/pau-brasil/>.

<sup>19</sup> However, the Dutch ceded Pernambuco to the Portuguese in 1662 (Valtonen 2001, 152).

with them, the Dutch decided to take both the land and the people by force, thus imposing a model of slavery and forced labor upon the native Southern Africans as well. Within 50 years of the establishment of the first Dutch settlement, the indigenous communities near Table Bay lost their lands as well as their traditional, independent means of existence.<sup>20</sup>

As in Brazil, the contributions of the local people at the Cape was not considered enough to satisfy the increasing needs of the Europeans, and thus, Europeans gradually began bringing in slaves from other regions. The first laborers imported to the Cape Colony in 1658 were originally from Angola, captured by the Dutch from a Portuguese ship that was transporting the slaves to the sugar fields in Brazil.<sup>21</sup> Later, the Brazilian sugar boom gave way to a mining boom. In the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, gold, diamonds, and emeralds were found in the area of what would become the state of Minas Gerais, followed by more discoveries in southern Bahía, Mato Grosso, and Goiás (Reid 2014, 48). Attracted by these riches, hundreds of thousands of Portuguese rushed to Brazil to benefit from the minerals. In Dave Zirin's words (2014, 42), "in the diamond and gold mines, under threat of whipping, torture, or death, slaves worked the mines until they died where they stood. This created a greater demand for slave labor, increasing a slave trade that resembled meat grinder..."

Even if the Cape initially served mainly as a way station, the colony kept growing in numbers. Many of the Dutch and German officials who retired from the services of the Dutch East Indian Company established themselves as independent farmers at the Cape. In 1688, a group of French Protestants settled in the area. These Dutch, German, and French people and their descendants are regarded as the earliest ancestors of the Afrikaner nation (Welsh 2009, 1). The term "Boer" refers specifically to farmers with a Dutch, German, and/or French background; some of them moved inland, colliding with the local Khoisan people. As expressed by Annika Teppo (2004, 26), "[w]ith their superior weapons, the Europeans soon decimated the Khoisan. The survivors were left with no option but to work for Europeans who used them for labor and sex." These interracial unions led to the creation of what is currently known as the South African "colored" population (ibid.). Many Boers also imported slaves to satisfy their need for laborers on their newly established farms (ibid., 25).

That is, the regions today known as South Africa and Brazil were conquered and colonized by the Europeans, and the exploitation of local people was accompanied by the increasing importation of slaves from other regions. This has had an enormous impact on the demographics and formation of social inequalities in both countries. Hawthorne (2010, 1) notes that before 1820, roughly three quarters of all the people arriving in the Americas

---

<sup>20</sup> See the article "Slavery in South Africa," available at <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/slavery-south-africa>.

<sup>21</sup> See the article "Slavery and Early Colonization in South Africa," available at: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-slavery-and-early-colonisation-south-africa>.

hailed from Africa. Out of approximately 12.5 million African slaves who were shipped to the Americas, almost 4.9 million ended up in Brazil (*ibid.*; see also Meade 2010, 33–34). The Cape Colony received altogether some 60,000 slaves from other parts of Africa as well as from Indonesia and other Eastern colonies. Even if this number of slaves was modest in comparison with the colonies in Brazil, the slave population soon outnumbered the Dutch colonial population in South Africa by three to one.<sup>22</sup>

In 1795, the British invaded the Cape Colony, positioning themselves against the Dutch, who were allied with Napoleon. In 1807, the British government banned the slave trade in all of its colonies, the Cape included.<sup>23</sup> However, this did not bring about any significant change in the attitudes toward the people who had formerly been slaves. The Boers felt alienated by British liberalism and began withdrawing further towards the North. When the territory of Natal was also annexed by the British in 1843, the Boers headed further inland and formed several states, the more long-lasting of which proved to be the Orange Free State and the South African Republic, also known as Transvaal (Teppo 2004, 27). These new nations were structured along the lines of racial boundaries: the blacks and “coloreds” did not have similar rights as the Boers. But it has also been noted that Natal provided a model for the apartheid policy of later years: urban residence was strictly controlled, and political rights were extended to whites only. In the Cape Colony, a non-racial franchise was established, but the right to vote was still based on property and income qualifications, practically excluding most black people (Edgecombe 1978, 22).

Similar attitudes persisted in Brazil: black people were not extended voting rights or have the rights to an education. Zirin (2014, 43) explains that,

the Portuguese court (...) saw Brazil’s riches in the same way as the oligarchs saw African slaves: as disposable, irrelevant, and replaceable. This practice had terrible long-term effects on the country’s development. (...) Deliberately stopping Brazil from industrializing ensured that European industry would reign supreme and Brazil would be used almost exclusively as a source of raw material. This also meant that issues like education went unaddressed. Fear of a non-white majority and the absence of the need for an educated workforce meant that schooling was not on anyone’s agenda. (...) Because of this dynamic Brazil was, as Galeano<sup>24</sup> put it, “inexorably condemned to poverty so that foreigners might progress.”

Schools and other institutions were founded in Brazil only at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the Portuguese court was forced to relocate to Rio de Janeiro, following Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal. King Dom João also opened Brazil’s ports to all friendly

---

<sup>22</sup> See the article “Slavery in South Africa,” available at <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/slavery-south-africa>.

<sup>23</sup> See the article “Slavery and Early Colonization in South Africa,” <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-slavery-and-early-colonisation-south-africa>.

<sup>24</sup> Zirin refers to Eduardo Galeano, a Uruguayan journalist, writer, and novelist.



nations and ended the Portuguese market monopoly. The Portuguese court returned to Lisbon in 1821, but the King's son, Dom Pedro, was left behind in Brazil. He was advised that, if the Brazilians were to claim independence from Portugal, Dom Pedro should consent and become the ruler rather than "lose everything" (Valtonen 2001, 160; see also Zirin 2014:46). In other words, the Portuguese were seeking to maintain control of their colony even if it were to become formally independent. September 7, 1822 became Brazil's Independence Day, and later in December, Pedro was crowned as Brazil's constitutional ruler.

The United States was the first country to officially recognize Brazil's independence, a country which had gained its own independence only some fifty years earlier. Brazil kept growing under the smooth-running government of Pedro II, Dom Pedro's son, until 1889, when the country was declared a federal republic. The new Constitution of Brazil was based on the model provided by the American Constitution, where the different states had their own legislative bodies and where the power of the president was balanced by that of a bicameral Congress. As in the case of South Africa, it was the British who campaigned vehemently to outlaw the slave trade in Brazil (Rohter 2012, 21), and in May 1888, Brazil became the last country in the world to formally abolish slavery (Zirin 2014, 50).

Still, even after slavery was abolished, Brazil remained highly stratified. Pekka Valtonen (2001, 621) describes how, by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, "two different Brazils" had emerged: one was developing, rich, modernizing, and urban; the other was traditional, poor, religious, and peasant. Following the way in which the Portuguese crown had exercised power through a highly bureaucratic machinery, providing select merchants and landowners with privileges and monopolies, an independent Brazil, which inherited these structures, found it difficult to achieve uniform economic development, the practice of democracy, and social justice. Private interests continued to trump the public good, and the circumvention of law was common practice for those in privileged positions (Goldblatt 2014, xxii). As expressed by Reid (2014, 10–11), "the forcible import of millions of African slaves marked Brazil's society and its politics indelibly, and is the single most important explanation for its continuing social inequalities."

The formation of a formally independent and united South African nation took longer, and it followed a different path, but one with a similar outcome as in Brazil: poverty, inequality, and the lack of social justice were deeply rooted in the country from the outset. In 1869, diamonds were discovered in Kimberley, and gold was found in Transvaal; thus, the British decided to annex the Boer republics into their colony. This led to a rebellion, known as the first Anglo-Boer War. The Boers' won, thus expanding their nation, called the South African Republic (ZAR).<sup>25</sup> Following the discovery of gold in Witwatersrand, the

---

<sup>25</sup> Original in Afrikaans: Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek.

British attacked the ZAR, again wanting to annex the regions with gold veins and make them a part of their own territory. This marked the beginning of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1899, which, in turn, ended in the defeat of the Boers (Teppo 2004, 27; Welsh 2009, 2).

In the South African mines, black people did most of the actual work, digging and extracting the gold and diamonds under difficult circumstances. In addition, 15,000 blacks were turned into combatants, ordered to fight together with the British in the war. The British also destroyed the farms owned by the Boers – where many black people made their living.<sup>26</sup> All of the residents of these farms were forced into concentration camps, where approximately 26,000 people, mostly children, lost their lives (Teppo 2004, 27; Welsh 2009, 2). Still, most black people willingly offered their support to the British, remembering how the British had contributed to the formal abolition of slavery. In other words, they were hoping that, after the war, the British would extend civic rights to black people.<sup>27</sup>

In 1910, the Union of South Africa was created out of the former Cape Colony, Natal, and the Boer republics, and this Union was granted nominal independence by the British Parliament. Contrary to the expectations of the black population, however, the British reconstruction regime aimed at maintaining white leadership and limiting voting rights to whites only (Teppo 2004, 28). In 1931, the Union gained full sovereignty from Britain. While the Anglo-Boer War had also created a group of poor white Boers, since their properties had been destroyed (ibid.), the black population had been poor and underprivileged the whole time, and there was still no improvement in their lives.

### *The 20<sup>th</sup> Century in South Africa: Apartheid, Inequality, and the Cold War*

Regardless of their inferior position in society, black South Africans increasingly strengthened their voices and demanded their rights over the years. Even though most blacks were unable to attend many years of school, and all of the country's best universities were restricted to whites, some black individuals, including Nelson Mandela, were granted exceptional entry into white society, with specific limitations.<sup>28</sup> In 1912, the African

---

<sup>26</sup> See the article "Black Concentration Camps during the Second Anglo-Boer War, available at: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/black-concentration-camps-during-anglo-boer-war-2-1900-1902>.

<sup>27</sup> See the article "Role of Black People in South African War," available at: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/role-black-people-south-african-war>.

<sup>28</sup> Mandela ([1994] 2013, 89) recalls how "at the university, teachers had shied away from topics like racial oppression, lack of opportunities for Africans, and the nest of laws and regulations that subjugate the black man. But in my life in Johannesburg, I confronted these things every day." As for basic education, Mandela writes (ibid., 167): "Either the government took over education for Africans or there would be no education for Africans. African teachers were not permitted to criticize the government or any school authority. It was (...) a way of institutionalizing inferiority."

National Congress (ANC) was founded, becoming the central organization that brought black people together to fight against white domination. The ANC's constitution denounced racialism, its leaders represented diverse tribal groups, and it preached the goal of all Africans being treated as full citizens of South Africa ([Mandela 1994] 2013, 86). In 1921, the Communist Party was founded, making a commitment to promote both the rights of workers and non-racialism (Welsh 2009, 45).<sup>29</sup>

After the Second World War, the National Party (NP), founded in 1914, introduced an even more rigorous approach to racial segregation. In 1948, in alliance with the Afrikaner Party (AP), the NP won the general election. This marked the beginning of the long period known as apartheid. During apartheid, the central government took control of practically every aspect of black people's lives, ranging from access to public facilities and restaurants to the right to use transport, beaches, and educational institutions – "Whites Only" signs appeared around the country (see, e.g., Welsh 2009, 56). Blacks were expelled from white urban areas and were forced to live in townships, which were purposefully made unattractive and without amenities. Their housing was rudimentary, and only a few black people were provided with electricity and adequate plumbing.<sup>30</sup> Blacks were barred by law from skilled work and from forming unions and going on strike (see, e.g., Dowden 2009, 385; Meredith 2011, 416). Restrictions were also imposed on other racial groups – for instance, the people regarded as "coloreds" were denied voting rights in 1956 (Welsh 2009, 95).

To protest against these regulations, the ANC, the South African Indian Congress,<sup>31</sup> the Colored People's Congress,<sup>32</sup> the South African Congress of Trade Unions,<sup>33</sup> and a small

---

<sup>29</sup> See also the article "The History of Separate Development in South Africa," available at: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-separate-development-south-africa>.

<sup>30</sup> Richard Dowden (2009, 381) describes his 1979 visit to one such township, called Winterveld, as follows: "It is as if thousands of people with nothing have come to this place of nothingness and must sit and do nothing until the end of time. A few lucky ones have menial jobs in Pretoria but while whites there wanted their labor, they did not want them living anywhere near the city. Father Mkhathswa and I visit a shack with three rooms that houses a family of fifteen. The latrine is four pieces of battered corrugated iron leaning together three yards from the house."

<sup>31</sup> The South African Indian Congress was established to promote the rights of people who had arrived in South Africa as laborers and to protest against racially discriminatory practices against people with an Indian background (see, e.g., Welsh 2009, 110).

<sup>32</sup> See the article "South African Colored People's Congress," available at: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-african-coloured-people-organisation-sacpo>.

<sup>33</sup> This initial Congress of Trade Unions, known as SACTU (see, e.g., Mandela [1994] 2013, 217, 273), later merged with COSATU, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, in an effort to consolidate the democratic trade union movement and commitment to the principle of "One Country, One Federation, One Union, One Industry." Currently, COSATU forms part of the Tripartite Alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist Party. The document on the fusion of SACTU and COSATU is available at: [http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf\\_files/CoJun90.1727.0588.000.002.Jun1990.8.pdf](http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf_files/CoJun90.1727.0588.000.002.Jun1990.8.pdf).

white congress – the Congress of Democrats<sup>34</sup> – joined forces to create an anti-apartheid movement, called the Congress Alliance.<sup>35</sup> However, there were tensions between these groups, especially between the ANC and the Indian Congress, given the way that black people were oppressed in ways that no other group was. As expressed by Welsh (2009, 112), “Africans were the worst afflicted, and consequently found themselves at the bottom of the racial hierarchy, with Coloreds and Indians constituting intermediate categories.” In 1955, the Congress Alliance gathered in Soweto, creating what became known as “the Freedom Charter,” which pronounced the principles of the struggle. In Mandela’s words ([1994] 2013, 170), the aim of

the Congress of the People was to create a set of principles for the foundation of a new South Africa. Suggestions for a new constitution were to come from the people themselves, and ANC leaders all across the country were authorized to seek ideas in writing from everyone in their area. The charter would be a document born of the people.

Soon after the foundation of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC),<sup>36</sup> which broke away from the Congress Alliance in 1959, all of these political organizations, as well as the Communist Party, were completely banned by the ruling apartheid government. The leaders of these anti-apartheid movements, including Nelson Mandela, who had become director of the ANC’s newly formed military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe,<sup>37</sup> were arrested in 1962, ending up in prison for decades. The national radio and news promoted the NP government’s propaganda, and literature and entertainment were censored as well (Meredith 2011, 413).

In his fight for freedom, both inside and outside of prison, Mandela’s central concern was *international public opinion* and how other nations could help the ANC and the other movements overthrow the abusive NP government (Mandela [1994] 2013, 298). But instead of boycotting the apartheid government, foreign investors from the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany competed vigorously for positions in South African industries, helping NP-led South Africa experience one of the highest and most rapid rates of economic growth the world had ever seen.

---

<sup>34</sup> This marginal white movement never had more than 700 members, but it was very active until it was banned in September 1962. See the article “South African Congress of Democrats,” available at: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-african-congress-democrats-cod>.

<sup>35</sup> For descriptions on the meetings between these groups within the Congress Alliance, see Mandela ([1994] 2013, 273).

<sup>36</sup> The PAC was first and foremost committed to promoting the rights of native “Africans” rather than to forming alliances with other ethnic groups and their ideas (Meredith 2011, 122).

<sup>37</sup> Umkhonto we Sizwe means “the Spear of the Nation” and it was the ANC’s underground guerrilla organization (Welsh 2009, 79). Mandela ([1994] 2013, 8) explains: “The congresses authorized me to go ahead and form a new military organization, separate from the ANC. The policy of the ANC would still be that of nonviolence.”

With the economic boom, approximately a quarter of a million white Europeans immigrated to South Africa, and a new class of Afrikaner businessmen was appointed as the leaders of banks and different industries. The white farmers benefited too, as did the working class; almost every skilled craft was reserved for whites alone (Meredith 2011, 413). While the English-speaking people in South Africa were able to maintain their privileged positions, the living standards of the Afrikaners, whose incomes had been less than half that of the English speakers' in the 1940s, especially after the Second Anglo-Boer War, which had destroyed their property, now kept rising (*ibid.*). Hence, the bonds between whites from different backgrounds – the descendants of the Dutch and British colonizers – started to become more consolidated, forming a relatively unified middle class. Meanwhile, blacks' ownership of and involvement in businesses was strictly regulated and practically prohibited (Welsh 2009, 56).

By providing economic support, the American and European nations initially *strengthened* the confidence of the white South African government in that its policies were not only acceptable, but even desirable and beneficial for white people in general (see Meredith 2011, 412). In 1959, in a meeting of the United Nations, Finnish representatives spoke up in opposition, arguing that South African apartheid violated the Finnish people's sense of justice.<sup>38</sup> However, the U.S. government in particular held that no economic sanctions should be imposed upon South Africa by the United Nations. Finland succumbed, not pursuing the issue any further (Peltola and Soiri 1999, 70).

A document titled "South African Relations with the United States," available at the U.S. Library of Congress,<sup>39</sup> claims that "all the United States administrations during the 1970s and 1980s condemned apartheid, but they were generally opposed to broad economic sanctions, often arguing that the most severe impacts of such sanctions would be felt by the same segment of the population that was most disadvantaged by apartheid." However, this was not the view held by the ANC, the members of which indeed represented the most disadvantaged, that is, the black people of South Africa: "Our strategy was to (...) scare away foreign capital, and weaken the economy. This we hoped would bring the government to the bargaining table" (Mandela [1994] 2013, 283). Thus, the American and European governments claiming that economic sanctions against the South African NP government would negatively affect the most underprivileged people in South Africa were *ignorant of the local context* and the circumstances that the underprivileged local people found themselves in.

---

<sup>38</sup> This Finnish position was formulated in the process of collecting information on South West Africa and conducting negotiations with South Africa on the future of Namibia; Finland was engaged in such projects due to its membership in the UN's South West Africa Committee (Peltola and Soiri 1999, 70).

<sup>39</sup> The document is available at: <http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/84.htm>.

Martin Meredith (2011, 414) points out that what the other nations saw in South Africa may have resembled a functional Western democracy, at least in principle: it had a parliamentary system of government, an independent judiciary, and an open market economy. However, the initial stance taken by the North American and European nations has been attributed first and foremost to the Cold War atmosphere and related preconceptions.<sup>40</sup> Erroneously, the entire South African freedom movement, which had the aim of liberating black people and other ethnic groups from white hegemony, was generally framed as “communist.” This interpretation among the North American and Western European nations provided the South African apartheid government and its allies with a plausible excuse to continue the abusive treatment of black and “colored” people. Mandela ([1994] 2013, 204–205) recalls the accusations presented against him in one of his many trials:

Van Niekerk said that he would prove to the court that the accused, with help from other countries, were plotting to overthrow the existing government by violence and impose a communist government on South Africa. (...) The state cited the Freedom Charter as both proof of our communist intentions and evidence of our plot to overthrow the existing authorities.

But even though the ANC was collaborating with the Communist Party in its fight for freedom in general, many of its leaders did *not* share such communist ideals or goals. For instance, Mandela emphasized that “we were extremely wary of communism. The document stated, ‘We may borrow from foreign ideologies, but we reject the wholesale importation of foreign ideologies into Africa.’ (...) The spirit of mass action surged, but I remained skeptical of any action undertaken with the Communists and Indians.” (Mandela [1994] 2013, 100, 115–116; see also *ibid.*, 366).

The ideological distance between the ANC and the Communist Party became even further blurred by misleading statements made by *other freedom fighters* in South Africa, in particular by members of the PAC, a movement which competed for popularity with the ANC. In his autobiography, Mandela ([1994] 2013, 296) describes his encounter with Simon Kapwepwe, Zambia’s (black) vice-president, who had said to him that “we have heard disturbing reports from the PAC to the effect that Umkhonto we Sizwe<sup>41</sup> is the brainchild of the Communist Party.” Mandela (*ibid.*) lamented that “it was another example of both

---

<sup>40</sup> As Meredith states (2011, 13), “The advent of the Cold War introduced a new factor to the African equation. In 1948, after the communist seizure in Prague, Western governments became convinced that communists were embarked upon a campaign of world mastery in which African colonies were prime targets.”

<sup>41</sup> Umkhonto we Sikwe: see footnote 37.

the lack of knowledge about South Africa in the rest of Africa and the extraordinary lengths the PAC would go to besmirch the ANC.”

In other words, African leaders, ranging from South Africa’s white pro-apartheid government to black leaders in other African countries, considered it legitimate to *speak and define ANC’s ideas on ANC’s behalf*. Mandela ([1994] 2013, 229) argued that “because of the PAC’s anticommunism, they became the darlings of the Western press and the American State department...” In this way, Soviet communist ideologies were *imposed upon the ANC* from the outside, while the actual goals and particular context of the South African freedom movement in general were dismissed, both on the African continent as well as globally (see also Hallin 1994, 61–63).<sup>42</sup> In other words, by not considering the anti-apartheid movement in a *contextual* and *holistic* manner, and by not distinguishing between institutions representing diverse ideologies in South Africa and other African countries, but rather instead by “assuming African unity despite all signs to the contrary” (Severino and Ray 2011, 61), African, American, and European nations alike failed to recognize the context, cause, and distress of the South African freedom fighters.

Finland’s initial expressions of sympathy for the ANC and the other South African anti-apartheid movements – rather than simply categorizing them as “communist” – can be explained by Finland’s geopolitical position. Situated next to, and with a long border with the Soviet Union, Finland was going through its own battle of ideological differentiation from its Eastern neighbor, from which it had gained its independence in 1917.<sup>43</sup> But following the Winter War and the Continuation War, which took place between 1939 and 1944, parts of Finland’s territory were lost again to the Soviet Union. Finland’s precarious political position during the following decades gave rise to the term “Finlandization,” which referred to a nation’s delicate political status between powerful nations and ideological positions in the East and in the West.<sup>44</sup> Caught between a rock and a hard place, Finland was obliged to create its own identity vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, while simultaneously acknowledging Soviet influence in the region in order to successfully maintain the balance. Like the ANC and other movements in South Africa that were labeled as “communist” in the U.S. and in Western Europe, Finland was frequently

---

<sup>42</sup> Hallin (1994, 61) notes that “in a period when a single ideology dominates a particular area of discourse, the constraints it imposes can be powerful and of great political significance. The early 1960s were precisely such a period – a period of consensus on foreign policy, when the Cold War ideology was accepted as defining the limits of ‘responsible’ political discussion. The assumptions of that ideology pervaded the news....”

<sup>43</sup> Finland had formerly been a province of the Swedish Kingdom, until the Finnish territory was conquered and later annexed by Russia in the war between Russia and Sweden in 1808–1809.

<sup>44</sup> Regarding the phenomenon called “Finlandization,” see the article “Suomettuminen maailmanpolitiikassa” (in Finnish), available at: <https://ulkopolitist.wordpress.com/2013/04/17/suomettuminen-maailmanpolitiikassa/>.

defined through its connections to the Soviet Union, even though it remained an independent nation in a very specific geopolitical context. Pekka Peltola and Iina Soiri (1999, 70) argue that because of its tense relationship with the Soviet Union, Finland wanted to support the legal agreements accepted by the international community, to make sure it was complying with everyone's expectations. Thus, Finland allowed the more powerful nations to decide the United Nations' stance in regard to apartheid in South Africa. However, different student and civic organizations in Finland continued to stage boycotts against apartheid (Peltola and Soiri 1999, 18–53).

The premise of this research is that world news should quote a range of different institutions and individuals, representing diverse nations and civic societies, and that each institution should be allowed to speak and define its ideas *on its own behalf*. Inspired by Pierre Bourdieu (1987, 13–14), I define power above all as the ability to use words to describe the people or institutions which represent them. This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which, during the Cold War and the first decades of apartheid, not only American and Western European institutions, but also different African institutions – including those like the PAC involved in various freedom movements – defined realities on the ANC's behalf. Obviously, the same may have happened the other way around, and the PAC or even the South African Communist Party may have been defined erroneously by the members of the ANC. The greater nations also imposed their views upon Finland, which was a smaller and more vulnerable nation, unable to present its understanding of the fight for freedom in South Africa as a viewpoint to be taken seriously within the United Nations.

With time, however, the international community grew more aware and critical of the abuses committed by the NP government in South Africa. In 1977, the UN arms embargo became mandatory, and following the election of Jimmy Carter as president, the U.S. also adopted a much more aggressive approach on human rights issues in South Africa. Around the same time, civil movements protesting apartheid increased in strength in the U.S. as well. Among the protesters was Barack Obama, who would later become the country's first African American President. In Obama's (2010, xi) own words,

the first time that I became politically active was during my college years, when I joined a campaign on behalf of the effort to end apartheid in South Africa. None of the personal obstacles that I faced as a young man could compare to what the victims of apartheid experienced every day, and I could only imagine the courage that had led Mandela to occupy that prison cell for so many years. But his example helped awaken me to the wider world (...) Over the years, I continued to watch Nelson Mandela with a sense of admiration and humility.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had a big impact on the mindset of white South Africans: they could no longer frame the freedom movement as a dangerous front for



international communism. Both white and black university students and politicians in South Africa became involved in campaigns demanding the liberation of Mandela and the other freedom fighters. Factions within the white South African elite also started to openly favor a more inclusive society, and some of these people began negotiating with Mandela – still being held as a political prisoner – about a new political dispensation for South Africa involving blacks as a central, equal component. In February 1990, Mandela was released, “a moment of liberation experienced around the world” (Meredith 2011, 436).

In August 1989, Frederik Willem de Klerk became South Africa’s President; a “man who had lived up to his promise (...) De Klerk began a systematic dismantling of many of the building blocks of apartheid” (Mandela [1994] 2013, 553). Eventually, negotiations between de Klerk and Mandela led to South Africa’s transition to a democracy, and the efforts between these two men were internationally recognized through the Nobel Peace Prize they received in 1993. However, the talks were overshadowed by increasing violence in the country. Some groups, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, boycotted most of the negotiations (Welsh 2009, 481), and they clashed frequently with members of the ANC. The country’s security forces and white right-wing paramilitary organizations were determined to thwart any prospect of the ANC gaining power, and death squads and massacres became commonplace (Meredith 2011, 438); “black life in South Africa had never been so cheap” (Mandela [1994] 2013, 588).

The negotiations between de Klerk and the ANC regarding the country’s future and forms of possible collaboration and coalition also broke down several times, given the “wide differences among the parties in regard to their constitutional proposals” (Welsh 2009, 428). Meredith (2011, 436) argues that “de Klerk believed there was a good chance that, if set free, the ANC, poorly organized and ill-prepared for peace, would fall into disarray...” Indeed, Mandela has written that, “one of the most important and demanding tasks (...) [was] to transform an illegal underground movement to a legal mass political party. (...) In the new ANC, we had to integrate not only many different groups, but also many different points of view” (Mandela [1994] 2013, 593; see also Welsh 2009, 431). After several years of “tortuous” negotiations, an agreement was reached on a new interim constitution, paving the way for national elections (Meredith 2011, 438).

In its campaign platform for the country’s first national, nonracial, one-person-one-vote election, the ANC promised to create jobs, build a million new houses with electricity and flush toilets, extend primary health care, and provide ten years of free education to all South Africans (Mandela [1994] 2013, 614). On April 27, 1994, South Africans – black, white, Indian, coloreds – formed long queues outside polling stations, with most people voting for the first time in their lives. The ANC’s epochal victory at the polls culminated in Nelson Mandela’s inauguration as the country’s president in May 1994.

## The 20<sup>th</sup> century in Brazil: Dictatorships, Inequality, and the Cold War

As with South Africa under the apartheid regime, Brazil in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was amongst the fastest-growing economies anywhere in the world (Reid 2014, 9). But this growth did not benefit all Brazilian citizens equally. Even though Brazil did not experience an official “apartheid” system as did South Africa, black people remained in inferior positions, and human-rights violations and censorship became commonplace, as Brazil was ruled by an authoritarian military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985. What is more, the army’s seizure of power was supported by the U.S. in an effort to suppress “communist” enemies amidst the Cold War. Hence, the story of 20<sup>th</sup> century Brazil is not so different from that of South Africa.

A growing number of American and European companies played a substantial role in managing banks and public utilities as well as in handling much of Brazil’s foreign trade. Inflation and poor working conditions provoked strikes among laborers, who were eventually granted minimal workers’ rights (Reid 2014, 76–77; Zirin 2014, 55–56). Electoral fraud was commonplace in Brazilian politics, while the army increased its role as a major political player. In 1930, the army deposed Washington Luis Pereira de Sousa from the position of president, paving the way for Getúlio Vargas, “a conservative who went on to create a labor party, court the masses and come to be seen in some ways as a symbol of the left” (Reid 2014, 79). Still, “he did little to reduce Brazil’s searing inequalities” (see also Zirin 2014, 55). In 1938, Vargas disbanded the Congress, beginning to rule as a dictator. The official explanation was that this *autogolpe* protected Brazil against a conspiracy by “communists” (Valtonen 2001, 625). Shortly afterwards, any parties or movements deemed as “communist” were banned, and strikes remained illegal between 1937 and 1946; union organizers were repressed, tortured, and even killed (Zirin 2014, 55).

This period of Vargas’s government, known as the *Estado Novo*, has been characterized as fascist in ideology, inspired by increasing trade with Germany in the 1930s (Meade 2010, 136; Zirin 2014, 54). Still, when the U.S. declared war on Germany, Brazil followed, breaking off relations with Germany and siding with the Allied Powers. The U.S. also relied on Brazilian rubber for its military industry, promoting another “production boom” in the country. But as Zirin (2014, 54) notes, “the people who paid the price for this deal were the Brazilian citizens conscripted to make the journey into the rubber plantations of the Amazon. Known as the ‘rubber soldiers,’ they worked in slave conditions for the war efforts and are still fighting for reparations to this day.” Moreover, an essential characteristic of Vargas’s government was the continuation of the so-called “whitening” policy. This was expressed in the country’s legislation as a plan to “develop in the ethnic composition of the population the more desirable characteristics of European ancestry” (Rohter 2012, 70). Between 1889 and 1934, over four million immigrants – mostly Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Germans, and Russians, as well as Syrian, Lebanese, and Japanese people –

entered Brazil (Meade 2010, 103–105). By the end of Vargas's period in office, most black people still lacked any means to advance socially or economically, either remaining in the countryside with very limited opportunities or else relocating to the expanding slums of the cities (Zirin 2014, 56).

As in South Africa, blacks in Brazil gradually began challenging their oppressors: the 1940s in Brazil were marked by an increasing black consciousness, leading to the first, but modest, law against racial discrimination. As explained by Teresa Meade (2010:137), “previously unheard or marginalized segments of the polity organized in trade unions, in women's organizations, in students groups” and so forth, while “women, Afro-Brazilians, and new intellectual forces raised their voices in the political and cultural arena.” Around the same time, people became increasingly frustrated with the economic policies of Eurico Gaspar Dutra, Vargas's successor, as salaries were kept artificially low in order to attract foreign investment. Taking advantage of such discontent, Vargas was able to regain power once more time in 1950, creating the state-owned oil company Petrobras and promoting the government's seizure of the country's oil. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the president of the U.S., criticized Brazil for destroying the opportunities for foreign investment (Valtonen 2001, 628). Soon after, Vargas dramatically shot himself (Fausto 1999, 250; Reid 2014, 88; Zirin 2014, 56).

Vargas's successor, President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1960), aimed to accomplish 50 years of development in just five years, managing to attract more foreign investments to the country (Zirin 2014, 57; see also Fausto 1999, 253). But he also took out substantial loans, accumulating a level of foreign debt that ultimately became a problem for Brazil. In just over three years, a new capital city, Brasília, was built in the inland state of Goiás. Brazil gained worldwide attention for this achievement (Meade 2010, 154). But in Reid's (2014, 92) words, “building Brasília came at a massive price. It was not properly budgeted for, and the opposition claimed that the project was stained by monumental corruption.” Not wanting to accept the series of cuts suggested by the International Monetary Fund, Kubitschek ceased all negotiations, but could not find any other solution for the out-of-control rate of inflation either (*ibid.*).

Still, it was especially Kubitschek's successors, Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, who raised eyebrows both inside and outside Brazil, and in the U.S. in particular. Monica Hirst (2013, 49) explains that,

the Quadros-Goulart government resorted to a new configuration of the basic tenets of Brazilian diplomatic action known as “Independent Foreign Policy” (IFP). This moment represented a turning point in the international projection of the country and consequently, its relationship with the U.S. According to the basic postulates of IFP, Brazil would expand its autonomy in the international public sphere (...). The country's postures should stem from the national interest and not from pressures by the great powers, particularly the U.S.

This policy underlined commonalities between Brazil and other developing nations in Latin America, Asia and Africa (...), particularly its criticism of colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and the armaments race.

What is more, Goulart, who assumed power in 1961, wanted to grant voting rights to illiterates, nationalize private oil enterprises, and impose taxes on multinational corporations (Hirst 2013, 49–50; Meade 2010, 161). These policies were supported by hundreds of unions representing rural workers, students, and Catholics, who were frustrated by the persistent inequality and rate of inflation in Brazil (Zirin 2014, 57). However, outside Brazil and especially in the U.S., these actions were viewed through the same Cold War lens as the actions of the South African anti-apartheid movements. Reid (2014, 97) notes that the US government saw Goulart as “anti-American, and as heading a government penetrated by communists” (see also Meade 2010, 162–164). According to the document “Brazil – United States,” a publication available at the U.S. Library of Congress, which describes the development of relations between these two nations,<sup>45</sup> “Goulart was known for having been a Vargas protégé and pro-Fidel Castro, pro-communist, and anti-foreign capital.” But Reid (2014, 95) argues that, in fact, “Goulart was not the radical leftist, let alone communist, that some of the opponents in Brazil and Washington would claim. Rather, he was a moderate would-be reformer...” Thus, as in the case with the ANC and other movements in South Africa, the communist ideology was *imposed* upon the Brazilian actors involved. In other words, without considering the particular context of poverty, inequality, and the legacy of colonial rule in Brazil, Brazil was still unambiguously framed as an ally of the Soviet Union.

Besides the U.S., the policies of the Goulart government were viewed critically by the Brazilian army as well, which had begun planning another coup. According to the previously mentioned document of the U.S. Library of Congress, “the exact United States role in the March 31, 1964 coup that overthrew Goulart remains controversial.”<sup>46</sup> Larry Rohter (2012, 27) also notes that there is no substantial evidence that would prove direct U.S. involvement. However, Zirin (2014, 58) points to the existence of an audiotape where U.S. President Lyndon Johnson is recorded as saying that “the United States needed to take ‘every step that we can’ to ensure Goulart’s overthrow.”<sup>47</sup> Zirin (*ibid.*) further explains that “Goulart had still neither resigned nor left Brazil when Johnson, unable to restrain himself, sent a congratulatory telegram to military puppet Pascoal Ranieri Mazzilli, who had provisionally assumed the presidency” (see also Meade 2010, 164). Reid (2014, 97) makes the straightforward claim that the coup was “backed up” by the U.S., explaining also

---

<sup>45</sup> This document is available at: <http://www.countrystudies.us/brazil/113.htm>.

<sup>46</sup> Source: see footnote 45.

<sup>47</sup> Zirin’s (2014, 58) claim about President Johnson’s statement is based on a document in the U.S. National Security Archive, available at: <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/>.

how the CIA channeled money to Brazilian opposition state governors. The army placed Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco in power as the new leader of Brazil, and the American ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, congratulated Brazil on the “great victory for the free world,” adding that “the West could have lost all the South American republics [to communism]” (ibid.).

There were internal conflicts as well. Reid (2014, 95) explains how Goulart’s policies had been complicated by the “irresponsible” attack by other ideologically leftist political groups, especially the one led by Lionel Brizola, who had claimed that Goulart’s plan was moving ahead too slowly and urged him to assume dictatorial powers. As with the goals of the ANC, the Communist Party, and the PAC in the South African context, the goals of the different “revolutionary” groups in Brazil were viewed by the international community as one and the same, and, therefore, so radical that an intervention and the complete prohibition of such groups were deemed legitimate. Following the military coup, the tenets of the IFP’s plan to pursue international affairs based on Brazil’s own needs rather than on those of the greater powers were abandoned. Brazilian Minister Juracy Magalhães’s statement that “what is good for the United States is good for Brazil” lay the groundwork for the new direction of the country’s foreign policy (Hirst 2013, 52).

The army remained in power for 21 years, and during this time, thousands of activists were arrested and many human rights abuses occurred, often involving systematic torture. Censorship was imposed on the press, radio and television programs, magazines, and books. The fifth Institutional Act suspended Congress indefinitely in 1968. Between 1964 and 1973, more than 500 unions were taken over. Even if discrimination in Brazil was not explicitly racist in a similar way as in South Africa, the poorest and most underprivileged Brazilians were black. As in South Africa, the Brazilian regime used “communism” as an excuse to torture people and severely limit poor people’s rights (Reid 2014, 99–103; Zirin 2014, 58). Meade (2010, 164) notes that “despite widespread and highly publicized human rights violations, the United States supported the string of dictators who ruled Brazil from 1964 until democracy was restored in 1988.” The crimes committed in Brazil did not gain as much attention among the American and European civic societies as South Africa’s apartheid system did, but the issue was still acknowledged by various associations and countries around the world, including Finland (Pirttijärvi 1998).<sup>48</sup> Dictatorships also prevailed in other South American countries, such as Argentina and Chile; thus, the Brazilian issue was often framed as part of a broader regional situation (see, e.g., Meade 2010, 164).

---

<sup>48</sup> Still, Pirttijärvi (1998, 103–104) highlights the fact that the Finland-Brazil Association, founded in 1975, has always emphasized the cultural, rather than the political, in its activities and orientation.

As in South Africa, the transition towards democracy in Brazil was gradual rather than sudden. General João Figueiredo allowed political exiles to return. In 1982, Brazilians were able to vote again for Congress and state governors. The nominal parties of the military government, ARENA and MDB, were reformed and renamed the Partido Democrático Social (PDS) and the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), and new parties were also allowed to register. These included the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), one of whose founders was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a passionate organizer of workers' unions and strikes. The campaign "Diretas Já," which called for direct presidential elections, mobilized millions of Brazilians. The protests were also covered by *TV Globo*, which, despite the fear of losing its licenses and with a military helicopter buzzing around its headquarters, decided to broadcast part of the demonstrations. The army gave in, and in 1985, Brazil again had a civilian president. The 1986 election for Congress and governors was based on universal suffrage for the first time in the country's history (Reid 2014, 103–106).

Reid (2014, 113) highlights the fact that in Brazil, "no government since 1930 had managed to combine growth, price stability, greater equity and democracy." This did not happen after the end of the dictatorship either. Tancredo Neves, the first civilian president chosen by an electoral college in 1985, died before assuming power, and José Sarney, governor of Maranhão, who was sworn in as president in Neves's place, has been defined as an opportunist without democratic legitimacy (ibid., 118). Sarney was followed by Fernando Collor de Mello, who called himself a "national savior," but did not live up to his promise: as Reid explains, "his campaigner against corruption proved to be corrupt, and the candidate who accused his rival of plotting to confiscate savings would do exactly that himself" (ibid., 123; see also Fausto 1999, 318–319).

After two and a half years in office, the lower house voted to impeach President Collor, who chose to resign instead (Reid 2014, 125; see also Valtonen 2001, 634–637). Previously the chapter described how, following the release of Nelson Mandela and the gradual transition of South Africa to democracy, the South African security forces continued to massacre people. A similar phenomenon occurred in Brazil; in the 1980s, the notorious police violence in Brazil and especially in Rio de Janeiro started making international headlines. Zirin (2014, 60) explains that such abusive behavior was rooted in the "partially demobilized security forces of the Latin American dictatorships, exacerbating violence in attempts to secure their own position." Furthermore, the violence was targeted mostly at black people, who formed the majority of the city's "exploding homeless population" (ibid., 61).

Collor's vice-president, Itamar Franco, then took over as president. His coalition government included Fernando Henrique Cardoso, initially appointed as foreign minister, but who in 1993 became the finance minister. With a capable team of economists, Cardoso

founded a new currency – the eighth new currency since 1942 – called the *real*. Suffering from high inflation, the Brazilian middle class had been forced to spend their entire paychecks as soon as they received them because the currency was losing its value so fast. Mortgages and long-term financial planning had been impossible. However, the Real plan brought inflation under control, and in just two years between 1993 and 1995, 13 million Brazilians officially moved out of poverty. Yet, the biggest challenges still lay ahead, as at that time more than 30 percent of the population was still living below the UN-designated poverty line (Zirin 2014, 64; see also Meade 2010, 171–173). But the relative success of the Real plan was enough to propel Cardoso to the presidency in 1995: just one year after Nelson Mandela assumed power in South Africa. In his inauguration speech, Cardoso is reported to have said: “Social justice will be the number one objective of my administration” (Reid 2014, 130).

### Building Better Societies and Reducing Inequalities in South Africa and Brazil

Remembering his youth in the rural village of Qunu, where he had been born in 1918, Mandela ([1994] 2013, 21) describes the traditional African form of government as follows:

Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a hierarchy of importance among speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and laborer. People spoke without interruption and the meetings lasted for many hours. The foundation of self-government was that all men were free to voice their opinions and equal in their value as citizens.

Since assuming the presidency of South Africa in 1994, Mandela and his party, the African National Congress (ANC), had committed themselves to promoting these values. Describing the ANC’s rise to power, Mandela (ibid., 614) also writes: “I told white audiences that we needed them and did not want them to leave the country. (...) I said, over and over, that we should forget the past and concentrate on building a better future for all.” In other words, the ANC’s goal was to change the system, so that it would incorporate and promote the rights of people from different ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds in fair and balanced proportions. While neither the ANC nor the pro-apartheid NP party had traditions of respect for liberal democracy, they finally came to agree upon a constitution that was classically liberal-democratic in form (Welsh 2009, 577). The ANC also rejected the idea that South Africa should become a one-party state, which could easily have led to hegemony. Governing in a tripartite alliance with the South African Congress for Trade Unions (COSATU) and the Communist Party (SACP), the ANC is currently challenged by the Democratic Alliance Party (DA) in the opposition, the latter being supported mainly by English-speakers and Afrikaners. Hence, while “the blacks” gained the majority rule, the whites still have a voice, too.

Aiming to implement the core principles laid out in the historic Freedom Charter, the ANC set out to ensure social unity and equal access to rights, opportunities, land, and other resources by means of affirmative action and redistribution. Successive ANC governments, led by Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, which followed that of Mandela, committed themselves to reducing poverty. Between 1994 and 2010, approximately 15 million previously un-serviced people were connected to a formal water supply. Social-wage packages designed and provided by the government include subsidies for housing, electricity, transportation, and sanitation, among other services. The number of those receiving such social grants increased from 2.9 million in 1994 to 13.4 million in 2009. The expenditure on social services has grown strongly, with education receiving the largest share, followed by health, social security, and housing (May 2010, 5–8).

In the health sector, important policy changes include the provision of free healthcare for pregnant women and children under six years of age as well as the expansion of the Child Support Grant offered to older children, which included over nine million children in 2010.<sup>49</sup> As for education, the South African Schools Act made educational attendance compulsory for all children aged 7 to 15, while the 2005 Education Amendment introduced a policy that exempts poor parents from paying for their children's basic education and has led to the creation of tuition-free schools. School enrolment has increased, and the Primary School Feeding Scheme Program provides 6 million children in 18,000 schools with a daily meal. Quotas have also been established at universities so that more black students from less privileged backgrounds are admitted (May 2010, 8).

Other accomplishments include the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) act, by which the ANC government aimed to “promote the achievement of the constitutional right to equality, increase broad-based and effective participation of black people in the economy and (...) increase employment and more equitable income distribution.”<sup>50</sup> The land reform programs of the ANC government have offered restitution, financial compensation, and resettlement aid. In an effort to increase black land ownership, the state started buying pieces of land from white sellers under a constitutionally grounded, so-called “willing buyer, willing seller” model, where prices were mutually negotiated (Cook 2013, 19).

In 1995, South Africa hosted the rugby World Cup, which Meredith (2011, 658) calls “the climax” of Mandela's and the ANC's efforts. In general, the South African black population regarded rugby as a “Boer game;” a “symbol of white supremacy.” But Mandela was determined to turn the rugby World Cup into a national event involving blacks and whites alike. Mandela appeared at the final game wearing the green and gold jersey and cap of the South African (white) Springboks team. South Africa's victory resulted in national

---

<sup>49</sup> See: <http://www.gov.za/services/child-care-social-benefits/child-support-grant>.

<sup>50</sup> See: [http://www.dti.gov.za/economic\\_empowerment/bee.jsp](http://www.dti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp).



euphoria, with blacks and whites shown celebrating together. Inspired by this experience, South Africa committed itself to hosting the soccer World Cup in 2010, seeing it as another opportunity to strengthen bonds within the new “rainbow nation” (Meredith 2011, 658–659).

### *Improving Lives in Brazil*

Despite his initial success at controlling inflation and making social justice the primary goal of his government, Cardoso’s government also struggled. In Zirin’s (2014, 64) words, “in the end, Cardoso’s Brazil had to be saved from catastrophe by a \$41.5 billion loan from the IMF. The bailout was hugely unpopular in Brazil for reasons that echo deeply into Brazil’s history: the idea of being trapped in the chains of foreign debt held by the powers of the Global North.” Still, Cardoso’s government initiated important changes. Much of the government’s efforts went to extending social programs to the poorest people and the poorest areas. Most importantly, the administration created a federal program called Bolsa Escola in 2001, which provided a minimum basic income to approximately 5 million families. Educational reform brought better salaries for teachers in the poorest states, raising primary school attendance from 88 to 97 percent in total and to 94 percent among black students. Reid (2014, 137) argues that toward the end of his term, “Cardoso could claim to have laid the foundations of a fairer, more democratic country and to have taken decisive steps to turn Brazil into a more modern and more competitive economy.”

In 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was elected Brazil’s president. His election marked the beginning of the rule of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), which had been founded during the military regime with the aim of advance the rights of workers and poor people. Since assuming power, da Silva has been praised for his ability to “bridge two worlds – those of the haves and those of the have-nots” (Reid 2014, 144; Zirin 2014, 65–76). Combining Cardoso’s “Bolsa Escola” with other social programs, da Silva’s Bolsa Familia program paid mothers a small monthly stipend, on the condition that their kids attend school and that both mothers and their children attend regular medical checkups. By 2013, the number of families receiving Bolsa Familia had climbed to 13.8 million (Reid 2014, 147). All in all, Bolsa Familia has helped lift a total of 36 million people out of general poverty (Tepperman 2016, 41; see also Zirin 2014, 77).

The Bolsa Familia program has been deemed especially successful because it was designed to mitigate poverty within one generation, while also providing the next generation with the means to avoid it altogether (Reid 2014, 147). Besides Bolsa Familia, Lula da Silva’s administration ultimately promoted more than 40 different social programs, run by close to 20 government ministers (Tepperman 2016, 36). These programs were structured in such a way that they would benefit more than just the poorest of Brazilians: “When millions can go to the supermarket to buy milk, to buy bread, the economy will work

better,” President da Silva was quoted as saying. In other words, da Silva managed to create a “pro-market approach” to combating poverty (ibid., 41). By 2014, the number of Brazilians living in extreme poverty had been reduced to less than three percent of the population (ibid.). Moreover, the incomes of the poorest Brazilians rose by more than 6 percent between 2002 and 2013, while the incomes of the richest grew relatively little: by 2.6 percent. During da Silva’s administration, unemployment reached an historic low of just 5.3 percent, while Brazil’s economy also experienced exceptional economic growth and a credit boom (ibid.)

The popularity of da Silva’s policies was reflected in the election of Dilma Rousseff, whom he strongly supported, as his successor in 2010, while Lula da Silva left office being even more popular than when he had entered it, with an approval rating of approximately 75 percent (Zirin 2014, 65). In Reid’s (2014, 158) words, da Silva “offered Latin America a powerful reformist example – that social change, the widening of active citizenship and the reduction of inequality were possible within the rules of democracy and of economic and financial stability” (see also Tepperman 2016, 41). Known generally as “the futebol nation” (Goldblatt 2014), Brazil’s chance of hosting the soccer World Cup in 2014 was considered, as in South Africa, a way to promote “general inclusiveness” (Bellos 2014, 127).

#### *South Africa and Brazil on the Global Stage: Successes and Challenges*

Reid (2014, 4) writes that “Lula’s main purpose (...) was to publicize what he called ‘a silent revolution’ in Brazil, the recovery of the country’s self-esteem.” Indeed, for both South Africa and Brazil, hosting the World Cup became an opportunity to show the world what these countries – two former colonies that had struggled for so long – had managed to achieve over the past decades. That is, they did not only want to demonstrate their abilities in soccer, but also beyond: in politics, in economics, and with respect to how they had managed to reduce inequality (Rohter 2012, 225). As expressed by Alex Bellos (2014, 379), “Lula lost his image of the luckless leftie, and Brazil also lost its image as the eternal country of the future. Under his watch, Brazil’s economy grew an average of 4 percent a year, jumping up in the international rankings...” In late 2007, the country’s oil company Petrobras announced a significant new oil strike deep in the South Atlantic Sea. Lula da Silva said the discovery was “a gift from God” and “a millionaire [lottery] ticket.” The money was spent to support da Silva’s extensive social programs, with him repeating the words: “Never before in the history of Brazil...” (Reid 2014, 153).

It was the European conquerors who had enslaved native Brazilians and Africans, profiting from the natural resources and establishing inequality and racism in these countries. It was the U.S., in alliance with many Western European countries, that had supported the racist and abusive dictatorships and apartheid governments, which in turn increased the income gap even wider, while suppressing the voice of underprivileged and poor individuals. It is

commonly argued in Brazil that the rise of the U.S. was achieved at Brazil's expense (Rohter 2012, 229). Suddenly with so much money at his disposal, at the same time that the U.S. and Europe were paralyzed by recession, Lula da Silva took the opportunity to teach them a lesson: "The crisis was caused by the irrational behavior of white, blue-eyed people, who previously seemed to know everything and now showed that they know nothing" (Wigell 2011, 5; see also Zirin 2014, 71).

Brazil was not only able to pay its debt to the International Monetary Fund, but in January 2008 it became its creditor, ridiculing the U.S. government, which was hit hard by the global financial depression: "Bush, my son, sort out your crisis" (Reid 2014, 153–154). Even if South Africa did not experience a similar economic boom as Brazil, it nevertheless became Africa's leading nation, financially, politically as well as symbolically (see, e.g., Cook 2013, 14). R. W. Johnson (2013, 4) describes how the leaders of the ANC were enthusiastic about realizing that their struggle had created "an international model for problem-solving. The new ANC ruling elite enthusiastically accepted this evaluation, traveling the world endlessly to take a bow as representatives of the miracle nation."

As they were promoting their new success around the globe, South Africa and Brazil also found each other. Allied with other countries that had similarly been burdened by European conquest, slavery, and colonization, South Africa and Brazil have developed an increasing awareness of their positions internationally in terms of what they have in common and how their remaining problems might be overcome. Reaching beyond the challenge of narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor in their own countries, the leaders of these countries became determined to tackle global inequality in a joint effort with other nations in the so-called Global South. The India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), established in 2003, aims to promote dialogue among "developing" countries and countries of the South "to counter their marginalization."<sup>51</sup> In its joint declaration, IBSA lists a number of issues ranging from social development and alleviating poverty and hunger to promoting human rights and trade. As a central issue, the IBSA demands "the comprehensive reform of the United Nations: The Security Council must be expanded to include developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America in both its permanent and non-permanent categories, so as to reflect contemporary realities and make it more democratic, legitimate, representative and responsive."<sup>52</sup> South Africa and Brazil also form part of the "BRICS" group, together with Russia, India, and China. The aim of the BRICS group is to promote multilateralism and challenge the hegemony of the

---

<sup>51</sup> See: <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/about-ibsa/background>.

<sup>52</sup> The IBSA declaration from 2010 is available at: <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/images/stories/documents/declarations/>.

West (Harden 2014, 3). Within the UN, South Africa and Brazil have most aggressively challenged the status quo (Taalas 2015, 45).

Responses from Western Europe and the U.S. have been ambiguous. President Lula da Silva got along well with both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama. At a G20<sup>53</sup> gathering in London in 2009, for instance, Obama is reported to have approached Lula da Silva, saying: “That’s my man right here. Love this guy. He’s the most popular politician on Earth” (Rohter 2012, 232). The Obama administration also proposed new partnerships with African nations based on responsibility and mutual respect (Severino and Ray 2011, 251), and the U.S. State Department defined South Africa as a “strategic partner” with “close bilateral ties” to the U.S. (Cook 2013, 3). In Europe, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for instance, argued that “to succeed now and in the future, the post-war rules of the game, the post-war international institutions, fit for the Cold War and for a world of just 50 states, must be radically reformed to fit our world of globalization” (Weiss 2009, 142). Janne Taalas (2015, 45–56) notes that the current situation, where neither Africa nor Latin America hold a permanent position on the United Nations Security Council, is generally regarded as unfair among the current members. Still, no consensus has been reached on how the situation can be fixed.

While still criticizing Western Europe and the United States for their hegemonic behavior, South Africa and Brazil were also beginning to behave in an arrogant manner themselves. As expressed by the Brazilian educational thinker Paolo Freire ([1970] 2000, 45): “Almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or ‘sub-oppressors.’ The very structure of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped.” Similar observations were made by Mandela ([1994] 2013, 177–178), who noted that the oppressed becomes the oppressor.<sup>54</sup> That is, next to their prominent South–South collaboration and attempt to create democratic platforms challenging Northern hegemony, both South Africa and Brazil expanded their influence on their respective continents and beyond in a way that has also been characterized as “imperialist.” For instance, Johnson (2013, 228–29) notes how the South African

---

<sup>53</sup> The G20 is an organization consisting of a mix of the world’s largest advanced and emerging economies, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. See: <http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/>; see also Reid 2014, 253.

<sup>54</sup> Mandela ([1994] 2013, 166) laments the fact that “a freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor.”

President Thabo Mbeki, Mandela's successor, took advantage of his regional and symbolic power:

Mbeki's great theme was the "African Renaissance." With South Africa's liberation, the whole continent had now cast off the chains of colonialism and conditions were ripe for the twenty-first century to be "the African century." (...) Mbeki would devise the institutions and write the script for the whole continent, becoming its leader, unifier and representative to the world. (...) Domestically, the dream of an African Renaissance played well. (...) He loved making high-sounding speeches ('I am an African') and announcing the creation of high-prestige advisory councils on investment, on information technology, indeed, on anything at all fashionable (...) The idea was that Mbeki, the philosopher-king, would preside over important meetings of the great and the good, thus confirming his image as an internationally recognized and supremely intelligent leader.

Likewise, in his book *The New Brazil: Regional Imperialism and the New Democracy*, Raúl Zibechi (2014, 9) describes how the Brazilian capital has begun exploiting other Latin Americans. As an example, Zibechi (2014, 15) describes hydroelectric projects developed by the Brazilian company Eletrobras as "mega projects unnecessary for Peru, benefiting the Brazilian state and its private corporations, and [that] in the process will cause serious environmental and social problems for Peru, particularly its indigenous people." It has often been stated that the United States treats Latin America as its backyard; sadly, Zibechi (ibid., 228) asks whether Brazil is now creating its own backyard, concluding that (ibid., 5) "the U.S. hegemony in South America tends towards being displaced by Brazil."

The South African ANC and Brazilian PT have also reputedly failed in many of the important goals they pursued in their own countries. Despite all of the achievements and substantial reduction in inequality that they have achieved, significant challenges still remain. Both countries still remain among the most unequal nations in the world.<sup>55</sup> Dave Zirin (2014, 156) notes that in South Africa, "the old system of racist apartheid has been supplanted with 'economic apartheid,' a reality visible throughout the country if you choose to see it." Julian May (2010, 2) argues that, regardless of all the efforts by the ANC, the improvement in the poverty gap has been only "modest," and that "little progress has been made towards reducing food scarcity in South Africa, especially among children." Cook (2013, 7) notes that unemployment rates in South Africa are still very high, the quality of black people's education remains very poor, and infrastructure is often defective. In addition, South Africa has a substantial AIDS problem, one which the country's public health system cannot handle. Finally, he notes that public corruption levels remain very high in South Africa.

---

<sup>55</sup> See chapter 1. See also Keeton 2014, 26; Tepperman 2016, 43.

Likewise, glaring inequalities, weak educational performance, a burdensome tax system, derisory investment in the public economy and infrastructure and corruption continue to persist in Brazil (Reid 2014, 8). Rohter (2012, 34, 42) observes that,

many of the rich and privileged act as if they are above the law and often get away with flouting rules that are supposed to apply for all. Often, they treat those they consider beneath them as if they were servants. For their part, the poor also have little faith in the law and institutions, which they see as stacked against the little guy, and they are on the lookout for ways to circumvent the forces discriminating against them. (...) The Brazilian Constitution (...) is one of the most generous and progressive in the world, guaranteeing citizens all sorts of rights that do not exist elsewhere. But many of those rights, promising benefits to the poor and other groups suffering from discrimination, exist only on paper. Despite the mandates, Congress has never appropriated the money to enforce those constitutional guarantees. It is as if the declaration of an intention to perform an act is the same thing as actually doing it, an attitude that spills over into many areas of Brazilian life.

Of course, many of these problems and forms of behavior still result from these countries' difficult past. For his part, Reid (2014, 243) observes that "Brazil has been shaped by the legacy of colonialism, slavery and poverty and by the imperatives of development." But he also points out that (ibid.) "many Brazilians thought that their politicians had become a self-serving and predatory class, a development that went hand in hand with a state that was both expensively bloated and yet incapable of providing the services they needed." Cook (2013, 6) attributes South Africa's enduring social inequalities to apartheid. But May (2010, 4) notes that,

while the violent actions of the apartheid state had much to do to increase poverty in the 25 year period from 1960 to the mid '80s, and continues to shape the prospects for poverty eradication in South Africa, the response in the 15-year post-apartheid period must increasingly be held accountable for the persistence of high poverty rates.

As the South African and Brazilian leaders, respectively, announced that they would be hosting the World Cup, they framed the possibility as a demonstration of their newfound power and presence on the global stage. In Brazil, the affirmation that Brazil would host both the Summer Olympics in 2016 and the soccer World Cup in 2014 moved President Lula da Silva to tears, with him claiming that this showed that Brazil was finally being recognized as a "First-class country" (Reid 2014, 5; see also Zirin 2014, 12). In South Africa, the World Cup's leading local organizer, Danny Jordaan, cried that "People will see that we are African. We are World Class!" (Zirin 2014, 156). But, Zirin also observes (ibid.): "Note that the concern was with what the world would see, not what South Africans would see. What South Africans saw, as one young man told me, was that 'football is looting our country.'"

By agreeing to host the World Cup, South Africa and Brazil committed themselves to collaborating with FIFA, a powerful Swiss non-profit organization that practically has a monopoly over international soccer (Kolamo 2014, 61–113). Thus, just as the exploited and oppressed in Latin America and Africa have been able to “delegitimize the neoliberal model and open cracks deep enough to form governments that oppose the Washington Consensus” (Zibechi 2014, 5), “all international sporting events tend to act as neoliberal Trojan horses” (Zirin 2014, 155). Many South African and Brazilian citizens and organizations have argued that the money spent on the World Cup should have been spent on the well-being of the citizens now that these countries had finally gained more economic and political stability and autonomy. Reid (2014, 264) notes that “Brazilians had noticed that the government seemed to give more importance to satisfying FIFA’s exacting demands than their own needs.” In the summer of 2013, massive protests broke out in Brazil, with the demonstrators holding up placards demanding “FIFA Standard” hospitals and schools. Strikes and demonstrations were frequent ahead of the World Cup in South Africa as well (Zirin 2014, 160).

The representatives of the ANC and the PT have argued that in the long run, the infrastructure created for the events would benefit the country as a whole. The leaders of the ANC reminded the citizens about the power of sport to unify the people, citing Mandela’s role in the rugby World Cup, while in Brazil the organizers of the World Cup were flattering Brazilians by describing them as champions who managed like no one else the skill of *the beautiful game*. Zirin (2014, 9) notes how the World Cup and the Olympics “reveal like nothing else the profoundly different interests of different sectors of Brazilian society.” Later in his book, he (*ibid.*, 156) makes the same observation regarding South Africa, describing it as a “place of jagged contrasts: rich and poor, black and white, immigrant and everyone else, the dispossessed and the self-possessed fighting for elbow room. (...) The 2010 World Cup took these contrasts and inflated them to the bursting point” (see also Reid 2014, 282–283).

The soccer World Cup is the most followed sports event in the world.<sup>56</sup> Most North American and European people learned about these events as well as South Africa’s and Brazil’s performance to host them *in the world news*. In the next and final part of this chapter, I elaborate on what sorts of normative expectations this range of diverse opinions among South African and Brazilian people with different socioeconomic backgrounds, as well as the historical burden of colonialism, slavery, and apartheid/dictatorship vis-à-vis American and European involvement, create for the North American and European journalists covering these complex democracies and their past and current situations.

---

<sup>56</sup> *The Economist* magazine estimated that “nearly half of humanity” would watch at least part of the World Cup in Brazil (see footnote 3 in chapter 1).

## Persistent Problems in the South and Normative Standards for Northern Journalism

“It’s the fault of the media,’ says the young PR man. ‘The image they give of Africa is just wars and famine and disease. We can change that. What Africa needs are success stories. We are going to re-brand Africa.’” Following this quote, Richard Dowden (2009, 4) proceeds to describe a campaign to change Africa’s image, accusing the media of “creating a false impression of Africa’s reality. Some even suggest there is a conspiracy against the continent by foreign journalists.” Dowden himself (*ibid.*, 5) laments the fact that,

the ordinary gets ignored in Africa. (...) Editors want breaking news but have little interest in explanations, let alone explanations from an African perspective. (...) Editors and journalists do not dig into the complexities of Africa. ‘Keep it simple, is the message.’ All the rich history, culture, and complexity of Africa is missed. Few in the media have felt the need to dig deeper into Africa. It is easier to describe it as a chaos. Africa may often look like chaos and madness but there is always a comprehensible – if complex – explanation.

Normative theories of journalism characterize the ideal functions of the press – what journalism *should* do (Benson 2008, 2591). In my view, it is important for a researcher to be transparent about the goals that the news under scrutiny is *expected* to meet, and *why*, before proceeding to assess any shortcomings or offering praise for the quality of coverage under investigation. In this study, my main goal is to measure the quantity and, especially, breadth; the relative proportions of different Southern and Northern perspectives in American and Finnish world news. In other words, my focus is on *how voluminously* diverse Southern sources get to speak and frame their own realities vis-à-vis American and Finnish journalists and other Northern voices quoted or paraphrased in the news.

Graham Meikle and Guy Redden (2011, 10) find that “journalists are licensed agents of symbolic power – authorized by their status as employees of news organizations to tell the stories through which we make sense of our society. They have claimed themselves the role of the Fourth Estate, the unelected guarantors of democracy.” Likewise, different normative theories are connected with diverse conceptions of democracy (Benson 2008, 2592). For instance, representative liberal theory defines journalism’s primary duty as giving a voice to the public’s *representatives* rather than to the citizens themselves: “The larger and more representative the party or organization, the more voice it has earned in the media (...); the amount of coverage of the frames of different actors should be more or less proportional to their share of the electoral vote for parties” (Ferree et al. 2002, 206–210).

Given the way that elites have often imposed their voices upon Southern citizens – defining them as slaves, or as happy to host a World Cup, and anything in between – my study has been more inspired by the kinds of normative theories that promote the inclusion of a



wider range of viewpoints in the news and, especially, the empowerment of middle-class and underprivileged citizens. For instance, democratic participatory theory embodies the ideal of *popular inclusion*; the media is expected to “seek out and actively facilitate the inclusion of diverse speakers and interests. In addition to the voices of member-driven organizations, the voices of ordinary citizens ought to be present. Formal credentials should not be a prerequisite for participation” (ibid., 210–215). Given my focus on the proportions of perspectives – the size of news frames and the relative volume of voices – the normative premise of my study is also that these perspectives should be elaborated upon in a *balanced* manner, but in such a way that each speaker can express themselves as *fully* as possible.

But there is more. For I argue that, for the Northern coverage to be fair, American and European journalists should also *contextualize* the news in such a way that it takes into consideration the deeper history and the structures and practices imposed upon Brazil and South Africa during the past centuries.<sup>57</sup> For instance, Larry Rohter (2012, 13) describes practices in colonial Brazil and how they continue to shape realities in the country today as follows:

The owners of the fiefs were in essence sovereigns of their own domains, above the law and responsible only to a crown that was far away and had little capacity to enforce its will or even monitor what was going on. The mentality that this situation created has persisted into modern times (...) The captaincy system created a preference for large estates that has made land distribution in Brazil extremely inequitable. Even today, a relatively small landed gentry controls the bulk of the country’s most productive terrain, while millions of peasants have no plots of their own and are forced to eke out a miserable living. (...) Nearly five hundred years later, the origins of two of the country’s enormous problems – glaring social imbalance and reckless exploitation of natural resources – are still visible.

In the words of James Hertog and Douglas McLeod (2001, 144, 148, italics added), “*news frames* provide the widely understood context for understanding new phenomena. When a topic is framed, its context is determined.” My work focuses on the quantity and proportions of frames – thus, the normative premise is that the greater the quantity and breadth of news frames, the better the chances of providing in-depth context to the

---

<sup>57</sup> As Hallin (1994, 62–63) explains, “in the entire corpus of *New York Times* coverage from 1960 through 1963, there were only two references to the problem of land tenure, each about a paragraph long. *Central America on Revolt* [the CBS story aired in March 1982; ibid., 61], on the other hand, began its discussion of each country with an overview of its history. Those histories, moreover, gave considerable attention to certain themes which until recently had been rigidly excluded from foreign news coverage, including social stratification (not simply ‘poverty’ or ‘underdevelopment’) as a cause of revolution, and the history of U.S. intervention and economic involvement in the Third World.” This latter description by Hallin captures well the kind of more historically informed contextual coverage that my study is concerned with.

complex phenomena that the news articles aim to describe. My Finnish-American comparison examines exactly how such context is, and can be, created.

The responsibility of the North, and the related problematics of Northern knowledge about the rest of the world, has been addressed by postcolonial studies, which has also become a prominent approach to studies on global communication. Broadly defined as a study of the effects of colonialism on cultures and societies, and how peoples and groups in “the Third World” have responded to and resisted their oppressors, postcolonial studies critique and seek to transcend the structures supportive of Western colonialism and its legacies (Go 2013, 29). While my study has obviously been inspired by postcolonial theory, leading me to consider the extent to which current Northern media may or may not “fall prey to colonialist knowledge’s presentations and epistemic violence” (ibid., 10), I also do not want to take such imbalances or “misperceptions” for granted. South Africa and Brazil have recently assumed more and more global responsibilities, while leaders have managed to improve the situations in their respective countries more efficiently than in many Western countries – for instance, Tepperman (2016, 41) describes how Lula da Silva’s Bolsa Familia program reduced inequality in Brazil at the same time that inequality rose significantly in the U.S.

In other words, even if previous studies have found that coverage on the “developing world” is negative and simplistic (see, e.g., Hamilton and Lawrence 2010, 631) and that “editors have little interest in explanations from an African perspective” (see Richard Dowden’s quote on page 44), I find that, if simply assuming the continuation of such patterns, I would be, in principle, doing epistemic and symbolic violence to both South Africa and Brazil, as they now see themselves as establishing a position of a *difference* from their troubled pasts. I also believe that the journalists in charge of the coverage being investigated deserve a chance to show that their perceptions may have been subject to change. In the context of discussing Africa’s place in the multipolar world, Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Ray (2011, 1) note that “there are countless books devoted to Africa, but they all speak of a different place: yesterday’s Africa. These keys to our understanding are now outdated, so much so that we are unable to make sense of the events that are shaking the continent and transforming it before our eyes.” Just as there are old books and new books, there is also old news and “new news,” and the latter forms the sample used in this study. While I certainly argue that this “new news” should not dismiss the past, but, rather, try to incorporate as much historical context as possible, I also believe that it is worthwhile to study how *today’s* South Africa and Brazil are covered, rather than assuming that Northern world news is condemned to “stay similar forever and ever” (see Kivikuru 1998, 200).

To analyze news concerning these transforming nations in a globalizing world, I examine perspectives at a *manifest* rather than latent level. Furthermore, I measure their size by

counting words in a systematic, quantitative manner in order to avoid over-interpretation, which is more likely to occur in studies using subtle qualitative methods (see Benson 2013, 5). That is to say, rather than simply seeking to confirm the prevailing claims that Northern editors have little interest in explanations from an African perspective, and that the North still dominates the South by imposing ideas and concepts on it, my method and approach enable openness to the possibility that the power relations between the North and the South, as reflected in Northern news, have, in fact, *transformed* of late. My research measures the relative volume of Southern and Northern voices representing a wide range of diverse institutions in order to understand how voluminously South African and Brazilian citizens from different socioeconomic backgrounds get to define their country in the news and the extent to which realities are framed on their behalf. My method is explained in chapters 4 and 5. However, before proceeding to those chapters, the next chapter focuses on the American and Finnish media systems and their resources and practices, which may promote or inhibit the production of multiperspectival and in-depth world news coverage.



---

### 3. Comparing American and Finnish World News: Media Systems and Sample

---

My decision to pursue comparative analysis – rather than focus on news produced in only one country – was inspired by the way that scholars engaged in comparative studies have discovered diverse ways of making news around the globe, expanding our understanding of journalism’s challenges and possibilities. Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004, 3) have highlighted the fact that “comparative analysis can protect us from false generalizations (...) but it can also encourage us to move from overly particular explanations to more general ones where this is appropriate.” Frank Esser (2013, 113) has noted that “comparative analysis (...) helps to prevent parochialism and ethnocentrism, but also to better understand one’s own system by juxtaposing its familiar structures against those of other systems.” In his comparison of immigration news in France and the United States, Rodney Benson (2013, 2) discovered that,

the French approach has the virtue of making more room for multiple, often critical perspectives, diverse civil society voices, and in-depth expert analysis. The French approach may or may not be replicable in the United States, but it reminds us that there are alternatives. In an ideal world, citizens in all democracies would benefit from some combination of these – and other – national models.

Benson (2010, 622) has also emphasized that “globalization and the Internet may or may not be leading to significant cross-national convergence; in my reading of the literature, it is the continuing differences, rather than the emerging similarities, that seem striking.”<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Cross-national comparative studies of news build strongly on the concept of the nation-state (Benson 2010, 622). However, some scholars have expressed skepticism as to whether this concept is still a relevant unit of analysis in the age of globalization. For instance, Susan Strange (2012, 225) proposes that “the authority of the governments of all states, large and small, strong and weak, has been weakened as a result of technological and financial change of the accelerated integration of national economies into one single global market economy.” However, these transformations in the role of the nation-state notwithstanding, the U.S. as a country continues to pursue global leadership and is still considered the world’s most powerful country (Weiss 2009, 142), while Finland, as a country, continues to be a more marginal player, at least in comparison with the U.S. (Juutinen and Käkönen 2016, 8, 266). This chapter will also discuss how the Finnish welfare state and the inherent media system model differ significantly and persistently from the American market economy and related Liberal media system (Curran et al. 2009; Nielsen 2013, 398). Thus, I argue that, at least in the case of my study, the nation-state vis-à-vis the media system is not only a meaningful but also a fruitful unit of analysis.

Rasmus Kleis Nielsen (2013, 398) has found that the differences between the American and Finnish media systems continue to persist. For their part, John Maxwell Hamilton and Regina Lawrence (2010, 631) emphasize that long-span systematic comparisons between world news produced in the U.S. and elsewhere have been scarce. My purpose is to contribute to filling in this gap. This chapter focuses on the specific characteristics of the American and Finnish media systems, while aiming to justify a comparison of them. I then review some previous research on American and Finnish world news in general and news related to South Africa and Brazil in particular, and conclude the chapter by detailing the criteria according to which my sample was constructed.

### Globally Dominant Market Economy vs. Small but Knowledgeable Welfare State

My decision to compare American and Finnish world news, rather than news produced elsewhere, was based on three principal factors. First of all, I was curious to examine world news on the Global South created in a hegemonic<sup>59</sup> Northern country, such as the United States, in comparison with news originating in a smaller Northern country that has played a much more neutral and marginal role in world politics, such as Finland.<sup>60</sup> Of course, the Northern powers challenged by the BRICS countries and other Southern blocs also include the European Union, of which Finland is a member. Still, Finland has a relatively small representation within the EU in comparison with such nations as Germany or France.<sup>61</sup> Finland was not involved in the early European expeditions and conquests of Africa and the Americas, nor was Finland among those nations that provided strong support to the apartheid government in South Africa or the dictatorship in Brazil (see chapter 2).

In other words, there has been no similar tension between Finland and South Africa/Brazil as there has been between the U.S. and South Africa/Brazil, or between South Africa/Brazil and their former colonizers, such as Portugal, the Netherlands, and/or the U.K. Paul Adams (2007, 18) observes that “representations, images or visions of one country by another country say as much about the country that is doing the depicting as about the country that is depicted.” My Finnish-American comparison thus explores whether Finland’s more neutral and marginal geopolitical role is reflected in a bigger share of Southern perspectives in Finnish world news than in American world news in relation to the volume of diverse voices promoting Northern interests. In other words, I measure the extent to which Southern people themselves are allowed to speak and frame their own

---

<sup>59</sup> On how this term is applied in the present work, see chapter 1, footnote 8.

<sup>60</sup> Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2009, 79) used a similar geopolitical rationale in their comparative study of news in the United States and Sweden.

<sup>61</sup> As also mentioned in chapter 1, Finland currently (in 2017) has 13 members in the European Parliament, while Germany, for instance, has 96 members and France has 72. See: [http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/finland\\_en](http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/finland_en).

realities, rather than having definitions imposed upon them in news produced by a “hegemonic” and more “marginal” Northern society.

My second motive for comparing American and Finnish world news is related to the way that the American and Finnish political systems and dominant ideologies differ from one another. In Finland, the state has played a crucial role, providing support and benefits to its citizens and creating a welfare state that has been continuously ranked among the least unequal in the world. The U.S., again, is much more clearly a class society, economically more unequal than the European countries with strong welfare states (see Hallin and Mancini 2004, 239).<sup>62</sup> Marko Juutinen and Jyrki Käkönen (2016, 34–35) note that economic growth in the United States has not been distributed evenly and that, in 2013, 14 percent of the American population could not provide for themselves or their families. The authors attribute these problems to the lack of a welfare state model, noting that “Third World problems” are rife in the U.S. as well. Jairo Luco-Ogando (2015, 57) describes the “neoliberal” form of society in the United States as follows: “In this worldview, those in poverty should embrace free market values and should not be distracted from this by state patronage in the form of welfare.” Hence, Americans – journalists and news audiences alike – could struggle more than Finns do to understand why the South African and Brazilian governments and other institutions should provide so much support for poor and underprivileged people in those countries.

On the other hand, the realities of the poorest people in the U.S. may be quite similar to the realities of poor people in South Africa and Brazil, and the same can be said about the richest people in those countries. In this sense, Americans could be *more* able to comprehend the range of diverse socioeconomic positions in South Africa and Brazil than Finns, given the similar income imbalance between people in the U.S. This understanding could specifically inspire American journalists to seek out voices and viewpoints from both extremes in order to *balance* the news, which is often regarded as the ideal objective of American journalism (Benson 2008, 2593). In other words, given the relative equality among Finnish people, Finnish journalists may struggle more than Americans to understand just how rich and just how poor many South Africans and Brazilians actually are.

In short, my Finnish-American comparison examines how the American market-dominated model and the Finnish welfare state ideology are reflected in the quantity,

---

<sup>62</sup> As also explained in chapter 1, in the GINI Index of the World Bank 0 represents “perfect equality,” while an index of 100 implies complete inequality. For Finland, the value is 27.1, which is substantially lower (that is, more equal) than that of South Africa (63.4), Brazil (52.9), and the United States (41.1). That is to say, out of all the countries involved in this study, Finland is clearly ranked as the least unequal, and South Africa as the most unequal; the U.S. is more equal than South Africa and Brazil, but much less equal than Finland. See: <https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings>.

diversity, breadth, and tones of different perspectives in the American and Finnish world news coverage of South Africa and Brazil. Lugo-Ocando (2015, 58, italics added) observes that poverty tends to be reported as a *decontextualized phenomenon*, in which its manifestations, rather than its causes, are at the center of the stories. In my research, as I have explained, one of the most important goals is to understand how context is created in the news by means of combining different voices and viewpoints in different proportions (see chapter 1). In chapter 2, I explained why historical context is a particularly important means for understanding the persistent poverty, among other issues, in South Africa and Brazil. While examining how these issues are contextualized in American and Finnish news, the ideologies shaping American and Finnish societies (market economy vs. welfare state) will be taken into consideration.

My third and final reason for pursuing a Finnish-American comparison is that the media systems in these two countries differ substantially, and in ways that can and should be connected with the previously discussed political differences between the U.S. and Finland. In their famous typology of media systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 49) draw a general distinction between *liberal democracies*, “with the United States as the most obvious example,” and *welfare state democracies*, which predominate mainly in Northern Europe. According to these authors (*ibid.*, 67), the Liberal media system that prevails in the U.S.<sup>63</sup> is characterized by a neutral commercial press, information-oriented journalism, strong professionalization, and moderate newspaper circulation. The Northern European Democratic Corporatist media system, which prevails in Finland,<sup>64</sup> is characterized by a historically strong party press, which has more recently transitioned towards a neutral commercial press, strong professionalization, state intervention but with protection for press freedom, and high newspaper circulation. That is, American journalism is more directly built on a business model, while in Northern Europe, the state has been more actively involved, promoting the media’s role as a social institution and, only secondarily, as a private business.

My research is concerned with the proportions of perspectives in each type of system. According to Hallin and Mancini, the American Liberal and the Finnish Democratic Corporatist media systems promote a diversity of viewpoints in distinct ways. The latter system is characterized by *external pluralism*, which means “pluralism achieved at the level of the media system as a whole, through the existence of a range of media outlets or organizations reflecting the points of view of different groups” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 29; see also Benson 2013, 132). The American Liberal system is characterized by *internal*

---

<sup>63</sup> In addition to the U.S., the Liberal model, also known as the “North Atlantic” model, prevails in Canada, the U.K., and Ireland (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 67, 198–248).

<sup>64</sup> In addition to Finland, the Northern European or Democratic Corporatist model prevails in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 67, 143–197).



*pluralism*, by which Hallin and Mancini (2004, 29) mean, first of all, pluralism achieved within each individual media outlet or organization (see also Benson 2013, 132). But Hallin and Mancini (2004, 29) add that internal pluralism “is actually used in two different ways in the media studies literature. We will generally use it to refer to cases where media organizations both avoid institutional ties to political groups and attempt to maintain neutrality and ‘balance’ in their content.”

My work examines how different pluralisms and other characteristics of the American and Finnish media systems shape their foreign news coverage of South Africa and Brazil. My specific contribution to Hallin and Mancini’s models is to elaborate on the relative *breadth* and *volume* of perspectives (news frames and institutional fields) inherent in different forms of pluralisms. Given that my core sample is limited to one general interest newspaper per country, I do intend to measure external pluralism at media system level (as, e.g., in Benson 2009). Rather, my purpose is to investigate how thoroughly the Finnish national newspaper *HS* elaborates on diverse viewpoints, as part of an externally pluralist media system, and how viewpoints offered by *HS* and the *NYT* are complemented in the news article content of one national broadcaster, business paper, and weekly magazine in each country.

A comparative study should also consider the extent to which and the ways in which media systems are *transforming*. The journalistic ideals of objectivity and neutrality have started to become the global model, even among journalists working in very different regions and media systems (Benson 2008, 2593). Another manifestation of the world’s media systems’ possible conversion toward the American Liberal model over time is the way that media, at least in Northern Europe, is becoming increasingly commercialized (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 251–254; 2012, 284). One important factor currently disrupting all media systems is technology and the new possibilities and formats created by the Internet, smartphones, tablets, and so forth; according to *NYT* journalist David Carr (2011, 11), “the print is dead.” In Finland, newspaper subscriptions have been continuously declining since the 1990s (Sauri and Picard 2012, 49), and in recent years many prominent Finnish news media sites have been forced to lay off a substantial number of journalists and other staff members.<sup>65</sup> In 2012, the imposition of a nine percent value added tax on Finnish newspapers – previously exempted, as a way to subsidize the papers (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 43) – made newspapers even more vulnerable to market forces (Sauri and Picard 2012, 46). In January 2013, the Finnish national newspaper *HS* switched to tabloid format. The paper’s editor-in-chief at the time, Mikael Pentikäinen,<sup>66</sup> explained that the purpose

---

<sup>65</sup> For instance, the Sanoma Company, which publishes *HS* as well as several magazines, laid off hundreds of employees in 2014 and 2015. See, e.g., <http://www.marmai.fi/uutiset/sanoman-yn-neuvottelut-paatokseen-241-tyontekijalle-potkut-6295879>.

<sup>66</sup> Soon after the newspaper’s tabloidization, in May 2013, Pentikäinen was fired from his position as editor-in-chief, due to a “lack of confidence” in him expressed by the leadership of the Sanoma

of the transformation was to meet the needs of audiences: “In this world of screens, many readers feel that a physically large, printed paper is impractical.” Tabloid papers have generally been associated with sensationalism, which, again, is connected with the aim of making profits (see, e.g., Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 95–96). However, in his editorial, Pentikäinen also emphasized his newspaper’s continuing commitment to quality journalism.<sup>67</sup>

In addition to *HS*, a significant proportion of Finnish foreign news coverage has traditionally been produced by *YLE*, the public broadcasting service. *YLE* is maintained by a special tax, one imposed on all Finnish adults since 2013; until then, *YLE* was supported by license fees paid by all households that owned a television.<sup>68</sup> But the 21<sup>st</sup> century has also marked an era when the entire existence of public media has been the subject of debate in Finland as well as in Europe more generally (see, e.g., Silvo 2010, 239–247). Finnish experts, when discussing *YLE*’s fate, have noted that “individualistic, market oriented thought” is taking hold in the Finnish journalistic world (Mäntymäki 2010, 14).<sup>69</sup>

Despite these challenges, it has been said that, at least initially, digitalization and the related crisis have had a less devastating impact on Finnish media than on American media (Väliaverronen 2009, 16; see also Nielsen 2013, 405). Carr (2011, 14), the *NYT* journalist, has characterized the years 2008 and 2009 as “by far the worst in newspaper history.” Between October 1, 2008 and March 31, 2009, the circulation of American newspapers declined by 7.1 percent (McChesney and Nichols 2010, ix). Simultaneously, American newspaper advertisement revenues collapsed, leading to the bankruptcy of many papers, while others lost three-quarters of their value (Meikle and Redden 2011, 4). In 2008, almost 6000 American reporters, columnists, and editors lost their jobs, while the annual decline in newsroom employment was 11.3 percent. What is especially relevant for this study is how the crisis has affected American world news coverage. In his book on the history of American foreign correspondence, Hamilton (2009, 463) describes the year 2008 as follows:

---

Corporation. An *HS* article about the notice is available at <http://www.hs.fi/hstvt/art-2000002930979.html>.

<sup>67</sup> I refer to the editorial “Maailman matkalla” by *HS*, published on January 6, 2013.

<sup>68</sup> The current rate of the *YLE* tax is 0.68 percent of the total sum of an individual’s earned income; however, the maximum amount to pay is €143 per year. People with low incomes are exempted. See: [https://www.vero.fi/en-US/Individuals/Payments/Public\\_broadcasting\\_tax](https://www.vero.fi/en-US/Individuals/Payments/Public_broadcasting_tax).

<sup>69</sup> Papathanassopoulos and Negrine (2011, 19) note that, “as more and more countries introduced greater elements of commercialism in their systems and/or undermined the pre-eminence of the public broadcasting service by cutting back on funding or making advertising revenue part of their funding structure, the Western European broadcasting scene began to look much more commercial than it once did.”

Foreign news was rapidly losing ground at rates greater than any topic area. Two-thirds of the surveyed papers had given less space to foreign news over the past three years; half had cut the resources dedicated to such coverage. The response rates were about the same for large and small newspapers (...) As media companies have gone public and have grown larger, more diversified, and more corporate (...) their executives have sought their bragging rights on Wall Street. On that boulevard, few were impressed that an editor was spending more money on foreign coverage.

In other words, the American and Finnish world news articles examined in this dissertation have been produced during a time of crisis; a time during which media in both countries were losing staff, support from subscribers, and revenues from advertisements; Finnish media was also losing the support of the state, which it had previously been able to rely upon. Both American and Finnish newspapers began producing an increasing amount of online content during this time, while *HS* also changed its print format from broadsheet to tabloid in 2013. Still, recent studies comparing American and Finnish media systems have found that they have *not* become structurally more similar (see, e.g., Nielsen 2013, 392).

Scholars have also found clear differences in the content produced by these two systems during the past decade. James Curran and colleagues explored the connections between the structure of media systems, the delivery of news, and citizens' awareness of public affairs, combining an analysis of both news broadcasting and newspapers in the U.S., Finland, Denmark, and the U.K. The authors (Curran et al. 2009, 11–12) discovered that, first of all, the American market-driven television system is “overwhelmingly preoccupied with domestic news,” whereas “foreign coverage on the main news channels in Britain and Finland is nearly 50 percent more than that in the US.” While the authors detected that *the NYT* was more oriented towards “hard news” than newspapers in the European countries examined, the authors also found that (ibid., 12) “among the European countries studied, the Finnish press [*Helsingin Sanomat*, *Aamulehti*, *Iltasanomat*, and *Metro*] proved more hard news and international news oriented than the press in Denmark and Britain.” Finally, they (ibid., 13) concluded that “the survey results revealed Americans to be especially uninformed about international public affairs,” and that (ibid., 16) “the sustained lack of attention given to international news on American television and the lack of knowledge of international public affairs in America is no coincidence.”

The differences in American and Finnish news coverage and related public knowledge can be at least partly explained by the fact that in Finland, newspaper readership vis-à-vis total population size is substantially high, which is not the case in the U.S. As has been mentioned, the Northern European Democratic Corporatist media system is characterized by “high newspaper circulation” in comparison with only “moderate” circulation in the American Liberal system (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 67). Even though Finnish newspaper subscriptions have been declining, Robert McChesney and John Nichols (2010, 167, 464)

emphasize that the Nordic countries still have some of the highest levels of newspaper readership in the world, while fewer Americans read a daily newspaper in the 21<sup>st</sup> century than in 1950, despite the fact that the population has more than doubled since then. Describing the impact of the financial crisis on Finnish media, Nielsen (2013, 399) notes that,

the Finnish newspaper industry, buoyed by its exceptionally high circulation figures and the high percentage of advertising placed in printed newspapers in Finland, has felt the impact of the recession and the rise of the Internet toward the end of the period [2000–2009], but remains in enviably robust position.

Given the American media's traditional dependence on the market, and that its audiences are not as persistent and "loyal" as Finnish newspaper audiences seem to be, American journalists may be accustomed to selecting perspectives and voices that they believe their readers would find "interesting" in order to attract larger audiences and sell their news product to non-subscribers. In Finland, again, the media's traditional role as a social institution may still encourage journalists to incorporate different voices and viewpoints primarily due to their informative, rather than economic, value. This said, many American media and journalists also emphasize social responsibility. For instance, Carr (2011, 19) writes that "reporters at the Times lead a privileged existence, with an owner who tries to do business in a way that enables good reporting, not the other way around."<sup>70</sup> The Ochs-Sulzberger family, which owns the NYT, has committed itself to quality reporting of foreign news, considering it an important part of the paper's coverage (Hamilton 2009, 464).

Hence, both media in my "core sample" – the NYT and HS – are committed to quality journalism. Still, the different circumstances described so far – American hegemony and Finnish marginality in world politics, the American Liberal and the Finnish Democratic Corporatist media system and their transformation, and the crisis of journalism – are likely to shape their world news coverage at least in slightly different ways. The coverage may also reflect the changes in South African and Brazilian societies and their newfound global power, which may make the coverage analyzed in this study different from earlier coverage (see chapter 2). A news article is always the creation of an individual with a unique *habitus* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 126–129; see also Bourdieu 2005, 32–33). In other words, the sources used and the angles from which different topics are approached are likely to also depend on the education and background of the journalists and editors covering the stories (Benson 2013, 61, 126–127). Finally, the American and Finnish journalists engaged in the task of producing news on South Africa and Brazil have had to operate from

---

<sup>70</sup> The NYT home page also emphasizes such social responsibility by stating that "the goal of the NYT is to cover the news as impartially as possible – 'without fear or favor,' in the words of Adolph Ochs, our patriarch – and to treat readers, news sources, advertisers and others fairly or openly." See: <http://www.nytc.com/who-we-are/culture/standards-and-ethics/>.

different geographical distances and positions, depending on the amount of foreign bureaus maintained by the media they are working for and their precise location.<sup>71</sup> As Ullamaija Kivikuru (1998, 204) notes: “Everything depends on everything – it is not easy to determine the direction of causal relations in foreign news coverage.”

I want to emphasize here that it is not my purpose to even try to analyze and explain *everything* included in the American and Finnish news articles on South Africa and Brazil. Rather, I focus specifically on the news frames and voices and their relative size and volume, detected at the manifest level. Furthermore, even though my research is “quantitative” in the sense that I determine the size of the frames and the volume of voices by counting words, rather than by searching for implicit meanings, my aim is not to conduct an ambitious statistical study, which would allow me to draw causal connections between the journalistic content and the different factors shaping the coverage. In my study, the American dominant and Finnish marginal geopolitical position, on the one hand, and the different media systems in these countries, on the other, form two possible causal variables, which can help explain the diversity and proportions of perspectives in the world news produced in these countries. However, it will not be possible for me to isolate the effect of these factors in news. My work has been guided by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 47), who write that they “see the relation between media and political systems more in terms of coevolution than of strict causal ordering.” When attempting to explain my findings, I also draw from Clifford Geertz ([1973] 2000, 14), who has argued that “culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly – that is, thickly – described.” In other words, rather than making any straightforward causal claims, the historical and geopolitical positions of the United States and Finland and the journalistic realities described in this chapter serve above all as background context forming the basis upon which my findings will be carefully interpreted.

But even if it is impossible to determine the precise impact of different factors on media content, my argument is that a careful and historically informed Finnish-American comparison of world news is especially important. As mentioned in chapter 1, Finnish scholar Turo Uskali (2007, 38) has expressed concern about Americans’ lack of knowledge about international affairs – reported on also by Curran and colleagues (2009), as explained above – vis-à-vis the U.S.’s global leadership role. Fearing that ignorance could lead to increasingly selfish behavior by the American political and economic elites, Uskali (*ibid.*) argues that “it is fundamental that especially the American media would continue to be a marketplace of thoughts and ideas and the worldview of the Americans would be as

---

<sup>71</sup> This aspect will be examined more closely in the final part of the chapter, where I explain my sample and the resources available for the *NYT* and *HS*, whose news content form the “core” of my sample.

multifaceted and truthful as possible.” Thomas Weiss (2009, 142), for his part, laments the “collective lack of historical perspective about international relations” among American policy makers. Thus, as I argued in the final part of chapter 2 with respect to normative theories of the press, it would be crucial for news to provide historical context, to help the readers – including policy makers – obtain a bigger picture of South African and Brazilian realities. For Finland, developing a profound understanding about the surrounding world is crucial, precisely because it is dependent on other, more powerful countries, such as the U.S., whose impact Finland as well.

As I was designing my comparative study, I was also guided by the following practical question: What could American and Finnish journalists engaged in the production of world news on the Global South learn from each other? American readers in general struggle with “an extraordinary class bias” in terms of their level of knowledge about “elementary hard-news stories” in comparison with most Finnish people, who are generally much more knowledgeable about such stories (McChesney and Nichols 2010, 51; see also Curran et al. 2009, 5). But Finnish media also increasingly has to operate at the mercy of the market, and Finnish journalists generally do not have similar experience as American journalists. Considering the circumstances in which American and Finnish journalists are currently working, my research can hopefully shed light on the specific potential and limitations of American and Finnish world news coverage with respect to the creation of in-depth multiperspectival news.

Before proceeding to describe my sample, I will briefly review how some previous studies have evaluated the performance of American and Finnish media in terms of their world news coverage, first in general and then concerning South Africa and Brazil in particular. While reviewing this earlier research, I also further explain why I have opted to compare news produced in *two* countries (the U.S. and Finland), rather than adopting a wider or a narrower sample.

#### American and Finnish World News: Review of Previous Research

Most previous studies comparing American and European/Finnish world news coverage have been ambitious multi-country studies. Such analyses have mainly focused on the so-called *media flows*, measuring the quantity of different topics related to diverse geographical regions in the news. Extensive media-flow studies conducted between 1979 and 1985 and in 1995 found that, in general, world news around the globe tended to emphasize events and incidents in the United States and Europe. The least important items were news regarding the “developing” world, with Latin America and Africa being ignored almost completely in both American and Finnish news (Pietiläinen 1998, 69, 88–89).

While such studies of media flows and *contra-flows* (Thussu 2012), as well as other types of ambitious quantitative analyses, have succeeded in illuminating the dominance of the

United States and Western Europe in global communication, such broad comparative studies have been criticized for a lack of depth and accuracy. The results have likely been distorted due to the large quantity of coders involved, working in different kinds of cultural environments (Kivikuru and Pietiläinen 1998, 6). Timothy Jones and colleagues (2013, 417) also point out that media-flow studies have generally examined the visibility of foreign nations in the news during a particular, limited moment in time. While their own work aimed at filling this gap, by examining the visibility of foreign nations in American coverage during a much longer time period – between 1950 and 2006 – the authors regret that (ibid., 433) “as such, it remains unclear whether our findings are generalizable to other countries.” That is, given the longitude of their sample, it was too challenging to compare this coverage systematically with similar coverage produced in other countries.

In other words, studies examining media flows and the visibility of countries in foreign news have often been restricted either by too many countries to allow for in-depth analysis, accompanied by a limited time span, or, focusing on a long time span, the comparability of the findings has been limited. Thus, I have opted for a nine-year time span (2006–2014), centered around the theme of the World Cup in South Africa and Brazil; these time spans and topic should be broad enough to detect change in the coverage, but narrow and focused enough to allow for a direct comparison of the coverage produced in two different countries. While I also examine the range of different news topics covered, my main focus is still on the *perspectives* used and their relative breadth. Of course, several studies have also examined perspectives in world news, rather than limiting their focus to particular topics. For instance, Tsan-Kuo Chang and colleagues (2012) conducted a longitudinal analysis focusing on perspectives in American news, but rather than examining news content, these authors interviewed the editors, concluding that American foreign news suffers from an “absence of contextual reporting” (ibid.). My content analysis focusing on perspectives should be able to test such a claim.

Studies that have examined American or Finnish news on South Africa or Brazil specifically include Sonia Serra’s (2000) examination of international press coverage of Brazilian street children in the 1980s and 1990s. Her sample consisted of news articles published in the *New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *El País*, the *Guardian*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*. She also examined related coverage in the Brazilian media. Serra (2000, 157) describes how the cries of poverty-stricken Brazilian communities, devastated by the violent behavior of the police and the death squads during the dictatorship, were initially dismissed by voluntary associations, academics, and journalists alike. However, “revelations by Amnesty International represented a turning point in the development of the issue (...). The pace of reform was influenced by international condemnation of the killings” (ibid., 161–162).

But even though she found that the media under investigation managed to raise global awareness on the issue, Serra (2000, 166) still claims that this was done by means of

“stereotypical coverage.” According to Serra (ibid.), “killings of street children generate stories which (...) reaffirm cultural images of Third World countries as places of barbarism, which selective coverage in Western media has helped to construct and reinforce.” As explained in the previous chapter, my work aims to assess whether or not such stereotypes about Africa and Latin America have been overcome in the “new” news of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, given Brazil’s and South Africa’s transformation and global leadership in this new millennium. Thus, Serra’s work serves as an important reference for an exploration of temporal change in the coverage examined in the present study.

As far as I know, no studies have been conducted that focus exclusively on Finnish news coverage concerning Brazil, but Finnish news related to other South American countries have also been deemed “stereotypical” (Pakkasvirta 2008, 132–140).<sup>72</sup> Sami Kolamo examined Finnish media coverage of the World Cup in South Africa in 2010. He studied media content published between June 1, 2010 and July 30, 2010, in four Finnish newspapers,<sup>73</sup> as well as broadcasting produced by YLE (Kolamo 2014, 50–54). While the media examined in his work and my own overlap somewhat, our approaches are still quite different: Kolamo emphasizes the actual sports event, focusing on the “camera-conscious performativity” and the “ways that the players’ and coaches’ bodily gestures and facial expressions are used to arouse the viewers’ emotions” (ibid., 295). My comparative work, on the other hand, is more broadly concerned with the way in which South African and Brazilian societies were covered over a longer time span, as captured in the media’s perspectives and their relative proportions.

Many of Kolamo’s findings are still relevant for my research. For instance, he (ibid., 107) found that *HS* emphasized the frustration of many South African poor people in its coverage. Following this observation, Kolamo laments that the Finnish journalists should also have contemplated the question of how and why day-to-day practices and solemn speeches so frequently conflict with one another in the South African context. In my study, I not only found that Finnish journalists did ask such questions, but also that the way in which the journalists included such considerations in their coverage differed significantly between the American and Finnish media.<sup>74</sup> Kolamo (ibid., 124) also paid attention to the ways in which the Finnish media depicted the image of a “unified South Africa” and “how the South Africans want to show that the continent of hardships is as capable as the richest

---

<sup>72</sup> Jussi Pakkasvirta examined Finnish media coverage of the construction of a Finnish-owned pulp factory in Uruguay in the first decade of the current century, which led to a political conflict between Uruguay, Argentina, and Finland.

<sup>73</sup> The newspapers in Kolamo’s sample include *Helsingin Sanomat*, *Aamulehti*, *Iltasanomat*, and *Ilta-lehti*.

<sup>74</sup> This finding is related to the American ideal of “objectivism” and to the way that Finnish journalists take stances and include personal reflections in their stories in a more open and transparent manner than do American journalists; see chapters 6 and 7.



in the world,” as expressed by an article published in *HS*. My study includes similar findings – but again, the way in which such depictions occurred in news articles differed between the American and Finnish media. Hence, while keeping in mind the fact that the approaches and methods of our studies are quite different, some of Kolamo’s observations will be cautiously taken into account in my Finnish-American comparison.

One other study related to the American coverage of South Africa that I believe deserves closer attention here was conducted by Meseret Chekol Reta, who examined American coverage of the South African presidential elections in 1994. Reta (2000, 534) concluded that,

the U.S. media, as represented here by *the New York Times* and *Washington Post*, framed issues in the South African elections in such a way as to encourage negotiation, reconciliation, free and fair elections and the formation of a government of national unity. By contrast, they discouraged violence and belligerence. Also, pro-election groups and individuals and those who put the rights and welfare of their people first were reported favorably, while those who by their Machiavellian spirit resorted to force to achieve their aims and who therefore had little regard for human life or for the welfare of their people and nation, those who obstructed the people from expressing their desires through the ballot box, were harshly condemned and portrayed as villains. In short, the U.S. media reported events, presented issues and portrayed characters on the bases of American democratic values.

Earlier in his paper, Reta (*ibid.*, 524) set forth his assumption that “journalists presenting news from other countries judge the extent to which those countries live up to or imitate American values or practices.” Here, Reta seems to share my concern about the extent to which the South Africans (and Brazilians) themselves are allowed to frame their own realities, rather than having viewpoints imposed upon them from the North. However, when evaluating his findings, Reta argues that (*ibid.*, 523) “coverage was found to be reflective of American journalistic values of ethnocentrism and social order.”<sup>75</sup> Here, I would note that “negotiation, reconciliation, free and fair elections and the formation of a national unity” are also values that were promoted and cherished by Nelson Mandela himself, the very election of whom these newspapers sought to cover. In chapter 2, I noted that as the apartheid regime gave way to democracy in 1994, the ANC and the NP parties came to agree on a Constitution that was classically liberal-democratic in form (see also Welsh 2009, 577). Even though Mandela remained critical of the U.S. on several fronts,<sup>76</sup> he has also emphasized the following points (Mandela [1994] 2013, 367):

---

<sup>75</sup> This claim by Reta was also included in a paper by Noshina Saleem (2007, 139), leading her to conclude that “U.S. media generally support US national interest and policies while framing other countries’ image.”

<sup>76</sup> See the report “South Africa – Relations with the United States,” available at: <http://countrystudies.us/south-africa/84.thm>; see also Mandela [1994] 2013, 590.

From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that Communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, I am an admirer of such a system. The Magna Carta, the Petition of Rights and the Bill of Rights, are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world. I have great respect for British political institutions, and for the country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration. The American Congress, the country's doctrine of separation of powers, as well as the independence of its judiciary, arouse in me similar sentiments.

These were the words of a man who not only was a candidate in these presidential elections, but who *won* the elections and it was the news coverage of these very elections that was under scrutiny in Reta's study. Thus, in my view, American news that framed the event "in such a way as to encourage negotiation, reconciliation, free and fair elections and the formation of a government of national unity" (see Reta's quote further above) might well have succeeded in capturing the situation from Mandela's and the ANC's perspective, and not exclusively from an American perspective. Obviously, given the ways that "communist" ideologies were imposed on South Africans during the Cold War (see chapter 2), it is very important to be cautious about any news that seems to frame "Western" values and ideas in a highly positive tone in a Southern context. For my study, the relevant question when evaluating this news coverage would have been as follows: How loud was the volume of the ANC, as represented by voices of Mandela and other members, vis-à-vis the volume of voices from the other South African parties quoted in the media, and how voluminously did the American journalists and other Northern sources express their own viewpoints on the election and its outcome? This was not the focus of Reta's study. However, while my study does not examine the presidential elections of 1994 or any coverage before 2006, I hope that my focus on the proportions of perspectives will more clearly and accurately demonstrate *whose* viewpoints the news coverage represented and how extensively.

Reta's argument also made me wonder how he or other researchers would have evaluated the NYT's and *Washington Post*'s content had these newspapers actually framed violence, belligerence, and "people who had little regard for human life or for the welfare of their people and nation" in a positive tone, while finding fault with the South African peaceful transition to democracy. Would such coverage have not been ethnocentric? At least, it would not have been responsible, moral, or respectable, given the extremes of violence that Nelson Mandela and other blacks experienced during the apartheid regime, which the U.S. supported. Rather than calling the coverage "ethnocentric," I believe Reta's analysis would have benefited from a systematic comparison to related news coverage produced elsewhere, in some other type of a democracy. Such a setting would have permitted the researcher to more accurately assess whether the coverage on South Africa was in fact shaped by the journalists' American biases and ideals, or, rather, by the same democratic ideals and values

cherished in many parts of the world. Reta did not provide any concrete suggestions as to how the American coverage could have and should have been improved, either – this, too, could have been more easily accomplished by means of a sensibly designed cross-national comparative analysis (see, e.g., Esser 2013, 113).

The precise gap my Finnish-American comparison aims to fill has been explained quite well by John Maxwell Hamilton and Regina Lawrence (2010, 631), who claim that,

[d]espite the importance of foreign news, its history, transformation, and future have not been much studied. The scholarly community often calls attention to journalism's shortcomings covering the world, yet has not examined the topic very systematically across countries over time. Thus, for example, we know from a variety of studies that U.S. foreign news, particularly coverage of the developing world, tends to be simplistic, to focus on crises and military conflicts, and to view events through the lens of U.S. policy interests. But most studies do not compare U.S. coverage systematically with that of other countries, and fewer still put foreign news in temporal/historical context.

My research takes on this very challenge, as I compare American and Finnish world news articles systematically, while also considering both the historical and temporal contexts within which the news was produced. My analysis also takes into account the particularities of the American and Finnish media systems. Hamilton and Lawrence (*ibid.*, 685) point out that most world-news studies examine sourcing practices in war-time contexts (see, e.g., Entman 2004; 2006). While there have been and continue to be differences of opinion between the U.S. and South Africa/Brazil, these differences have not led to wars or to military conflicts between these countries, but, rather, these differences have always been more ideological in nature. Thus, my aim is to also contribute to their claims that “we know less about the sourcing of foreign news in non-war context (...) [and] the degree to which sourcing has changed over time, if it has at all” (Hamilton and Lawrence 2010, 685).

Finally, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 3) warn that a comparative analysis can be “ethnocentric itself, imposing on diverse systems a framework that reflects the point of view of one of these.” As a Finn, I obviously have a strong connection with the Finnish media system: I grew up watching YLE news, as my grandfather, a veteran of the Winter War, would listen to each and every news cast on a daily basis and read the daily newspaper cover to cover without fail. I was taught to think of media as a social institution, an essential part of the welfare state. However, I have also regularly visited the U.S. since I was young, becoming fascinated by how different newscasts and newspapers are on that side of the Atlantic. My understanding of the American media rose to a completely new level during my stay at New York University's Department of Media, Culture, and Communication during the academic year 2013–2014. While there, I actively exposed myself to American news and other media content, besides familiarizing myself with the American media system and related research. In addition to learning substantially about American media,

my academic year in the U.S. also helped me to rethink the nature of Finnish media from an American perspective rather than just from my own national standpoint. Nowadays, I routinely seek my morning news from both the American and Finnish media, without any special preference for one or the other. Thus, I believe that I am well prepared to conduct a Finnish-American comparison without fear of being tempted to impose the framework of one system over the other.

### Sample Selection Criteria and Proportionality

The New York Times' interest in the lost, the forgotten and unpenetrated places on earth dates back to 1886 when it gave its readers long-delayed accounts of Lieutenant Frederick Schwatka's journey up to the frozen, barely known western shore of Alaska. (...) There was barely a season during this period, except in the Second World War years, when its pages were without some first-hand account of man's thrilling air, sea and land conquests; of expeditions to Tibet, to the lost Incan and Mayan cities, to the jungles of Africa, South America, Asia, and Central America. (Berger 1951, 275)

The "core" of my sample consists of articles from the *NYT* and *HS*. In addition, I examine how the perspectives used in the *NYT* and *HS* are complemented in other American and Finnish news media. However, my analysis of these other media is not nearly as comprehensive or systematic as my principal study of the *NYT* and *HS*.

The first edition of the "New-York Daily Times" was published in 1851, 145 years before the newspaper would launch its first web site (Hamilton 2009, 86; Lee 2011, 48). Since then, it has evolved into a national newspaper based in New York (Barnhurst and Nerone 2001, 557).<sup>77</sup> The *NYT* journalist Carr has noted that the newspaper's editorial page is "somewhat to the left or reflexively liberal, depending on your perspective" (2011, 16; see also Entman 2010, 331).<sup>78</sup> Still, it is important to consider the point made by Hallin and Mancini (2004, 27) that "in the United States, no one could coherently map the politics of the media (...); those on the left of the spectrum are likely to tell you that all the media slant to the right, and those on the right that they slant to the left."<sup>79</sup>

The Finnish national newspaper *HS* was founded in 1889 – almost forty years later than the *NYT* – as "Päivälehti" ("The Daily Paper"), at a time when Finland was still under Russian rule. During these early years, Päivälehti's editorial staff maintained strong ties

---

<sup>77</sup> The ownership of the *NYT* has already been previously discussed in this chapter: see page 56.

<sup>78</sup> A study by the Pew Research Center in 2014 found that approximately two-thirds of the *NYT*'s audience have political values in favor of the left or center. Available at: <http://www.journalism.org/interactives/media-polarization/outlet/new-york-times/>.

<sup>79</sup> With the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States, the U.S. media become more polarized. However, my sample is limited to the years 2006–2014; thus, the current highly polarized political situation does not manifest itself in my research materials. This aspect is further discussed in chapter 9.

with the nationalistic Young Finns Party (Hankimo et al. 2012, 6, 14, 18), reflecting what Hallin and Mancini (2004, 74) have described as the “political parallelism” characteristic of the Democratic Corporatist media system. In 1904, the paper changed its name to *Helsingin Sanomat* (*HS*), and a decade later it had become Finland’s most widely circulating newspaper. It was not until 1943 that *HS* formally severed its ties with the Progressive Party and its predecessor, the Young Finns Party; since then, the paper has pursued a “liberal line” (Hankimo et al. 2012, 36). Nowadays, *HS* is the largest subscription-based daily in the Nordic countries and Finland’s leading national newspaper. In 2012, *HS* joined forces with Channel Four Finland, strengthening its video services. *HS* is published by the Sanoma Corporation, which also publishes the tabloid paper *Ilta-Sanomat* in addition to magazines and digital services (ibid., 54).

Even if both media under study are leaders in their respective regions, the NYT still has much more substantial resources in comparison with *HS*. Hamilton (2009, 466) has distinguished between several types of foreign correspondents. The principal distinctions are as follows: 1) traditional foreign correspondents who are sent abroad by an established news organization to maintain a permanent bureau; 2) local foreign correspondents who cover the world from within their home countries (that is, in this case, the United States and Finland); and 3) parachute foreign correspondents who have been dispatched for short-term assignments, usually to cover major breaking news, for established news organizations. The NYT has “traditional foreign correspondents” in twenty countries (Kaphle 2014),<sup>80</sup> and it maintains permanent foreign bureaus in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and in Johannesburg, South Africa. *HS* only has “traditional foreign correspondents” in Washington D.C., Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, London, Beijing, and Stockholm. In 2010, *HS* introduced a new type of a “circulating” correspondent, with a different correspondent filling the post each year (Hankimo et al. 2012, 53).<sup>81</sup> In the year 2014, *HS*’s circulating “traditional correspondent” was based in Brazil. Otherwise, “local foreign correspondents” and “parachute correspondents” accounted for *HS*’s coverage of South Africa and Brazil.

The time period of the coverage examined was designed so that it would encompass 2006–2010 for South Africa, culminating in the year of the World Cup (2010), and 2010–2014 for Brazil, again culminating in the year of the World Cup (2014). During these periods, there was plenty of guaranteed peak media attention devoted to the respective countries (Benson 2013, 10).<sup>82</sup> The fact that the NYT maintained bureaus and “traditional foreign

---

<sup>80</sup> Kaphle’s (2014) article was published in the report “The New Global Journalism” by the Tow Center for Digital Journalism. The report does not include page numbers, but the report is available online; see link in references cited section.

<sup>81</sup> Delhi, India was selected as the first location; the second location was Cairo, Egypt.

<sup>82</sup> However, in the period that followed, South Africa would continue to receive plenty of media attention in Finland, since in 2015 South Africa became the host of *HS*’s circulating “traditional correspondent.” By the time this correspondent appointment was announced in April 2014 (see:

correspondents” in both South Africa and Brazil during the whole period of coverage examined here, and *HS* did not, is also clearly reflected in the quantity of coverage produced by these two media: the total amount of news content produced by the *NYT* on these countries was substantially larger than that of *HS*. Given that *HS* had a correspondent in Brazil for a year, while this was not the case for South Africa, the difference between the amounts of coverage produced by the *NYT* and *HS* is even more remarkable regarding the South Africa-related coverage. In order to proportion my analysis according to the overall amount of coverage published, I ended up constructing my whole sample so that *American news materials are represented in greater quantity*. In other words, I examine a larger number of American news stories than Finnish news stories; *my NYT sample is over two times larger than my HS sample*. Moreover, within my *HS* sample, Brazil-related stories are given more emphasis than South Africa-related stories, given the relatively larger quantity of them due to the one year of content produced by a “traditional *HS* correspondent” in Brazil.

Given the fact that most *NYT* articles are produced by traditional correspondents or parachute correspondents, I have tried to include in my study sample mostly those kinds of *HS* articles that were also produced by traditional correspondents and parachute correspondents. In other words, I wanted to make sure that the journalists whose work is being compared worked in more or less similar circumstances. I also examined *NYT* and *HS* articles produced by “local foreign correspondents;” that is, journalists working from their offices in the U.S. and Finland (see definition provided above; Hamilton 2009, 466). Whenever comparing articles related to similar topics, the resources for each media available at the time as well as the particular position of the journalist in charge of the coverage – traditional/parachute/local – is taken into consideration.

I began my sampling process by carrying out two primary searches in the digital archives of these respective media. The first search word was “South Africa,” specifying a time period between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010. The second search word was “Brazil,” specifying a time period between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2014. At this stage, the search included all stories where South Africa or Brazil were mentioned, ranging from articles listing sports results to stock reports, art, music, and film reviews, travel stories, and blogs. However, both archives allowed me to list the findings also by relevance (rather than

---

<http://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000002726563.html>), I had already decided that my sample would be centered on the World Cup event and related societal transformations. Due to the expectations of the University of Helsinki and the foundations supporting this work that a doctoral dissertation should be completed within a four-year period, it was impossible to expand my sample to include the coverage produced in 2015 and, simultaneously, redefine my rationale with respect to the World Cup; considering my comparative approach, I would have had to expand my *NYT* sample to include the year 2015 as well. Thus, I was unable to incorporate the 2015 coverage in my current analysis. Such an expansion of my analysis is among my suggestions for further research (see chapter 9).

just newest/oldest first), enabling me to quickly form an understanding of the kinds of articles where South Africa and Brazil played a central role.

Obviously, it would have been easier and faster to simply narrow the search down to “world news” and “news articles” to start with, as both archives allow for such specifications. Still, I did not want to restrict my search too much in advance. Even though my main focus was on “world news,” I was conscious of the fact that news concerning South Africa and Brazil would also be published in other sections, such as sports, culture, travel, and editorials (Kivikuru and Pietiläinen 1998, 7). Conducting a thorough search allowed me to perceive the totality of the coverage and the relevant topics and genres involved. Based on such initial observations, I began narrowing my sample so that it gradually became more manageable and comparable.

Following this initial inquiry into the archives, I revised the most relevant search results one by one, excluding all articles that did not meet specific criteria. The main criterion was that the stories included in my sample must focus on South African/Brazilian *society*, and/or on relevant Brazilian/South African institutions (e.g., political parties or actors, civic associations and citizens, academics, etc.), and that such stories must have a central role in the articles. Hence, articles where South Africa or Brazil were simply mentioned in one or a few sentences were not included in my sample. I also excluded articles that merely listed sports results (which team/athlete won/lost in the World Cup/Confederations Cup/some other event, without substantial analysis of the impact of such success/failure on society) and stock reports (articles listing the economic values of stocks and how their values had risen/fallen without placing an emphasis on the impact of such economic developments on society). Articles solely based on releases by news agencies were also excluded; in such cases, the name of the news agency (e.g., AP/Reuters) is listed at the beginning of the story, replacing the name of the journalist. I tried to incorporate stories that were long, of medium length, and short from both media, but stories that were just a couple of paragraphs long were excluded right away. Finally, I excluded all articles that focused on the lives of South African and Brazilian immigrants living outside their home countries. However, articles focusing on South African/Brazilian institutions operating in other countries were not excluded, as I found that such articles were fruitful for examining the coverage of my target countries’ foreign policy and South-South collaboration.

I have also been a regular subscriber to the print/replica versions of both media. Since the Brazil-related materials were still being published while I was beginning this research project, I was able to obtain most print versions by simply reading the newspaper every day. In order to obtain print editions of the South Africa-related coverage, I also paid visits to the archive of the *HS* in Helsinki, and while in New York, I had access to Lexis-Nexis, ProQuest, and other digital archive services. Whenever an article was published in both online and print formats, I took both versions into consideration, but coded only the

print/replica version, if that was available. Most of the “online-only” stories were blogs, which I mostly excluded from my analysis. While I found their content highly interesting for an analysis of Northern coverage on the South, they were problematic for the purposes of my study, as blogs do not tend to contain quotes, but rather, articles in this genre resemble columns. My purpose, again, was to examine the range and proportions of Southern voices quoted or paraphrased in the news; to conclude that blogs do not quote many Southern voices would be misleading, given the specificities of the genre. Hence, my study focuses mainly on the news *article* content available to paying subscribers, but the contents of the blogs that I browsed through have nevertheless been taken into consideration in my analysis. Besides news articles, I have incorporated some editorials, as these are apt for analyzing the stance adopted by the newspaper in question. Op-ed articles, authored by different Northern and Southern authors, were included as well. In table 7 (appendices), which presents the numbers and titles of all the articles in the core NYT and HS sample, the included editorials have been specified with an “Edit.” and Op-ed articles with an “OP-ED”.

All of the articles that did meet my initial sampling criteria and were not excluded based on the criteria explained above were saved in a folder titled “Tentative sample.” I took a screenshot of each article and saved it as a doc-file, naming them based on the particular medium’s name, the date of publication, and the article title; for example, NYT\_2012\_10\_Brazilian Corruption Case Raises Hopes for Judicial System. Whenever both online and print versions existed of the same article, I saved both, differentiating them by adding the label “\_print” or “\_online” in the file name. If I only had a physical “paper” version of a story, these were scanned. By saving all of the articles in a similar way, I wanted to ensure that I remained aware of the amount and availability of different print and online articles throughout the sampling process.

At this point, I also created a folder titled “Possibly meeting criteria,” where I saved all such articles that did not entirely meet my initial sampling criteria, but which I did not want to immediately exclude either. For instance, some such articles focused mostly on sports and the results of soccer games, but they also contained one or two paragraphs of interesting societal analysis. Other articles did not mention a news agency as a principal source at the beginning, but still, news agencies would be quoted or paraphrased in several paragraphs, suggesting that the story had nevertheless been built on material produced by news agencies. The “Possibly meeting criteria” folder also contained numerous reviews of South African or Brazilian hotels, food, or art, which contained some fascinating analysis about South Africa or Brazil as a country/culture. Still, such coverage did not seem apt for my analysis, which aims to measure the proportions of perspectives; like blogs, these stories were usually limited to the voice of the reviewer, due to the characteristics of the genre.



By the time I had completed this initial review of all the journalistic content available in the *NYT* and *HS*, I also began developing my coding manual, identifying all the relevant news frames used and the institutions quoted in the news in order to then elaborate upon my methodology as a means of measuring their relative size and volume. My news frame and institutional field categories were formulated on the basis of the relevant frames and fields identified by other researchers as well as the sample I had gathered by this time. During the process, I soon realized that some of the content would have to be excluded simply because the viewpoints it contained were too different from the generic frames and institutional fields I was able to identify in the majority of the articles. Articles focusing on science, art, and religion in particular were too different from stories describing the transformation of the Brazilian and South African societies ahead of the World Cup and developments in international relations. Thus, articles that were “too different” were excluded from my materials at this point (see chapters 4 and 5 for a more specific description of my frame and field categories and their formation).<sup>83</sup>

The final, definite sample was constructed by narrowing down the tentative sample by means of *stratified sampling* (see Nummenmaa 2009, 28).<sup>84</sup> The core of my sample now consisted of topics and angles emphasized by the journalists and repeated throughout the coverage, while topics and angles receiving relatively little attention and importance were represented in smaller proportions. For instance, in both the *NYT* and *HS*, a substantial number of stories described how the World Cup has benefited or affected the lives of people in the poor neighborhoods of South Africa/Brazil. Both media also, for instance, published a great number of stories concerning protests and strikes and the development of international relations. Thus, such articles are emphasized in my sample. In comparison, both media published relatively few articles on the South African or Brazilian economies with a societal focus. Thus, my final sample contained fewer such articles in comparison with articles on protests, strikes, and the way in which the World Cup was perceived in Brazil/South Africa. That is to say, I tried to create the final sample so that it would be similar to the tentative sample in terms of the proportions of different topics and angles included.

My final sample was also proportioned according to the amount of overall coverage produced by the *NYT* and *HS*. As already explained, the *NYT*'s sample was larger because of the paper's greater amount of resources and ability to provide more coverage: it consisted of 130 articles on South Africa and 130 articles on Brazil, totaling 260 articles. In my tentative sample, the amount of Brazil-related coverage by the *NYT* was almost two times

---

<sup>83</sup> However, some articles that were excluded from the present study were examined in a study where I measured the proportions of perspectives in U.S. and Finnish news coverage on scientific discoveries in Brazilian Amazonia; see Cheas 2016.

<sup>84</sup> See also: <http://www.fsd.uta.fi/menetelmaopetus/otos/otantamenetelmat.html>.

larger than Brazil-related coverage by *HS*; thus, my final *HS* sample on Brazil contained 72 articles in total, making it approximately 55 percent of the size of the final *NYT* sample. Since *HS* published even less content on South Africa, my *HS* sample on South Africa was, again, proportioned according to the relative amount of *NYT* and *HS* coverage and contained 30 articles. In other words, the total size of my *HS* sample was 102 articles. While the time span for both the *NYT* and *HS* encompassed the years 2006–10 for South Africa and 2010–14 for Brazil, *HS*'s coverage was especially scarce in 2006 and no articles during this year met my final sampling criteria.

When the collection of my definite sample had been completed, all of the included articles were numbered. When discussing my findings in regard to individual articles in chapters 6–8, I refer to the articles by number rather than the complete title in order to save space. As has been mentioned, the complete list of numbered articles forming part of my *NYT* and *HS* sample can be found in table 7 (appendices).

The “imbalance” in the size of the *NYT* and *HS* samples obviously sets limitations on my comparative analysis. However, had I analyzed the same number of *NYT* and *HS* stories, such a study would not reflect the actual amount of total coverage published in these two media, leading me to make conclusions based on a relatively smaller sample of the *NYT*'s coverage in comparison with that of *HS*. Given the overall amount of coverage and the resources available to both newspapers, which are also reflected in my sample, I would rather see that my main focus is on the coverage of the central global power, that is, the U.S., and its main national newspaper, while *HS*'s coverage, representing the more marginal Finland, is more limited in size, functioning like a “mirror” by which to analyze the *NYT*'s coverage. This should allow me to assess what makes the *NYT*'s coverage specifically “American,” and vice versa.

As has been noted, I also examined content produced by other American and Finnish media to see how the perspectives used by the *NYT* and *HS* were complemented in these other agenda-setting American and Finnish media. I mostly focused on the online articles produced by the Finnish public broadcaster *YLE* and the American Cable News Network *CNN*. It could of course be argued that *YLE*'s contents should have been analyzed vis-à-vis the American public broadcasting service *PBS*. However, *YLE*'s foreign news production plays a significant agenda-setting role in Finland (see, e.g., Hellman 2010), while the same cannot be said of the *PBS* in the American context; in general, *YLE*'s role in Finland is much more substantial than *PBS*'s role in the U.S. (McChesney and Nichols 2010, 192). Ultimately, *CNN* was chosen since, according to a report by the Pew Research Center,<sup>85</sup> *CNN* remains the leader in terms of the sheer number of foreign bureaus it maintains

---

<sup>85</sup> See *State of the News Media 2016*, authored by Jesse Holcomb/Pew Research Center, available at: <http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/cable-news-fact-sheet/>.

around the world. Since my method was designed to measure proportions of perspectives in *written* content, my analysis of CNN and YLE did not encompass broadcasting. However, I still analyzed short news videos that were linked to the news articles included in my sample. In addition, I explored some of the content of *Taloussanomati* and *The Wall Street Journal* (agenda-setting business papers) and *Time* and *Suomen Kuvalehti* (important news weeklies).

I want to emphasize that I did not carry out a systematic search in the archives of any of the media listed above, as I did in the archives of the NYT and HS. Instead, I specifically searched for articles in these other media based on particular topics covered by the NYT and HS. For instance, the NYT published a substantial quantity of news articles concerning the “pacification” of Rio de Janeiro’s slums by the Brazilian police. I then conducted a search using the key words “Rio de Janeiro pacification slums” in the archives of CNN, the WSJ and *Time*, in this way directly locating particular content rather than going through everything that was published on different topics.

In the following two chapters, I describe how I coded my news-material sample in order to understand the relative size of the news frames and the volume of voices in the coverage. All of the articles in my sample were coded in the same manner. However, the average size of the frames and the average volume of voices, as well as the average share of negative framing towards different fields by other fields, were only measured in the NYT’s and HS’s content, given the systematic way in which this core sample was gathered.



---

#### 4. Frame Analysis: Measuring the Size of the Windows on the World

---

Following the publication of Erving Goffman's book *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* in 1974, frame analysis has become one of the most popular approaches in media studies. Todd Gitlin (1980, 7) defines news frames as persistent patterns of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, noting that frames organize information for both the journalists as well as their audiences. By framing, politicians and other actors use journalists to communicate their preferred views on issues to a wider public, while journalists both use their sources' frames as well as superimpose their own frames upon those of their sources in the process of producing news (D'Angelo and Kuypers 2010, 1). My study examines the proportions of frames expressed and imposed by different Southern and Northern institutions in American and Finnish world news.

When advising scholars on how to do frame analysis, Dennis Chong and James Druckman explain (2007, 107, *italics added*): "An initial set of frames for an issue is identified inductively to create a coding scheme. (...) Coders then analyze a sample, identifying the presence or absence of the predefined frames in the story or article." Indeed, coding for the presence or absence of frames has been the norm in most types of frame analyses (see, e.g., Benson 2009, 408; 2013, 5; de Vreese et al. 2001, 112). However, my argument is that such a method fails to capture the relative breadth of frames in the news. In other words, when coding just for the presence or absence of frames, the results give the illusion that whenever some frames are included in the news, they feature similar proportions – or that the possible differences in their breadth are irrelevant, which I find a questionable claim.

Questions regarding the proportions of frames have certainly been raised before. Such concerns were already embodied in Gaye Tuchman's (1978, 1) classic idea of news as a window on the world – a window that can be large or small. Rodney Benson (2013, 4–5) explains how "a linguistic frame – like a window frame – focuses our attention on a particular vista to the exclusion of others." The goal of the present work has been to create a methodology to measure the relative size of the windows on the world, that is, the news frames used in American and Finnish world news reports depicting South Africa and Brazil. Tuchman (1978, 1) also writes that the view through a window also depends on "whether it has many panes or few." In addition to assessing the breadth of frames, I investigate how frames connect and merge with one another – the extent to which the windows on the world have panes dividing them and how large each of the panes is in

relation to one another. Elaborating on theories about different pluralisms in American and Finnish news (see chapter 3; see also Hallin and Mancini 2004, 29–30), I examine how the quantity and breadth of panes differ in American and Finnish news, at both the news article level as well as the overall sample level.

Many studies have claimed that mainstream news, and American and European world news on the “developing” world in particular, fall short of providing the context for understanding complex phenomena such as poverty (see, e.g., Lugo-Ocando 2015, 62). In the previous chapters, I have already cited James Hertog and Douglas McLeod (2001, 144, 148, *italics added*), according to whom the “news frames provide the widely understood context for understanding new phenomena.” That is to say, the greater the quantity of frames, the more context in the news. Nevertheless, my goal is to also learn how context is created by expanding diverse frames and/or by combining panes of different sizes at the article as well as the overall sample level.

John Maxwell Hamilton and Regina Lawrence (2010, 684) note that “sourcing practices are prime elements in the construction of narratives and frames in the news.” Still, Kevin Carragee and Wim Roefs (2004, 206) have lamented that “[a]lthough a large body of research has looked into media frames, there is a significant lack of examination of the multiple social actors including politicians, organizations, and social movements, who create the frames.” As has been explained, my work combines frame analysis with field analysis (as in Benson 2009; 2013) in order to understand which particular Southern or Northern institutions “sponsor” (Porto 2007, 312) these frames. However, just as my method assesses the relative size of these frames, sponsored as they are by different speakers and journalists, my field analysis also aims to assess the relative volume of the voices of these frame sponsors. In other words, rather than only examining how the “window on the world” is constructed out of differently sized panes, I also examine who contributes to the breadth of each window pane, and how much.

World news, especially that concerning the “developing world,” has generally been characterized as negative (Uskali 2007, 26, 245). To continue with the window metaphor, I considered it important to assess the extent to which the different panes depict “sunshine or thunderstorms;” to measure the relative tone of different news frames and how these frames contribute to the positivity or negativity of the view offered at the level of both a news article and the overall sample. In other words, by assessing the share of positive dimensions within frames of different sizes, my intention was to reveal the relative tone of the world news coverage as well as connect these different nuances with the speakers involved — who (that is, which particular institutions) frames South Africa and Brazil negatively, and how voluminously. Before moving on to describe my method for measuring the size and tones of frames in the news, I will explain how I came up with seven frames in particular, the relative sizes, tones, and sponsors of which are measured in this dissertation.

## The Seven Frames and Their Positive and Negative Dimensions

Frame analysts have distinguished between two types of frames: issue frames and generic frames. The former pertain to particular topics or news events, while the latter are applicable to a range of different news topics (de Vreese et al. 2001, 108). In her extensive review of framing literature published between 1997 and 2007, Porismita Borah (2011, 255) found that most researchers tended to develop a unique set of frames for each study, lamenting that this tendency may prevent frame analysts from making connections to broader theoretical questions (see also Nisbet 2010, 46). In Borah's (2011, 255) view, "developing generic frames identified in prior studies helps to elucidate the conceptual issues." Already a decade earlier, Hertog and McLeod (2001, 151) had emphasized that frames identified in previous works should always be included and tested in subsequent research.

Given that my sample contains news articles produced and published in two different countries – the U.S. and Finland – pertaining to diverse topics in the context of two Southern countries – South Africa and Brazil – my premise was that the frames used in my study should be rather generic in nature. As noted by Claes de Vreese and colleagues (2001, 108–109), "generic frames are broadly applicable to a range of different news topics, some even over time and, potentially, in different cultural contexts." With respect to issue frames, they note that such focused analysis allows for greater specificity, but that the high degree of detail renders issue-specific analysis difficult to compare and generalize.

The frame analyses focusing on generic frames often adopt a deductive approach: predefining certain frames as content-analytic variables to verify the extent to which they occur in the news (see, e.g., Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 94; Van Gorp 2010, 91). However, many studies with this approach focus on the occurrence of just a few specific, generic frames in the news (see, e.g., Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 95), while my frame analysis is concerned with ideological multiperspectivalness: how many different ways of looking at an issue can be found in the news (Benson 2009, 408–409, 2013, 5), and how broadly these views have been elaborated upon. Thus, limiting the scope of frames to a few generally known generic frames would run the risk of potentially dismissing other important perspectives used in the coverage. As opposed to the deductive approach, an inductive approach involves analyzing a news story with an open view to reveal an array of possible frames, beginning with vaguely defined preconceptions of these frames. Holli Semetko and Patti Valkenburg (2000, 94) note that an inductive approach "can detect the many possible ways in which an issue can be framed, but this method is labor intensive, often based on small samples, and can be difficult to replicate."

Given the way my work focuses on Northern coverage of the South, I must be careful not to "impose" any frames that are strongly rooted in Northern/Western cultural contexts and, thus, unsuitable for the kinds of world news I am studying (see Benson 2015, 258).

That is, the frames examined here must be “culturally available” (Benson 2009, 408) in all the different contexts where they may be used. While American and Finnish journalists operate in connection with American and European newsrooms, many of the “sponsors” of these frames are likely to be South African or Brazilian. Still, as my sample is nevertheless a product of American and European journalistic fields, I found that generic frames commonly used in the U.S. and Europe should not be overlooked either.

The most important source for identifying the frames used in this study was my tentative sample (see chapter 3). But as Baldwin Van Gorp notes (2010, 94), since frames are a part of culture, they enjoy a wider circulation than simply being present in news stories. Thus, he emphasizes that the initial stage of analysis, during which time the relevant frames are identified, should not be restricted to just analyzing the news media. Rather, he says “it is advisable to strategically collect sources of ‘frame sponsors’ who use frames for strategic purposes, including, for instance, pressure groups, NGOs, and political parties.” Likewise, Benson (2013, 6) mentions having gone through “dozens of policy papers and academic studies,” not to mention numerous news articles and editorials, in order to formulate the list of relevant frames and fields for his French-American comparison of immigration news.

To adequately perceive the full range of frames relevant for my study, I first of all familiarized myself with South African and Brazilian history and their current sociopolitical situations, as illustrated in chapter 2, and the role of different institutions in these developments. I also explored other frame analyses that focused on coverage of the “Global South” and related issues to understand what kinds of frames or variations in frames could be found in my materials. For instance, I was inspired by Matthew Nisbet’s (2010, 67–69) description of frames on poverty and their key elements. Other world news studies, such as *A Changing World, Unchanging Perspectives: American Newspaper Editors and Enduring Values in Foreign News Reporting* by Tsan-Kuo Chang and colleagues (2012), were helpful for understanding the range of perspectives generally used, and especially, the important perspectives that were often found lacking in American and Western European world news coverage. But given the fact that I was studying “new” news on the transformation of South Africa and Brazil and these countries’ global and local responsibilities in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (see chapter 2), I also wanted to make sure to expose myself to a range of current frames that could appear in the news rather than just assuming that the viewpoints generally used in the coverage of “the developing world” would persist and be as relevant as before. For this purpose, I read reports produced by South-South collaborative bodies such as the BRICS and IBSA, as well as the United Nations, the G20, and so forth. I also familiarized myself with reports by different Southern civic organizations. As I was formulating my frame and field categories, I also took up the habit of reading current daily news produced by South African and Brazilian mainstream and alternative online media sites to learn what issues were being raised by local voices and from what particular angles.



Nisbet (2010, 51) argues that frames should be identified both deductively and inductively, and I believe this is exactly what I ended up doing. Based on my reading of previous framing literature, and the other materials described above, I identified a set of generic frames in my tentative sample — *Responsibility*, *Conflict*, *Human Interest*, and *Economic Consequences* frames — all of which have been found to commonly occur in “Western” news (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 95; see also de Vreese et al. 2001, 109–110; Guenduez et al. 2016, 586). Such common generic frames also include a *Morality* frame (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 95); however, I found that this frame did not resonate with most articles in my sample, except with those news articles that focused on religion and more philosophical topics. In the end, such articles were not included in my final sample (see chapter 3), and I did not include the *Morality* frame in my coding scheme either. Instead, I identified three additional frames, which were not so much based on previous frame analyses as on my sample and other readings; namely, *Credibility*, *Exoticism*, and *World Order* (see table 1 on pp. 80–83 for the specific characteristics of each frame).

As I proceeded in the research, it also became clear that in my sample, the four generic frames that I had found to be relevant took slightly different forms compared with how they had been defined by other researchers in different contexts. For instance, Ali Asker Guenduez and colleagues (2016, 584) have found that the *Attribution of Responsibility* and *Conflict* frames are strongly associated with a negative tone, while in my sample I clearly identified both negative and positive tones in these frames. Without careful measurement, it seemed difficult to say which tone dominated in each particular case. For instance, the *Responsibility* frame was frequently used to emphasize the way that the South African and Brazilian governments were trying to solve issues, for instance by creating diverse social welfare programs. But just as often, it seemed that the frame depicted the irresponsibility of different institutions in these and other Southern countries. Not only did I find that these frames were relevant, but they were also fruitful for the development of my methodology to measure the relative tones of the frames vis-à-vis the frame size.

To identify these generic frames at this initial stage, I chose to build on specific items that Semetko and Valkenburg (2000, 98) had developed for this purpose; each item was meant to measure a particular frame. For instance, their items for identifying the *Attribution of Responsibility* frame included the following: “Does the story suggest that some level of the government has the ability to alleviate the problem?” and “Does the story suggest the problem requires urgent action?” (ibid., 100). However, their model did not contain a similar amount of items for each frame, nor was it systematically designed to distinguish between positive and negative tones. At this point, I began developing the basis for my coding: six items for each frame, three to measure positive dimensions and three to measure negative dimensions. For instance, to elaborate on Semetko and Valkenburg’s first item, “Does the story suggest that some level of the government has the ability to alleviate

the problem,” I created an equivalent item to identify the corresponding negative dimension: “Does the story suggest that some level of government does not have the ability to alleviate the problem?” While it would have been fascinating to also code for “neutral” frames, I did not want to complicate my coding scheme too much. I also found that in most instances, the coverage was clearly positive or negative rather than neutral. Thus, the scarcer neutral dimensions of frames were coded along the positive dimensions vs. negative dimensions; in this way, I was nevertheless able to say how much of the coverage was clearly negative in tone.

As my study advanced, I elaborated on the generic frames based on my research materials. For instance, the original “Conflict” frame became the *Conflict and Peace* frame, as I learned that news coverage depicting dissension was often complemented with views expressing positive chances for agreement and collaboration. Furthermore, the “Economic Consequences” frame was converted into the *Social and Economic Impact* frame. This was because the original “Economic Consequences” frame could only be applied in contexts where someone’s financial interests were involved, while many of my news materials instead, or often simultaneously, dealt with symbolic interests. For instance, when South Africa and Brazil were pursuing seats in the United Nations Security Council, the leaders of those countries would emphasize the significance of such an appointment for their respective countries and/or how not getting the seat would affect them. In the coverage concerning commissions investigating crimes committed during the apartheid era in South Africa and the dictatorship in Brazil, the consequences were also symbolic rather than merely economic in nature.

Stephen Reese (2010, 21) notes that news frames can either be “macro” or smaller in scope. My frames are certainly macro rather than micro in scope, and it can be said that smaller *subframes* can be found within these big frames: the *Social and Economic Impact* frame contains an *Inequality* subframe within the larger frame. Item no. 21 of this larger frame portrays some individual or institution as lacking the resources to pursue a desired action, while the corresponding positive item, no. 22, describes some individual’s, institution’s, or country’s sufficient or ample resources for pursuing a desired action. When both dimensions were found in the same news article, the story then depicted inequality between these particular individuals and/or institutions, even if the word “inequality” was not explicitly mentioned in the text. But the proportions within the frame were not necessarily balanced: a story may have emphasized someone’s abundant resources and only briefly mentioned someone else’s complete lack of resources, or vice versa. In this way, the proportions of positive and negative dimensions within these frames also illuminated power relations between the different countries, institutions, or individuals involved.

In similar fashion, I created items to identify the positive and negative dimensions of the *Credibility*, *Exoticism*, and *World Order* frames, which I had identified based on my sample

and related readings. In the end, then, I had seven frames and 42 items in total; six for each frame. With the help of these items, I measured the relative size of each frame by counting the number of words featuring different dimensions pertaining to that particular frame and then proportioning their sum in relation to the overall length of the article. The relative tone of each frame was assessed by proportioning the number of words featuring positive dimensions within each frame vis-à-vis the total number of words in that particular frame. These measurements and the related coding will be explained in more detail below.

An important observation about the tones of the frames is that different experiences can be either positive or negative for different people. Therefore, the “positivity” or “negativity” of a story always depends on its angle. To avoid confusion, the *Credibility*, *Exoticism*, and *World Order* frames were always coded positive when they depicted South African or Brazilian accomplishments and negative when they portrayed these countries’ failures and pitfalls. A large positive *World Order* frame, as conceptualized in my study, suggests that South African or Brazilian leadership was recognized positively in the newspaper by the American/Finnish journalist or by some source quoted. But simultaneously, these frames “on the positive side” may have depicted the decay or collapse of other countries, such as the United States or European nations. When quoted, institutions also at times framed themselves or their allies positively – for instance, through the positive *Responsibility* frame, governments often argued that they had indeed resolved a problem, while certain citizens may have voiced very different experiences. Thus, just as with the size of frames, their tone must also always be examined vis-à-vis the frame sponsor as well as the objects of the framing.

Table 1 on the next pages provides examples of the dimensions of the seven news frames as they occur *individually* in the paragraphs of the news articles being studied. However, in this and the previous chapters of this dissertation I have also explained my interest in the ways in which these windows onto the world are combined and expanded. As I began to apply the items to identify the dimensions in my sample, I soon discovered that most of the time, and especially in American news, these dimensions significantly *overlap* with the dimensions of other frames in the same paragraph. In table 2 on page 85, I demonstrate how the frame dimensions presented in pages 80–83 overlap in my sample at paragraph level.

## Frame Analysis: Measuring the Size of the Windows on the World

DIMENSION NO.	ITEM to detect the particular dimension of the frame at the paragraph level	EXCERPTS FROM THE NYT SAMPLE Paragraphs illustrating the character of each dimension
<b>ATtribution OF REsponsibility FRaME</b>		
1 (neg.)	Does the article suggest that some individual/institution/country is/should be held responsible for a particular situation?	Art no. 150, par. 2: A human rights court said that a Brazilian amnesty law (...) was responsible for the forced disappearance of at least 70 peasants and militants.
2 (pos.)	Does the article credit some individual/institution/country with having resolved a particular situation?	Art. no. 45, par. 13: He announced the reappointment of the finance minister, Trevor Manuel, who is credited with keeping the nation's economy at a hum.
3 (neg.)	Does the article suggest that some individual/institution/country does not have the ability to fix a particular situation?	Art. no. 177, par. 22: "Those responsible are the people we elected to protect us," he said. 'City Hall,' he specified. "They failed to prevent this from happening."
4 (pos.)	Does the article suggest that some individual/institution/country does have the ability to fix a particular situation?	Art. no. 73, par. 13: "There is no place that will be hidden from me," Mr. Zuma announced, leaving the impression he (...) would pop up wherever malingerers were not earning their paychecks.
5 (neg.)	Does the article describe how an individual/institution/country is ignoring or downplaying a particular problem?	Art. no. 150, par. 9: Lula da Silva's government did little to break the pattern of earlier governments in not going after those responsible for the dictatorship crimes.
6 (pos.)	Does the article describe how an individual/institution/country is trying to resolve the problem?	Art. no. 79, par. 8: Dr. Aaron Motsoaledi (...) has accepted the government's responsibility for past failings and begun charting a more comprehensive approach to the AIDS crisis.
<b>HUMAN INTEREST FRaME</b>		
7 (neg.)	Does the article describe how people are upset, sad, or disappointed?	Art. no. 47, par. 5: Her disappointment is not only with herself; she is heartsick about her country.
8 (pos.)	Does the article describe people's happiness and excitement?	Art. no. 32, par. 18: Once home, she said: "I just sat and watched them. And I was very happy."
9 (neg.)	Does the article describe how individuals are affected by a particular issue or situation?	Art no. 73, par. 17: "We have to dig a pit for a toilet, and when it's full, we dig another. They tell us we are on a waiting list to get services. Whether I'll die first, I don't know."
10 (pos.)	Does the article describe how individuals have benefited from a particular situation?	Art. no. 77, par. 24: Abongile (...) noted appreciatively that she did not have to sit with chattering teeth in class this winter because the broken windows had been fixed.
11 (neg.)	Does the article describe personal lives (e.g., where people live, where they work or study, what they wear or eat, etc.) in a negative light; i.e., people being miserable?	Art. no. 32, par. 17: Zelda Hansen, 37, the wife of a welder and mother of sons aged 4, 12, and 14, has lived at the hospital for more than a year. (...) Her eldest son has started to seem like a stranger to her, she said, while her youngest, her 'flower pot,' was growing up without her guidance.
12 (pos.)	Does the article describe personal lives (e.g., where people live, where they work or study, what they wear or eat, etc.) in a neutral or positive light; i.e., people's lives being good?	Art. no. 209, par. 18: As a teenager, Mr. Barbosa moved to the capital, Brasilia, finding work as a janitor in a courtroom. Against the odds, he got into the University of Brasilia, the only black student in its law program at the time. Wanting to see the world, he later won admission into Brazil's diplomatic service, which promptly sent him to Helsinki...
<b>CONFLICT AND PEACE FRaME</b>		
13 (neg.)	Does the article describe explicit disagreement/confrontation between individuals/institutions/countries?	Art. no. 31, par. 7: Dr. Plaff's case has stirred a furious reaction from rural doctors and advocates on AIDS issues...

14 (pos.)	Does the article describe how individuals or institutions with different interests have reached an agreement about something?	Art. no. 43, par. 5: The party's secretary general announced the ouster at a news conference. (...) He welcomed the news and agreed that he is going to participate in the process and the formalities.
15 (neg.)	Does one individual/institution/country reproach another?	Art. 134, par. 13: Earlier in the week, Mr. da Silva scolded the world's most powerful nations on Brazilian television, saying that none of the heads of state pushing hardest for sanctions had spoken directly with Mr. Ahmadinejad.
16 (pos.)	Does one individual/institution/country apologize or try to politely approach another?	Art. no. 67, par. 23: Mr. Zuma has appealed to people to be patient. "There must not be violence between us," he told a rally last week (...) "Let us work together."
17 (neg.)	Does the article present a contradictory viewpoint or definition of a situation in comparison with the definitions offered elsewhere in the article? Often detectable by words such as "nevertheless," "still," "but," "however," etc.	Art. 185, par. 7–8: As millions of poor Brazilians are shielded from the slowdown, Ms. Rousseff's approval ratings remain high. Still, critics are growing more vocal about the need for Brazil to become more energetic in addressing complex structural dilemmas weighing the economy down...
18 (pos.)	Does the article describe how different individuals/groups/ideologies can coexist peacefully?	Art. no. 155, par. 3: The two countries' differences were also aired, if gently, as Mr. Obama met with the newly elected president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who has signaled a desire for closer relations with the United States...
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT FRAME		
19 (neg.)	Is the emphasis on how something is/has not been/will not be profitable for an institution/country (materially and/or symbolically)?	Art. no. 79, par. 12: 'These are some of the chilling statistics that demonstrate the devastating impact that HIV and AIDS is having on our nation,' Mr. Zuma said. 'Not even the youngest are spared.'
20 (pos.)	Is the emphasis on how something is/has been/will be profitable for an institution/country (materially and/or symbolically)?	Art. no. 245, par. 7: The 420-page stadium manual published by FIFA, soccer's world governing body, says that a new arena "provides many benefits for the local community" and enhances community pride. It says many new stadiums have gymnasiums, shops and other perks for residents.
Inequality subframe	21 (neg.)	Does the article emphasize someone's/some institution's/country's lack of resources for pursuing a desired action?
	22 (pos.)	Does the article emphasize someone's/some institution's/some country's degree of sufficient or abundant resources for pursuing a desired action?
	23 (neg.)	Does the article emphasize how pursuing or not pursuing a course of action has had/has/could have a negative impact on something?
	24 (pos.)	Does the article emphasize how pursuing or not pursuing a course of action has had/ has/could have a positive impact on something?
		Art. 64, par. 19: The superintendent is new to this command and said he tried to keep at least six vehicles on patrol in Diepsloot, but said that the few paved roads did not penetrate the contorted pathways of the shacks...
		Art. 93, par. 10: The South African Finance Ministry said it expected that the broadened access to drugs would put a million more people on treatment in the next few years, roughly doubling the current case load. It has budgeted an extra \$1 billion for it. Mr. Motsoaledi said Mr. Zuma reopened the budget to get more money for AIDS when it became clear that costs would be higher.
		Art. no. 141, par. 25: She said she was concerned that the influx of workers would usher in gangs, drugs and crime, as has happened in the building of other dams.
		Art. no. 70, par. 17: The authors of the papers prescribed what they considered an affordable agenda to improve the health system, including a more strategic effort to prevent the further spread of H.I.V.

Table 1 (continued through pages 80–83): Items for identifying the negative and positive dimensions of frames, with excerpts from the NYT sample. The dimensions 21 and 22, if found in the same article context, constitute the *Inequality* subframe within the *Social and Economic Impact* frame. For translated excerpts from the *HS* sample, see table 6 (appendices).

## Frame Analysis: Measuring the Size of the Windows on the World

DIMENSION NO.	ITEM to detect the particular dimension of the frame at the paragraph level	EXCERPTS FROM THE NYT SAMPLE Paragraphs illustrating the character of each dimension
<b>C R E D I B I L I T Y   F R A M E</b>		
25 (neg.)	Does the article contain expressions of concern or doubt as to whether South Africa/Brazil/their institutions can handle an issue/problem because of some difficult circumstances/situation?	Art. no. 83, par. 6: Will South Africa be able to deliver an event untainted by the country's notorious crime, creeping xenophobia and social unease?
26 (pos.)	Does the article emphasize South Africa's/Brazil's/their institution's ability to handle an issue/situation despite difficult circumstances?	Art. no. 115, par. 5: A fledgling democracy that has struggled to address its profound social ills proudly discovered it could deliver a mega-event that required years of careful investment and planning.
27 (neg.)	Does the article evaluate how South Africa/Brazil or some institution in these countries is acting/behaving worse than expected in a particular situation?	Art. no. 13, par. 12: What has left some of South Africa's admirers slack-jawed is the apparent incongruity of its positions. (...) South Africa's current leaders are withholding the same sorts of international condemnations that sustained them when they were battling oppression.
28 (pos.)	Does the article evaluate how South Africa/Brazil or some institution in these countries is acting/behaving according to or above expectations in a particular situation?	Art. 111, par. 3: A cataclysmic wave of violent crime in South Africa, the fear of so many World Cup killjoys, has simply not occurred. No wave, barely a ripple.
29 (neg.)	Is South Africa's/Brazil's/their institutions' performance compared to the more successful performance of other countries in dealing with a similar issue/situation?	Art. no. 142, par. 8: Over the past decade, Brazil's students have scored among the lowest of any country's students taking international exams (...) trailing fellow Latin American nations like Chile.
30 (pos.)	Is South Africa's/Brazil's/their institutions' performance appreciated as equal or superior to that of other countries in dealing with a similar issue/situation?	Art. no. 137, par. 19: Neither Ms. Bachelet [President of Chile] nor Mr. Uribe [President of Colombia] reached the "emotional depths of sheer allegiance and loyalty that Lula was able to inspire in a lot of Brazilians," Mr. Shifter said.
<b>E X O T I C I S M   F R A M E</b>		
31 (neg.)	Is a South African/Brazilian individual/institution/ phenomenon described as traditional/ unique in a negative light?	Art. 174, par. 15: Brazil's political culture has done its share in contributing to delays, with corruption scandals involving high-ranking sports officials.
32 (pos.)	Is a South African/Brazilian individual/institution/phenomenon described as traditional/special/unique in a neutral/positive light?	Art. 218, par. 15: Pelada has always been a part of Brazilian culture, and it has adapted to the country's changing face. In São Paulo, for example, the hub for pelada used to be on the edges of the city's two rivers, the Pinheiros and the Tieté. Players would scamper alongside the water in games that were known collectively as futebol de varzea...
33 (neg.)	Description of South African/Brazilian reality: what does the country look/smell/feel like? Negative adjectives.	Art. 233, par. 4—5: Garbage bobbed on the surface, everything from car tires to floating mattresses. The water reeked so badly of sewage that he was afraid to put his feet in to launch his boat from shore. 'I have never seen anything like this before,' Mr. Delle Karth said of Guanabara Bay in Rio de Janeiro, where the Olympic sailing and windsurfing events take place.
34 (pos.)	Description of South African/Brazilian reality: what does the country look/smell/feel like? Positive adjectives.	Art 221, par. 9: Baroque architectural gems grace this city. Musicians enthrall audiences with high-octane performances reflecting Salvador's status as a bastion of Brazil's popular culture...

35 (neg.)	Does the article describe South African/Brazilian rituals/beliefs/practices that are deemed dangerous, absurd, or harmful?	Art. 7, par. 16: In fact, the party's leaders – and thus, South Africa's leaders – have traditionally been picked by party bigwigs behind closed doors, a custom that dilutes the value of Mr. Zuma's megawatt charisma. In that tight circle of insiders, the dark horses to succeed Mr. Mbeki include the party's national chairman, Mosiuoa Lekota...
36 (pos.)	Does the article describe South African/Brazilian rituals/beliefs/practices that are deemed fun or productive?	Art. 117, par. 21: There is a South African concept, Ubuntu, that describes an approach to life that is characterized by selflessness, sharing, unity and respect.
WORLD ORDER FRAME		
37 (neg.)	Does the article speak of South Africa/Brazil as an integral/natural part of (or similar to) other countries or continents, with the other countries/continents being described in negative terms?	Art. no. 14, par. 12: FIFA departed from its norms – and perhaps took a gamble – when it awarded the 2010 World Cup to South Africa in 2004. Not since Chile was the host of the games in 1962 has soccer's governing body chosen a nation as underdeveloped as this one, according to Econometrix...
38 (pos.)	Does the article speak of South Africa/Brazil as an integral/natural part of (or similar to) other countries or continents, with the other countries/continents being described in neutral or positive terms?	Art. 146, par. 4: Mrs. Rousseff (...) joins a growing wave of democratically elected female leaders in the region and in the world in the past five years, including Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina and Angela Merkel in Germany.
39 (neg.)	Does the articles describe how cultural, political and/or economic circumstances have worsened (or remained equally bad) in South Africa/Brazil?	Art. no. 47, par. 11: The country's power company unfathomably ran out of electricity and rationed supply. Gone was the conceit that South Africa was the one place on the continent immune of such incompetence.
40 (pos.)	Does the article describe how cultural, political and/or economic circumstances have improved (or remained equally good) in South Africa/Brazil?	Art. no. 118, par. 6: Since the World Cup has been attributed to South Africa in 2004, definitely the economy of South Africa is rising, and they're not any longer considered a developing country but an emerging country.
41 (neg.)	Does the article describe South Africa/Brazil/their institutions as a follower/receiver (in comparison with other countries and their institutions)?	Article no. 182, par. 12: Brazil still trails other nations, notably China and the United States, which have far more expensive aid programs and trade in Africa.
42 (pos.)	Does the article describe South Africa/Brazil/their institutions as a leader/donor (in comparison with other countries and their institutions)?	Article no. 69, par. 5: South Africa is a powerhouse in Africa, with an impressive mineral-driven economy and considerable clout across the continent. Mrs. Clinton said she wanted the nation the play a larger role not just in Africa but on the global stage as well, helping in the battle against climate change, for instance.

Table 1 (continued through pages 80–83): Items for identifying the negative and positive dimensions of frames with excerpts from the NYT sample.

## Overlapping Dimensions of Frames

In her systematic review of scholarly literature on framing, Borah (2011, 255) found that only a small number (3.2%) of frame analyses have examined *mixed frames*. I have already presented my argument that focusing on the ways in which frames intertwine and overlap is particularly important, given the fact that when frames are combined the news coverage can reach beyond the limitations of individual “windows,” and *amplify the vision* and context provided in the news.

In my sample, the overlap mostly occurred either on the negative or the positive side of the frames. For instance, negative dimensions of the *Responsibility frame* often overlapped with negative dimensions of the *Social and Economic Impact frame*, depicting how, for example, the irresponsible behavior of some politicians affects the lives of people, or vice versa; on the positive side, some politicians were framed as responsible persons, and consequently, their actions were framed as having a positive impact on different people’s lives. But it was also relatively common for positive *and* negative dimensions of different frames to overlap in the same article and even in the same paragraph. To continue with the same example, negative dimensions of the *Responsibility frame* sometimes overlapped with positive dimensions of the *Impact frame*, describing how the corrupt behavior of a certain politician had led to his/her dismissal and demonstrating that the country was overcoming the problem of impunity and enhancing the honesty of its government; such a paragraph might also have featured a positive dimension in the *Credibility frame*.<sup>86</sup>

I want to clarify and emphasize that my frame dimension categories are *not* mutually exclusive (see Van Gorp 2010, 99). Still, none of the frames “depend” on the other – each frame and dimension also occurred independently in different contexts, promoting a particular view that clearly differed from the views in the other frames. But I also found that most paragraphs contained dimensions of multiple frames. The number of different dimensions per paragraph also depended on the length of the paragraph. However, most paragraphs – even the longest ones – did not tend to contain more than four frames. In Table 2, I have gathered some examples of overlapping positive and negative dimensions of frames (examples again from the NYT).

---

<sup>86</sup> The *Credibility frame* contains a description of South Africa’s and Brazil’s performance under difficult circumstances; see dimensions 25–30 in Table 1.



OVERLAPPING NEGATIVE DIMENSIONS OF DIFFERENT FRAMES	OVERLAPPING POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DIMENSIONS OF DIFFERENT FRAMES	OVERLAPPING POSITIVE DIMENSIONS OF DIFFERENT FRAMES
Art. no. 3, par. 3. Frames: <i>Conflict and Peace</i> (dim. 15) and <i>Responsibility</i> (dim. 5): “A top United Nations official delivered a blistering attack on South Africa on Friday at the closing of the 16th international AIDS meeting here, saying that its government ‘is still obtuse, dilatory and negligent about rolling out treatment.’”	Art. no. 95, par. 12. Frames: <i>Responsibility</i> (dim. 3, negat.) and <i>Impact</i> (dim. 20, posit.): “‘Everyone said we need a leader who can set an example,’ said Jonny Steinberg, author of ‘Sizwe’s test,’ which showed the deep stigma still associated with AIDS in rural South Africa. ‘It just so happens we’ve thrown up a leader who makes a negative example, but it’s good enough. It’s started a conversation among ordinary people.’”	Article 71, par. 3. Frames: <i>Responsibility</i> (dim. 4) and <i>Credibility</i> (dim. 26): “The new government of President Jacob Zuma seems to have a clearer-eyed view of the problem, its remedies and the need to improve the overall health care system than its predecessor did. Fixing what’s broken will not be easy, but we are encouraged by signs of a commitment to do so.”
Art. no. 222, par. 26-27: Frames: <i>Responsibility</i> (dim. 3), <i>Conflict</i> (dim. 15); <i>Impact</i> (dim. 19), <i>Exoticism</i> (dim. 35): “A project started under the previous mayor, twice over budget at \$250 million and marooned in the middle of a highway, the place has provoked angry complaints that it is out of touch with both the city’s culture and its real needs. A concrete complex of theaters, raised sky high on giant piers, the center may be the most absurd new building in years. (...) People in charge complained to me about whole sections of unusable seats with no views (...) and stairs going nowhere.”	Art. no. 107, par 27. Frames: <i>Credibility</i> (dim. 25, negat.), <i>World Order</i> (dim. 40, posit.), and <i>Conflict and Peace</i> (dim. 14, posit.): “Sunat Gulati, the president of the United States Soccer Federation, said South Africa would face challenges more difficult than were faced by other recent World Cup host countries. ‘In some ways, we won’t know if it meets the challenges until the tournament starts,’ Gulati said. ‘But when you look at the history of the world over the last 25 years, an extraordinary story has unfolded in South Africa. It’s hard to argue with the decision to play here...’”	Art. no. 95, par. 8. Frames: <i>Responsibility</i> (dim. 6), <i>Human Interest</i> (dim. 12), and <i>Impact</i> (dim. 24): “‘It has been my style that I don’t hide things,’ Mr. Zuma said, adding that he had been circumcised ‘some time ago’ but hoped, by going public about it, to encourage other men to follow his lead. ‘I thought it was important because that could help quite a few other people who, if I did not do it, they would be hesitant and not knowing what to do.’”
Art. no. 145, par. 11. Frames: <i>Human Interest</i> (dim. 7) and <i>Conflict and Peace</i> (dim. 13): “‘Nobody likes us here,’ Officer Luis Pizarro said during a recent night patrol. ‘It can be frustrating sometimes.’”	Art. no 199, par. 5: Frames: <i>Responsibility</i> (dim. 6, posit.), <i>Conflict and Peace</i> (dim. 13, negat.), <i>Impact</i> (dim. 24, posit): “Ms. Rousseff expanded upon proposals she unveiled on Friday in a nationally televised address. She said Monday that the government would allocate more than \$22 billion to upgrading public transit systems, largely by building subways, and emphasized that hiring foreign doctors to work at beleaguered public hospitals – an unpopular plan among Brazilian doctor groups – would be an ‘emergency step.’”	Art. no. 182, par. 3. Frames: <i>World Order</i> (dim. 42), <i>Impact</i> (dim. 24), and <i>Conflict and Peace</i> (dim. 14): “In Mozambique, Brazil’s government is opening a plant making anti-retroviral drugs to fight the AIDS epidemic. Brazil is lending \$150 million to Kenya to build roads and ease congestion in the capital, Nairobi. And in Angola, a rising oil power, a new security agreement seeks to expand the training of Angolan military personnel in Brazil.”

Table 2: Overlapping dimensions of frames at the paragraph level with excerpts from the NYT.

In the table on the previous page, I illustrated the overlapping dimensions of frames in the different news articles that form part of my sample. The middle column shows how positive and negative dimensions of the different frames can coexist without canceling each other out. However, there were some instances where both positive and negative dimensions of the *same* frame occurred in the same paragraph – in such cases, the negative dimension usually subverted the positive one. The most common case of such “defeasance” had to do with the *Inequality* subframe occurring within the *Impact* frame, which has already been discussed earlier in this chapter: when the same paragraph described someone’s “haves” and someone else’s “have-nots,” *both* dimensions of the *Impact* frame were coded as *negative*.

I will take another example of a positive dimension being converted into a negative one in regard to the *Conflict and Peace* frame. The example is from NYT article no. 47, paragraph 15, which contains the following description: “Rich and poor, black, white and mixed race: their complaints may differ, but the discontent is shared. Polls show a pervasive distrust of government, political parties and the police.” Here, the same paragraph seems to contain positive dimension no. 14, reflecting *agreement* between “the rich and poor, black, white and mixed race” people in that the authorities are not to be trusted. However, this very “pervasive distrust” provokes negative dimension no. 15 of the same frame, as these groups are framed as reproaching the authorities. In addition, the passage features a negative dimension of the *Responsibility* frame, while the *Conflict and Peace* frame was also coded as negative. However, I still want to emphasize that this sort of “defeasance” only occurred *within* frames; dimensions of one frame cannot change the tone of another frame.

Before explaining my coding process in more detail, I still want to note, as Hertog and McLeod (2001, 143–145) have also pointed out, that *frames are not the same as themes or topics*. Rather, frames shape what we learn about different topics. Van Gorp (2010, 94) advises that the most important guideline for frame analysis is not to focus on what a text is about, but on how the story is told. This said, there are obvious connections between frames and topics. For example, a story about presidential elections is likely to feature a large *Conflict and Peace* frame (describing disagreement or agreement between different candidates) and *Social and Economic Impact* frame (how choosing a specific candidate would benefit or affect different sectors of society). However, it could also feature a *Responsibility* frame (what the government or the different candidates have accomplished or what problems they have been unable to or have not wanted to solve). Furthermore, a story about presidential elections could have a *Human Interest* frame, emphasizing the personal characteristics or background of the candidates and/or the feelings of citizens (gratefulness, excitement, disappointment, fear) voting for a particular candidate. It could even feature an *Exoticism* frame, placing emphasis on how the voting system in Brazil or South Africa differs significantly from the systems in other countries, and so forth. In principle, *any* of my seven frames can and, in fact, did tend to occur in relation to *any* news topic in my

sample – my concern was their different proportions and tones in different contexts and how these were connected to the frame sponsors.

Finally, my sample also contained *frameless* paragraphs. These are usually short paragraphs expressing *factual* information from no particular angle; Van Gorp (2010, 94) calls these “short informative messages.” For instance, the following short passage, included at the end of NYT article no. 3 contains no frame: “The next AIDS conference will be held in Mexico City in August 2008.” In some rare cases, a paragraph was coded as frameless because none of my 42 dimensions could capture a frame in that paragraph, even if the paragraph seemed to contain one. Hence, in such cases none of my frames were “imposed” upon the paragraph, but rather, it was acknowledged that, should these paragraphs contain a frame, they were beyond the scope of my analysis and the range of frames being analyzed. However, as already explained in the section on sampling in chapter 3, my final sample was constructed so that articles that were too different thematically were excluded. These stories, mostly concerning art, religion, and science, could not have been successfully coded given my seven frames and their dimensions. Perhaps for this reason – and because the news articles I analyzed seemed to contain a rather consistent set of “macro frames” – frameless space usually takes up only a small percentage of each article’s space, sometimes there is no frameless space at all.

In their comparison of American, French, and Norwegian news, Rodney Benson and Tim Wood (2015, 812) found a substantial amount of frameless quotes in all of the media examined. A principal difference between their work and mine, however, was that these authors coded for the presence or absence of frames (*ibid.*, 809) rather than for their relative breadth. In my work, I often found just a few dimensions of one or more frames in an article; had I been coding for the presence or absence of “the whole frame,” the criteria of “presence” in such cases might not have been met.<sup>87</sup> What is more, some scholars have conceptualized frames as “interpretive packages,” detectable by a number of framing devices such as metaphors, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images (see, e.g., Borah 2011, 249). Benson (2013, 5, footnote 6) takes issue with such coherent frame packages, noting that “one rarely discovers such fully developed frames in news articles.” Still, Van Gorp (2010, 100) emphasizes that “coders should be trained to recognize the framing and reasoning devices and to code not for the individual devices but for the frame package as a whole.”

In my study, the focus was specifically on the individual positive and negative dimensions of frames and how their interplay can contribute to the multiperspectival coverage of complex realities. As I have explained, coding just for the presence or absence of frames or

---

<sup>87</sup> Of course, this depends on the coding criteria in each study. However, for a frame to be coded as “present,” it usually has to be clearly identifiable, whereas in my analysis the “presence” of a frame in an article may be manifested as a single dimension in just one paragraph.

even for complete “frame packages” may lead the researcher to overlook smaller windows, which may have not been elaborated upon as comprehensively but which still can play an important role in the coverage. In Tuchman’s (1978, 1) metaphorical language, some windows may be very small, or opaque, next to big and clear ones. In short: the way that my study takes into account the most minuscule and opaque panes may help explain why “completely frameless space” was found to be so small in my work in comparison with other studies. Another difference is that my work elaborates on frames that are rather generic and macro in character.

I will now move on to a detailed overview of the coding process, after which, to conclude this chapter, I will address some concerns related to the reliability of my framing analysis.

### Coding and Counting the Size of Frames

As has already been noted, my study of frame proportions proceeded at the paragraph level. Before beginning the coding process, I divided each story into paragraphs, usually building directly on the paragraph divisions made by the journalist; most American and Finnish news articles in my sample consisted of short pieces of text that were separated from other similar units with a short space in between. The paragraphs were then numbered in successive order, with the title being the first paragraph. Captions were also conceptualized as paragraphs and assigned a number depending on their position in the article. In the coding sheet, every paragraph was identified by its particular number (see illustration on page 91).

In the first reading, I counted the total number of words in each paragraph and marked this number in the second column on the coding sheet. In the third column, I marked the codes of the items with which I identified particular dimensions of frames (see table 1) for each paragraph. Following each dimension code, I added in parentheses the number of words pertaining to that particular dimension. Usually, the dimensions of frames identified in a particular paragraph took up the whole paragraph. Thus, if a paragraph contained, for example, 35 words, and I identified, say, frame dimension no. 27 (negative *Credibility* frame, depicting someone or something falling short of expectations) and this particular dimension was detectable throughout the whole paragraph, I marked 27(35) in my sheet. As has also been noted earlier, each paragraph can have multiple dimensions of different frames. Hence, if the same paragraph contained a dimension from some other frame, say no. 5 (negative *Responsibility*, emphasizing how someone has dismissed or downplayed a problem), and it overlapped with the *Credibility* frame throughout the paragraph, I wrote 5(35) in the same column.

In some instances, a particular frame dimension may be limited to only one part of the paragraph. In such a case, the paragraph was broken down into sentences, with a sentence being the smallest unit of analysis. Thus, if for instance in the next paragraph of this

imaginary example the total number of words is 42, and dimension 11 of the *Human Interest* frame can be clearly detected in the whole paragraph, while dimension 31 of the *Exoticism* frame is clearly limited to one sentence containing 17 words, I marked them as 11(42) and 31(17). However, as mentioned, dimensions not taking up the whole paragraph are quite rare.

Even though I preferred to code all the articles and to do the calculations at first manually, I used Microsoft Excel to save all the data in digital format and verify my calculations. After completing the coding for each article, I counted, with the help of Excel, the overall length of each story by summing up the total number of words in each paragraph. I then counted the total number of words pertaining to each frame as a whole by summing up the number of words containing its different dimensions. This total number of words was then proportioned with respect to the overall article length, resulting in a percentage reflecting the frame's total size. Then, finally, I counted the relative share of positive dimensions within each frame to illustrate their relative tone at the article level.

For example, if an article has 1200 words altogether, and if the different dimensions of the *Responsibility* frame take up 750 words, the overall "size" of this frame is 62.5% of the total article's space (with all percentages being rounded to one decimal point). And if, say, 350 of these 750 words are taken up by positive dimensions, their relative share within the frame is 46.7% (that is, the rest of the frame is made up of negative dimensions). The same article could also feature, for instance, a *Credibility* frame that takes up 51% of the article's space and contains 42% positive dimensions. As said, in most articles the frames overlap, creating broader frameworks. Thus, when counting the overall size of the frames in an article, their total sum usually exceeds 100%. However, it is rare that two or more frames in an article would have the exact same size. Usually, the different dimensions of particular frames overlap in some paragraphs, but are also used independently and in connection with the other frames.

One important reason leading me to conceptualize the size of the frames as percentages, rather than simply in relation to the total number of words, is that the *English language tends to have more words than Finnish*. For instance, "in my house" would be *talossani* in Finnish, with *talo* signifying "house," *ssa* signifying "in," and *ni* signifying "my." The American news articles generally contain a much greater number of words than the Finnish news articles, and, thus, the frames in American news also tend to contain more words than in Finnish stories. By proportioning the number of words pertaining to each frame and each dimension in accordance with the overall article length, the analysis depicts the *relative* share of article space granted to each frame rather than suggesting that American frames are larger simply because they contain a greater number of words.

As has been explained, my analysis identified frames and their dimensions *at the manifest level* and did not look for latent meanings. However, in order to code for the title – that is, the first paragraph – it was usually necessary to code the rest of the article first. This is because the title is usually relatively short and, thus, contains frames expressed in a condensed manner. Often, the title seemingly contained only one dimension of just one frame, but after having coded the whole article, it became apparent that there were several dimensions. That is to say, only after coding the whole article and discovering how it was framed did the different connotations in the title become apparent. Hence, it could be said that the title is often the “least manifest” paragraph and this is why it is always coded last.

In most cases, the frame dimensions in the paragraphs were quite manifest and clear. Sometimes, a particular paragraph may have seemed to feature some dimension of a particular frame, but this was not completely clear. Often, however, this “unclear” frame appeared more clearly in the next paragraph. It was as if the preceding paragraph were “anticipating” it, but it had not yet fully developed. In such cases, the dimension was typically coded for both paragraphs. When marking dimensions in my coding sheet, rather than marking the codes of the dimensions in a strictly numerical order, I always started with the “clearest” dimension. In this way, when revising my coding I paid special attention to the last codes marked in each row, since these codes referred to the dimensions that I was most unsure about.

On the next page, I present a concrete example of my coding of NYT article no. 142. To save space, I have not illustrated the coding of the whole article. The frame analysis and coding of this particular example article are explained in the subsequent pages; the field analysis and related coding are explained in chapter 5.

## AMERICAS

*Educational Gaps Limit Brazil's Reach*

By ALEXEI BARRIONUEVO SEPT. 4, 2010



A school in Catob, Brazil. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's hometown. Andre Vieira for The New York Times

CAETÉS, Brazil — When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in as Brazil's president in early 2003, he emotionally declared that he had finally earned his "first diploma" by becoming president of the country.

One of Brazil's least educated presidents — Mr. da Silva completed only the fourth grade — soon became one of its most beloved, lifting millions out of extreme poverty, stabilizing Brazil's economy and earning near-legendary status both at home and abroad.

But while Mr. da Silva has overcome his humble beginnings, his country is still grappling with its own. Perhaps more than any other challenge facing Brazil today, education is a stumbling block in its bid to accelerate its economy and establish itself as one of the world's most powerful nations, exposing a major weakness in its newfound armor.

"Unfortunately, in an era of global competition, the current state of education in Brazil means it is likely to fall behind other developing economies in the search for new investment and economic growth opportunities," the World Bank concluded in a 2008 report.

(...)

But those successes fall short of the urgent thrust for change that some education specialists were hoping to see from Mr. da Silva, considering his background. Not nearly enough was done to improve the quality of education and teaching methods, and the president has not used his bully pulpit to inspire the nation to demand more from its teachers and schools, they say.

(...)

"Brazil will continue to grow slower than its potential," said Samuel Pessoa, an economist at the Brazilian Economic Institute at the Getulio Vargas Foundation. "If it had a better education system, things would be different."

Marya Domit contributed reporting from São Paulo, Brazil.

## EXCERPT FROM CODING SHEET:

ARTICLE NO: 142

ARTICLE TITLE: EDUCATIONAL GAPS LIMIT BRAZIL'S REACH

MEDIUM: NYT

DATE: SEP 4, 2010

AUTHOR: ALEXEI BARRIONUEVO

Par #	Total number of words	Frames: Dimension (Number of words)	Fields: Speakers, quoted (Number of words)	Fields: Objects N=neg. P=pos. (Number of words)
1	5	21 (5), 25 (5)		
2	12	no frame		
3	32	8 (32)	1 (13)	
4	39	26(39), 20(39),40 (39)		P1(39)
5	58	21(58),25(58), 39 (58)		
6	42	21(42), 29(42), 41(42)	18 (34)	

(...)

28	63	3(63), 27(63), 23(63)	44 (61)	N1(63)
----	----	-----------------------	---------	--------

(...)

35	35	25(35), 19(35)	55 (20)	
----	----	----------------	---------	--

WHEN THE WHOLE ARTICLE HAD BEEN CODED, I COUNTED THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WORDS IN ALL THE PARAGRAPHS (SECOND COLUMN ON THE LEFT), THE SUM OF THE WORDS FEATURING DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS OF EACH FRAME (THIRD COLUMN FROM THE LEFT), THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WORDS THAT EACH FIELD WAS GIVEN TO SPEAK (SECOND COLUMN FROM THE RIGHT), AND THE NUMBER OF WORDS IN WHICH EACH FIELD WAS FRAMED BY OTHER FIELDS (FIRST COLUMN ON THE RIGHT). THESE SUMS WERE THEN PROPORTIONED ACCORDING TO THE OVERALL ARTICLE LENGTH AND EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE. I ALSO COUNTED THE SHARE OF POSITIVE DIMENSIONS WITHIN EACH FRAME:

WORDS, TOTAL	SIZE OF FRAMES (% posit. dims.)	VOLUME OF VOICES % of whole art. sp. / quot. sp.
1419	CRED. 64.8% (11.0%)	BRAZ. POLIT. 10.6% / 27.4%
	IMPACT 48.1% (34.6%)	BRAZ. ACAD. 9.5% / 24.7%
	RESP. 40.7% (53.6%)	ANONYM. 7.5% / 19.3%
	HUM. INT. 22.7% (36.6%)	BRAZ. CIVICS 4.9% / 12.5%
	W. ORDER 21.8% (18.8%)	GLOBAL ECON*. 4.3% / 11.1%
	Frameless space 0.8%	BRAZ. ECON. 2.0% / 5.1%

## OBJECTS OF FRAMING

% of whole art. sp.

BRAZ. POLIT.: N, 11.0%; P, 14.0%

PROPORTION OF SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE IS DETERMINED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH A FIELD IS FRAMED NEGATIVELY BY OTHER FIELDS BEYOND THE FIELD'S VOLUME TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF. IN THE EXAMPLE ABOVE, THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL FIELD IS DEFINED NEGATIVELY BY OTHERS IN 11.0% OF TOTAL ARTICLE SPACE AND GETS TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF IN 10.6% OF TOTAL ARTICLE SPACE. THUS, THE ARTICLE CONTAINS A VERY SMALL PROPORTION OF SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE, 0.4% TOWARD THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL FIELD (SEE CHAPT. 5) EVEN THOUGH THE POLITICAL FIELD IS ALSO FRAMED POSITIVELY BY THE OTHER FIELDS (14.0%), THIS DOES NOT SUBVERT THE ACT OF SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE, FOR THE FIELD IS EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK FOR ITSELF, FOR THE COVERAGE TO BE BALANCED.. POSITIVE FRAMING CAN ALSO LEAD TO SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE, ONLY THIS NEEDS TO BE ANALYZED QUALITATIVELY.

The title of the article, the coding of which was illustrated on the previous page, contained dimension 21 of the *Social and Economic Impact* frame (from now on, referred to simply as the *Impact* frame), describing Brazil's lack of resources for pursuing a desired action. It also contained dimension 25 of the *Credibility* frame, expressing doubt as to whether Brazil could meet expectations due to difficult circumstances. The coding of the title was facilitated by coding the rest of the article first. The second paragraph consisted of a caption, which simply stated: "A school in Caetés, Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's hometown." This caption was coded as frameless space; it simply notes the existence of a school in da Silva's hometown, without attributing any particular definitions to the school or to President da Silva. It can be said that this caption was paving way for a frame which clearly manifested itself in the next paragraph, namely, the *Human Interest* frame (dimension 8). It reads as follows: "When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in as Brazil's president in early 2003, he emotionally declared that he had finally earned his 'first diploma' by becoming president of the country."

Paragraph 4 then credited President Lula da Silva for his ability in fixing the country's problems, mentioning difficult circumstances such as extreme poverty. Here, the emphasis also shifted from a *Human Interest* angle, depicting the realities of individuals, to the larger society and to how a great number of people, not just Lula da Silva himself, have benefited from the situation – thus, a positive *Impact* frame. In addition, the paragraph featured dimension 40 of the *World Order* frame, indicating a positive transformation, considering the fact that it emphasized how Lula da Silva's policies were "stabilizing Brazil's economy and earning near-legendary status both home and abroad."

In the next paragraph, no. 5, all three frames continued to overlap, but now they featured negative dimensions – 25, 39, 21– describing the country's on-going struggle to overcome difficulties and expressing doubt as to whether Brazil could indeed become a global leader. The paragraph also noted Brazil's continuing inability to improve its educational system. Paragraph 6 still featured the same frames, as it quoted the World Bank as a means of explaining that "the current state of education in Brazil means it is likely to fall behind other developing economies in the search for new investment and economic growth opportunities." (The coding of quotes and the measurement of their volume is explained in chapter 5.)

After coding the whole article in this way, the number of words in each paragraph was totaled. Then I counted the sum of all the negative and all the positive dimensions of each frame; their overall sum yielded the size of the frame as a whole when proportioned according to the total article length, that is, 1419 words.<sup>88</sup> This revealed that the largest

---

<sup>88</sup> I always did the counting first manually on a separate sheet of paper, but then revised it in Excel. I realize that I could have done it directly in Excel, but this was a way of double-checking my calculations. Even though Excel would obviously count them correctly, sometimes the count would



frame was *Credibility*, taking up 64.8% of the space in the article, followed by *Impact* (48.1%), *Responsibility* (40.7%), *Human Interest* (22.7%), and *World Order* (21.8%). I then counted the relative share of positive and negative dimensions within each frame, discovering that, within the *Credibility* frame, only 11.0% of dimensions were positive while 36.6% were positive within the *Human Interest* frame, 34.6% in the *Impact* frame, and 18.8% in the *World Order* frame. However, the *Responsibility* frame contained a remarkable proportion of positive dimensions: 53.6%. Thus, my analysis reveals that, overall, the article expressed substantial doubt as to whether Brazil would be able to fix its educational system and meet expectations (through mostly negative *Credibility*, *World Order*, and *Impact* frames). Simultaneously, however, the story emphasized the positive efforts and responsibility of the country's leaders as they try to fix the situation.<sup>89</sup>

After I had finished coding the whole sample, I counted the average size of each frame at the overall sample level in the *NYT* and *HS*, since these are the two media whose contents I had explored systematically (see chapter 3). The average size of frames in the *NYT* and *HS* with respect to their coverage of South Africa and Brazil were counted separately, as I wanted to explore whether this changed over time (as described in chapter 3, the South Africa coverage focuses on the years 2006–2010 and the Brazil related-coverage on the years 2010–2014) and whether the South African and Brazilian cultural contexts produced different proportions of frames in the American and Finnish media.

I applied an arithmetic average count to assess the average size of each frame in the *NYT* and *HS* sample pertaining to news on South Africa and Brazil. That is to say, the average was counted simply by summing up the percentages reflecting the space each frame had taken up in each article; this number was in turn divided by the total quantity of articles included in the particular sample (see, e.g., Nummenmaa 2009, 64). In a similar way, I counted the average share of positive dimensions within each frame to measure their average tone. Obviously, to count the average tone I only divided the total sum by the number of articles wherein the particular frame was found rather than by the total number of articles in the sample. For example, if there were five articles in a sample, and dimensions of the *Responsibility* frame could be found in four of them, I would divide the sum of words by five in order to count the relative size of this frame at the whole sample level; to count the average share of positive dimensions within the frame, I would divide the sum by four.

---

not match my manual count, and this would sometimes lead me to find a typo on my Excel sheet. Hence, by counting both manually *and* with Excel, I was able to make sure my calculations were correct and the information was copied correctly from my coding sheets to Excel.

<sup>89</sup> However, the article also contained a minor proportion of symbolic violence towards the Brazilian political field, indicating that this field was still being framed negatively in greater article space and not allowed so much space to speak for itself. Fields and symbolic violence will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

## On the Reliability of Manifest-Level Frame Analysis

As I began developing my method for assessing the relative size and tones of the frames in news, my purpose was to be as clear and transparent as possible. Coding frames at their *manifest*, rather than latent, level has been found to increase coding reliability (Benson and Hallin 2007, 32). By coding at the manifest level, I felt my findings could be more easily verified by others.

Once I had devised a preliminary set of items for verifying the positive and negative dimensions in the seven frames I had identified in my sample, I invited two colleagues from the University of Helsinki to test these items, to see whether their coding would yield similar results as mine. The main purpose of this testing was to reveal weaknesses in my coding scheme, so that it could be improved before I began the actual coding process. My colleagues Antti Korpisaari and Ave Ungro coded 25 articles each: Korpisaari coded the Finnish articles and Ungro the American articles.

First, I explained my coding manual to both testers, and they had a chance to ask any questions that might occur to them. After this initial guidance, the actual coding was done independently, without any consultation with me or between the testers, during January and February of 2015. The biggest difference in our results was that I had usually identified a greater number of different frame dimensions per paragraph – from one to four – whereas the testers had usually detected from one to two. This difference was greater in the coding between Ungro and myself, possibly because, in general, I had detected more overlapping frames in the American news than in the Finnish news.

Korpisaari and I concurred on at least one frame dimension<sup>90</sup> in 86.2% of the paragraphs (in 468 paragraphs out of 543 in total); with Ungro, I concurred on 81.5% of the paragraphs (in 454 out of 557 paragraphs in total). In other words, the frames and dimensions that Korpisaari and Ungro had marked were usually similar to mine, but, in addition, I had marked the dimensions of other frames, which were lacking in their coding. As I was engaged in the coding process, I had already formulated an idea in my mind about how the dimensions of frames can and do overlap, but at this time, I discovered, this was not yet expressed clearly enough in my coding manual.

I want to emphasize that in the future, my goal is to develop this methodology further, to comparatively measure proportions of perspectives in larger, more heterogeneous samples

---

<sup>90</sup> More specifically, by this I mean that we concurred on the frame and the tone of the frame dimension. If my tester had, for instance, positive dimension 20 for the *Impact* frame in a particular paragraph, while in that same paragraph I had positive dimension 22 for the same frame, I still regarded this as “concurring.” However, if my tester had, for instance, negative dimension 19 for the *Impact* frame, while I had positive dimension 20, then this would *not* have been considered “concurring” on a particular dimension of a frame, because we disagreed on the tone.

while also building more on statistical methods. At the same time, the aim is to develop a more accurate way to measure inter-coder reliability – assessing agreement corrected for chance and on all frame dimensions in each paragraph. But even if the reliability test still needs to be further developed, the test conducted at this point was still useful in many important ways – not least because it helped reveal weaknesses in my own coding and understanding of frames. Even though, usually, I had coded more frames than my colleagues had, the opposite case also occurred on several occasions. By this time, I had committed the items to memory, and the test revealed that, as the testers were actually looking at the items the whole time while coding, they had detected some frame dimensions that I had missed myself, since I had simply not thought of those particular dimensions while coding. Once I saw what they had marked, I immediately agreed that, indeed, those frames were also there. Following this epiphany, I took up the habit of always keeping my coding manual next to me while coding and regularly reading my items, even if having already memorized them, to constantly remind myself of their definitions.

Following the testing, I made several modifications to the items I had developed and began elaborating more on the question of overlapping frames. After the coding test, I spent several months improving the coding manual before beginning the actual, systematic coding of my whole sample with the improved items. Even though I had already coded hundreds of articles while elaborating on and testing my items, I still began the actual coding process all over again. In other words, I systematically coded the whole sample with the refined manual without looking at any of my older coding results. Given the great number of different articles that I had coded, many of which had formed part of my “preliminary sample” and had been excluded since then (see chapter 3), it was impossible for me to remember exactly how I had coded the different articles previously. Only after I had finished coding my whole sample, around November 2015, did I begin comparing my final results with the way that I had previously coded the same articles, as a form to test single-coder reliability. Since I had modified my manual along the way, the new and old coding were not directly comparable. Still, comparing my “final” coding with the articles coded earlier showed that I had been rather consistent throughout in the way that I had identified particular dimensions in specific contexts. I randomly selected 25 articles that I had coded both previously as well as with the new manual and found that I “agreed with myself” in 93.2% of all the paragraphs on at least one frame dimension.

That said, even if I have been consistent in my coding, and even if the dimensions whose connections and expansion I had measured were detectable at the manifest level rather than being entangled in webs of meaning (see Hertog and McLeod 2001, 140; Reese 2010, 24), coding with my items obviously involves many interpretations as well. Despite careful testing and honing of the items used to identify the dimensions of the frames, the results are still subject to change depending on who does the coding. Still, my work is transparent in the sense that the items I have used are listed on pages 80–83 of this dissertation. Most

of the news articles in my sample can be found online should anyone wish to verify my findings – or to try to apply my items to other types of news materials in order to test the general applicability of my method.

During the future developments of my method, I would still build on a manifest-level analysis of frames that are rather generic in nature, given the ways that these allow a more transparent study of various kinds of news materials. Of course, more detailed and qualitative approaches would likely reveal a number of more hidden angles and meanings in the news texts (see also Hallin 1994, 81–82; Hallin and Mancini 2017, 165–166). Such frame analyses on Northern coverage of the South are definitely needed as well. In other words, with my manifest-level analysis and generic frames, my purpose is not to undermine studies that focus on smaller samples as a means of detecting issue frames at a deeper level. Still, I argue that my systematic comparative work has the potential to reveal patterns and proportions that a more focused qualitative study would not manage to do. In Finland, frame analyses have mostly been qualitative and based on issue frames. For instance, Esa Välvirronen (1996, 112, 118) argues that “the concept of the frame enables the kind of profound analysis of discourse structures and understanding of the whole that is difficult to grasp with quantitative analysis.” While my current work could also be defined as more qualitative than quantitative – I do not make use of complex statistical methods – it has still been my intention to combine both; I assessed the frames by measuring words at the manifest level.

Finally, one of my future goals is to also complement the content analysis with interviews with the journalists who wrote the articles, which was not possible within the resources and time available for the present study. The aim of the interviews is to allow the journalists to define *their* realities with *their* voice: why were particular perspectives emphasized and others de-emphasized, what is the precise role of anonymous sources, what are the constraints that they had to deal with in their daily work, and so forth. I believe that hearing the views of the journalists can help the researcher realize what aspects of the journalistic practice the used method and related findings may have dismissed or misinterpreted – and how such gaps could be overcome, by further improvements of the method. Only by applying multiple approaches and then combining them will a broad scholarly view on news be achieved and frame analyses be further improved (see D’Angelo and Kuypers 2010, 3; Entman 1993; see also Hallin and Mancini 2017, 168).

---

## 5. Field Analysis: Measuring the Volume of Voices and Symbolic Violence

---

In the previous chapter, I described my method for measuring the relative size of frames as well as the proportions of positive and negative dimensions within seven diverse frames. Following Rodney Benson's (2009; 2013) example, my frame analysis is complemented with field analysis, which examines what institutions and agents are involved in the framing process and how extensively. Originally inspired by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, "field theory calls attention to the multiple, distinct perspectives that arise from fields (and subfields), each with their own semi-autonomous logic" (Benson 2009, 184; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 94–104). Like my frame analysis, my field analysis reaches beyond mere search of the presence or absence of different perspectives; I measure the relative *volume* of voices, representing a range of diverse fields and subfields. In addition, I examine how frequently and voluminously different institutional fields are the *objects of framing* by the other fields involved.

A field can be defined as a network or a configuration of objective relations between positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). What differentiates one field from another is the specific logic, or *rules of the game*, which determine the relative value of different species of capital – economic, social, and cultural – in that particular field (ibid., 97–98). By economic capital, Bourdieu means money or assets that can be turned into currency (see Benson and Neveu 2005, 3–4; Bourdieu 1987, 4). Cultural capital is *informational* capital, that is, knowledge valued in a given field. Social capital implies connections and group membership (Bourdieu 1987, 4). Finally, symbolic capital is the form the different types of capital take once perceived as legitimate (Bourdieu 1987, 4; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119). The relative position of different agents in a field and the legitimacy of their actions are determined by the composition as well as the volume of the different kinds of capital in their possession (Bourdieu 1987, 4; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 99). In other words, as expressed by Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu (2005, 4), "organizations or individuals who dominate a field are generally those who successfully convert one form into the other, and in so doing, amass both 'social capital' of friendship and colleague networks, and 'symbolic capital' through which their dominance is legitimated."

I considered field analysis a particularly fruitful theoretical approach for my study, as it is primarily concerned with objective relationships of symbolic domination (see Bourdieu 2005, 31). In chapter 2, I explained the persisting inequality in South African and Brazilian

societies as well as the way that South Africa and Brazil have been subordinated by Northern nations for centuries. My field analysis has been especially influenced by Bourdieu's (1987, 13–14) claim that “what is at stake in symbolic struggles is (...), essentially, power over words used to describe groups or the institutions which represent them.” As also described in chapter 2, Northern symbolic domination of the South has been historically rooted in the tendency to *define situations on behalf of South African and Brazilian people*, starting from the European conquest and persisting into the 20<sup>th</sup> century through the periods of South African apartheid and Brazilian dictatorship. Currently, South Africa and Brazil, along with other countries in the Global South, are aiming to *strengthen their voice* in the international public sphere (Harden 2014, 14).

According to field theorists, historical struggles tend to give rise to implicit rules and common-sense assumptions about how the world works (Benson and Neveu 2005, 11). Thus, such *path dependency* (ibid.; see also Benson 2005, 95) could be reflected in persisting patterns of domination by the Northern fields and the relative silence of the Southern fields in American and Finnish world news. On the other hand, Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, 110) emphasize that the relations between fields are not defined once and for all time. That is, the journalistic fields do not necessarily reinforce the existing power status quo, but may actually *transform* power relations between fields (Benson and Neveu 2005, 9). My field analysis thus examines whether the supposed new world order is reflected in more balanced world news, where a greater share of space is granted to Southern voices and views, enabling them to frame their own situations and circumstances for European and North American people reading the news.

As in the case of the size of frames, I measure the relative volume of voices by counting words, included in quotes by different institutional fields, and proportioning their quoting space in relation to the overall article length and total quoting space. Likewise, I count the number of words by which certain fields have been framed by other fields as well as the tone that was used. For instance, if a representative of FIFA claims that the World Cup will benefit South African citizens and that, hence, these citizens are happy about the World Cup, then FIFA would be defining the situation on behalf of South African citizens. When some institution is allowed to frame another institution *beyond* this institution's ability to speak for itself, I understand this as an act of *symbolic violence*; the *imposition* of representations by one field or agent over another (Bourdieu 1987, 13; see also Bourdieu 1977, 190–197; Wacquant 2013, 277). To continue with the same example, if FIFA is given *more space* to define the realities of South African citizens than the citizens themselves – in this case, by imposing an *Impact* frame on them – then FIFA, a Northern institution, is committing an act of symbolic violence on South African citizens, facilitated by the Northern journalistic field in charge of the coverage. The proportion of this particular symbolic violence depends on the breadth of FIFA's definition as it exceeds the volume of

the voices of South African citizens themselves. This example also shows that, in principle, symbolic violence can be committed through both negative *and positive* tones in the frames. However, I have found that symbolic violence on the negative side is more easily measurable than that on the positive side, as positive framing can also be *praise* of one field by another. For instance, to still continue with the same example, FIFA could also note that South African citizens have done a terrific job supporting the organization of the event. In this case, there would be no symbolic violence, even if South African citizens were not allowed to speak as voluminously. Thus, positive framing between fields calls for more in-depth qualitative analysis, which is also included in my study. Symbolic violence resulting from negative framing (one field framing another field more voluminously than the object field's own volume) is measured at both the article level and overall sample level.

My hypothesis is that symbolic violence in American and Finnish world news is not limited to Northern institutions imposing their views on Southern ones. In chapter 2, I described the inequality that prevails among people in South Africa and Brazil. Field theorists have observed that the journalistic field tends to engage primarily with agents with high volumes of capital (see, e.g., Benson and Neveu 2005, 5). Therefore, Northern journalists may also render their medium as a site where powerful institutions in South Africa and Brazil get to frame realities on behalf of more underprivileged citizens in their countries. In chapter 2, I also explained how South Africa and Brazil have recently begun to pursue imperialist policies on their own continents and beyond, following the path of their past oppressors. Thus, American and Finnish news could also feature voices of South African and Brazilian leaders speaking on behalf of, and committing acts of symbolic violence on, other Southern nations. Finally, there is at least a theoretical possibility that Southern institutions have not only been allowed to define realities on behalf of Northern institutions, but that they are allowed to speak more voluminously than the latter in Northern news.

Field theorists have noted that field relations extend beyond national boundaries (see, e.g., Benson 2015, 264; Bourdieu 1998, 41). My comparative study draws on Julian Go's (2008, 207) definition of the *global field*, which he sees as "a worldwide arena in which states or other actors (corporations, nongovernmental institutions, international organizations [etc.]) compete with each other over species of capital." In his examination of British and American empires and their formation, Go (ibid.) also notes that the global political field as it exists now "has been emerging as early as the 16<sup>th</sup> century, when European actors began reaching across the globe to construct a worldwide (as opposed to just a regional or interregional) network of connections and field of competition." That is, the modern global political field began taking shape around the same time as South Africa and Brazil were conquered and colonized (see chapter 2). The riches gained by the European rulers from their colonies and their expanding influence further contributed to their might and the legitimacy of their actions, while allowing them to maintain their Southern colonies in subordinate positions.

Go (2008, 213) notes that the United States entered the global political field relatively late, at a time when it was dominated by recognized European nations. In similar fashion, it can be said that South Africa and Brazil (among other nations in the global South) are now entering the global political and economic fields, having accumulated sufficient amounts of different kinds of capital to become legitimate players. Just like the United States did earlier, these Southern countries may have the opportunity to become superpowers by employing pre-existing imperial networks to realize their economic and political goals (*ibid.*). However, Go (*ibid.* 208), also maintains that “core states would seek symbolic capital that authorizes them to maintain or enhance their dominant position” (see also Bourdieu 1977, 117). In other words, South Africa and Brazil will not gain legitimacy without a struggle, as has also been noted by political scientists studying the challenges that these nations are still facing (see, for example, Taalas 2015, 45–46). That is, South Africa and Brazil have been obliged to play the game of global politics according to rules they have not set, rules that have been dictated by the very powerful agents who have traditionally dominated the field (Albert 2017, 8; Benson 1999, 468). However, should they gain enough symbolic capital, they may manage to modify those rules and adjust them to meet their particular interests.

Daniel Hallin (2005, 224) finds that field theory is particularly useful for historical and comparative analysis of the media. Likewise, Benson (2005, 87; see also 1999, 482) highlights how,

without cross-national comparison, significant aspects of a national field may become naturalized and thus remain invisible to the domestic-bound researcher. Cross-national research offers a valuable tool to help field researchers effect that all-important epistemological break with the commonsensical and hence ideologically-charged conceptions of their object of study.

In my study, cross-national field analysis is meant to reveal differences in the way that the “hegemonic” American and “marginal” Finnish national fields<sup>91</sup> position themselves vis-à-vis the South African and Brazilian fields in the American and Finnish news. The American and Finnish journalistic fields also differ in their relationships with their own countries’ economic and political fields and civil society, as has been discussed in chapter 3: the American journalistic field is positioned closer to the field of economics and the market pole, while the Finnish journalistic field is more proximate to civic society and the political field, given the premise of journalism as a social institution and its relatively close ties with the state (Benson 2013, 37–47;<sup>92</sup> Hallin and Mancini 2004, 76).

---

<sup>91</sup> See chapter 3, footnote 58, for reflection on the notion of the “nation-state” and its relevance for the present study.

<sup>92</sup> To be more precise, Benson (2013, 37–47) elaborates on the relative position of the French (not the Finnish) and the American journalistic fields vis-à-vis civic and market power. While the Finnish



Employing field analysis in a cross-national comparative setting also comes with many challenges. As Benson (2005, 87) notes,

analysis of the social world should be comprehensive, simultaneously examining historical geneses and trajectories, structural relations among fields, and the practices and worldviews of social actors within fields. Such comprehensive ‘thick description’ is difficult enough to accomplish for a single field within a single national context, let alone cross nationally.

In the following section, I will explain how I proceeded with my field analysis so that it would be suitable for comparative purposes but still able to capture the local logics of the American, Finnish, South African, and Brazilian fields. I then describe how I measured the volume of voices in the different fields being quoted or paraphrased as well as the proportions of symbolic violence. Toward the end of the chapter, I will summarize how my field analysis is linked to my frame analysis.

### Identifying and Defining Global, National, and Local Fields

“Field” is a spatial metaphor (see Benson and Neveu 2005, 1), and hence, it is also in that regard well suited for a study that literally examines the amount of space granted to different institutions quoted in the news. However, the metaphor should not be taken too concretely. As Mathieu Albert emphasizes, “a field is not a thing, it is a *relationship*.”<sup>93</sup> Bourdieu has noted that “to think in terms of field is to think relationally” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). That is to say, field is a *research tool* that makes it possible to investigate the relationships between different institutions (see Bourdieu 2005, 30). Bourdieu provides the following tangible example of how fields manifest themselves (ibid., 31):

When the historian addresses the journalist it is not an historian who speaks to a journalist (...) it is an historian occupying a determinate position in the field of the social sciences who speaks to a journalist occupying a determinate position in the journalistic field, and ultimately it is the social science field talking to the journalistic field.

In Benson’s (2015, 264) words, “what is potentially universal, then, is a basic structural, relational model of social relations. The concrete forms that it takes in any given social context are expected to vary.” Furthermore, Benson and Neveu (2005, 18) emphasize that “fields cannot be understood apart from their historical genesis and trajectory.” The trajectories of South African and Brazilian institutions were discussed in chapter 2, and it is this historical context that shaped my understanding of “the concrete forms” that these fields have taken in these particular countries.

---

journalistic field also can be seen as relatively close to the civic pole, due to its traditional role as a civic institution, here I refer primarily to the way in which Benson discusses the positions of the fields, from a theoretical perspective, rather than to the particular national fields in focus.

<sup>93</sup> Q&A session in the seminar “Pierre Bourdieu on Science, Knowledge, and Power,” University of Tampere, February 17, 2017.

The initial stage of my field analysis proceeded in a similar way as my frame analysis, as explained in chapter 4 (see also Benson 2013, 8): The first step was to carefully list all the sources in my sample, to go through diverse scholarly literature on South African and Brazilian history and politics, and to read news published also in South African and Brazilian mainstream and alternative media. The purpose of such background reading was to familiarize myself with the context, both local and international, in order to be able to consider the range of potential voices that could and should be quoted or paraphrased in the American and Finnish news for the news to meet the normative goals of multiperspectivalness (see chapter 2). Following Benson (*ibid.*, 10), each speaker category aims to capture the particular logic of a field or a subfield. After first identifying all the important speaker categories, that is, the fields, I then coded the whole sample so as to systematically measure their relative volume in the American and Finnish news.

The initial exploration provided me with a preliminary list of local and international political, cultural, economic, and academic organizations, civic societies, legislative bodies, and other potential sources. But as in the case of my frame analysis, I also wanted to tie my field analysis to previous field analyses, which have identified a number of general fields in different cultural and national contexts, such as the political field, the economic field, the academic field, the journalistic field, the artistic field, and so forth (see, e.g., Benson 1999, 464; 2013, 9; Bourdieu 2005, 29; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). These broad fields consist of a number of *subfields* parallel to each other in their internal organization – Benson and Neveu (2005, 4) describe how fields inside fields resemble a series of Russian dolls. Despite being largely similar, each subfield still has its own logic, rules, and regularities (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 104).

My work conceptualizes these commonly known general fields as “macro” fields – the largest “doll” in the “series.” As such, these general fields operate at the global, rather than the local, level. National fields are considered to be subfields of these larger general fields, that is, relatively smaller but still at the same time large “dolls.” The more local the field, the smaller the field (e.g., Global politics > national politics > regional politics > city councils > community politics). In this way, the national fields are influenced by both the broad global fields as well as by the small local fields; the national field is a mixture of foreign and local influences. To avoid confusion, I speak of global fields, national fields, and local subfields rather than of fields, subfields, “subsubfields” and so forth.<sup>94</sup> The local subfields within the national fields – for instance, political parties within a national political system – have connections with, and have often received influences from,

---

<sup>94</sup> This decision was also influenced by Roger Friedland’s article “The Endless Fields of Pierre Bourdieu” (2009).

ideologically similar subfields in other countries, but they are simultaneously shaped by the national field system of which they are a part (Figure 1).<sup>95</sup>



Figure 1: Structure of a field. National fields, the relative volume of which are the main focus of my measurements, are influenced by both global supranational and local traditional institutions.

Benson and Neveu (2005, 11) observe that fields tend to exert their most powerful effects “not at the level of individual organizations, but at the mezzo-level of the inter-organizational ‘field,’ which tends to be national.” In my analysis, I focus first and foremost on the relative volume granted to such South African/Brazilian national fields and their struggle for power and legitimacy vis-à-vis American and European national fields and supranational institutions, as reflected in the American and Finnish news. But I also examine the dynamics within the South African and Brazilian subfields to understand more specifically whose views those Northern news articles quoting such institutions actually represent. The news coverage in focus is a product of the American and Finnish journalistic fields, which form part of the global journalistic field. The similarities and differences in their coverage may result from the diverse logics shaping action in these particular national journalistic fields and subfields as well as their “hierarchically structured relations in the world media system” (Benson 1999, 484; see also Benson 2013, 127).

An important concept that needs to be considered in the construction of analytical field categories is that of *habitus*. Bourdieu uses the term to refer to *socialized subjectivity*: the field structures the habitus, whereas the habitus constitutes the field as a meaningful arena in

---

<sup>95</sup> For instance, in chapter 2 I described how the South African ANC party was deemed “communist” by American, Western European, and other African leaders during the Cold War. Even though the ANC members of the time had been somewhat inspired by the work of Marx and socialism, their movement and ideology was heavily grounded in local South African circumstances and needs. As expressed by Nelson Mandela ([1994] 2013, 121): “A friend once asked me how I could reconcile my creed of African nationalism with a belief in dialectical materialism. For me, there was no contradiction. I was first and foremost an African nationalist fighting for our emancipation from minority rule and the right to control our own destiny. But at the same time, South Africa and the African continent were part of the wider world. Our problems, while distinctive and special, were not entirely unique, and a philosophy that placed those problems in an international and historical context of the greater world and the course of history was valuable.”

which to invest one's energy (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 126). The habitus of each agent – attitudes, tastes, education, physical bearing, and so forth – is shaped by his/her position in the complex system of stratification that makes up the field as a whole as well as the circumstances through which one arrived at such a position (Benson 2015, 266). To identify subfields, I have paid special attention to the relative distance between agents in a particular field – the agents with the most similar habituses have been conceptualized as forming a subfield within the larger field. As expressed by Bourdieu (1987, 5),

the space is constructed in a way that the closer the individual agents in it, the greater their probable number of common properties, and conversely, the farther they are from each other, the fewer properties they will have in common. To be more precise, the agents who occupy neighboring positions in this space (...) are therefore subject to similar conditioning factors: consequently they have every chance of having similar dispositions and interests, and thus of producing practices and representations of a similar kind.

In other words, to measure the relative volume of different Southern and Northern speakers in news, the voices representing “neighboring positions” were grouped in the same analytical (sub)field category. In this way, my purpose was to capture the extent to which collectives having a similar economic and social base pursue own their specific interests (Bourdieu 1987, 9).

For instance, the South African and Brazilian national political fields were seen as containing two large subfields: the governing African National Congress (ANC) and in Brazil, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) parties together with their allies, as opposed to the main opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance in South Africa and the Partido da Social Democracia (PSDB) in Brazil, and their allies. In addition, the national field contains smaller subfields, created by coalitions of parties whose agents have similar habituses. Throughout the period of my news analysis, 2006–2010 for South Africa and 2010–2014 for Brazil, the ANC and PT maintained their respective positions as governing parties, promoting extensive social programs and battling inequality. At the same time, however, both the ANC and the PT parties also embraced liberal economic policies and agreed to organize the World Cup and adhere to the standards demanded by FIFA, among other commitments, creating controversies within their own parties and among their supporters. These internal conflicts gave birth to a number of smaller fields within these particular subfields (that is, subsubfields), formed by agents with similar habituses who at the same time claimed distance from other agents with different habituses.

By claiming that the ANC and the PT, and their principal opponents, each form a subfield within the national fields of politics, I am not suggesting that all the agents within these fields have similar habituses or that they share exactly the same worldview. In line with Bourdieu's claim that the real is the relational (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 96), the neighboring positions of the fields and subfields used in this study must always be

understood relationally: in comparison with the policies promoted by the opposition party DA, the agents within the ANC party usually adopted “neighboring positions.” Within each party, again, agents adopted neighboring positions that differentiated them from party members with different habituses.

In chapter 8, I examine the dynamics of the diverse fields and subfields in more detail: which particular agents were quoted and how extensively, and how their views differed from those of other agents in the same field and subfields. However, following Benson’s (2013, 8) example, at the more macro levels of my analysis I have compressed the subfield categories into broader categories to allow for meaningful comparisons. For instance, to understand how the proportions of perspectives reflect North-South relations, analyzed most extensively in chapter 6, all of the different political parties were analyzed as part of the South African and Brazilian national political fields. In such a context, the agents of the different parties were seen as adopting relatively neighboring positions vis-à-vis the American and European political fields. However, if some agent within the South African or Brazilian political fields claimed distance from his/her own national parties and proximity with agents within the American or Finnish political fields, then this obviously was taken into consideration in the analysis.

Originally, I also tried to identify the particular political affiliation of local politicians, such as governors and mayors, quoted in news. However, as I was exploring my sample, I soon found that the great majority of the news articles did not reveal the specific ideological affiliation of local politicians. Hence, I created a broader subfield category by which to refer to all mayors and governors within each national field, regardless of their political stance. Of course, I could quite easily have verified the affiliations of the quoted politicians with the help of books and Google; however, given my emphasis on manifest-level coding, agents were coded as representing particular political parties or institutions only when the affiliation was made explicitly clear in the news article. The same applies for the *objects* of coding: unless some institution or person was specifically mentioned, it was not coded as the object of framing.

I want to note that whenever the news quoted someone whose institutional affiliation was explicit in the text, the voice of that individual was coded as representing that particular institution (see Benson 2009, 408). For instance, if the news quoted a Brazilian sociologist from the University of São Paulo, this person was coded as representing the Brazilian academic field and the subfield of social sciences.<sup>96</sup> If the news quoted a South African

---

<sup>96</sup> Sometimes, news would quote, for instance, a Brazilian scholar affiliated with an American university, or vice versa. In these cases, I used Google to find out more about the quoted scholar and the length of the stay in the foreign country. If the Brazilian scholar, to continue with the example, was a visiting scholar in an American university for a year or two, (s)he was coded as representing the Brazilian academic field. But if this Brazilian scholar held a permanent position in

policeman, this person was coded as representing the South African field of law and order, and so forth. However, when the institutional affiliation of quoted citizens was not mentioned, they were coded as “unaffiliated individuals” (as in Benson 2009, 408). To be coded as an “unaffiliated individual,” or a representative of any particular field, the source’s name had to be mentioned. In addition, I established a category called “anonymous sources.” As expressed by Zvi Reich (2009, 107), “an anonymous source can be any type of person, offering any kind of information, who, for whatever reason, demands that his/her identity not be publicized.” The *Reporter’s Handbook* has highlighted that journalists should always *explain* to audiences *why* a source was granted anonymity (see Duffy 2014, 256–257; see also Boeyink 1990, 234). Along similar lines, prominent newspapers such as the NYT have implemented rules and policies according to which unnamed sources should be used sparingly and rationale should be provided for their usage (Boeyink 1990, 237, 261; Carlson 2011, 39–40).<sup>97</sup>

My study differentiates between sources that have requested anonymity and this having been made clear or explained in the article (usually, fear of reprimand due to revealing sensitive information concerning someone), and unidentified sources with no explanation whatsoever as to why they are presented anonymously – in this research, only the latter were coded as “anonymous” sources. For instance, if a story quoted a “businessman,” explaining that this businessman’s name was not revealed due to the fact that (s)he feared losing his/her job due to the delicate information (s)he provided to the reporter, this source was coded as representing the field of economics. But if the story simply referred to unidentified “businessmen,” with no names or explanation as to why these voices were quoted in an unidentified manner, they were coded as anonymous. However, if a source was first quoted by name and then, later, referred to more vaguely – for instance, first introducing the name and affiliation of an academic, and later in the story referring to him/her as the “the expert” or “the specialist” – it was not listed as anonymous but according to its originally mentioned affiliation.

Besides unaffiliated individuals, the national fields I call “civic societies” also encompass non-governmental organizations founded and led by South Africans, Brazilians, or people from other Southern countries. International organizations operating in South Africa and Brazil, such as Human Rights Watch or Greenpeace, were coded separately, not as part of South African or Brazilian national civic society, but as part of global civic society. Again,

---

an American university and/or had been working there for quite some time, then the scholar was coded as being affiliated with the American academic field.

<sup>97</sup> The NYT Guidelines on Integrity (on Anonymity and Its Devices) state that “the use of unidentified sources is reserved for situations in which the newspaper could not otherwise print information it considers newsworthy and reliable. (...) The general rule is to tell readers as much as we can about the placement and known motivation of the source.” Available at: <https://www.nytc.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/Guidelines-on-Integrity-updated-2008.pdf>.

at the more general level of analysis, I measured the extent to which South African and Brazilian civic societies, consisting of both unaffiliated individuals and local NGOs, were quoted as a “whole” vis-à-vis other national fields in the Southern and Northern countries (for instance, representatives of the national political and economic fields). But in order to understand how Northern news promotes equality among South African and Brazilian citizens and organizations with different socioeconomic statuses, I also created more specific analytical categories to differentiate between unaffiliated individuals and associations in neighboring and more distant positions.

In chapter 2, I described how race has largely determined people’s destinies in both South Africa and Brazil since the early years of colonization. While Brazil never adopted an official practice similar to apartheid in South Africa, race has been regarded as a significant factor limiting “colored” people’s access to education, decent housing, and other basic human rights in Brazil as well (see, e.g., Rohter 2012, 68). However, I soon discovered that the news articles quoting or paraphrasing South African or Brazilian individuals did not often mention the interviewee’s “color” or “race.” And even if they did, such references were often highly problematic: the range of “races” in both countries is highly diverse and as arbitrary as racial classifications tend to be (Appiah 2015, 7). For instance, Larry Rohter (2012, 65) notes that besides “black” and “white” people, Brazil also has “a large intermediate category that may actually be the country’s largest demographic group and whose existence complicates racial classifications and makes race more a continuum than a sharp divide.”

Dave Zirin (2014, 156) likewise notes that in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, racial apartheid has been supplanted by economic apartheid: both South Africa and Brazil are characterized by extreme levels of social and economic inequality. Even though the situation among many poor black people has significantly improved in both countries, poverty still correlates systematically with “race”; most poor people in these countries consider themselves “black” or “colored” (Reid 2014, 181). Poor people in South Africa and Brazil alike are often deprived of proper education, and consequently, they work in low-pay jobs and are forced to live in isolated neighborhoods (see, e.g., Custódio 2013). Thus, by incorporating the voices of poor, underprivileged people, news would simultaneously be likely to give voice to “black” and “colored” people.

To detect “neighboring positions” within South African and Brazilian civic societies and to formulate subfield categories, I built on these people’s *socioeconomic class* rather than on their “color” or “race.” Between the extremes of very rich and very poor, both countries have witnessed the rise of an increasingly large middle class. However, many people in this “new middle class” are still scraping to get by (Custódio 2013); hence, I have incorporated “poor people” and “lower-middle-class people” into the same analytical subfield category. Again, within each subfield, different people have different habituses. The poor people in

Rio de Janeiro may have very different backgrounds and lives than the poor people in São Paulo, for example. However, when examining their habituses *in relation* to substantially richer people in these same regions, their “neighboring positions” become more apparent.

Even if the quoted person’s socioeconomic status was not explicitly mentioned in the news article – and this is often the case – it was often possible to deduce their status from the news context at the manifest level. For instance, if the news article interviewed an individual living in a distant neighborhood with a poor reputation, and quoted him or her as saying that (s)he has to wake up at 5 a.m. to catch a bus to go to work, it is likely that this person was underprivileged, at least *relatively speaking*, in comparison to someone commenting on traffic jams in the one of finest neighborhoods of the city. However, I also added the analytical category “socioeconomic class unclear” to include those individuals quoted in such news contexts whose background and socioeconomic status were not clear. The existence of this category also permitted me to explore the extent to which the news stories were or were not transparent about the statuses of the individuals being interviewed. All of the field and subfield categories are presented in table 3.

Many of the global intergovernmental institutions were coded as Northern rather than as Southern. These include the United Nations: Even though South Africa and Brazil are very active members, neither country has managed to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and the structure of the organization arguably still reflects the “old” world order (Taalas 2015, 45–46; Weiss 2009, 143–144; see also Harden 2014, 3). All intergovernmental institutions with headquarters in Western Europe or North America, and which have been defined as promoting “Western” values, are characterized as “Northern” in my work.

Of course, fields also tend to overlap. For instance, the former President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, is both the country’s former president and a sociologist, and he was quoted as either an academic or as a politician. In my analysis, I always coded the quoted person’s field according to the emphasis in the article. For instance, if the article dealt mainly with Cardoso’s political campaigns and what he had accomplished or failed to do as president, or previously as minister, then he was coded as representing the Brazilian political field (and the PSDB subfield). Then again, if the emphasis was, for instance, on international economics, and Cardoso’s political background was not emphasized in the article, with the story referring instead to his theories and other scholarly work, then he was coded as a Brazilian academic.



GLOBAL FIELD	P O L I T I C S			
INTER- NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (*Northern)	United Nations (UN)* India, Brazil, S. Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA)      G20*      European Union (EU)* BRICS Forum African Union (AU)      UNASUR			
NATIONAL FIELD SUBFIELDS	SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL FIELD Govt. (ANC and allies) Opposition (DA and allies) Other central parties Marginal parties Other political institutions Local governors	BRAZILIAN POLITICAL FIELD Govt. (PT and allies) Opposition (PSDB and allies) Other central parties Marginal parties Other political institutions Local governors	AMERICAN POLITICAL FIELD Government Diplomats Other political institutions	FINNISH POLITICAL FIELD Government Diplomats Other political institutions

GLOBAL FIELD	E C O N O M I C S			
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (*Northern)	World Trade Organization (WTO)* BRICS/New Dev. Bank (NDB)      UN Conf. on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)* African Development Bank (AfDB)      International Monetary Fund (IMF)* Dev. Bank of Latin America (CAF) World Bank* Southern multinational businesses      Northern multinational businesses*			
NATIONAL FIELD SUBFIELDS	SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC FIELD Reserve Bank DBSA (Dev. Bank) Other financial institutions Large businesses Small businesses	BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC FIELD Central Bank BNDES (Dev. Bank) Other financial institutions Large businesses Small businesses	AMERICAN ECONOMIC FIELD Federal Reserve Bank Private banks Businesses	FINNISH ECONOMIC FIELD Central Bank Private banks Businesses

Table 3 (continued through pages 109–111): Institutional fields and subfields. Not all existing institutions are listed in the table, only the ones that were of relevance in the news coverage studied. Fields marked with an asterisk (\*) represent institutions regarded as Northern.

*Field Analysis: Measuring the Volume of Voices and Symbolic Violence*

GLOBAL FIELD	L A W   A N D   O R D E R			
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (*Northern)	African Defense Council Council of South American Defense		UN Security Council* NATO* International Criminal Court (ICC)*	
NATIONAL FIELD SUBFIELDS	S. AFRICAN FIELD OF LAW & ORDER S. Afr. Armed Forces State Security Agency Police Legal authorities	BRAZILIAN FIELD OF LAW AND ORDER Brazilian Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (ABIN) Police Legal authorities	AMERICAN FIELD OF LAW AND ORDER U.S. Armed Forces Natl. Sec. Agency (NSA) Fed. Bur. Invest. (FBI) Legal authorities	FINNISH FIELD OF LAW AND ORDER Finnish Armed Forces Legal authorities

GLOBAL FIELD	S P O R T S			
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (*Northern)	FIFA* International Olympic Committee (IOC)*			
NATIONAL FIELD SUBFIELDS	SOUTH AFRICAN FIELD OF SPORTS World Cup Org. Committee S. African Football Association (SAFA) Sports teams	BRAZILIAN FIELD OF SPORTS World Cup. Org. Committee Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF) Sports teams	AMERICAN FIELD OF SPORTS U.S. Soccer Federation Soccer teams	FINNISH FIELD OF SPORTS Finnish Soccer Assoc.

GLOBAL FIELD	A C A D E M I C			
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (*Northern)	International think tanks based in Africa, Asia or Latin America (e.g., Southern Voice)		International think tanks based in the U.S. or in Western Europe (e.g., European Council on Foreign Relations*)	
NATIONAL FIELD SUBFIELDS	SOUTH AFRICAN ACADEMIC FIELD Social Sciences Economics Arts and Humanities Behavioral Sciences Education Technology and Engineering Natural Sciences	BRAZILIAN ACADEMIC FIELD Social Sciences Economics Arts and Humanities Behavioral Sciences Education Technology and Engineering Natural Sciences	AMERICAN ACADEMIC FIELD Social Sciences Economics Arts and Humanities Behavioral Sciences Education Technology and Engineering Natural Sciences	FINNISH ACADEMIC FIELD Social Sciences Economics Arts and Humanities Behavioral Sciences Education Technology and Engineering Natural Sciences

GLOBAL FIELD	CIVIC SOCIETY			
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (*Northern)	INGOs based in Latin America, Asia, or Africa (e.g., Enda Third World)		INGOs based in the U.S./Western Europe (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace*)	
NATIONAL FIELD	SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIC SOCIETY	BRAZILIAN CIVIC SOCIETY	AMERICAN CIVIC SOCIETY	FINNISH CIVIC SOCIETY
SUBFIELDS	Local NGOs, eminent Local NGOs, marginal Unaf. indiv., privileged Unaf. indiv, middle class Unaf. indiv, low income Unaf. indiv, soc.econ. status unclear	Local NGOs, eminent Local NGOs, marginal Unaf. indiv., privileged Unaf. indiv, middle class Unafi. indiv, low income Unaf. indiv., soc.econ. status unclear	NGOs Unaffiliated individuals	NGOs Unaffiliated individuals

GLOBAL FIELD	JOURNALISTIC			
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (*Northern)	International news organizations based in Latin America, Asia, or Africa (e.g., African News Agency)		International news organizations based in U.S./Western Europe (e.g., Reuters, Associated Press*)	
NATIONAL FIELD	SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNALISTIC FIELD	BRAZILIAN JOURNALISTIC FIELD	AMERICAN JOURNALISTIC FIELD	FINNISH JOURNALISTIC FIELD
SUBFIELDS:	News agencies Mainstream media Alternative media Unaffiliated journalists	News agencies Mainstream media Alternative media Unaffiliated journalists	News agencies Mainstream media Alternative media Unaffiliated journalists	News agencies Mainstream media Alternative media Unaffiliated journalists

Table 3 (continued through pages 109–111): Institutional fields and subfields. Not all existing institutions are listed in the table, only the ones that were of relevance in the news coverage studied. Fields marked with an asterisk (\*) represent institutions regarded as Northern.

In addition to the institutional fields presented in table 3 on the previous pages, my original coding scheme also included the “arts” and “religious” fields. However, such sources were quoted so seldom that I combined these voices under a category titled “other sources.” Still, Southern and Northern “other sources” were consistently coded separately. By measuring how extensively all of the previously listed fields and subfields were quoted or paraphrased in the American and Finnish news, and the extent to which they were framed by other fields, my goal was to understand how the proportions of perspectives reflect existing power relations between the countries and institutions involved. In the next and final part of this chapter, I explain my method for measuring the volume of these diverse institutional fields as well as the proportions of symbolic violence.

### Coding and Measuring the Volume of Voices and Symbolic Violence

My coding sheet is illustrated on page 91. Both the frame analysis and field analysis proceed at paragraph level. Whenever someone was quoted or paraphrased in an article, I counted how many words the quote contained and noted which field the quoted person represented and which field served as the object of framing. The speaker field was marked with a specific code in the middle column.<sup>98</sup> Whenever a particular field served as the object of framing in a paragraph, this field’s code was marked in the final column on the right. Following the speaker field’s code, I marked the number of words that the quote contained in parentheses. In a similar way, the object field’s code was followed by parentheses enclosing the number of words contained in the framing concerning this particular object field. If the framing was positive in nature, I added a “P” in front of the object field’s code; if the coding was negative, I added an “N.” Of course, the tone of framing could be deduced from the frame dimensions marked in the previous column – however, I found that this practice clarified the coding process even more. Obviously, many paragraphs did not contain quotes or definitions for any of the fields; in this case, these columns were left empty. If the middle column is empty, indicating that no one was quoted, but there is nevertheless an object field, then this signifies that the journalist did the framing concerning that particular object field. I will now first explain the coding process and how the volume of voices were counted, and then proceed to explaining the coding regarding the object field.

To measure the speaking volume, I only counted the number of words included *in the actual quote*, not the journalist’s introduction to the quote. For instance, in the sample article on page 91, the third paragraph contains the following text (italics added to illustrate the quote): “When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in as Brazil’s president in early

---

<sup>98</sup> Each international institution has its own code and each subfield has its own specific code. That is, there is no specific code for the national field as a whole, but instead, the national field can be identified using any of the codes that refer to the subfields forming part of that national field (just like each frame is identified by any of the six dimensions that it consists of; see table 1).

2003, he emotionally declared that *he had finally earned his 'first diploma' by becoming president of the country.*" The italics indicate the only part that was considered as part of da Silva's quote, that is, *his voice*, which thus included thirteen words. In the sample coding sheet on page 91, third row, I first marked the code for the Brazilian PT government, which is 1, while in parentheses I marked the number of words included in the quote, that is 1(13).

The sixth paragraph of the sample article includes another quote, this time from the World Bank. In this case, everything inside quotation marks was coded as part of the quote (here, marked with italics): "*Unfortunately, in an era of global competition, the current state of education in Brazil means it is likely to fall behind other developing economies in the search for new investment and economic growth opportunities,*" the World Bank concluded in a 2008 report." In the row that refers to the sixth paragraph, I marked the code referring to the World Bank, which is 18, and following the code the number of words included in the quote: 18(34).

As has been explained, I did not include the whole sample article on page 91 due to a lack of space. The next paragraph included in the coding sample illustration was paragraph no. 28, which reads as follows (italics added to illustrate what is counted as part of the quote): "*But those successes fall short of the urgent thrust for change that some education specialists were hoping to see from Mr. da Silva, considering his background. Not nearly enough was done to improve the quality of education and teaching methods, and the president has not used his bully pulpit to inspire the nation to demand more from its leaders and schools, they say.*" In this case, it was impossible to "cut" the quoted part from the part where the sources are mentioned; thus, only the last part, "they say," was not considered as part of the quote. Furthermore, the wording "some education specialists" did not indicate the precise field, even though it did suggest that the quote was associated with the academic field.<sup>99</sup> Still, since no accurate information about institutional affiliation or identity was available, the source was identified with code no. 44, which I use to refer to *anonymous sources*. That is, the code followed by the number of words in parentheses was 44(61).

The final paragraph, no. 35, also included in the illustration, reads as follows (again, italics added to illustrate words that form part of the quote): "*Brazil will continue to grow slower than its potential,* said Samuel Pessoa, an economist at the Brazilian Economic Institute at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. *'If it had a better education system, things would be different.'*" Since the article quoted Mr. Pessoa in the role of an expert,<sup>100</sup> his affiliation (Brazilian academic

---

<sup>99</sup> Here, "some education specialists" could possibly refer to the World Bank, whose report had been quoted previously. However, as there was no explicit connection and no particular "education experts" were named in the World Bank quote either, I coded the nameless "education specialists" as anonymous.

<sup>100</sup> Note that Mr. Pessoa was identified as an "economist" and not an "education specialist"; thus, the unidentified "education specialists" did not refer to Mr. Pessoa either (at least manifestly enough to be coded as such).

field and the sub-field of economics) was identified with the code 55. Thus, in the final row, I marked 55(20).

Once I had coded the whole article in this way, I counted the total volume first of each subfield separately, and then, by summing the subfields, of each national field and international entity as a whole. The volume was counted by proportioning the word sum in relation to overall article length. In the sample article, the PT party received 151 words altogether. Since the article's total length was 1419 words, the PT (as well as the Brazilian political field as a whole, since none of the other subfields had been quoted) received 10.6% of total article space in comparison with 4.9% for civic society, represented by non-governmental organizations and unaffiliated individuals. The international economic organizations received 4.3% of total article space, while the Brazilian economic field received 2.0%. The Brazilian academic field was quoted in 9.5% of the total article space. In addition, 7.5% of the total article space consisted of quotes from anonymous sources.

In addition to proportioning all of the voices in relation to total article space, I also always counted the *total quoting space*, that is, the overall number of words expressed as quotes in the whole article. In the sample article, quotes took up 551 words in total, that is, 38.8% of article space. In relation to the overall quoting space, PT (151 words) received 27.4%, while Brazilian civic society received 12.5%, the international economic organizations, 11.1%, the Brazilian economic field, 5.1%, the Brazilian academic field, 24.7%, and anonymous sources, 19.3%. Obviously, the sum of these relative shares of total quoting space must add up to 100%, while the sum of each field's share of total article space must match the count achieved by summing up the words included in all quotes and proportioning them relative to the overall article space (i.e., in this example, 38.8%). Throughout the process, I verified my count by making sure the sums of the different calculations correlated properly. As in my frame analysis, I also made use of Excel in my field analysis to count and inspect the sums and proportions.

The purpose of this overall quoting space count was to ascertain the extent to which American and Finnish journalists included quotes in their stories vis-à-vis the "journalistic" space that they had reserved for their own voice as authors. In this way, I also aimed to obtain a more multidimensional understanding of the relative amount of article space given to Southern and Northern sources. An article may have yielded only a small proportion, say 5%, of article space to Southern sources altogether. Based on this finding, it would have been possible to draw the rather hasty conclusion that Southern sources were dismissed in this Northern story. But if the same article only gave, say, 2% of quoting space to Northern sources, then the share given to Southern voices was in fact relatively significant, at least in comparison with that of the Northern sources. Before making claims about the dominance of either Northern or Southern sources in the news, it is important to consider their relative volume at different levels.

After coding the whole sample in this way, I counted the average volume of the voices from the different Southern and Northern national fields by summing up each field's percentage of quoting space in different articles and dividing this sum by the quantity of articles included in the count, that is, by doing so in a similar manner as I had counted the average size of the frames (see chapter 4). The average volume was also counted at different levels: in relation to the overall article space and overall quoting space. When counting the average share of overall quoting space, percentages were recalculated to equal to 100 in order to illustrate each field's share of total quoting space at an overall sample level (Figures 2–5, chapter 6).

Some stories contained *quotes within quotes*, meaning that someone was quoted as saying what someone else had supposedly said. For instance, NYT article no. 131, which dealt with police operations in the slums of Rio, included the following description: “So far the ‘pacification’ police have been installed in small neighborhoods, like Dona Marta, which has about 6000 residents. ‘The testimonials I have received from the people that have been freed from this parallel power are just incredible,’ Mr. Cabral said. ‘We are now free from terrorism,’ they tell me. ‘Finally, governor, I can sleep at night.’” However, this quote was coded as representing the political field (the governor) rather than civic society because the paragraph did not include voices of the citizens themselves. In fact, paragraphs like this often embody symbolic violence; should the citizens not be quoted in equal proportions in this article, their realities were then defined on their behalf by the governor.

In the column on the right side of the coding sheet (see page 91), I marked the *objects of framing*. For this, I used the same institutional field categories as in the middle column, where I identify the speakers. To illustrate the coding process in practice, I again turn to the example article on page 91. Paragraph 4, which features the positive dimensions of the *Impact*, *Credibility*, and *World Order* frames, explains how Mr. da Silva lifted millions of people out of extreme poverty and stabilized Brazil's economy. Hence, the Brazilian political field, and the PT subfield in particular, was the object of *positive framing* by the journalist. Thus, I marked the code 1 to refer to the PT subfield, followed by the number of words that this positive framing contains: P1(39).

The same article contained paragraphs where the Brazilian political field was not quoted, but, rather, was the object of negative framing by other quoted sources. For instance, paragraph 28 contains the claim that “those successes fall short of the urgent thrust for change that some education specialists were hoping to see from Mr. da Silva... Not nearly enough was done to improve the quality of education...” Thus, in the last column of row 28, I marked N1(63); that is, negative framing concerning subfield no. 1 (the PT party), which had 63 words (see page 91 for the complete paragraph).

I have emphasized that in order for a field to be marked as the object of framing, the reference had to be explicit rather than implicit. Many times, the frame was clearly positive

or negative without needing to attribute praise or criticism to any particular field. Rather, the object was often simply “Brazil” or “South Africa.” For instance, the sample article ended with the statement that, “Brazil will continue to grow slower than its potential,” as expressed by a researcher at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, using a negative *Credibility* frame. However, no particular institution was mentioned as the cause of this failure; in other words, the paragraph did not contain a clear “object” of framing.

Again, after coding the total article in this way, I counted the total amount of words that were targeted at different fields, positive and negative, separately. In the sample article, the Brazilian political field (and the PT in particular) was framed negatively in 156 words altogether, or in 11.0% of the total article space. That is, the negative attention towards this field *exceeded* the total amount of article space that this field was allotted to speak for itself, which was 151 words, or 10.6% of article space. However, the difference was quite minimal: 0.4%. Thus, the proportions of negative framing and the field’s ability to speak for itself were quite balanced in this particular article.

However, this was not the case in many articles, where a field’s own volume was often substantially lower than the amount of negative framing targeted at such a field. Building on Bourdieu (1987, 13), this is what I call *symbolic violence*. The “louder” the voice of the negative framer vis-à-vis the framed field, the larger the proportions of symbolic violence. In addition, the severity of symbolic violence was determined by the *relative distance* between the framer and the framed. Such distance was conceptualized as ideological as well as geographical distance. The most severe acts of symbolic violence were those where the definer was both ideologically as well as geographically remote, and this particular field’s voice was substantially louder than the object field’s voice. For instance, the American economic field defining Brazilian civic society in, say, 40% of article space, with only 15% of article space being granted to Brazilian civic society to speak for itself, would be a severe act of symbolic violence towards Brazilian civic society. If the object of negative framing was Brazilian businesses, then symbolic violence would still take place, but less severely, due to the ideological proximity of the definer and object fields. That is to say, even though each field operates according to its own national logic, both the American and Brazilian economic fields are still part (national subfields) of the global economic field and, thus, they occupy somewhat neighboring positions, at least in comparison with civic society. Of course, symbolic violence can also occur within subfields; this is examined more closely in chapter 8.

In the sample article on page 91, the Brazilian political field was framed negatively by academics as well as by local associations. In addition, it was defined negatively by anonymous sources, which, I argue, is a particularly severe act of symbolic violence due to the fact that in such cases neither the ideological nor the geographical distance of the framer were revealed. This type of symbolic violence is explored in chapter 6. Here, I still



want to point out that in addition to the negative framing, the Brazilian political field was also framed *positively*; both the journalist as well as the academics quoted in the news article praised the accomplishments of President Lula da Silva and the PT party. In fact, these positive associations were more voluminous than the negative ones, taking up 14.0% of total article space. Thus, it could be argued that this balanced out the negative framing of the field. However, my study has revealed that even *positive* framing can embody symbolic violence, although this is not often the case. My argument is that even if a field is defined positively by other fields, this should not imply that the object field can be denied its own voice.

Object fields were only marked when they dealt with the current state of affairs. For instance, if an article framed the South African pro-apartheid NP government as object, the current government was not defined as object. In the case of “past” objects, I opted to write down the institution to which the article referred, but it cannot be assumed that this object field should be allowed chance to “respond,” because the people who represented such historical institutions are often not even alive anymore. However, I found that it was important to detect the extent to which such historical institutions were included in the news.

Finally, I also counted the average share of negative definitions concerning each field vis-à-vis their ability to speak for themselves to detect symbolic violence and measure its proportions at the core sample (NYT and HS) level. The average share of positive definitions concerning each field were not counted because this form of symbolic violence is more difficult to assess quantitatively, at least in a similar way as the negative framing. Obviously, it is also important to consider *what* each field says, not only how voluminously it speaks. In principle, I saw symbolic violence whenever some field’s volume and ability to frame its own realities was exceeded by some other field’s ability to speak on the first field’s behalf. However, the *severity* of this symbolic violence depended on the particular context and the particular positions of the Southern and Northern institutions involved. These are analyzed in chapters 6 and 7.

#### On the Reliability of Manifest-Level Field Analysis

As in my frame analysis, the transparency and reliability of my field analysis was enhanced by the fact that the fields and subfields were identified at the manifest level. Their volume can also be easily verified by anyone who should want to test my findings: the subfields and fields are listed in this chapter, while much of the news material is available online and the fields’ relative volume can be assessed simply by counting the number of words. My field categories were included in my preliminary coding manual, which was tested with the help of two colleagues (see chapter 4). While the actual volumes per field were not counted during the testing phase, as the sizes of frames were, the testers paid attention to my field categories vis-à-vis the citations in the text. Whenever the news articles quoted someone

that the testers could not easily associate with one of my existing field or subfield categories, they made a mark beside those paragraphs. As with my frame dimensions, all my field and subfield categories were carefully thought through after the test coding phase, and only when the categories had been refined was the whole sample systematically coded based on the definite criteria.

As I also noted in regard to my frame analysis, the manifest-level field analysis elaborated on in this study has its limitations. Rather than examining detailed debates between individuals, my focus was at the macro level: the relative volume of Southern and Northern national fields and subfields and what their interactions reveal about the power relations between the countries and institutions involved. For instance, some other study might choose to focus solely on the coverage of people living in South African and Brazilian slums, revealing different nuances in the statements by such individuals and their particular stances toward different political actors.

Rather than arguing that one approach is more important than the other, I would again suggest – as I already argued in regard to frame analysis – that different approaches can and should complement one another. In her preface to the Finnish translation of Erving Goffman’s classic piece *Sociology of Interaction*, Eeva Luhtakallio (2012, 8) notes that the approaches inspired by Goffman, including frame analysis, encompass “a broad scale of interaction, ranging from the quietest whimpers by individuals to societal structures and principles.” Rodney Benson and Tim Wood (2015, 804) argue that most framing studies cannot offer systematic and reliable analysis on the relationship between frames and speakers. I hope that in this and the previous chapter, and in the coding sample on page 91, I have managed to show how the connections between frames, the fields being quoted or paraphrased, and the objects of framing, as well their relative proportions, have been captured and elaborated on in my work. During the analysis, I would constantly go back to the article-level coding to revise my assessment of who sponsored what frame, in what particular context, in what tone, how voluminously, and for whom.

The next three chapters focus on my research findings, starting with a more “macro-level” analysis of how and to what extent different Southern and Northern national fields have framed each other in American and Finnish news and in what tone.

---

## 6. Findings: Proportions of Frames, Fields, and Symbolic Violence in American and Finnish World News

---

As explained in the previous chapters, my work is concerned with the combinations and proportions of different frames and fields. Based on my analysis of 260 news articles in *the New York Times* and 102 news articles in *Helsingin Sanomat*, the table below shows, first of all, the average *number* of perspectives per news article as well as the average length of the stories:

	<i>The New York Times</i>		<i>Helsingin Sanomat</i>	
	ON SOUTH AFRICA	ON BRAZIL	ON SOUTH AFRICA	ON BRAZIL
INSTITUTIONAL FIELDS	3.2	3.6	2.1	2.3
NEWS FRAMES	6.4	5.7	5.8	6.0
Average length of articles:	976.8 words	1103 words	448.6 words	538.3 words

Table 4: Average number of different news frames and institutional fields per article in the NYT's and HS's coverage of South Africa (2006–2010) and Brazil (2010–2014).

However, as I have emphasized, my goal has been to reach beyond counting the mere numbers of frames and voices in the news in order to measure their relative *size and volume*, that is, *proportions*. In the news articles I studied, some of the frames were so small and some of the voices so silent that had I coded for their presence or absence only, these minuscule views may not have met the criteria of “present” and would have been dismissed completely (coded as absent). Or alternatively, they might have been coded simply as “present,” creating the illusion that these viewpoints were substantial when in fact they only played a modest, yet still significant, role in the coverage. In the following sections, my aim is to demonstrate what my method has revealed about field and frame proportions in the American and Finnish coverage of complex realities in South Africa and Brazil. Building on Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and concept of symbolic violence, I explore what these proportions of perspectives reveal about the power relations between the countries and institutions involved.

A number of studies have found that American and European foreign news, and their coverage of the developing world in particular, tend to view events through the lens of U.S. policy interests (see, e.g., Hamilton and Lawrence 2010, 631). Annabelle Sreberny and Chris Paterson (2004, 8) state that “international news has frequently been criticized for

being ethnocentric and narrow” (see also Pedelty 1995, 222; Uskali 2007, 19). Tina Ustad Figenschou (2010, 86) describes how alternative global news sources like Al-Jazeera aim to “report forgotten stories from the perspective of the voiceless – the Global South, the underprivileged, the subaltern, the underdog, and the disenfranchised.”

The findings of my analysis of field proportions, illustrated in figures 2–5 show that, on average, less than one third of article space in the *NYT* and only about one fifth of article space in *HS* consisted of quotes – the rest of the article space was taken up by the American or Finnish journalist, telling the story and framing realities in South Africa and Brazil. In this sense, it could indeed be argued that Northern journalistic perspectives dominated the coverage for the period in question. But when zooming in on the “quoting space” to examine who was quoted and how much, my study demonstrates that the Global South is anything but voiceless: South African and Brazilian voices received between 70 and 80 percent of total quoting space, on average, in both media compared to only 11–16 percent of quoting space granted to American and European voices. The rest of the quoting space consisted of anonymous quotes, the specific role of which will be analyzed later in this chapter.

Researchers have found that Western governmental voices tend to predominate in Western world news (see, e.g., Entman 2004, 2; Hallin 1994, 64; Uskali 2007, 238). Figures 2–5 on the next pages also show that political fields are the loudest among the sources quoted (except in *HS*’s coverage of Brazil, where it was the second loudest field after unaffiliated individuals) – but not the American or European political fields; instead, the local South African and Brazilian political fields received between 23 and 27 percent of total quoting space, on average, in the *NYT* and between 15 and 30 percent in *HS*. In comparison, the American and European political fields received only a few percentage points of coverage; their highest share, six percent, had to do with the *NYT*’s coverage of Brazil. Thus, the “traditional mistrust among the international media of authorities in less developed countries” (Serra 2000, 166) was not detectable in my research materials. Civic society also had a voice – local individuals were extensively quoted in both the *NYT* and *HS*, and many of these voices belonged to underprivileged citizens in townships and favelas.

Why is the relative volume of Southern voices here so different than the findings presented in previous research on world news? I believe this can be at least partly explained, first of all, by the fact that South Africa and Brazil are relatively pacific democracies, rather than being torn by conflicts. Daniela Dimitrova and Jesper Strömbäck (2009, 87) note that especially war coverage presents journalists with safety concerns and logistical obstacles that may limit their access to places and people. For example, in their analysis of the Swedish and American news coverage of the Mohammad Cartoons crisis, following the Danish newspaper *Jyllandsposten*’s publication of caricatures of the Muslim prophet in September

2005, Dimitrova and Strömbäck (ibid.) say that US journalists were limited in their access to sources in the Middle East and had to rely heavily on the Danish government as a source.

Second, the high volume of South African and Brazilian voices in American and Finnish world news may reflect the relatively prestigious position of South Africa and Brazil in the so-called Global South. For instance, Jairo Lugo-Ocando (2015, 62) describes CNN coverage related to drought and related starvation in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Somalia, concluding that “this is the type of news report that often dominates the coverage of poverty on an international level, in which not a single source from the affected country itself is included and the whole story is articulated through the voices of Westerners.” In comparison with South Africa, these four East African countries are in an inferior position in many ways: they are not members of the BRICS or other similar international coalitions, they are not hosting a respected event such as the World Cup, and their governments have not come up with successful social programs enabling millions of previously poor people to raise their living standards and to reach out and address their diverse concerns to foreign journalists. To explain this lack of voices in the cases he writes about, Lugo-Ocando (ibid., 67) quotes Gayatri Spivak (1988, 287), according to whom “the subalterns – that is, those in poverty – are represented as ignorant of their own interests, having no history and unable to speak for themselves, and therefore silent on both local and international levels.”

I want to be cautious about the extent to which my findings on the relatively high volume of South African and Brazilian voices in American and Finnish news can be generalized to describe the volume of Southern voices in Northern news more broadly. But I also argue that scholars focusing on the coverage of conflicted or impoverished regions should not generalize that their findings characterize international world news coverage on *all* poor or “developing” countries. Because even if South Africa and Brazil are indeed much more privileged and powerful than, say, Ethiopia or Somalia, there still is substantial poverty in South Africa and Brazil as well, and these nations are also still part of the “Global South,” struggling with many problems similar to those of East Africa. And yet, my study shows that both South Africa and Brazil and their citizens, including those living in poverty, certainly have a voice in American and Finnish world news.<sup>101</sup> Most international news studies have limited their focus to coverage of regions impacted by humanitarian crises, conflicts, and wars (see, e.g., Chouliaraki 2006; 2008; Entman 2004, 2006; Pedelty 1995); Hamilton and Lawrence (2010, 685) argue that much less is known about the sourcing of other regions and topics. My study clearly shows that the dominance of Northern voices in Northern news concerning countries in the South should not be taken for granted – and that the relative volume should always be measured systematically and with an open mind, rather than just aiming to confirm previous assumptions.

---

<sup>101</sup> In *HS* coverage of Brazil, underprivileged citizens are the loudest of all quoted sources. These more specific findings on the relative volume of subfields are examined in chapter 8.

The New York Times coverage of South Africa:  
Proportions of Northern and Southern fields




Figure 2: Proportions of Northern and Southern fields in the NYT's coverage of South Africa. "North" refers mainly to the U.S. and "South" to South Africa. Other Northern and Southern countries have been quoted only modestly in the coverage, and thus, their voices have been incorporated into the "North" and "South" categories. In the lower chart, which depicts relative share of total quoting space, the share of the South African political field and other Southern political fields have been specified due to their particular relevance to the analysis.




Figure 3: Proportions of Northern and Southern fields in the NYT coverage of Brazil. Just as in Figure 2, “North” refers mainly to the U.S. and “South” to Brazil. The shares of Brazilian and other Southern political fields have been specified due to their specific relevance to the analysis.

*Helsingin Sanomat* coverage of South Africa:  
Proportions of Northern and Southern fields




Figure 4: Proportions of Northern and Southern fields in *HS*'s coverage of South Africa. "North" refers mainly to Finland and "South" to South Africa. Other Northern and Southern countries have been quoted only modestly in the coverage, and thus, their voices have been incorporated into the "North" and "South" categories. In the lower chart, which depicts relative share of total quoting space, the shares of South African and other Southern political fields have been specified due to their specific relevance to the analysis.






Figure 5: Proportions of Northern and Southern fields in *HS*'s coverage of Brazil. "North" refers mainly to Finland and "South" to Brazil. Note: in Figures 2–4, distinctions between the Southern political fields have been specified due to their specific relevance to the analysis. However, the only quoted Southern political field in the *HS* Brazil-coverage was the Brazilian political field.

## Segmented and Overlapping Windows on the World

Next, I will discuss how the diverse Southern and Northern fields, relative volume of which was illustrated in the previous section, have *framed* the South African and Brazilian realities. The charts displayed on the next page, which depict the average size of the news frames vis-à-vis total article space in the *NYT* and *HS* show that, in the same manner as the fields, some frames were more spacious than others. In the *NYT*'s coverage, South Africa and Brazil-related news featured the exact same frame proportions, that is: *Responsibility* frame > *Conflict* frame > *Impact* frame > *Credibility* frame > *Human Interest* frame > *Exoticism* frame > *World Order* frame. What seems striking is the fact that in the *NYT*'s Brazil coverage, all of these frames were systematically smaller in size than in its South Africa coverage, even though the “order of magnitude” was the same. In the *NYT*'s South Africa coverage, the average size of all the frames was 31.9% of the article space, while in the Brazil coverage it was 27.8% of the article space.

Earlier in the study, I explained how my frame analysis was originally inspired by Gaye Tuchman (1978, 1), who defined news as a window on the world: “Through its frame, Americans learn of themselves and others.” She also points out that “like any frame that delineates the world, the news frame may be considered problematic. The view through a window depends upon whether the window is large or small, has many panes or few...” (ibid.). In the “overall window,” then, that is, in the total sample, all of the panes in the *NYT*'s Brazil window were smaller than in the newspaper's South Africa window, providing the readers with narrower views of Brazil than of South Africa. Since the South Africa-related sample encompasses coverage between 2006 and 2010 and the Brazil-related sample between 2010 and 2014, these frame proportions could either indicate that 1) the frames had simply shrunk over time, possibly due to the increasing time pressures and crisis of journalism caused by digitalization and the economic depression (see chapter 3; see also Ryfe 2012, 173–174), that is, that the journalists did not have the time or resources to “expand” the windows as much, and/or that 2) circumstances and sources in Brazil somehow led to more limited coverage.




Figure 6: Proportions (average size) of news frames in the *New York Times* coverage of South Africa and Brazil. Due to the fact that the frames overlap in the coverage (see chapter 4), the sum of their sizes exceeds 100%.




Figure 7: Proportions (average size) of news frames in *Helsingin Sanomat* coverage of South Africa and Brazil. Due to the fact that the frames overlap in the coverage (see chapter 4), the sum of their sizes exceeds 100%.

These frame proportions in the NYT echo, quite literally, what Chang and colleagues (2012, 368) have called “the shrinking space for foreign news coverage in the US,” by which they are actually referring to the diminishing *amount* of world news items in comparison with domestic news and other stories and which they attempt to explain by, in their words, the “Americans’ indifference to events taking place overseas” (see also Riffe et al. 1994). Such arguments go back decades. Hamilton (1976, 10), for instance, has described how North American people are particularly ignorant about Latin America: “What has kept U.S. news managers from improving coverage is a belief that North Americans simply don’t care. As James Reston put it, ‘the people of the United States will do anything for Latin America except read about it’” (see also Hamilton 2009, 126; Pedelty 1995, 222).<sup>102</sup> Hamilton (1976, 10) concluded that newspapers “should encourage their reporters to do more in-depth reporting about Latin America instead of competing for flashy stories.” In other words, the relative lack of breadth in American news on Latin America has already been identified as a persistent issue.

Such “shrinking” of frames is more difficult to note in *HS*, as the proportions between frames in its coverage of South Africa and Brazil are somewhat different: the *Impact* and *Human Interest* frames were larger in *HS*’s Brazil-related coverage than in its South Africa coverage. It must also be kept in mind that my *HS* sample on South Africa was over two times smaller than my *HS* sample for Brazil, and *HS* did not have a long-term correspondent in South Africa, as it did in Brazil, for the whole year of 2014 (see chapter 3). The average size of all the frames in the *HS*’s coverage of South Africa (25.9%) was very similar to their average size in the *HS*’s coverage of Brazil (25.7%), but given the fact that the sample was not balanced, these average sizes should be compared with caution. When looking at Finnish-American differences in news coverage, however, one remarkable and clear finding is that the frames in the NYT were larger than in *HS* regarding coverage of both South Africa and Brazil. Only the *World Order* frame was more prominent in *HS* than in the NYT in the coverage of both Southern countries. The *Human Interest*, *Impact*, and *Exoticism* frames received more prominence in the *HS*’s Brazil-related coverage than in its South Africa coverage, whereas in the NYT, the opposite was true.

In both media, the frames tended to overlap, creating broader frameworks of interpretation (see chapter 4, table 2). In Gaye Tuchman’s metaphoric language, they became larger windows with no panes separating them. For example, the *Responsibility* frame was combined with the *Impact* and *Conflict* frames to describe how police corruption has resulted in increasing violence in the Brazilian slums or *favelas*. The *Exoticism* frame was

---

<sup>102</sup> Mark Pedelty (1995, 222) writes that “SPECA reporters joke that you can get the U.S. to do anything in Central America except read about it. Before blaming the situation on readers, however, it is important to note how limited the U.S. press presentation of the world is.” SPECA refers to the Salvadoran Foreign Press Corps Association.

combined with the *Credibility* and *Impact* frames to explain how “traditional” South African remedies like garlic were proving useless in the fight against AIDS, and so forth. My argument is that in the *NYT*’s Brazil coverage, the frames overlapped *less* than in its earlier South Africa coverage, which helps explain their relatively smaller size. In *HS*, again, the frames overlapped *consistently less* than in the *NYT*. In other words, the *NYT*’s “big” window depicting Brazil was more segmented than its view of South Africa, whereas both windows created by *HS* were more segmented than the views created by the *NYT*.




Illustration 2: Segmented (left) and overlapping (right) news windows on the world.

Table 4, presented earlier in this chapter, shows that each *HS* article features roughly six frames on average – a similar amount as the *NYT* articles. Thus, both media are pluralist in their framing of South Africa and Brazil; but in *HS*, the frames remain more segmented, while in the *NYT*, they overlap more. Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004, 151) say that “one of the most important characteristics of the Democratic Corporatist countries is their strong division into political and cultural sub-communities, a pattern often referred to as segmented pluralism.” According to these authors (*ibid.*), the Northern and Central European media institutions tended to be rooted in such sub-communities, leading to the tradition of an ideologically plural press with strong advocacy functions. Hallin and Mancini (*ibid.*, 183) find that, more recently, political orientations in the Democratic Corporatist countries tend to be manifested “in patterns of selection and emphasis in news reporting, rather than explicit commentary.” Framing is precisely about selecting and emphasizing specific aspects of a perceived reality; politicians and other actors use journalists to communicate their preferred frames to the wider public (see chapter 4). Thus, my finding that Finnish news presents news frames in more segmented way than American news raises questions about the possible connection between segmented frames and segmented pluralism in the Finnish media system, as compared to more overlapping frames and the tradition of internal pluralism in the American media system.

However, given my focus on foreign news, the fact that a substantial proportion of the quoting space was taken up by diverse South African and Brazilian sources, rather than sources representing different sectors of the Finnish society does not enable me to conclude whether the news reflects persisting patterns of political parallelism in the Finnish national context. Instead, I would suggest that the strong ideological and linguistic divisions which

shaped the formation of the Finnish media system in its early stages (see Hallin and Mancini 2004, 153) may have generated a journalistic logic which routinely organizes frames provided by diverse sources in a segmented, rather than in an integrated form. That is to say, even if the currently leading Finnish newspapers including *HS* formally detached themselves from political parties by the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (see Hankimo et al. 2012, 26), becoming diversified omnibus commercial papers more similar to American newspapers (see Hallin and Mancini 2004, 159), this does not necessarily imply that the diverse information included in the papers was and is organized in a similar way as it is in the U.S., where commercial “catch-all” papers have been the norm from much earlier on.

Kevin Barnhurst and John Nerone (2001, 3; see also Barnhurst 2010) have defined the form of news as “the persisting visible structure of the newspaper, the things that make *the New York Times*, for example, recognizable as the same newspaper day after day although its content changes.” Curiously, I found that the Finnish form of segmented pluralism takes a very similar form in *HS*’s tabloid edition as it does in its earlier broadsheet version (see chapter 3),<sup>103</sup> and I did not detect any major difference between the ways in which the perspectives were organized in the paper’s online and print editions, either. The same can be said about the *NYT*: the frames overlapped significantly in both its online and print editions in comparison with *HS*’s print broadsheet, tabloid and online versions. In other words, I found that both the *NYT*’s online and print editions promote overlapping windows on the world, whereas *HS*’s broadsheet, tabloid, and online editions use more panes. Thus, my study provides support for Pablo Boczkowski’s (2004, 73–76) finding that the *NYT*, along with other American elite newspapers, recreates its print norms in online settings. My findings also support claims that the structural differences between American and Finnish media still continue to persist and that such differences manifest themselves in both print and online forms of the news (Nielsen 2013, 398–404; Powers and Benson 2014, 249); even if the frames have shrunk somewhat in the American news over time, Finnish-American differences were still notable and clear throughout the periods of coverage.

The impact of media system characteristics on news content will be examined even more later in this chapter, but it should already be noted here that different kinds of pluralisms, inherent in different media systems, can promote *different forms of democracy* (Hallin and Mancini 2012, 283; see also Benson 2013, 48). The segmented view is not “inferior,” it just reflects a distinct logic of bringing diverse viewpoints together. In my understanding, the slightly diminishing frame proportions in the *NYT*’s Brazil coverage do not necessarily indicate that Americans are becoming more “ignorant” or that they do not care about

---

<sup>103</sup> As explained in the introduction and in chapter 3, *HS* was converted from broadsheet to a more compact tabloid form as of January 2013.

Brazil or Latin America, but that their world view, and the journalistic logic shaping the American coverage of global affairs, may be gradually changing. Table 4 also shows that the NYT's Brazil-related news articles were actually *longer* than its articles concerning South Africa, which suggests that this change in frame proportions was not a result of *less time* or *less space*. Curiously, these frame proportions indicate that if some changes are taking place, then the American media system seems to be becoming somewhat more segmented, like the Finnish media system, rather than vice versa. As described in chapter 3, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 301) cautiously predicted European media's convergence with the American Liberal model, while some studies have suggested that quite the opposite seems to be happening (Nielsen 2013, 400; see also Hallin and Mancini 2012, 284).<sup>104</sup>

But there is still more to the comparative analysis of frame proportions. As explained in chapter 4, each frame is made up of positive and negative dimensions, which determine the *tone* of the coverage. While parts of the reality behind the news window may feature clear skies and sunshine, other proportions of the view could reveal less radiant sceneries. Scholars focusing on world news have unanimously claimed that news concerning "the developing world" merely focuses on violence, conflicts, and suffering (see, e.g., Chouliaraki 2006, 187; Hess 1996, 28–59; Pietiläinen 1998, 104–106). Uskali (2007, 9–12, 245) regrets that the Western mass media portrays a "pronouncedly negative image of the world," especially in its coverage of Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia. According to Esser and colleagues (2017a, 71), "few trends are better documented than the news media's inclination to depict political events and actors in primarily negative terms" (see also Galtung and Ruge 1965, 69).

Figures 8–9 on the next page illustrate my findings regarding the tones of the frames and the average share of positive dimensions within each frame in the NYT and HS. These figures, depicting the average share of positive and negative dimensions within each frame in the NYT's and HS's coverage of South Africa and Brazil, show that the frames were more negative than positive. Yet each frame did contain considerable positive dimensions as well: some frames were as much as 40% positive on average. That is, based on my findings, I argue that Northern news on the Global South is certainly not all negative.

---

<sup>104</sup> Nielsen (2013, 400) says that "if anything, U.S. newspaper companies are actively trying to change their business models to make them more like those prevalent in Europe (by increasing sales revenues and expanding ancillary businesses built on the newspaper brand)." Benson (2013, 147) writes that "for the most part, the French national newspapers are at least as broadly balanced and internally pluralist as their American counterparts – and usually more so. If anything, U.S. newspapers are moving toward the French level of internal pluralism rather than vice versa."




Figure 8: Average share of positive dimensions within frames in the NYT coverage of South Africa and Brazil, vis-a-vis frame size.




Figure 9: Average share of positive dimensions within frames in the HS coverage of South Africa and Brazil, vis-à-vis frame size.



Having first explained the surprisingly high share of Southern voices quoted in the news in both newspapers, and then having revealed the unexpectedly high share of positive dimensions within the frames in the coverage, it would seem logical to draw a connection between the two findings – to assume that the local voices framed their own realities in a positive light, thereby challenging the Northern pessimistic view about the “developing” world. But, in fact, my study shows that, especially in the case of the *NYT*, the quoted *Southern* fields did most of the *negative* framing, “supported” by anonymous sources and targeted at realities and institutions in their own countries. Significant proportions of the positive framing can, again, be traced to the Northern sources quoted and the amount of journalistic space. Similar patterns occurred in the *HS*’s coverage, but not as much nor as systematically as in the *NYT*.

I will now first “zoom in” on the negatively framed space (the shadows behind the news window) to examine which Southern fields in particular were doing the negative framing and which fields were the *objects* of these critical definitions. As has already been noted in this dissertation, Paul Adams (2007, 18) has argued that “representations, images or visions of one country by another country say as much about the country that is doing the depicting as about the country that is depicted.” Indeed, I will try to show how, by examining the tones and proportions of the Southern fields quoted in the articles, we can learn at least as much about the logics of the Northern journalistic fields orchestrating the outcome.

### Negative Frames, Relative Distance, and Symbolic Violence

Many of the negative framings found in the coverage were “vague criticisms” not aimed at any particular field, but at social reality as a whole. Such pessimistic views can be found, for example, in article no. 64 (the *NYT* on South Africa), paragraph 7:<sup>105</sup> “Experts point to the particularly brutal nature of crime in this country: the unusually high number of rapes, hijackings and armed robberies. The murder rate, while declining, is about eight times higher than in the United States...” In article no. 251 (the *NYT* on Brazil), paragraph 14, a Brazilian truck driver is quoted, describing the environment that he lives and works in: “This place a bit like hell...” *HS* article no. 297 mentions that “Brazil is always called the eternal land of the future. Until now, this bright future has never arrived.”<sup>106</sup>

But many of the negative framings in these news articles were targeted directly at distinct fields. Some fields were framed negatively in a limited number of articles related to a specific topic over a short period of time, and even in these articles, the proportion of

---

<sup>105</sup> As explained previously, all of the news articles of my core sample have been numbered; the titles and dates of publication can be found in table 7 (appendices), based on this article number.

<sup>106</sup> Original in Finnish: “Brasiliaa sanotaankin ikuiseksi tulevaisuuden maaksi. Tähän asti loistava tulevaisuus on aina jäänyt toteutumatta.”

negative framing remained small in comparison with the negative framing of other fields. For instance, in the context of the protests in Brazil in 2013, the local associations subfield (as part of civic society) was accused of “vandalism” by the Brazilian journalistic field and the law and order field: breaking things, not obeying the police, and so forth. However, such negative framing could only be found during the period of peak media attention (term from Benson 2009, 405) surrounding the protests.

Some fields were framed negatively in a much more systematic manner throughout the whole period of coverage. The most frequent and voluminous objects of negative framing were the South African and Brazilian political fields. Table 5 (appendices) shows that in both media, the local political fields were quoted more frequently than they were negatively framed.<sup>107</sup> But when looking at the average *proportions* (see figures 2–5) described earlier in this chapter, that is, at the average *space* that the local political fields were given to speak for themselves in these news stories vis-à-vis the space where they were framed in a negative light by other fields, it becomes clear that at the overall sample level, the negative framing was actually *more voluminous* than were their own voices.

In Figures 10–11 the next page, the column on the left illustrates the average volume of the South African and Brazilian political fields, that is, the share of article space in which they were quoted vis-à-vis *total article space*.<sup>108</sup> The column on the right side illustrates the average share of negative attention given to these political fields; the definitions concerning these fields determined by the other fields quoted in the coverage, including the American and Finnish journalistic fields, vis-à-vis *total article space*. If the two columns featured similar proportions, then the coverage would be *balanced*. But note that the column on the right, depicting the share of negative attention, is substantially higher than the column illustrating the overall volume at which the fields were able to speak. The article space where these political fields were framed negatively, *which exceeded the ability of these targeted fields to speak for themselves*, is what I, building on Pierre Bourdieu (1987, 13–15), define as the *proportion of symbolic violence* in the news.

---

<sup>107</sup> Curiously, in the NYT’s coverage, both the South African and Brazilian political fields were quoted in the same relative amount (78.5%) in each respective sample. That is, 78.5% of the NYT’s South Africa-related sample quoted the South African political field, while 78.5% of the NYT’s Brazil-related sample quoted the Brazilian political field (see table 5 in appendices).

<sup>108</sup> As explained in chapter 5, the volume of the voices was measured at two levels: total article space and total quoting space. While figures 2–5 depict each field’s share of total quoting space, here I refer to the *total article space*, since the fields have also been framed by the American/Finnish journalists; that is to say, the negative framing examined here reached beyond the total quoting space.




Figure 10: Proportions of symbolic violence towards the South African and Brazilian political fields in the NYT coverage at the total sample level.




Figure 11: Proportions of symbolic violence towards the South African and Brazilian political fields in HS at the total sample level.

Building on Bourdieu (1987, 13), who said that “what is at stake in symbolic struggles is the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world and its divisions (...), that is, power over words used to describe groups or the institutions which represent them,” I have conceptualized symbolic violence as the ability of a field to impose its logic on another field and frame a situation or problem concerning another field on this other field’s behalf. In line with my frame and field analysis, rather than simply determining the “presence” or “absence” of symbolic violence in the news, I have argued that it is vital to consider the *proportions* of symbolic violence in the news. The severity of symbolic violence depends on the proportions of negative framing by other fields vis-à-vis the amount of quoting space granted to the negatively defined field to speak for itself. In other words, given the larger share of negative attention vis-à-vis the speaking volume at the overall sample level, my research shows that the South African and Brazilian political fields were objects of symbolic violence in both the NYT and HS. Looking at the average shares, the difference between the political field’s total quoting space and negative attention space was greater in the NYT (-11.6% for South Africa and -6.4% for Brazil) than in HS (-7.0% for South Africa and -4.0% for Brazil).

But the news I studied also contained *other forms of symbolic violence*, inherent in the logics of the American and Finnish journalistic fields and found at different levels of coverage. Just like the dimensions of the frames, these forms of symbolic violence also *overlap*. As I will show in the course of this chapter, some of these forms of symbolic violence were more severe in the American than in the Finnish coverage, and vice versa. In this general findings chapter, I focus mainly on the symbolic violence aimed at the Southern political fields, given its systematic and voluminous nature. More modest and less frequent symbolic violence towards other fields is examined in chapters 7 and 8.

For Bourdieu, “every linguistic exchange contains the *potentiality* of an act of power” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 145, italics in original). Who has the power, then? I have already hinted that the large proportions of local voices quoted in the NYT and HS were found to frame the institutions in their own countries quite negatively. But of course, the most powerful fields are the Northern (American and Finnish) journalistic fields, which not only receive most of the article space to frame Southern realities, but also get to *choose* the critical sources as well as do the editing. This led me to conclude that *all American and Finnish news articles include some proportions of symbolic violence*: the Northern journalistic fields imposing their logic on the Southern fields being quoted and/or framed in their stories.

When defining the severity of symbolic violence, it is important to also consider the relative *distance* between the Northern journalistic field in charge of the framing process and the local Southern fields being quoted and framed in the articles. Field analysts have pointed at the *habitus gap* between journalists and their sources (Benson 2013, 27), with *habitus*

meaning the internalized dispositions which generate perceptions, aspirations, and practices (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 126; see also Swartz 1997, 104). As emphasized by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, 96), to think in terms of a field is to think relationally: “remoteness in space” can lead to “a form of aversion or lack of understanding” (Bourdieu 1987, 5). In other words (Bourdieu 2000, 610, *italics mine*), “*social proximity and familiarity* provide conditions of ‘*nonviolent*’ communication.”

When creating world news and interviewing sources, journalists are not only faced with habituses different than their own, which I call *ideological distance*, but they must also deal with *cultural* (and *geographical*) distance (see Galtung and Ruge 1965, 67). Even though field relations extend beyond national boundaries (Benson 2015, 264; Bourdieu 1998, 41), and the larger fields can be conceptualized as “global” (Go 2008, 297; see chapter 5), each country’s (sub)fields are still defined by their own *rules of the game*, established once the field was founded and which tend to persist over time (Benson 2013, 25; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 98). This means that a journalist must also know the particular *context* in order to comprehend the local rules of the game that have shaped the habituses of the people that (s)he is interviewing and framing (Bourdieu 2000, 611; see also Benson and Neveu 2005, 4).

Benson (2013, 27) points out that one might expect “habitus affinities” (i.e., *proximate* fields) to contribute to *more positive* news coverage, and “habitus disaffinities” (*remote* fields) to produce *less positive* coverage. The American and Finnish news analyzed for this study show that, even though geographically/culturally proximate, the South African and Brazilian individuals, associations, and academics being quoted claimed an *ideological distance* from their own countries’ political fields by framing them in a systematically negative tone. For instance, NYT article no. 47 (paragraph 29) quoted 26-year-old TV-installer Louis Manjanja, who “...blames the African National Congress, which led the liberation struggle, for the troubles. ‘The ANC is a bunch of greedy guys fighting for positions and ignoring what needs to be done,’ he said. ‘I voted for them before, but not again.’”

Both countries experienced protests prior to the World Cup, but in its coverage of Brazil, where the demonstrations gained more magnitude and media attention, the voices of unaffiliated individuals were especially loud in the NYT:

(Article no. 194, paragraph 13): “They don’t invest in education, they don’t invest in infrastructure, and they keep putting makeup on the city to show the world that we can host the World Cup and Olympics,” said Jairo Domingos, 26, a technical support assistant in Rio.

(Article no. 198, paragraph 14): “I don’t believe in her [President Dilma Rousseff’s] promises,” Sergio Mazzini, 65, said late Friday night during a protest in the São Paulo city

center. “There have been too many promises for me to keep believing. We don’t know where all this is leading, but they are trying to fool us.” Felipe Possani, 20, an intern at a bank (...) had nothing but scorn. “She’s a joke,” he said. “She’s just faking...”

*HS*, which did not have a correspondent in Brazil at the time (in 2013), published fewer articles regarding the Brazilian protests, but still the coverage focused on complaints by the general populace (example from article 309, paragraph 11): “The protesters accuse the government for ignoring education and healthcare while sowing money to sport stadiums...”<sup>109</sup>

In both the *NYT* and *HS*, the South African and Brazilian academic fields, and, to a lesser extent the American and Finnish academic fields, were also quoted framing the two Southern countries’ political fields quite negatively. It is difficult to determine the ideological and cultural distance of the academic fields vis-à-vis the fields they are allowed to frame in the news, especially given the way that academics have usually specialized in the realities that they have agreed to comment on. This provides the academic field with special “permission” to explain phenomena on behalf of others. Daniela Dimitrova and Jesper Strömbäck (2009, 87) note that “using academics as sources tends to increase the credibility of the news and provide ‘unbiased’ viewpoints.” Of course, the journalist may not have chosen the most knowledgeable expert available, provoking violent communication nonetheless. Still, in principle, as explained by Bourdieu (2005, 40), “the field of the social sciences does not aim to intervene in the struggle for the imposition of the dominant vision of the social world.” But Bourdieu (*ibid.*) then adds that “it nonetheless *does so*, in as much as its findings immediately become instruments in the struggle.” In other words, even if the academic fields would merely aim to explain situations from their more neutral scientific perspective, these statements can still be used in journalistic coverage to impose particular visions of the social world on the other fields involved. For example, in *NYT* article 221, paragraph 12, the Brazilian scholar and writer Antonio Risério was paraphrased as saying that “our political leaders are of such mediocrity that it is hard to comprehend.” For the journalist to have contacted this particular academic source indicates that (s)he may well have intentionally sought out a specific tone in a particular frame to complement a story.

Even though most quoted voices within the political fields belong to representatives of the governing parties, some voices emerge from the margins of the local political fields, reflecting a struggle within the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 99). Such a situation also contributes to the negative framing of the field as a whole. This kind of “conflictual proximity” can be explained by the “law of the search for distinction” (see, e.g., Bourdieu

---

<sup>109</sup> Original in Finnish: “Mielenosoittajat syyttävät hallituksen lyöneen laimin koulutuksen ja terveydenhuollon samalla kun se kylvää rahaa urheilustadioneihin...”

2005, 39; see also Swartz 1997, 231). NYT article 200, paragraph 16, provides just such an example of conflicted proximity:

“Those wolves, that trash over there, they rob the people, they feast on the meat of the people by stealing public money destined to do things for us,” said Caio Fabio de Oliveira, 45, a civil servant in the Health Ministry, who was among the demonstrators against Congress this week in the capital, Brasilia. “It is shameful for the Brazilian people; I work for the government, and I’m ashamed every day...”

In all of the excerpts cited above, the voices that framed their governments in a negative tone belonged to South African and Brazilian people explicitly identified in the articles. This means that they were geographically and culturally proximate to the political fields being framed, but ideologically distant. The presence of a geographically/culturally more distant field (the Northern journalistic field conducting the interview) did not seem to push them any closer to these local political fields; if it did, then this push would have been reflected as more positive views and the narrowing of the habitus gap between the local fields involved, at least temporarily.

With a much more silent voice, Northern (American and Finnish/European) political fields were also quoted framing the South African and Brazilian governments with an admonitory tone. These fields, again, were ideologically proximate but distant culturally and geographically. Their criticisms were usually related to issues such as human rights and humanitarian crises. For instance, in NYT article no. 3, United Nations official Stephen Lewis reproached the South African government’s inability to solve the country’s AIDS problem (paragraph 3): “Its government is still obtuse, dilatory and negligent about rolling out treatment.” The article continued as follows: “In his remarks, Mr. Lewis said, ‘The government has a lot to atone for,’ and ‘I’m of the opinion that they can never achieve redemption’” (paragraph 6).

Some of the most dissatisfied sources quoted in the news coverage belonged to FIFA and the International Olympic Committee, which directed the largest part of their complaints – about delays, defective infrastructure, crime and security, and so forth – at the South African and Brazilian governments rather than at the local sports fields. However, as depicted in the charts 2–5 earlier in this chapter, the voices of these Northern sports institutions were also relatively silent, accounting for only a small percent of the total quoting space throughout the coverage. Much more space was given to the Brazilian and South African sports fields, which often criticized their countries’ political field as well.

Curiously, in the American journalistic space (i.e., the NYT’s article space not consisting of quotes), I rarely found any negative framing of the Southern political fields, or any Southern fields whatsoever. Most negative framing in this American journalistic space was vague in nature, aimed at South Africa or Brazil in general rather than at any specific field.

In other words, in the NYT, negative framing of different fields was done mostly by means of quoting culturally/geographically proximate and ideologically distant fields (the local South African and Brazilian individuals, associations, and academic fields), and to a much lesser extent geographically distant but ideologically proximate fields (i.e., the Northern political fields). To elaborate on the idea of “disaffinities” leading to negative coverage (Benson 2013, 13), I would add that in the NYT’s international news coverage, ideological disaffinity/distance was more decisive than geographical/cultural disaffinity/distance, meaning that the former resulted in larger proportions of negative coverage. But this claim only applies to those sources that were explicitly *named* – in my sample, many critical sources were anonymous, and I will argue that these unnamed voices indeed emerged and secretly imposed ideas from a distance.

#### Anonymous Sources: Symbolic Violence Disguised

The neutral stance adopted by the NYT journalists (attributing most of the negative frames to quoted sources) can be explained by the American tradition of a neutral commercial press and a form of journalistic professionalization centered around the principle of objectivity, which is characteristic of the Liberal media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 67, 219). But in addition to the culturally proximate, but ideologically distant, Southern sources quoted with a negative tone in the news, my research revealed a relatively large proportion of quoting space reserved for anonymous sources (see Figures 2–5), which, I discovered, were systematically used in the NYT to negatively frame the South African and Brazilian political fields and how they conflict with American interests.

One of the problems related to the use of anonymous sources in foreign news coverage is the impossibility to determine their relative distance vis-à-vis their object field, in this case the Southern political fields. My first example illustrating this phenomenon is from the NYT’s coverage concerning Brazil’s interference in the American-led attempt to impose sanctions on Iran due to its controversial nuclear program; in May 2010, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, flew to Iran to negotiate a deal with Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Brazil claimed that it had promoted international peace and understanding by reaching an official agreement with Iran (Reid 2014, 239–240). NYT article 134, paragraphs 7–10 (*italics mine*, to illustrate anonymity), explained:

Celso Amorim, the Brazilian foreign minister who represented the country at the United Nations when the United States used evidence to build a case against Iran, has described this weekend’s talks as an effort to prevent that from happening again. But the effort is hardly a selfless one, *analysts say, arguing that* Mr. Silva sees the Iran talks as a way to stand against American dominance and advance Brazil’s emergence as a major player on the international stage. (...) *Critics in Brazil* have also questioned why Mr. da Silva has embraced Iran in recent months at the risk of alienating the United States...



The story suggests that these “critics” were from Brazil, that is, from a culturally proximate field, but the story did not specify the ideological distance. Subsequent NYT articles, such as article no. 136, continued to address Brazil’s involvement in Iran and quoted (paragraphs 3–5), again, unidentified “*opinion-makers*,” “*lawmakers*,” and “*others*” who “fretted that he [Lula] had damaged Brazil’s relationship with the United States.” Here, again, the news article hinted at the fields involved – law and order, and politics – but not their cultural/geographical distance.

My other example is a news article that framed the U.S. government as the *responsible* field following Edward Snowden’s revelation that the American National Security Agency had been spying on the Brazilian government (Reid 2014, 259). NYT article 210 was quite critical of the United States: American actions were framed negatively in 48.5% of the article space, and the quoted fields that accounted for this negative framing – mainly, the Brazilian political field and journalistic field – were clearly identified with complete names and affiliations. The only part of the article where the Brazilian political field was framed negatively was in paragraph 15, which, curiously, presented the only anonymous source in the whole story. The paragraphs 14 and 15 had stated:

The Brazilian authorities have ordered Brazil’s Postal Service to develop a national e-mail system allowing users to exchange encrypted messages that would presumably be harder for intelligence agencies to monitor. The new system, scheduled to begin in 2014, is intended as an alternative to American services like Gmail and Hotmail. (...) (paragraph 15) *Cybersecurity experts* have expressed skepticism, pointing to how even hackers have found ways to penetrate seemingly secure satellites and porous parts of the internet, but Brazil is still moving ahead with the programs...

Anonymous sources also abounded in business-related stories promoting (American) market-friendly policies and criticizing South African and Brazilian aims to nationalize private enterprises. For example, NYT article no. 147 (paragraph 2) explains that, “[w]hen the outgoing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (...) was first elected (...) *some* feared he and his workers party would demonize the private sector, make life harder for foreign investors, and compete with (...) Chávez to become Latin America’s leading populist firebrand.” And in article no. 230, paragraph 17: “A *growing chorus of critics* argues that the inability to finish big infrastructure projects reveals weaknesses in Brazil’s model of state capitalism.”

Similar negative framing of the Southern political fields by anonymous sources was frequent in the NYT’s South Africa-related coverage. For example, article no. 1 (paragraph 6) paraphrased South African President Jacob Zuma, who “...has laid it bare, effectively arguing that he is being persecuted for his cultural beliefs.” But Mr. Zuma was then anonymously challenged in the very next paragraph: “*Many experts* call it a political Hail

Mary, a desperation throw aimed at salvaging the public career of a man accused of corruption and sex crimes...”

My analysis of the *NYT* coverage as a whole provides me with substantial evidence to suggest that these anonymous sources were both culturally/geographically and ideologically distant from the South African and Brazilian political fields, that is to say, furtively imposed from the North. Turo Uskali (2007, 45) has paid attention to forgeries and deceit in journalistic coverage in the United States and elsewhere, claiming that they have been possible precisely because “editorial staffs have started to accept the use of anonymous sources in stories.” In 2003, Jayson Blair, a national reporter for the *NYT*, was discovered to have fabricated information and quotes, some of which had been attributed to anonymous sources. A year later, the editors of the *NYT* published an apology related to the paper’s coverage of the run-up to the war in Iraq, following claims that the *NYT* and other American media were not sufficiently skeptical of information provided by anonymous administrative officials (see Duffy 2014, 252–253; see also Carlson 2011, 31–35). Researchers have also found that the use of anonymous sources has a negative impact on perceived news credibility with American news audiences (e.g., Pjesivac and Rui 2014, 654; Sternadori and Thorson 2009, 63). Michael Sheehy (2008, 24, 32) laments that American foreign news stories are more likely to include unnamed sources than domestic news (see also Sobel and Riffe 2016, 301).<sup>110</sup>

I still want to emphasize that, especially in the coverage of delicate issues and crimes, some sources *did* request anonymity from the journalist when agreeing to be interviewed, and this was made explicit in the article. For example, in *NYT* article no. 6 (paragraph 4), the following explanation was included:

The taxi owner is 54, a beefy man with a shaved head, propped in a chair beside his bed at Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town. The seven bullet wounds in his legs are shrouded in a blanket. He may yet lose a foot, but he has other worries. “Do not put my name on any paper,” he said. “If I see my name, I will hold you responsible for my death...”

As explained earlier in chapter 5, in cases such as this one, I did *not* code the source as anonymous. Rather, the man was coded as an unaffiliated individual: he clearly existed and was giving a voice to frightened citizens in South Africa.<sup>111</sup> However, in my sample,

---

<sup>110</sup> Sheehy (2008, 30) focused on the domestic and foreign news coverage of *The Washington Post*, finding that up to 70.3% of the total sample analyzed (458 news articles) contained at least one anonymous source. This is even more than I found in the *NYT*, where the share was 50% in the South Africa-related coverage and 59.2% in the Brazil-related coverage; see table 5 (appendices).

<sup>111</sup> Since his job is mentioned (taxi driver), he could have also been coded as a representative of small business owners in South Africa (representing the economic field). However, as explained in chapter 5, I coded articles according to their point of emphasis, and in this context, his role as an ordinary citizen suffering from the violence was clearly being emphasized, rather than any business logic as such.

only a handful of news articles quoting anonymous sources provided any explanation as to their usage, and in most cases it was unclear why the speaker would even need to request, let alone be granted, anonymity, considering the *NYT*'s policy that anonymous sourcing should be used only if the information cannot be found in any other way (Duffy 2014, 257; see also Boeyink 1990, 234).<sup>112</sup> In his Public Editor article titled "Those Persistent Anonymous Sources," published in the *NYT* on March 21, 2009, Clark Hoyt lamented the newspaper's inability to use anonymous sources in a consistent and clear way:<sup>113</sup>

The Times has a tough policy on anonymous sources, but continues to fall down in living up to it. (...) Last year, at my request, a group of journalism students at Columbia University studied anonymous sources in the Times and concluded that their use was actually down by roughly half since the strengthened policy was adopted in 2004. But the students said the paper failed to follow its own rules for explaining them nearly 80 percent of the time. (...) Given the examples we found – nonessential and even trivial information attributed to anonymous sources, personal attacks, and inadequate details about a source's credibility – I think it is time again for a forceful rededication of the newspaper's own standards. "We need to do better," [the executive editor Bill] Keller agreed. (...) Abramson, a former Washington bureau chief, said she thinks the city's problems with anonymous sources are part of a "culture of hiding who is talking" that is spreading everywhere, in part because "any quote can become an Internet time bomb."

Was such "culture of hiding who is talking" apparent in Finnish news also? As my figures 2–5 show, *HS*'s coverage of South Africa and Brazil on average contained almost the same proportion of anonymous sources as the *NYT*'s coverage, but table 5 (appendices) reveals that such anonymous sources were used much less frequently. In other words, in those articles that anonymous sources are used in *HS*, they take up even larger proportions of article space than in the *NYT*. In many articles in *HS*, the anonymous sources were also cited in a similar manner as in the *NYT*. In *HS* article no. 315 (paragraph 14), for instance, anonymous "*critics fear that after the World Cup, the stadium will become another 'white elephant,' expensive and useless mega project.*"<sup>114</sup> Still, my analysis as a whole indicated that in *HS*, anonymous sources were used much more heterogeneously than in the *NYT*, and they could also frequently be found in positive contexts. The use of passive voice is also quite common in Finnish news. For example, *HS* article 272, paragraph 14, mentioned that "in foreign policy, [South Africa's President] Mbeki's merits *have been* commended."<sup>115</sup>

---

<sup>112</sup> The *NYT*'s policy on anonymous sources was updated in 2016; available at [https://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/the-times-gives-an-update-on-anonymous-source-use/?\\_r=0](https://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/the-times-gives-an-update-on-anonymous-source-use/?_r=0).

<sup>113</sup> Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/opinion/22pubed.html>.

<sup>114</sup> Original in Finnish: "Arvostelijat pelkäävät, että stadionista tulee kisojen jälkeen yksi uusi 'valkoinen elefanti', kallis ja hyödytön jättiprojekti..."

<sup>115</sup> Original in Finnish: "Ulkopolitiikassa Mbekin ansioita on kiitelty."

The article does not explain who in particular had been praising Mr. Mbeki in this context, but that was not seemingly the point of the story anyway; the article merely reminded readers that Mr. Mbeki had also achieved some good results next to his many failures. Such positive usages of anonymous sources demonstrate that anonymous/unnamed sources and passive voice have many distinct functions, and rather than just being used to include disguised criticisms as I found in the case of the *NYT*, in *HS* they are part of the journalistic narrative style in general.<sup>116</sup>

Differences in Finnish and American news may also reflect the fact that, given Finland's much more marginal role in global politics, at least compared with the United States (see chapters 2 and 3), Finnish national interests are not really at stake in the issues being covered, at least not most of the time and in similar ways as are American interests. Despite Finland's more marginal geopolitical position, or maybe precisely *because* of it, I found that Finnish journalists more explicitly and willingly, even if not that frequently, take a stance within *HS*'s journalistic space and do so *without* disguising negative frames in anonymous quotes.<sup>117</sup> For instance, in *HS* article no. 276 (paragraph 3), the journalist wrote the following passage, which clearly features a negative *Credibility* frame rather than just a neutral description:

Jacob Zuma (...) is most likely going to become South Africa's next president in the elections held today. The shoes are big to fill, since, for years now, the rainbow nation has been sliding downward politically. How is it that Zuma, soiled in corruption and rape scandals, will be able to lead Africa's greatest economy, the success of which will have an impact on the future of the entire continent? This remains a question mark.<sup>118</sup>

The Finnish journalists' readiness to take sides seemingly more easily than American journalists makes sense when looking at the countries' media history: as explained in

---

<sup>116</sup> In their comparison of Swedish and American news, Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2009, 85) found that in the press coverage concerning the Iraq War, anonymous sources were much more common in American than in Swedish news. On the other hand, they found that in domestic news concerning elections, anonymous sources were significantly more common in the Swedish than in American press. But they also discovered that the absolute levels of anonymous source use differ sharply between the two events, being much more common in the war coverage. The authors (*ibid.*) conclude that "the nature of the event may have a significant impact on source use (i.e., war versus election news, or foreign versus domestic news)."

<sup>117</sup> Similar geopolitical differences could help explain the higher usage of anonymous sources in American than in Swedish news coverage on the Iraq War, where the U.S., unlike Sweden, was centrally involved; see footnote 116.

<sup>118</sup> Original in Finnish: "Poliittisena kameleonttina pidetty Jacob Zuma, 67, on tänään keskiviikkona pidettävissä vaaleissa mitä todennäköisemmin nousemassa Etelä-Afrikan seuraavaksi presidentiksi. Saappaat ovat suuret, sillä sateenkaarimaa on jo vuosia luisunut poliittisessa alamäessä. Miten korruptio- ja raiskausskandaaleissa ryvettynyt Zuma kykenee johtamaan Afrikan suurinta taloutta, jonka menestys vaikuttaa koko mantereen tulevaisuuteen? Tämä on toistaiseksi vielä suuri kysymysmerkki."

chapter 3, the Finnish Democratic Corporatist media system – much like the French or Spanish Polarized Pluralist system and unlike the American Liberal system – is rooted in the tradition of *political parallelism*, which, still back in the 1970s and 80s, enabled journalists to display a political identity and claim journalistic autonomy (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 177). Since then, the level of political parallelism has significantly declined in European countries, including Finland. Still, Hallin and Mancini note the following (2004, 261):

...to some extent, in fact, the ideology of the Liberal media system spread without actually changing journalistic or other media practices. We have always been struck by how common it is, in Southern Europe particularly, for journalists to express allegiance to the global notion of ‘objectivity,’ while they practice journalism in a way that is very much at odds with U.S. or British notions of political neutrality.

### The Framer and the Framed: American and Finnish Rules of the Game

Based on their comparative study of news in sixteen countries in North America and Europe, Frank Esser and colleagues (2017a, 80) argue that negativity is most widespread in commentaries, editorials, and opinion pieces. Indeed, these were the only sections in the NYT where I found that American journalists directly framed South African and Brazilian political fields rather negatively, as illustrated in this example (editorial article no. 35, paragraph 11): “South Africa can ill afford another five years of failed leadership and frustrated hopes. Whoever succeeds Mr. Mbeki must look long and hard at all that has gone wrong and vow to do better...” However, in the NYT, many of the opinion pieces most critical of Southern political fields were, again, written by Southern authors – South African and Brazilian academics, artists, journalists, and other writers invited or permitted to publish their views as columns in the NYT’s op-ed section.<sup>119</sup> In other words, even in the most openly critical section of the NYT, Southern sources were still expected to do most of the negative framing.

In *HS*, the editorials and opinion articles did not differ so much from the rest of the newspaper’s news content – regular world news articles, feature articles, and editorials often contained negative framing in a similar way, explicitly expressed by both Southern and Northern sources. For example, *HS* article no. 297 described the increasing immigration of Europeans to Brazil in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. A large *World Order* frame in this

---

<sup>119</sup> For example, op-ed article no. 72 by South African journalist Mark Gevisser was severely critical of the South African government and the way in which it handled the World Cup (paragraphs 13–14): “South Africa has an obsession with reputation, manifested by a tendency toward bling: if we look good, we are good. (...) The result was a cesspit of corruption and intrigue that played a significant role in bringing [President] Mbeki down and has also severely compromised his successor, Jacob Zuma. Now, with the World Cup, there are indications once more that the huge, rapid expenditure toward a deadline-driven goal has created similar conditions of corruption and intrigue that might fester for years...”

story depicts how Brazil is now attracting Europeans who are having a hard time finding work and getting by in their home countries. But the negative tone of this frame soon turned to Brazil, depicting the country as a backward place: the European individuals quoted in the story criticized everything from Brazilian politics and bureaucracy to the heat, insecurity, and traffic jams. Even though the quoted European speakers were living in Brazil, they emphasized their European origins and higher education in comparison with the Brazilians. In this case then, the framer (European individuals) was both culturally/geographically as well as ideologically distant from the object fields (Brazilian politics, and business) being framed negatively. As explained in chapter 5, I use the term “unaffiliated individual” to refer to individuals whose names were mentioned but not in connection with any particular institution. What these individuals quoted in the *HS* article explicitly had in common was that they were of Southern European (Spanish or Portuguese) origin and they had a similar *habitus*: they were all young professionals looking for a future in Brazil. Their names, ages, and areas of specialization were explicitly stated in the article. Their photos were included in the story, showing their faces and expressions up close.

This article is a great example of the Finnish quoting logic, not only because the young Europeans quoted were framing Brazilian realities so negatively, but also because they are *the only quoted field* in the whole story. Brazilians had absolutely no voice, not a single word, even though their country and its institutions were being framed in a harshly negative tone by the Northern sources. Still, before claiming that this story contains symbolic violence – I will indeed argue that it does – it needs to be explained that an analysis of this form of symbolic violence must be connected with analysis of the logic of the Finnish journalistic field. Previously in this chapter, I described how the Finnish framing logic differs from the American framing logic in that the frames overlap less – Finnish news is more segmented. A similar logic shapes how sources are quoted in Finnish news: the newspaper tends to give space to one or a few fields at a time. In most *HS* articles included in this study, more than one field was quoted, but the structure of the story was still segmented – rather than engaging in direct debate, each of the speakers received their own physical space in an article, and when their space ended, so too did their turn to speak, which was then given exclusively to the next field.

But regardless of whether there were one, two, or three quoted fields in an article, another important characteristic of Finnish news is that all of these quoted fields tended to be *proximate* to one another, either culturally, ideologically, or both. For instance, it was difficult to find stories that quoted Finnish *and* Brazilian/South African (i.e., Northern and Southern) fields in the same story.<sup>120</sup> Ideologically proximate fields, such as Southern non-governmental organizations and Southern individuals, could easily be found quoted

---

<sup>120</sup> There are some exceptions to this; these will be explored in chapter 7.

in the same Finnish story. But combinations of fields with more different habituses – Southern businesses and Southern non-governmental organizations, for instance – were, again, exceptional. But what I found most surprising is that there seemed to be *no “rule of proximity” regarding the object field*. Likewise in the example article cited above, the European individuals framed the Brazilian political and economic fields negatively regardless of both ideological as well as geographical distance. In the NYT, it was difficult to find stories where ideologically and/or geographically distant fields were *not* quoted in the same article. Such diverse fields were also placed in intense debate with one another, many paragraphs featuring more than one field and opposing viewpoints. But the NYT proved much more cautious in regard to the object field, especially when it came to geographical and cultural distance: as I have shown, anonymous sources and Southern fields typically did the negative framing concerning other Southern fields.

The differences in American and Finnish quoting logics can, again, be explained by the characteristics of the respective media systems. The Finnish Democratic Corporatist system is known for having developed a mass circulation press from an early point in time and for high newspaper circulation (see chapter 3; Hallin and Mancini 2004, 67). Finnish people are known to actively follow the news, which is also reflected in relatively high levels of public knowledge concerning current events and international affairs (see chapter 3; see also Curran et al. 2009, 17; Nielsen 2013, 399). Thus, Finnish journalists may feel confident that their readers will actively expose themselves to the whole range of coverage, and rather than trying to fit a number of different viewpoints in each news article, diverse voices and viewpoints are scattered in articles published over a longer time span.

Hallin and Mancini (2004, 67) define the external pluralism inherent in the Finnish Democratic Corporate media system as “pluralism achieved at the level of the media system as a whole, through the existence of a range of media outlets reflecting the points of view of different groups or tendencies.” Hence, the “big story” may extend beyond individual news articles – if the news audience actively follows the newspaper and other media outlets, then they are eventually expected to develop a multifaceted vision where different viewpoints are at least more balanced than in individual news articles. If Southern fields are completely silenced and negatively framed in one article, as in the example above, other news articles – which the audience is also expected to have read – will promote only Southern perspectives.

However, I have also previously described how the subscriptions of Finnish newspapers have been in systematic decline for years now (Sauri and Picard 2012, 49), and more and more readers are becoming online subscribers – the public broadcasting television network YLE, which retained the attention of the great majority of Finns for decades, is in crisis too (Silvo 2010). Thus, Finnish journalists should perhaps no longer take it for granted that their audiences will reliably read all of the stories written on an issue and become exposed

to all the relevant perspectives. Aware of this current reality, journalists who nevertheless exclude the negatively framed field take the conscious risk that this object field's voice will never be heard, at least not loudly and clearly enough. Therefore, I argue that there is symbolic violence in articles such as the previously mentioned no. 297 (European immigrants in Brazil story); in that news article, the European individuals being quoted were imposing their logic and defining a situation on behalf of the Brazilians without allowing the Brazilians to speak for themselves. Here, we indeed have "the voiceless" South, as discussed by Figenschou (2010) and others.

But I also maintain that this form of symbolic violence must be analyzed vis-à-vis the particular logic of the Finnish journalistic field – even if a news article has ignored (not quoted) a negatively framed field, leading to symbolic violence, the journalist who created the story, and who followed *the rules of the game* established by that particular journalistic field (Bourdieu 2005), may have had the sincere intention of giving prominent voice to this negatively framed field in some other article to be published later. Earlier in this chapter, I also mentioned that different forms of pluralism promote *different forms of democracy*. An essential part of such a democratic model is – or at least has been – active citizenship: people, not just journalists, are expected to take part in public debate and stay informed (Ferree et al. 2002, 211). Thus, I would argue that journalists do not bear the full responsibility for this kind of symbolic violence – rather, Finnish society as a whole is expected to embrace this duty of learning as a collective (see also Hallin and Mancini 2004, 187). Paul Adams (2007, 3) writes that the "search for mutual understanding is an unending process that lies at the heart of civil society"; he reminds us also that (ibid., 7) "the bonds of citizenship must be pushed beyond the borders of the nation state, toward the construction of a transnational democratic system."

Similar expectations regarding the need for citizens and news audiences to remain active and take the initiative do not seem to be implicit in the American Liberal media system. In their comparative study, James Curran and colleagues (2009, 17) found that American audiences follow the news on a less regular basis than Finnish audiences, also concluding that Americans were much less knowledgeable about international affairs than Finns. Compared with the high newspaper circulation rates in Finland, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 67) describe the American circulation rates as only "moderate." The Liberal media system is characterized by internal pluralism, which means that each individual media outlet is likely to promote a wide range of different perspectives (ibid., 29). The way in which this type of pluralism differs from European newspapers has been explained by Benson, who cites American journalists claiming that "if you have time to read several newspapers, you might get a broader range of news with the French press, but if you only



have time to read one, you're better off with an American newspaper."<sup>121</sup> That is, American journalists do not expect citizens and news audiences to go through multiple media to become exposed to many viewpoints – rather, the different perspectives are readily available in the same newspaper on the same day.

Thus, the NYT allows the negatively framed object field, such as the South African and Brazilian political fields, to speak for itself in the very article where this negative framing occurs, even if the proportions are not always balanced. This way, the newspaper tries to make sure that the reader becomes exposed to multiple sides of the issue, rather than just one, as in individual Finnish articles is often the case. But, in my view, this internal pluralistic logic does not provide the NYT with the means for nonviolent communication either – and here I come back to the way that anonymous sources are used for negative framing in these news. Whereas in the Finnish news the negative framer is explicitly identified but the object of the framing is not necessarily quoted, in American news the object field is quoted, but the *source* of the negative framing is *not identified* (except as “critics,” “experts,” and the like). Thus, the object field gets to speak for itself, but without knowing *whose* logic is being imposed upon it in the article, and whether this negative definition is local or global (culturally/geographically proximate or distant) in nature. In his discussion on anonymous sources, David Boeyink (1990, 235) crystalizes the essence of this problem, which I conceptualize as symbolic violence:

An attack based solely on an anonymous source denies the accused an opportunity to confront his or her accuser. This would be considered outrageous in a court of law. Why is it less problematic when someone is accused of misdeeds anonymously before the whole community?

Fair enough, sources quoted in news often only learn what the other sources have said when reading the newspaper – and since this is the NYT, many South Africans/Brazilians may not even read it. At least they will not read *HS*, unless they miraculously happen to know Finnish. Here, I am concerned with the “view on the world” presented to the American/Finnish readers rather than with the extent to which the South African and Brazilian sources being quoted become exposed to each other’s views through a particular medium and article. In both cases exemplified above – *HS* quoting only Europeans to negatively frame Southern people and the NYT using anonymous sources to frame Southern people – the Southern object fields’ power to speak is undermined by the legitimacy of the Northern journalistic field to impose a foreign – distant – logic upon it. In the words of David Swartz (1997, 43), “symbolic capital is denied capital: it disguises the underlying ‘interested relations to which it is related giving them legitimation.’” Sobel and Riffe (2016, 300) observe that “the cynical view is that sources use anonymity to (...) create

---

<sup>121</sup> I refer to a draft version of a manuscript by Benson; see also Benson’s interview with Jay Rosen, available at: [http://archive.pressthink.org/2003/12/05/benson\\_interview.html](http://archive.pressthink.org/2003/12/05/benson_interview.html).

an illusion of transparency.” Given the way negative views are systematically connected with anonymous sources in the NYT, Finnish journalists, even if more openly quoting and expressing negative viewpoints in an unbalanced manner, are at least more *transparent*, which, next to the role of an active citizen, is an important characteristic of democratic news coverage according to multiple normative theories of journalism (Ferree et al. 2002, 207).

To summarize so far: I have shown that the Finnish segmented form of news, on the one hand, and the American internal pluralism and the aspiration for a “neutral” press, on the other, embody two distinct forms of *potentiality for an act of power* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 145): 1) negative framing from distant positions (geographically as well as ideologically), transparently but without quoting the object; and 2) negative framing without identifying the source, even if quoting the object. These “potentials” are not always realized, for both media in my sample also contained a number of articles which, in my view, were excellent examples of non-violent communication. I still also emphasize that symbolic violence must always be analyzed vis-à-vis the logics of the journalistic fields – without fully attributing the violence to the individual journalist, but rather, to the media system as a whole.

#### South Africa and Brazil Are Off the Map! Implicit Ideas and Perilous Praise

There are two other forms of symbolic violence that characterize American and Finnish framing of South Africa and Brazil. What is special about these forms is that one of them is produced by a *lack of framing*.<sup>122</sup> The other form of symbolic violence at stake here occurs on the *positive side* of frames. I will try to clarify what I mean.

Figures 6–7 show that the *World Order* frame is the only frame that was larger in *HS* than in the NYT in the coverage of both countries. In *HS*, the frame was used to emphasize South Africa’s and Brazil’s economic and social transformations as well as their increasing involvement in global politics. More than 50% of the frame was still negative on average, and certainly many of the *HS* articles featuring this particular frame described how the two countries still failed to exhibit proper leadership skills and how circumstances had worsened in South Africa and Brazil after the initial “boom” and promise of the BRICS, often in combination with negative dimensions of the *Credibility* frame. Now, what I find curious is the complete *lack* of this particular frame in many similar American contexts. That is, rather than emphasizing the rise – or fall – of South Africa/Brazil on the global stage, their existence on the world map is *ignored completely*.

---

<sup>122</sup> By “lack of framing,” I am not referring to “frameless space,” but rather to the mere lack of the usage of a frame that would seem relevant in a particular situation.

As I have just shown, the *World Order* frame was also used in significant proportions in the previous sample article from *HS* on European immigration to Brazil. Certainly, it was imposed by European speakers and the Finnish journalistic field, reminding readers that Brazil was still “bureaucratic” and “backward” in many ways, and supposedly not as sophisticated as Europe, despite its new financial wealth. Brazilians were not allowed to speak for themselves and define their perspective on the world order. Still, the frame *was there* – indicating that at least Brazil’s place on the world map had been taken into consideration, even if negatively. But in the *NYT*, this frame was seemingly lacking in many contexts where it would have been relevant – indeed, it was the smallest frame in the coverage on both South Africa and Brazil (see Figure 6). The American attitude inherent in the coverage by the *NYT* of both Southern countries is best exemplified in a quote included in article no. 177 (paragraph 6): “Brazil sees itself as having arrived or close to arriving,” said Peter Hakim, president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, a research and policy organization in Washington. “The United States sees Brazil as big, the most important country in Latin America, but not anything like a global power...”

In their study of “frameless quotes,” Rodney Benson and Tim Wood (2015, 804) argue that “ideologies are often expressed in silences.” Building on this finding by Benson and Wood, I argue that the *NYT* is doing symbolic violence to the South African and Brazilian political fields by ignoring a frame for what seem to have been implicit political reasons. Even though *HS* used this frame for many negative purposes as well, it again did so *transparently*, whereas this form of symbolic violence by the *NYT* is, again, characterized by *reticence*, as in the case of the use of anonymous sources for negative framings.

Finally, the last form of symbolic violence takes place, as already mentioned, within the *positive framing space*. This occurs when some field – usually the political or the sports field – is able to frame its own accomplishments in a positive light, thereby emphasizing how its own actions have *benefited* some other field. If this object field is quoted in a balanced way, presenting its own view (has it really benefited and how?) no symbolic violence has seemingly occurred. But my research materials contain quite a few articles where the object did not get to say much, or *anything at all*. The image of the quoted field was then enhanced at the cost of some other field, which was depicted as a subordinate “recipient” with no, or at least less, ability to speak for itself.

By now, it is probably not surprising that this form of symbolic violence is much more common in *HS* than the *NYT*. For instance, *HS* article no. 274 exclusively quoted the former Finnish President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Martti Ahtisaari, who said, among other things, that (paragraph 4):

...he [Ahtisaari] himself considers that his most important accomplishment was the reconciliation between occupier country South Africa and the guerrilla movement Swapo.

(paragraph 5) This reconciliation was, in Ahtisaari's view, a precondition for the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. (...) (paragraph 6) "Most of my South African friends are ready to accept my claim that the agreement with Swapo encouraged the government of South Africa to begin negotiations with Mandela..."<sup>123</sup>

The story contained no negative framing of President Ahtisaari's actions, and his "South African friends" were not quoted at all in the story, and neither were any other fields. In other words, Mr. Ahtisaari was allowed to frame his own success *on behalf of the South African* people – the journalist made no effort to verify his claim from any South African institution or individual. Certainly this form of symbolic violence can be explained via the Finnish journalistic logic. But I still insist that, while this logic makes such a practice understandable, it no longer makes it completely acceptable, given the reduction in Finnish newspaper subscriptions and the related lowering of expectations with respect to the citizens consuming different media in society.

Such occurrences of symbolic violence are rare in the NYT. One example of a *potentiality* for violent communication of this type can be found in article no. 247, which exclusively quoted Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff (however, a slide show connected to the article quoted Brazilian individuals as well). The story was published in the context of Brazil's 7–1 loss to Germany in the World Cup, and President Rousseff offered words of comfort to the nation. She was given the opportunity to celebrate her own accomplishments as well (paragraph 14):

Ms. Rousseff defended her economic record, noting that inequality had diminished during her administration and that of Mr. Silva, while unemployment has fallen to historic lows. "In concrete terms, this means your maid has the chance to sit in an airplane and travel to see her parents," she said, pointing to an example of how incomes have climbed in Brazil this century.

No maids, or even underprivileged individuals, were quoted in the actual article. Still, President Rousseff's self-praise was not overwhelming in the article, as, curiously, the preceding paragraph (no. 13) *anonymously* challenged her accomplishments: "Slow growth has opened her to criticism over her insistence on using a sprawling apparatus of state-controlled companies and banks to guide economic policies..." Thus here, the anonymous sources, the uses of which I have defined as a form of symbolic violence in general, were used to balance the story, exposing President Rousseff to criticism as a means of countering

---

<sup>123</sup> Original in Finnish: "Hän pitää itse tärkeimpänä saavutuksenaan sovinnon hiomista miehittäjävaltio Etelä-Afikan ja sissiliike Swapon välille. (paragraph 5) Tämä sopu oli Ahtisaaren mukaan edellytys myös Etelä-Afrikan apartheid-järjestelmän purkamiselle. (...) (paragraph 6) Useimmat eteläafrikkalaiset ystäväni ovat valmiita hyväksymään väitteeni, että sopimus Swapon kanssa rohkaisi heitä [Etelä-Afrikan hallitusta, toim. huom.] aloittamaan neuvottelut Mandelan kanssa."

her self-praise. Yet, the anonymous sources quoted here did not sound like they were promoting the view of Brazilian maids, but, rather, that of the American institutions opposing the Brazilian form of state capitalism. Thus here, too, the anonymous sources as such embodied symbolic violence, even though they in a way prevented another form of symbolic violence from taking place.

Thus far, I have defined multiple forms of symbolic violence in the NYT's and HS's coverage of the two countries, identified especially in the context of framing the South African and Brazilian political fields. As I have shown in this chapter, the South African and Brazilian fields in general were given much more quoting space on average than previous research has claimed/assumed. This even more prominent negative attention by other fields aimed at the Southern political fields helps explain the surprisingly large share of quote space allotted to them: since they were framed negatively with such a loud volume and so frequently, the South African and Brazilian political fields were also given a greater chance to speak for themselves and "defend" themselves than the other fields, which received smaller proportions of negative attention.

The different forms and proportions of symbolic violence described in the previous pages challenge the idea that these Southern political fields, even if the speakers quoted in such fields had the loudest voices throughout the coverage, were simply the most powerful among all quoted speakers included in the stories. In this sense, fields that were rarely framed negatively by the other fields involved and yet still received considerable quoting space, such as the Southern academic fields, local associations, and unaffiliated individuals, can be considered even more powerful than the Southern political fields – at least symbolically – when it comes to defining Southern realities for Northern audiences.

Over the years, civic societies in the Global South have acquired more and more resources to speak up in international news. Already before the "boom" of the Internet and social media, Sonia Serra (2000, 169) described Brazilian associations protesting against police violence in the slums, "outside the structure of power," but eventually still attracting the attention of prominent international media such as the NYT, and in this way managing to influence Brazilian national policy-making. Now, in the era of the Internet, Southern citizens can even more easily express their political views in social media and get their message across to a wider global audience. For example, HS article no. 309 on the protests in Brazil directly quoted content that Brazilian protesters had published on Twitter. Similar quotes from social media were found in the NYT articles. That is, my study suggests that both American and Finnish journalists do also take advantage of the South African and Brazilian voices available online as opposed to just incorporating the voices of people who had been interviewed in situ (see chapter 3).

In South Africa, protests that gained media coverage were targeted above all against Zimbabwean and other African immigrants who had entered the country to compete for

jobs with impoverished South Africans. Despite the fact that these protests were much more violent in nature than the protests in Brazil, the news articles also give voice to the citizens themselves, and framed the South African *government* rather than the protesters as the main, even if not the only, responsible field. For instance, NYT article no. 112 focused its attention on the malice of the local politicians rather than the hatred of the citizens (paragraph 20): “The Forced Migration Studies Program at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, which has examined the nation’s continuing xenophobic impulses, concludes that local political leaders often instigate the violence as a means to advance personal agendas...”

### Context, Complexity, and Democracy: Interplay of Positive and Negative Frames

I have previously discussed how the NYT especially uses anonymous and mainly Southern sources to frame the South African and Brazilian political fields in a negative light. Thus, of course it could be now argued that the Northern media takes advantage of such cries, stemming from the Southern civic and academic fields, just to further criticize the Southern governments and “reaffirm cultural images of Third World countries as places of barbarism” in the “stereotypical coverage of the international media,” as Serra (2000, 166) ultimately defines the Brazilian citizens’ engagement with *the NYT* and other Western media.

In what follows, I try to show that, at least based on my sample, the NYT’s and HS’s coverage of South African and Brazilian realities in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is much more multifaceted than that. But given the very different logics of the American and Finnish journalistic fields, this complexity is created in different ways. My first example is from NYT article no. 142 concerning education in Brazil.<sup>124</sup> The story quoted a representative of a local non-governmental organization, who first directed her pessimism at Brazilian realities in general (paragraph 10):

“We should be ashamed of ourselves,” said Ilona Becskeházy, executive director of (...) an organization based in São Paulo devoted to improving Brazilian education. “This means that 15-year-olds in Brazil are mastering more or less the same skills as 9-year-olds (...) in countries such as Denmark or Finland...”

Reading just this part, one might hastily conclude, in the light of earlier claims about the quality of Western world news, that this article was just another manifestation of the persistent negativity of the news and the supposed backwardness of Southern countries, and this quote used to reinforce just such an idea for ignorant American and European audiences. But reading further, it becomes clear that in the same article, these negative

---

<sup>124</sup> A screenshot of this same article, no. 142, was used as an example of my coding process; see page 91 in chapter 4.

dimensions of the *Credibility* and *Impact* frames were complemented with positive dimensions of the same frames as well as the *Responsibility* frame (e.g., paragraph 25): “School enrollment has continued to climb, a trend that began in the 1990s under the previous president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and middle school graduation rates have risen under Mr. da Silva by 13 percentage points to 47 percent,” [Minister of Education] Mr. Haddad said.”

But in the very next paragraphs, the Brazilian political field was framed negatively, not that surprisingly, by anonymous sources (paragraph 30): “It has not helped, critics add, that Mr. Silva has sometimes used his own lack of an education as part of a populist discourse...” In this example, in addition to the potential for symbolic violence caused by anonymous framing, the interplay between the positive and negative dimensions of the frames was used to illustrate the complexity of Brazilian realities: yes, its education policies were still lagging behind, and yes, this was affecting the Brazilian people and the government was not able to fix the problem. But there *was* the claim that the government had also made efforts, that some of the efforts had succeeded, and that some people had benefited from the efforts, too. A similar level of complexity could be detected in the NYT’s South Africa coverage as well.

Esser and colleagues (2017a, 80) argue that news topics most likely to be negative in character include the occurrence of scandals, crime and the judicial system, the quality of governing, and immigration. Certainly, these topics were also framed negatively in my sample. But I also found quite a few positive dimensions here and there in such articles, which are apparent, for instance, in the title of NYT article no. 184: “Brazilian Corruption Case Raises Hope for Judicial System.” Paragraph 7 went on to describe how “‘...this trial shows that Brazil’s institutions are functioning with vigor,’ said Thiago Bottino, a law professor at Fundação Getúlio Vargas. ‘The justices could have easily washed their hands of this case and walked away, instead, they entered the fight for an ethical democracy’” (positive *Responsibility* and *Credibility* frames). These positive panes in the middle of large window frames depicting darkness helped introduce some light to the scenery, reminding readers that reality is not as simple as it might at first seem.

As mentioned earlier, Table 5 (appendices) still shows that there were a greater number of stories in both media where the South African and Brazilian political fields were quoted but not negatively framed. These articles mostly concentrated on the achievements and accomplishments of the ruling party in both countries. But I have shown in the previous subsection how positive views and self-praise can also lead to violent communication, if the politicians are allowed to speak without including views from the people who supposedly benefited from their policies.

My whole point here is that, as already emphasized in chapter 4, the same realities can be either positive or negative for different people, depending on the angle. For instance, many American and Finnish news articles described the happiness of unaffiliated South African and Brazilian individuals as a result of the World Cup: they reported feeling proud and excited about their home countries finally making it onto the global stage – and they gave credit to the politicians for making it happen. The World Cup had created jobs for their families, it had inspired their kids to play soccer, and it had reminded them of the promises of Nelson Mandela and his ANC party in South Africa and of “Lula” and “Dilma” and their PT party in Brazil; politicians who in the opinion of many citizens had made a significant contribution to the well-being of ordinary people. At the same time, though, other people lost their homes as their neighborhood were destroyed because of construction projects related to the World Cup. Some people who really wanted to see a soccer game could not afford to attend. Some people lost their loved ones in accidents at the construction sites when stadiums were being built too hastily due to excessive promises by the government. As this example regarding the World Cup coverage shows, had the news been 100% positive, the coverage would probably not have been multiperspectival at all. Rather than complaining about the “negativity” of the news, then, I argue that researchers should focus, first of all, on the *interplay between different positive and negative views of different sources and how they are balanced in news over time*.

My study suggests that, within the limits of their media systems and the rules of the game for their respective journalistic fields, both American and Finnish journalists make a *conscious effort* to introduce these diverse viewpoints to the readers so that they would understand the complexity of the realities being covered. NYT article no. 38 is particularly fruitful for illustrating what I mean. It was titled (*italics mine*): “*Complex Ties Lead Ally Not to Condemn Mugabe.*” The story tried to explain why South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki continued to support Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, despite the latter’s highly repressive politics and human rights violations, condemned by the whole international community. The story began with an exceptionally open and negative description of both African leaders (paragraphs 3–4):

President Robert Mugabe’s enforcers had already begun to rampage across Zimbabwe, beating his political opponents, when television cameras captured a startling image of Mr. Mugabe holding hands with the smiling South African president, Thabo Mbeki, a professed champion of African democracy (...) Mr. Mbeki, leader of the continent’s most powerful nation, spoke no evil of Mr. Mugabe’s repressive ways.

But as the story continued, these frames – *Responsibility*, *Credibility*, and *Conflict* – became more positive, accompanied by a smaller, but still positive, *Human Interest frame*, used to explain how these two controversial leaders had become friends while fighting against apartheid and repression in Africa. Paragraph 8 acknowledged that “Mr. Mbeki’s policy,



typically called ‘quiet diplomacy,’ is built on the staunch conviction that his special bond with Mr. Mugabe can resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe through patient negotiations...” The very next paragraph again became negative, quoting anonymous sources who attributed Mr. Mbeki’s politics “to a hubristic resistance to admitting failure, a worldview deeply suspicious of Western interference in African affairs.” But in paragraphs 13–14, the South African political field was again allowed to speak for itself, stating that “Mr. Mbeki’s mediation led to relatively fair election in the first round of voting. ‘His approach has produced results,’ said Themba Maseko, the spokesman for South African government.” Then Mr. Mbeki’s biographer was again quoted, explaining Mr. Mbeki’s special friendship with the Zimbabwean governor: “Mugabe is the father, but not a beloved father, a troublesome one, the kind the son wishes would just listen to him once in a while...” The story concludes with a firm statement from the South African government: “Mr. Mbeki has told the [Zimbabwean] government and the opposition that the violence needs to stop,’ Mr. Maseko said.”

In this article, the fact that the two Presidents were responsible for serious human rights violations was emphasized at the very beginning. But the positive tones of the frames describing their friendship, their previous success in the fight against apartheid, and their bad experiences with white governments in the past can help the reader also understand *their* (Mr. Mbeki’s and Mr. Mugabe’s) perspective – *why* they had behaved in the way that they had. Familiarizing themselves with the reasons was probably not going to make readers approve of any of the human rights violations or repressive politics – but this comprehension is probably going to make the South African politicians look more human and less “barbaric” (Serra 2000, 166). Prestigious international newspapers like the NYT are also read by politicians at the United Nations and other political institutions, who collaborate – or at least try to do so – with the South African and Zimbabwean governments. Providing different perspectives on the matter, including that of Mr. Mbeki and Mr. Mugabe, can enhance *greater levels of mutual understanding*, that is to say, promote non-violent communication across the global and local fields of politics, economics, civic societies, and so forth.

Frank Esser and colleagues (2017b, 23) argue that:

Democratic theory expects the media to provide information that is substantial and reliable, inclusive and diverse, analytical and enlightening, and that serves the public interest. (...) News features such as negativity, bias, personalization, soft news, strategic framing, and interpretive news have given rise to the concern that they may hinder the fulfilment of these functions...

I agree with the first sentence, and disagree with the second. I disagree, first of all, because the NYT’s article on Mr. Mbeki and Mr. Mugabe, just like most NYT articles I analyzed, contained negativity *and* personalization *and* soft news – and precisely *because* of these

characteristics, the story was analytical, enlightening, and served the public interest. Many researchers have condemned the *Human Interest* frame as “sensationalist” and as an element that does not belong in “sober” and serious news (see chapters 1 and 3; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 95–96). But other scholars have pointed out how this frame can make stories on difficult matters more readable and comprehensible for different kinds of audiences and thus promote active citizenship among audiences (Benson 2008, 2594). My study shows that the “tabloidized” *HS* coverage of Brazil provided exceptional context on Brazilian realities by including so many diverse voices from the country’s civic society. Over time, these voices were complemented by voices representing the Brazilian political field and other fields to highlight multiple realities in the country. The piece quoted above by the *NYT* on Mr. Mbeki and Mr. Mgubabe also demonstrates how a *Human Interest* frame does not have to be large to help add context – some *proportions* are enough.

Returning to the claim by Esser and colleagues, I concur with Benson (2009; 2013) on that it is more fruitful to study multiperspectivalness than bias, because, as expressed by Bourdieu (1977, 169), “the overt opposition between ‘right opinion’ and ‘left’ or ‘wrong’ opinion (...) delimits the universe of possible discourse.” But if taking on the question of whether bias hinders the media’s democratic fulfilment or not, then I would say that it depends most of all on the *transparency* of the bias. For instance, the previously cited *HS* story on European immigrants in Brazil was completely biased in the sense that it only provided the highly negative European perspective on Brazilian institutions and realities. Then again, it was precisely the exposure to this overwhelming European perspective that may have led some Finnish consumers of media – expected to be active and independent thinkers, due the Finnish form of democracy – to disagree with the quoted sources and formulate their own opinion and seek out more information. In this story, as well as in other Finnish news stories, the biased sources and their position and institutional affiliation were defined clearly. American journalists want to look more neutral, and thus they are probably less biased than Finnish journalists, at least that would be the official claim. But as I have shown, the *NYT*’s coverage abounded in anonymous definitions of South African and Brazilian institutions, which in many cases seemed to indicate *the hidden bias* of American journalists and/or politicians. And I would argue that hiding bias is much more dangerous than spelling it out and simply letting the reader choose a side. Therefore, in my view, news that explicitly includes bias is better than news that claims to be free of bias. After all, given the way people’s visions are always limited by their habitus, is there even a way to create news that does not contain bias?

Bourdieu (for example 1987, 13) has insisted that fields are engaged in a constant struggle, each field aiming to impose its own viewpoint on others and promote what it considers to be the legitimate vision of the social world and its divisions. But my research also shows that, next to different forms of symbolic violence, there *are* non-violent forms of

international communication, which, in the news I analyzed, manifested themselves as the systematic aims by the journalists to point out the *deficiencies in the logics* of different quoted fields by exposing them to alternative logics, ultimately placing them in a wider social context. This applies to the Northern journalistic field as well, as I found that both American and Finnish journalists explicitly reflected on their own ability – or inability – to describe the complex realities as fully and comprehensively as they would deserve: “I wondered what to respond. There are many realities and many truths in Brazil.” (Maria Manner, *HS* Brazil correspondent, article 361, paragraph 5<sup>125</sup>). I believe my findings provide me with the grounds to challenge Bourdieu’s (2000, 608) idea that “intrusion” is inherent in all social exchanges, that is, that the relations between fields are *invariably* competitive rather than collaborative, unconscious rather than conscious, leading without exception, to misperception (Swartz 1997, 63; Wacquant 2013, 2).

In the next chapter, I present findings that focus more on the American and Finnish forms of news while building on multi- and interdisciplinary approaches, and explore how they embody symbolic violence. I also reach beyond my *NYT* and *HS* sample to investigate how frames and fields are elaborated upon and interconnected in other American and Finnish media.

---

<sup>125</sup> Original in Finnish: “Mietin, mitä vastata. Brasiliassa on monia todellisuuksia ja monia totuuksia.”



---

## 7. Creating Context in Northern News on the South: The American Interperspectival and the Finnish Multiperspectival Form of News

---

Many researchers lament the lack of context in news and especially in the coverage of international topics (see, e.g., Hamilton 2009, 9). Jairo Lugo-Ocando (2015, 63) argues that “alternative context, such as the need for state-building and critical analysis about the root causes of poverty, are often absent in news reports because many of the news sources used to produce the stories have a specific political agenda or want to appear politically neutral...” Jay Rosen<sup>126</sup> argues that “*the news flows to us without the context we need to understand it*” (2011, italics in original). According to Rosen, there are “three big meanings we attach to context when we complain about it being missing in the news system as it stands” (ibid.). The first is *background knowledge*, by which Rosen means the information needed to comprehend the news that is being reported: “If you don’t understand what a Collateralized Debt Obligation is, you are not going to understand the new report on the role that CDO’s played in the financial crisis” (ibid.). Rosen proceeds to explain that such background knowledge is analogous to the pre-requisites for a college course: what a student needs to know before (s)he can enter a specific-level course.

The second meaning of context is *the story so far*, which, in Rosen’s words, means everything that has happened before the reader started paying attention to a particular story: “If there has been a committee investigating the financial crisis for a year and it finally fell into fighting over how to prevent another crisis, there is a ‘story so far’ there.” This second type of context is also analogous to “joining a college course in week 5: you need to know what happened in weeks 1–4. That’s different from pre-requisites.” Finally, the third meaning of context, as defined by Rosen, is related material or *the deep historical context* – continuing with the financial news example, such context could be financial bubbles in the history of the United States.

Deep historical context seems to be particularly important in Northern news on the South. In chapter 2, I described how European nations and the United States have historically prevented South Africa and Brazil from being able to develop while ensuring that they remain in a subordinate position politically, economically as well as culturally. Lugo-

---

<sup>126</sup> Jay Rosen is a professor at New York University’s Arthur L. Carter Institute for Journalism. I refer to his blog, titled *Public Notebook*, available online at: <https://publicnotebook.wordpress.com/2011/07/31/three-different-kinds-of-context-were-missing>.

Ocando (2015, 61) argues that the historical legacy of colonial rule and the other causes of poverty have been ignored by the Western news media. Rather, he argues (*ibid.*) that “the overall journalistic discourse about the developing world is heavily influenced by colonial and post-colonial ideas that have survived over the years in different forms, mimicking the colonial imaginary of the Third World.”

In this chapter, I explore specifically how *the New York Times*, *Helsingin Sanomat*, and, with a more limited sample, other American and Finnish media, CNN and YLE in particular, incorporated background knowledge, the story so far, and deep historical context, in news articles on South Africa and Brazil.<sup>127</sup> I found that, contrary to general claims about world news lacking context or being simplistic, both American and Finnish world news articles contained a substantial quantity of context of type 1 (background knowledge) and type 3 (deeper historical context). While this type 3 context did not usually extend all the way back to colonial times or even back into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, I still found historical context to be used in a way that informed readers about American and European responsibility, past and present, vis-à-vis the struggles that South African and Brazil were currently going through.

The question about type 2 context (the story so far) is trickier. American news generally summarizes the main points included in previous coverage in every news article. However, direct links to previous stories in American coverage of a particular topic are rarer, and in the NYT practically non-existent. *HS* and *YLE* provide more links to previous coverage than the American media, but no summaries of “the story so far” are included in each article; rather, the Finnish reader is expected to read all the stories, one by one, and in this way, gradually grasp the story so far.<sup>128</sup> This again, I argue, is related to the specific expectations of citizens in the Finnish media system and the inherent form of democracy, which was already discussed in chapter 6. In line with the characteristics of the different media systems, I found that the American and Finnish media provide these diverse types of context in distinct ways: in the American news, the inclusion of context is connected to

---

<sup>127</sup> One of the most well-known conceptualizations of context in the news has been provided by Shanto Iyengar, who distinguished between “episodic” news, referring to specific events, and “thematic news,” by which he means more analytical, historical, and contextual coverage (Iyengar 1991, 14; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 95). However, for this study I was especially inspired by Jay Rosen’s typology, as it seems to perfectly capture the three different kinds of context that were relevant in my sample and in Northern coverage of the South. Rosen’s analogy of the college course was also helpful as I pursued a comparison with multidisciplinary and interdisciplinarity and how these forms of news illustrate principal differences in the American and Finnish forms of news.

<sup>128</sup> It should be kept in mind that my present analysis focuses on news coverage published between 2006 and 2014; the media may have substantially changed their practices with regard to providing links to earlier coverage between 2014 and 2017.

the journalistic logic promoting *internal pluralism*, whereas in the Finnish news, context is more *segmented* (see Hallin and Mancini 2004, 67).<sup>129</sup>

I will shortly proceed to offer concrete examples from my research materials to illustrate what I mean by the integrated and segmented forms of context. But before that, I still want to elaborate on the elements of context and how these can be studied. As I have explained in the course of this dissertation, many media scholars associate context with news frames. According to James Hertog and Douglas McLeod (2001, 148, italics mine), “*news frames* provide the widely understood *context* for understanding new phenomena.” Rosen states that “how to provide these different kinds of context is obviously an unsolved question in the news system as it stands.” I have already argued that, in principle, the answer is simple: *many* news frames are needed to expand limited perception (see also Benson 2009, 402; Porto 2007, 312). Table 4 (see chapter 6) shows that the NYT’s South Africa coverage contained 6.4 news frames and its Brazil coverage 5.7 news frames per article on average, whereas the HS’s South Africa coverage contained 5.8 news frames and its Brazil coverage 6.0 news frames per article on average. In other words, both media depicted the reality through multiple frames in each story. Hence, it seems only logical that I would find that these stories were contextual.

However, my main argument is that, in order to understand how context is created in news, counting the frames is not enough – the focus must be on the relative *proportions* of perspectives and the *tones* of the news frames. In chapter 6, I demonstrated that in the NYT’s coverage, the *Responsibility* and *Conflict and Peace* frames were much larger than, for instance, the *World Order* and *Exoticism* frames on average (see figures 6–7). In HS’s coverage as well, the different frames featured different sizes, and both the NYT and HS used the positive and negative tones of frames to highlight different aspects of the complex reality. I also measured the relative volume of quoted voices from sources who, in addition to the journalist, took part in the framing the South African and Brazilian realities. These voices, too, depicted partial visions of social reality, shaped by the *habitus* and institutional affiliations of each quoted speaker (Bourdieu 1987, 2). I have further demonstrated that the field proportions were not balanced in the coverage either: the Southern political fields, academics, and unaffiliated individuals were given much more space to define their realities throughout the coverage than the economic fields or law and order fields, for example (see figures 2–5 in chapter 6).

---

<sup>129</sup> Similar observations have been made in regard to the way context is created in regard to other news topics in American and European media. Based on his French-American comparison of immigration news, Benson (2013, 59) found that the American narrative journalism often aspires to integrate the thematic historical/structural context with the episodic context (see footnote 127 on Shanto Iyengar’s definitions) *within* articles. In French news, again, Benson (ibid.) found that “the episodic–thematic mixing mostly occurs across articles on the same or adjacent pages.”

These frame and field proportions raise an important question: Is the context presented in the news – background knowledge, the story so far, and deep historical context – used to illuminate the realities of different fields in equal proportions? Like news frames, context can be neutral and positive in nature. Thus, my question can also be formulated in this way: How (and how much) does the context presented in the news benefit or affect the different fields involved? To explore the implications of the different frame and field proportions as well as the different media logics on the creation of context and the distribution of power in the news, I further elaborate on Rosen's analogy of a college course and connect my analysis with the production of knowledge in academia.

### Multi- and Interdisciplinary Models for Creating Context in News

As has been explained in the previous chapters of the present thesis, to frame is to perceive something in a selective manner (see chapter 4; see also Benson 2013, 4). Joe Moran (2002, 14) argues that academic disciplines are “clearly discursive constructions in that their power arrangements permit certain ways of thinking while excluding others” (see also Bourdieu 2005, 36–37). James Welch (2009, 37, italics added) observes that “epistemology is not merely a technique by which disciplines validate truth; it is *how disciplines actually frame knowledge and ‘see’ reality*” (see also Newell and Green 1982, 25). Thus, both frames and disciplines are, essentially, limited views on a complex reality.

My research has been especially inspired by my background in area and cultural studies, which takes a multi- and interdisciplinary approach to the study of different regions. Allen Repko (2012, 11) describes how, in general, “scholars interested in ‘studies’ are excited by the prospect of examining a broad issue or complex question” – in area and cultural studies, different disciplinary perspectives are combined to increase our understanding about complex phenomena. What makes the approach special for the purposes of my study is the importance of *context* in the holistic analysis of complex realities in distant regions. Heikki Mikkeli and Jussi Pakkasvirta (2007, 111) explain how, for instance, a “Latin American Studies” approach to the work of Mario Vargas Llosa would reach beyond the field of literature studies to include an examination of Peruvian society and culture through many disciplines, such as political science and history.

Rodney Benson (2013, 4–5) has said that “the language of framing reminds us that some element of truth is usually present in the different ways of looking at an issue or event. Rather than searching for ‘bias,’ this approach suggests new kinds of questions, such as: How many of the different ways of looking at an issue are presented? Which perspectives are emphasized or de-emphasized?” Along similar lines, Welch (2009, 63) highlights that interdisciplinarity “relinquishes the need for universal, absolute knowledge toward more polyvalent notions of truth that necessarily involve the clash of differences, within which mutually incompatible assumptions can all be ‘correct’” (see also Newell 1998, 558–560). By reaching beyond traditional disciplines, approaches such as area and cultural studies



aim to overcome traditional limits of Western concepts and knowledge, to better understand regions outside the “Western world” (see also Benson 2015, 258; Klein 1996, 114). Likewise, I argue that Northern news on the Global South should contain many different frames and voices, to enable more contextual and holistic understanding of the distant societies behind the news window.

But of course, perspectives can be combined in different ways. In *multidisciplinary* studies, a scholar can look through several windows, one at a time, and finally draw the big picture by carefully bringing together the views from each separate window. The argument I develop in this chapter is that *Finnish news coverage resembles multidisciplinary approaches*: different viewpoints of different “sizes” are included in news stories in a segmented way, one after another, rather than in an overlapping manner. Reading through diverse articles, or different segments of the same article, the reader becomes exposed to completely different perspectives on the same scenery. Each Finnish news article adds new background knowledge and historical details, without repeating what has already been explained in a previously published story. Continuing with Rosen’s example of a college course, Finnish “students” (news audiences) are expected to attend every class and read through a range of different texts. In every “class” (news article), a different person is invited to speak, from a different angle – if multiple speakers present opinions in the same class, they are not on the stage together, but rather, appear one after another. Finally, the “students” are supposed to connect the different pieces in their minds, like a puzzle, thereby ultimately forming a multifaceted vision on the complex realities behind the different windows. Finnish segmented news then can be defined as “multiperspectival.”

*Interdisciplinary* studies help construct large windows with few or no panes – integrating different frameworks, and generating new, broader ones. *American news*, then, is *more similar to interdisciplinary approaches*, as different viewpoints are brought together already during the writing and reading process. Therefore, American news can be called “interperspectival”: each news article simultaneously exposes the audience to multiple sides of a complex reality. Just by reading one article, or even one paragraph of an article, American readers will be presented with reality through a broad window, revealed in many shades and tones. In American news, the background knowledge and deep historical context included in subsequent stories is quite similar: the same information is repeated from one article to the next, as if assuming that the audience is not familiar with the previous stories on the topic. If again comparing this reading of the news with a college course, American “teachers” (journalists) are much more forgiving of those students (audiences) who only learn of the course (topic) “in week five” or of those students who ended up in a course that surpassed their level of knowledge. Rather than making these people go back to the previously assigned readings, the teacher provides a summary in every class from different points of view to make sure that everybody is “on board.” Thus, the

*teacher (the journalist) creates the context* – the students do not have to think that much, at least in comparison with Finnish students (readers).

The logic inherent in multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research<sup>130</sup> has been exemplified in many inventive ways, which I think are useful for defining multiperspectival and intersperspectival news as well. Repko (2012, 17) has compared the multidisciplinary approaches (here, Finnish news) with a fruit salad: even though the different flavors are mixed in the end, each fruit (perspective) maintains its own essence and taste, and the different pieces remain distinguishable and separate from each other. Interdisciplinary studies (here, American news) are more like a smoothie – all of the different fruits are there, but they are blended together and become “a mess,” meaning that consumers cannot distinguish between the different tastes. Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta (2007, 64–65) point out that interdisciplinary approaches can also be likened to a cake: the sugar, eggs, and flour create a new solid “thing,” one which no longer resembles any of the individual ingredients it is made of.

I found that the American “intersperspectival” form of news shapes both NYT print and online coverage. Likewise, the Finnish “multiperspectival” logic persists in the different editions of *HS* – online, broadsheet, and tabloid (as of January 2013). Frank Esser (1999, 292) has described how “the term ‘tabloid’ originally referred to (...) the concentrated form of medicines as pill or tablet. This narcotic tabloid effect and the fact that it is easy to swallow have been readily transferred to the media.” I found that the NYT indeed provided news in a “concentrated form,” and the way American journalists contextualized the stories over and over again made these stories “easy to swallow” – like a smoothie – for even those readers who had never seen any previous coverage on the topic. Finnish *HS* tabloid-size articles, again, were certainly not presented in a concentrated form – the fruit salad of Finnish news could not be swallowed in an instant. Thus, even if Finnish *HS* physically shrank into a tabloid size, my study does not suggest it became a typical tabloid paper. But even if the NYT provides contents that are “easy to swallow,” the NYT does not resemble a tabloid, either, as it – as I have shown in the previous chapter as well – consistently highlights the complexity of diverse Southern realities in each and every article and paragraph, and focuses on serious political processes, economic developments, and social processes, rather than aiming for simplicity and mere entertainment (see Sparks 2000, 10).

In principle, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research strives for balance: “[The] whole refers to the comprehensiveness of the research result so that the understanding is

---

<sup>130</sup> I have purposefully limited my analysis to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, rather than also discussing transdisciplinarity and/or crossdisciplinarity (see Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta 2007, 63–67; Repko 2012, 20–21), because I did not want to add too many concepts; also, I find that multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary are the best-suited concepts for illustrating American and Finnish forms of the news.

responsive to the perspective of each contributing discipline but not dominated by any one of them” (Repko 2012, 383). Still, scholars often accentuate different perspectives in different proportions. Likewise, when making a fruit salad or a cake, some ingredients can be used in larger quantities than others – a fruit salad may contain only half a banana and two apples, for instance, depending also on which ingredients are easily available to the cook. But the banana still gives flavor to the salad; it makes the dish more complex. A cake can contain a spoonful of spices, such as cinnamon or cardamom, which, despite their small amount, still enrich the flavor of the end product. What I am arguing here is that the more modest perspectives – minuscule windows – included in the coverage are nevertheless very important. They can significantly enrich the experience for readers and add context; they expose consumers to a more holistic experience than if only a few principal flavors – or views – were included in perfectly balanced proportions.

#### Context, Relative Distance, and Symbolic Violence

It is important to keep in mind that the imbalance of different perspectives leads to a *partial view* of a complex reality. While this seems only a logical consequence of human endeavor, it is a dangerous one if not acknowledged and explicitly stated as such. According to Repko (2012, 55), disciplinary perspectives are biased. In chapter 6, I argued that the bias is more detectable in Finnish news, since each field perspective is given clear boundaries within which it has the opportunity to speak. Finnish news also uses less anonymous sources, thus making the news more transparent. American news articles often *seem* more balanced, given the large quantity of different viewpoints intermixed throughout each story. Still, my careful assessment revealed that the viewpoints were *not* balanced. Metaphorically speaking, just by staring at a fruit salad it is possible to draw some basic conclusions about the nature and proportions of the ingredients included. By staring at a smoothie, or even by drinking it, it is much more difficult to deduce the nature and proportions of the ingredients. For these reasons, a lack of balance can be more “dangerous” in American news.

On the other hand, the main challenge with Finnish multiperspectival news is that it is impossible to guarantee that readers become exposed to all or even many of the viewpoints necessary for understanding situations in a complex manner. Due to the lack of type two context – the story so far – in so many Finnish news articles, some readers may accidentally skip related coverage by not following the newspaper with a similar level of attention every day. Some readers might also choose to ignore parts of the coverage on purpose. If the consumer of a fruit salad prefers one taste over the others, (s)he can easily pick his/her preferred pieces of fruit from the salad and leave the others untouched, without even tasting them at all – in other words, (s)he would only expose her/himself to those stories where the perspectives that (s)he finds appealing predominate. As expressed by Herbert Gans (2011), “audiences head for where they want to go.” Of course, the larger and more dominant the perspectives included in a story – that is, the bigger the quantity of a

particular type of fruit in the salad – the less likely it is that the reader will be able to consciously or unconsciously evade such perspectives, or undesired fruit, entirely.

Then again, the virtue of segmented multidisciplinary approaches has been defined as the ability to allow each field to develop its own perspective fully in terms of its own particular logic, methods, and definitions before being placed in a wider context, that is, the often conflicting claims and ideas developed by other fields. Interdisciplinary studies have sometimes been accused of superficiality and a lack of depth (see, e.g., Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta 2007, 72–73). According to such arguments, the students and scholars involved in interdisciplinary studies run the risk of becoming “generalists” rather than obtaining a thorough understanding of an issue from any particular perspective. One important problem with American intersperspectival news is, indeed, that while the consumers of news are presented with a “holistic” experience – it is impossible to remove a specific ingredient from a smoothie or a cake – they may struggle to grasp the particular essence of the different flavors included, especially of those ingredients that occur in smaller amounts. Since all the relevant ingredients are included in the same package, consumers may not feel a necessity to purchase another product, especially if not particularly pleased with the overall taste. Even if the same ingredients were included in many articles, the proportions still vary. Hence, consuming just one smoothie could lead to an almost complete dismissal of those flavors that occur only in minimal quantities.

According to Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta (2007, 69), the ultimate purpose of interdisciplinarity is to bring different disciplines closer together in order to present different angles on a common theme. However, even though interdisciplinary studies emphasizes integration, Boden (1999, 14–18) claims that other disciplines are often taken into account without active cooperation. In chapter 6, I showed how the different frame and field proportions result in symbolic violence in both American and Finnish news. This occurs when one field has the opportunity to frame realities concerning another field on this other field’s behalf, that is, when the framer receives more space than the framed. In multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary studies as well, it is a common practice to *apply knowledge from one discipline to contextualize another* (ibid., 15–16). Idealistically, the incorporating of different angles and types of context would be done only after carefully consulting with representatives from each relevant field. However, it is rather common that a representative of one field “borrows” an idea from another field, without having prior specialization in that other field and without consulting a representative of that other field, just to support research goals in his/her own field. In such a case, then, the researcher imposes the logic of his/her own field upon the other field involved in order to advance his/her own goals.

The possibilities for successfully contextualizing another academic field depend on the relative distance between the disciplines involved (Repko 2012, 331). In chapter 6, I

presented the argument that the severity of symbolic violence depends on the relative distance – ideological and cultural/geographical – of the field that is doing the framing vis-à-vis the field that is the object of this definition. In academia, too, “knowledge is located” (Klein 1996, 3; see also Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta 2007, 22-23). Repko (2012, 331) distinguishes between “narrow interdisciplinarity,” which draws on disciplines that are epistemologically close to one another, such as physics and chemistry, and “wide interdisciplinarity,” which connects disciplines that are epistemologically farther apart, such as art history and mathematics. According to Repko (ibid.), “the greater the epistemological distance between disciplines, the more difficult it is to create common ground between their insights.”

In addition to the analysis of symbolic violence, then, I argue that relative distance must also be considered when examining the production of context in the news. If a story contains significant background knowledge (type 1 context), the story so far (type 2 context), and a deeper historical context (type 3 context), but these contexts are provided by fields that are either ideologically or culturally/geographically quite distant from those particular fields whose backgrounds or histories are being discussed, or their relative distance is not explicitly revealed, as is often the case in American news, then such an article would not provide context in a similar way as it would if the context were provided by the object fields themselves. But I am *not* arguing that context cannot be provided on behalf of other fields, either. Bourdieu (1988, 1, italics mine) notes that “obstacles of scientific knowledge are constituted *as much by excessive proximity* as by excessive remoteness.” Continuing with my analysis of the differences between various disciplines and perspectives included in news, this observation by Bourdieu would suggest that sometimes, a representative of some field may not be able to see his/her own situation in a larger context. Therefore, providing context on behalf of other fields is not necessarily an act of symbolic violence. In the following pages, I will demonstrate that, actually, such practice can often even *benefit* the object field.

#### Integrating Ideas: Interperspectivalness in American News

Interdisciplinary studies focus on a complex problem by drawing on diverse disciplinary insights and *integrating* them (Repko 2012, 20). To illustrate what I mean by “interperspectivalness” in the American news, I start by describing the contents of NYT article no. 124, titled “Wage Laws Squeeze South Africa’s Poor,” which was published on September 29, 2010. I have chosen this article as my example because I found it a very “typical” NYT article, reflecting the kind of complexity and structure that I discovered in the majority of the American stories I analyzed (some exceptions will be discussed later in this chapter). In such “typical” stories as this one, voices representing diverse, ideologically and culturally/geographically distant fields are engaged in intense interaction rather than remaining isolated in their own sections, as in the Finnish news. Such stories also contain

significant proportions of background knowledge (Rosen's type 1 context) and deeper historical context (type 3 context), but there is also symbolic violence. The "story so far" (type 2 context) is less clear, but there were hints of that, too.

Article no. 124 began by describing how a sheriff had arrived at a South African factory to close it down, as "part of a national enforcement drive against clothing manufacturers who violate the minimum wage." Then, the story described how "women working on the factory floor – the supposed beneficiaries of the crackdown – clambered atop cutting tables and ironing boards to raise anguished cries against it. 'Why, why?' shouted Nokuthula Masango, 25, after the authorities carted away bolts of gaily colored fabric." Here, a positive *Responsibility* frame, describing the government's efforts, was complemented with a negative *Human Interest* frame – the individuals involved were sad and shocked about the efforts. Background knowledge (type 1 context) was provided by explaining, through more negative dimensions of the *Human Interest* frame, how the anguished woman needed her "miserable pay" to support her large family. This local view was then placed in broader global context through negative *Impact* and *World Order* frames, describing how South Africa had "too few unskilled jobs" due to "low wage competition from China"; thus, the women "feared being out of work more than getting stuck in poorly paid jobs" – this last part also further expanded the *Human Interest* frame.

The next paragraphs provided deep historical context (type 3) by alternating between positive and negative dimensions of the *Impact*, *Credibility*, and *World Order* frames:

In the 16 years since the end of apartheid, South Africa has followed the prescriptions of the West (...). It has won praise for its efforts, and the economy has grown, but not nearly fast enough to end an intractable unemployment crisis. (...) With the advent of democracy in 1994, the African National Congress-led government had to simultaneously rebuild an economy staggered by sanctions and prepare a disadvantaged black majority to compete in a rapidly globalizing world.

A smaller *Conflict and Peace* frame could also be found in the article, overlapping with the *Impact* and *Responsibility* frames. This conjunction shows how different agents within the South African political field proposed to solve the situation in different ways (paragraph 21): "Eight months ago, [President] Mr. Zuma proposed a wage subsidy to encourage the hiring of young, inexperienced workers. But it ran into vociferous opposition from COSATU, the two-million-member trade union federation that is part of the governing alliance, which contended that it would displace established workers. The plan has stalled..." Through the *Responsibility* and *Impact* frames, the story then proceeded to explain how "officials from the government and the bargaining council are now pushing offending factories to come up with plans to pay minimum wage."

Thus, through overlapping frames that provided both background knowledge as well as historical context, the story clarified the position of the poor workers as well as that of the government and the workers' union. But in addition to these perspectives, the *Human interest* and *Impact* frames were further extended to provide background knowledge concerning the factories' foreign owners. In this way, the story showed another aspect of the complex reality: the reluctance of the factories to pay more did not, at least in all cases, result from greed or ignorance – as was claimed by the unions – but from a lack of resources: “At the Wintong factory, proprietors Ting Ting Zhu and her husband, Hui Cong Shi, who are saving to put their only child through college, say they start a machinist at \$36 a week, far less than the minimum wage. They themselves live in a single room in their red brick factory...” (paragraph 27).

Background knowledge was added mostly by the quoted fields themselves, when local people described their life situations and the conditions under which they worked. But the journalist also added historical context by explaining the specific challenges of the post-apartheid government in a globalizing world. Simultaneously, as in many NYT articles, the journalist explicitly emphasized the intricacy of the situation: “*Further complicating matters*, just as poorly educated blacks surged into the labor force, the economy was shifting to more skills-intensive sectors like retail and financial services, while agriculture and mining, which had historically offered opportunities for common laborers, were in decline” (paragraph 15, italics added). In addition to this explicit mention of complexity, contradictory perspectives were placed in tight interaction with one another so that by reading almost any paragraph, the reader was exposed to multiple sides of the issue.

Even though the article was an “independent” story in the sense that no other story in my South Africa sample dealt directly with the minimum wage issue, the story was also related to other topics, such as the education of black people in South Africa. For instance, in paragraph 16, positive dimensions of the *Responsibility* frame overlapped with negative dimensions of the *Credibility* and the *Impact* frames, with the article explaining how “the country’s leaders have invested heavily in schools, hoping the next generation would overcome the country’s racist legacy, but the failures of the post-apartheid education system have left many poor blacks unable to compete in an economy where accountants, engineers and managers are in high demand.” In addition to article no. 124, the impact of apartheid on South Africa’s education policy was discussed in a number of previous stories published in the NYT. Still, there were no links connecting these stories to one another. Instead, I found that in *all* the stories related to education, the situation was viewed comprehensively, describing how during the apartheid period blacks were forced to attend separate schools offering an inferior education and why the post-apartheid government was still struggling to fix the problem. In each and every story, the voices of South Africa’s underprivileged citizens and government officials were quoted and they were given the floor by turns, so

that multiple sides of the issue were addressed throughout each article. That is to say, the same complex situation was explained from scratch every time – like the college instructor who pardons those who only entered the class “on week five,” the journalist took those who had skipped the earlier coverage into consideration by providing the same context over and over again.

In article no. 124 on South African factories and the minimum wage problem, many of the negative definitions were targeted at particular institutional fields. The South African political field, the South African economic field, and the Chinese business field were all framed negatively – but all of these fields were also given a chance to speak for themselves and introduce their own perspectives. However, the South African economic field was only given one percent of article space to speak for itself, while it was framed negatively in 3.3% of the total article space – therefore, this particular article contained 2.2% of symbolic violence towards the South African economic field. The symbolic violence towards this field could not be detected at the overall NYT sample level, as was the case with symbolic violence towards Southern political fields – in this article, too, the proportion of symbolic violence was quite modest.

But it is notable that while this article managed to present a highly multifaceted view of South African realities by intertwining diverse perspectives throughout the narrative and frequently alternating between different viewpoints between consecutive paragraphs, the field perspectives were still not balanced. Moreover, the contextual information provided by the journalist and the sources interviewed did not focus as much on the conditions under which the South African businesses had to operate – the emphasis was rather on the *government's* struggle and efforts to try to resolve the situation. In other words, the context provided by the American journalist benefited, above all, the South African government and the individuals (laborers) involved; here, the American journalistic field was contextualizing a situation on behalf of culturally and ideologically distant fields in a way that was sympathetic to them.

#### Context That Benefited Brazil: Symbolic Violence on the American Political Field

Negative framing is not always, even if usually, directed at the Southern political fields – it depends on the news topic being discussed. My next example has to do with the *American* political field and how it was the object of significant proportions of symbolic violence. What is more, the volume of this symbolic violence increased *by means of incorporating context*. My Brazil-related NYT sample contained eight news articles related to a spying scandal that caused a fissure between the United States and Brazil.<sup>131</sup> First in the fall of

---

<sup>131</sup> In addition, one NYT article concerned spying between Canada and Brazil, but this article was excluded from this particular analysis to keep the focus on U.S.-Brazil relations.



2013, Edward Snowden revealed that his former employer, the American National Security Agency (NSA), had been monitoring the phone calls and emails of Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff as well as spying on Petrobras, the oil giant partially owned by the Brazilian state. In the news coverage following Snowden's announcement, the American political field was framed quite negatively, while given relatively little article space to speak for itself. Moreover, the coverage dug even deeper into history and America's responsibility in the matter. An excerpt from paragraph 9 reads as follows: "While Brazil maintains generally warm ties with the United States, resentment lingers over the repressive eavesdropping by the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985 and the support of the United States for the coup that brought the military to power" (see discussion in chapter 2).

Ironically, a few months later it was discovered that Brazil had also been spying on the U.S. Still, in the latter coverage concerning the Brazilian spying, the proportions did not significantly change – the American political field continued to receive much more negative attention and significantly less quoting space than the Brazilian political field. This continual negativity towards the American political field was rooted in the *background context provided by the American journalist* (article no. 220, paragraph 5):

By almost any measure, such modest operations [by Brazil] stand in sharp contrast to the sweeping international eavesdropping operations carried out by the [American] National Security Agency. Brazil's president, Dilma Rousseff, recently postponed a state visit to Washington after revelations that the NSA had spied on her and the Brazilian oil giant, Petrobras.

Without adding this background context, the NYT could have framed Brazil much more negatively, while "sparing" the United States from criticism at this particular time. But rather than focusing merely on one angle – Brazil being guilty of spying – the story reveals that the reality was more complex by repeating the whole scenario about the NSA spying on Brazil, despite the fact that this American spying had already been dealt with and criticized in seven previous articles published within the previous months. Rather than suggesting that the reader should revise his/her understanding of the earlier coverage, the journalist included a summary of what had previously happened. Hence, we can again think of the sympathetic college instructor who does not mind those students entering her/his class on week five and being ignorant of what had happened previously. This time, skipping the summary might have felt like a relief to the teacher (journalist), as the background information was not exactly flattering to the (American) teacher's home country, that is, to his/her culturally/geographically proximate fields. Still, rather than counting on the possibility that the students would seek out the background information on their own, the teacher remained determined to include it, whether comfortable or not, also as a useful recapitulation for those who had faithfully followed the topic since week one.

The only spying-related story where the American political field spoke louder (21.8% of total article space) than the Brazilian political field (11.6%) was article no. 211, titled “Obama Tries to Soothe Brazil and Mexico Over Spying Reports.” Even in this story, negative definitions concerning the American political field covered up to 15.9% of article space, compared with none aimed at the Brazilian political field. The Brazilian political field was the object of symbolic violence in two of the articles, but the proportions were modest, while the level of symbolic violence towards the American political field was significant. But what nevertheless makes this coverage intersperspectival is that, in all of the articles, *both* the American and the Brazilian political fields were systematically quoted – by reading any of these stories, the reader became exposed to both American and Brazilian voices and viewpoints. The difference is that the Brazilian voices were persistently much louder than the American voices. Thus, it could be said that the Brazilian political field’s viewpoints were an important, central ingredient in the “intersperspectival” cake, like flour, whereas the American political field’s viewpoints were more like vanilla sugar or cinnamon – not occurring in near the same quantity. Still, this minor ingredient was scattered throughout the cake; it could not be avoided, regardless of what piece of cake a reader preferred to take. While being exposed to the highly negative coverage concerning American spying, then, the reader was also constantly reminded of the American political field’s perspective.

The figures on the next page depict the relative volume of the Brazilian and American political fields vis-à-vis the negative framing targeted at those fields. The figures show that, in principle, the proportions of “symbolic violence” in this particular news coverage were much greater with respect to the American political field than the Brazilian political field. However, given the fact that the coverage dealt with an issue where the U.S. government had been deemed culpable of a serious act, and where its historical responsibility was also emphasized, the American political field should not be viewed as an innocent object either. Here, I would rather suggest that the low share of quoting space allotted to the American political field vis-à-vis the high share of criticism towards it reflects *recognition of the American responsibility by the journalist*.




Figure 12: Symbolic violence toward the Brazilian political field in the NYT spying-related coverage. When the light gray line (indicating the share of negative framing vis-à-vis total article space) is higher than the dark gray line (indicating volume of voice), this indicates the occurrence of symbolic violence. The greater the space between the lines, the greater the proportion of symbolic violence. In this particular coverage of spying, only two articles contained minor proportions of symbolic violence towards the Brazilian political field.




Figure 13: The NYT's coverage of spying: the American political field's quoting space vis-à-vis negative framing of this field. In principle, seven out of eight articles on the spying issue contained symbolic violence towards the American political field. However, given that the coverage dealt with an issue where the U.S. government had been deemed culpable of serious acts, I find that this high proportion of negative framing in regard to the American political field vis-à-vis its relatively silent voice reflects journalistic recognition of American responsibility, rather than lack of journalistic ethics.

Spying-related coverage in the *Wall Street Journal* did not differ much from that of the NYT. The story “New Spying Allegations Add to U.S.-Brazil rift,” published on September 8, 2013, began by citing the Brazilian *Globo* television report about Edward Snowden’s revelations. The story then quoted the Director of American National Intelligence, who defended American actions: “What we do not do, as we have said many times, is use our foreign intelligence capabilities to steal the trade secrets of foreign companies on behalf of U.S. companies.” Right after this quote, Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff was quoted, disagreeing with the previous American statement: “Ms. Rousseff said in a televised speech on Friday (...) that U.S. spying included ‘strategic factors or to do with commercial and economic factors.’ She called the activity ‘inadmissible...’” This debate was then followed by the incorporation of more background knowledge by the journalist, information *favoring Brazil* rather than the U.S.: “Relations between the U.S. and Brazil have been strained by a series of allegations of NSA spying on the Latin American country. NSA documents leaked by Mr. Snowden showed that the NSA collects more data in Brazil than in other Latin American nations....”

A subsequent article by the WJS in November 2013, titled “Brazil Spied on U.S. Diplomats,” likewise resembled the NYT’s coverage of the same situation, reminding readers – and informing those who had missed the earlier coverage – that even if Brazil had spied on the U.S., the U.S.’s own spying, which had been revealed earlier, was more severe in nature. The WSJ article *did* provide a vague connection to the previous coverage (italics added): “*Press reports in August indicated that* the U.S. National Security Agency had been monitoring electronic and phone communications of Brazilian citizens, businesses and government officials, including Ms. Rousseff.” But the WSJ article did not provide the names of any previous articles or direct links to the earlier coverage: as in the NYT, the “story so far” (type 2 context) was summarized in each story by the journalist.

However, some American media provided more comprehensive type 2 context than the NYT and the WSJ. Taking advantage of online formats, both CNN and *Time* incorporated direct links to earlier coverage of a particular topic within their news articles. Still, each CNN and *Time* article on the Brazil-U.S. spying rift, to continue with this example, contained comments by the Brazilian political field, perspectives from the White House, *and* background knowledge. That is to say, the coverage was as complex and interspectival as the stories created by the NYT and the WSJ; just by reading one CNN or *Time* story, readers were exposed to multiple sides of a complex reality and gained an understanding of the main points of the story so far. But by providing links to the earlier coverage, the views included were further deepened and amplified. Returning again to an earlier metaphorical example, readers were encouraged to purchase more than one smoothie to make sure they received a proper dose of different ingredients, included in different servings and in different proportions.

For instance, CNN's story "Brazilian President's U.S. State Visit Postponed Over Alleged Spying," published on September 18, 2013, began with a short quote from the American political field, according to which "President Obama had previously ordered a thorough review of American intelligence activities, but it [a White House statement] acknowledged that process would take several months to complete." The story then went on to explain that "Brazil is still not satisfied with the situation" and that "'the conditions for a state visit on the previously agreed date haven't been provided,' Rousseff's office said." But by clicking a link right below the quote by the American political field, the reader was led to another, previous article, titled "As Brazil's Uproar Over NSA Grows, U.S. Vows to Work Through Tensions," published by CNN less than a week earlier. This story was also complex in character, including both Brazilian and American perspectives. But the American voices quoted in this earlier, linked article, emphasized efforts to truly recognize Brazil's claims and to try to fix the situation: "'What I assured President Rousseff (...) is that I take these allegations very seriously,' Obama told reporters." Thus, in this earlier story, the White House's efforts were explained in *a more voluminous way* than in the second article, which focused more on Brazil's disappointment. This earlier article was as interspersive as the second one, but it featured different proportions; here, American viewpoints were emphasized more than in the latter article, even if Brazilian viewpoints still dominated.

Both of the articles contained links to other articles as well, incorporated in different parts of each story, creating a cluster of connected stories. A busy reader could easily skip the links and just read the one article, which nevertheless revealed the situation from many angles. Here, a student who joins a college course "in week five" is still treated sympathetically; all the crucial angles that had been explained "during weeks 1-4" are repeated in week five. Still, those students who wanted to grasp the story so far in a more profound way were given links to the readings provided earlier.

A White House statement announcing the postponement said President Barack Obama had previously ordered a thorough review of American intelligence activities, but it acknowledged that process would take several months to complete.

As Brazil's uproar over NSA grows, U.S. vows to work through tensions

Rousseff spoke with Obama on the phone Monday in a last-minute attempt to patch things up,

Illustration 3: Integrated link in a CNN article titled "Brazilian President's U.S. State Visit Postponed Over Alleged Spying," published on September 18, 2013. The link leads to the previous CNN article, "As Brazil's Uproar Over NSA Grows, U.S. Vows to Work Through Tensions," published on September 12, 2013. The linked article was also interspersive, but added more volume to the American views expressed.

In addition to these links, CNN created context by including a box where the “highlights” of each different story were summarized. While a reader who had the time and energy to read through many stories was introduced to a wide network of related articles, a very busy reader could still get the core idea and a glimpse of diverse views just by reading the main points:




Illustration 4: A “story highlights” box, included in the CNN story titled “Brazilian President’s State Visit Postponed Over Alleged Spying,” September 18, 2013.

Finally, given the fact that CNN is first and foremost a broadcasting company, it is only logical that the coverage also contained *news videos*. Since my method was created to measure frame and field proportions in news *articles*, not broadcasting, it was not possible for me to include an accurate measurement of how the perspectives used in the news articles were complemented in the news videos (see chapters 4 and 5). However, based on my study, I argue that such a methodological development would be highly crucial, given the way that news videos can be used to further contextualize the phenomena described in news articles. CNN’s coverage of the Brazil-U.S. spying issue is a great example: A video titled “Why Are Brazil, Mexico Angry With NSA?,” a link which was readily available on the article page, *added volume* to the voices included in the Brazilian and Mexican political fields, which were also quoted in the article.




Illustration 5: A news video, linked to the CNN news article “Brazilian President’s State Visit Postponed Over Alleged Spying,” published on September 18, 2013. The news video, titled “Why Are Brazil, Mexico Angry With NSA?” added more volume to the voices of the Brazilian and Mexican political fields, which were also quoted in the news article.

To summarize: in this section, I have tried to exemplify what I argue are key characteristics of the American intersperspectival form of news coverage: continuously overlapping news frames and their different tones, as well as the integration of diverse viewpoints throughout the article space so that readers become exposed to many, often contradictory, angles by reading just one or at most a few paragraphs. Each news article provides a view of the complex scenery in its entirety, including background knowledge, deeper historical context, and a summary of the story so far – readers are not expected to search for and acquaint themselves with previous coverage. However, some media, such as CNN, integrate a great number of links in their digital news articles. The linked articles also offer “complete views” in that they similarly provide a whole range of different perspectives.

Still, just because American news tends to include diverse viewpoints in all of the articles, this does not mean that the proportions are balanced. While in some articles context is utilized to support the claims of a negatively framed field (for instance, the story about the South African government struggling to provide education and jobs for blacks; the deep historical context provided by the journalist made the South African political field’s failure more understandable), at other times background context underscores the negative framing of a field even more (e.g., the coverage of U.S. and Brazilian spying and the ways in which the severity of the U.S.’s spying was emphasized throughout the whole coverage). I will now move on to explore the multiperspectival form of Finnish news and how it differs from American intersperspectival news in regard to the creation of context, on the one hand, and symbolic violence, on the other.

### *Segmenting Sentiments: Multiperspectivalness in Finnish News*

Earlier in this chapter, I explained how multidisciplinary can be compared to a fruit salad: the different flavors remain distinguishable throughout the preparation as well as the consumption process. Teivo Teivainen (2003, 15–16; see also Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta 2007, 71) takes a different approach and draws an analogy between academic disciplines and nation-states. In multidisciplinary research, he argues, the borders separating the individual “states” are strengthened rather than brought closer together. I find that Teivainen’s idea about disciplines resembling nation-states is particularly apt when discussing Finnish multiperspectival news, as one of the most striking differences between it and American intersperspectival coverage is the Finnish tendency to compartmentalize speakers representing different nationalities – culturally/geographically distant fields – into separate articles, or at least into segments within an article.

I will now try to provide examples from the Finnish coverage of topics similar to the previously examined American coverage to illustrate the specific features of each form. I concluded the previous section by examining American news regarding the spying crisis between Brazil and the United States. In *HS*, only a few news articles addressed this topic: articles no. 316 (published on September 3, 2013) and no. 317 (on September 19, 2013).

In both of these stories, the only quoted speakers represented the Southern political field and the Southern journalistic field. In the earlier *HS* story, the American political field was framed negatively in 49.5% of article space, and in 36.8% of article space in the latter story, but it was not given a chance to say *anything at all*; therefore, in principle the American political field was the object of substantial proportions of symbolic violence in both stories. In a related news article by *YLE*, titled “Brazilian President Canceled Trip to the US – Did Not Give in to Persuasions by Obama,”<sup>132</sup> published on September 17, 2013, *Brazilian* president Dilma Rousseff was quoted, clarifying what the *American* president had supposedly told her, on his behalf, and then using this statement against him – the Americans themselves were not allowed to comment on the issue. In other words, while the Finnish articles resemble the American coverage in that Brazil spoke relatively loudly on the issue, while the U.S. was criticized harshly, the American coverage nevertheless always quoted this American object field, even if in much more modest proportions than the Brazilian political field, whereas in the Finnish news the American voice was muted completely.

While I indeed argue that this Finnish coverage of the spying scandal is yet another manifestation of the multiperspectival, “segmented” logic, I also believe that the more limited view depicted in *HS*’s coverage of this topic may result from other, external factors – mainly, the fact that American interests were directly involved in the matter, whereas Finland had practically nothing to do with the whole spying issue. For Finnish journalists, different sources representing the American political field are not available in a similar way as they are for American journalists. Hence, the Finnish coverage of this particular topic may be more scarce and different for many reasons, not only because of the “multiperspectival” form of news. To make the comparison fairer, I will proceed to examine news articles where both *Finnish and Brazilian* interests were directly involved and quotable voices from both countries readily available to Finnish journalists. On June 20, 2013, *HS* published an article titled “Meat Companies Hide the Route of Foreign Meat to Finland.”<sup>133</sup> The article criticized the lack of transparency of Finnish businesses importing meat from abroad – the story took as its main focus the horse meat imported from Brazil. This aspect is what I find makes the story comparable to the American coverage of the NSA spying issue; here, the Finnish journalistic field was framing another Finnish field (economic) as being responsible for questionable actions taking place in Brazilian territory.

---

<sup>132</sup> Original in Finnish: “Brasilian presidentti perui matkan Usahan – ei taipunut Obaman suostutteluihin.”

<sup>133</sup> Original in Finnish: “Lihayhtiöt salaavat ulkomaisen lihan reitin Suomeen.” The article does not have an index number because I did not include it in my final sample (see chapter 3). But later, I ended up coding it anyway, as I realized it is crucially connected to the next day’s story, which focused completely on Brazil, and helps me illustrate the segmented character of stories in Finnish news.



The critical approach by the Finnish journalist notwithstanding, the *Finnish economic field* was the *only quoted field* in the whole text. When pressed for an explanation by the journalist regarding the conditions under which the animals were being slaughtered in Brazil, the reply offered by the Finnish businesses in question was as follows: “I cannot say more than this: get in touch with the [Brazilian] factory. For us, it is enough that these animals have been approved by the local authorities.”<sup>134</sup> In other words, the accused Finnish businesses in turn attributed responsibility to the *Brazilian* entities involved: “Jansson cannot say from where the Brazilian slaughterhouse acquires the horses, the meat of which BHJ buys and sells: ‘I do not know. This is not apparent from the papers that we receive...’”<sup>135</sup> The Brazilian companies exporting the meat did not have opportunity to respond anything to the claims. The only Brazilian “presence” in the whole article was a large photo depicting a Brazilian truck driver delivering animals to a slaughterhouse and holding a chicken in his hands. The caption said: “Some birds in the load of the truck, driven by Marx Bispo Damasceno, died on their way to the slaughterhouse. ‘Sometimes, I drive for 500 kilometers,’ Damasceno says during a break in the tiny village of Lobato in Brazil.”<sup>136</sup> The image and the contents of this modest quote by the Brazilian driver seem to *support* the claims by the Finnish businesses that if someone was acting irresponsibly in this meat production chain, it was the Brazilians who abused the animals, not the Finnish businesses who were just buying the meat. Hence, the background knowledge – type 1 context – added from a Brazilian perspective ironically served to *support the view of the Finnish businesses* quoted throughout the story as reproaching the Brazilians. The silent Brazilian voice was not integrated in the text of the article, which only featured geographically/culturally proximate fields (Finnish businesses and the Finnish journalistic field) – the Brazilian perspective was limited to the single image and caption space.

The picture of the Brazilian driver was taken in Brazil, in the tiny village of Lobato, by a photographer working for *HS*. Thus, a lack of access to Brazilian sources to comment more thoroughly on the issue was not the reason that Brazilian voices were not quoted more in the story. In fact, *HS* sent both a reporter and a photographer to Brazil to track down the origin of the imported meat. This was mentioned at the beginning of the story: “*HS* travelled to Brazil to find out where the meat that is being sold in Europe and Finland comes from. 1/3.”<sup>137</sup> The second part of the three-part series was published a day later, on

---

<sup>134</sup> Original in Finnish: “Minä en voi muuta sanoa, kuin että ota yhteyttä sinne tehtaaseen. Meille riittää, että paikallinen viranomainen on hyväksynyt nämä eläimet.”

<sup>135</sup> Original in Finnish: “Jansson ei osaa sanoa, mistä brasilialainen teurastamo hankkii hevoset, joiden lihaa BHJ Finland ostaa ja myy: ‘En tiedä. Se ei käy ilmi papereista, jotka me saamme...’”

<sup>136</sup> Original in Finnish: “Teurasauton kuljettajan Marx Bispo Damascenon kuorman linnuista kuoli muutama matkalla teurastamolle. ‘Joskus ajan 500 kilometrin matkoja,’ Damasceno kertoo tauolla Lobaton pikkukylässä Brasiliassa...”

<sup>137</sup> Original in Finnish: “*HS* matkusti Brasiliaan selvittämään, mistä Euroopassa ja Suomessa myytävä liha tulee. 1/3.”

June 21, under the title “The Hidden Origin”;<sup>138</sup> in my sample, this is article no. 310. Thus, here we have type 2 context: the heading “2/3” suggests that the reader can find *the story so far* in part 1/3. The main difference between the stories headed 1/3 and 2/3 was that in the second story, *only Brazilians were quoted*. Essentially, the second part of the story provided *more background knowledge* (type 1 context) on the situation explained in the *earlier, first article*, through a large *Human Interest* frame, as the Brazilians at the opposite end of the production chain now had opportunity to describe the circumstances they were working in:

Loading horses in the truck is normal work for the Ferreiras. For years, the family has been delivering horses to a slaughterhouse that supplies meat to be consumed in Europe. The business was initiated by the father, Anisió Ferreira. Now, a great part of the work is being done by the brothers, Adalberto and Celso Ferreira. Every week, the men travel long distances to farms, where they purchase old horses that are too exhausted to work. The horses are gathered to wait in the yard of the Ferreiras, and once a week the animals are transported to be sold to the slaughterhouse.<sup>139</sup>

Moreover, paragraph no. 36 quoted the director of the slaughterhouse, who explained that one of the main reasons why the business had become more difficult was the new requirements by the European Union: “The EU now wants the products to be traceable.”<sup>140</sup> This additional background knowledge, in addition to the personal narratives of the Ferreira brothers, helps explain *why* many of the small and remote Brazilian farms where the old horses were being purchased from *lacked the necessary official paperwork* and how the requirements complicated the lives of the Ferreiras: “Anisió Ferreira is considering quitting his business. He says that during the best years, he was able to sell 2000 horses a month. Now, he can barely sell around a hundred...”<sup>141</sup>

In other words, article no. 310 and the previous article on the same topic, published one day earlier, offered two different, contradictory perspectives on the situation: that of the Finnish businesses, complaining that Brazilians do not provide them with all the required information and paperwork, and that of the Brazilian farmers and food factories, arguing that Europeans have started to request too much paperwork, which interferes with their

---

<sup>138</sup> Original in Finnish: “Piilotettu alkuperä.”

<sup>139</sup> Original in Finnish: “Hevosten lastaus rekkaan on Ferreiroille tavallista työtä. Perhe on jo vuosia toimittanut hevosia teurastamolle, joka välittää lihaa Eurooppaan syötäväksi. Bisneksen aloitti isä Anisió Ferreira. Nyt ison osan hommista hoitavat veljekset Adalberto ja Celso Ferreira. Viikoittain miehet matkustavat pitkiä matkoja ostaakseen maataloilta vanhoja hevosia, jotka eivät enää jaksu tehdä työtä. Hevoset kootaan odottamaan Ferreirojen pihalle, josta ne sitten kerran viikossa kuljetetaan teurastamolle myytäväksi...”

<sup>140</sup> Original in Finnish: “EU haluaa nyt tuotteilta jäljitettävyyttä...”

<sup>141</sup> Original in Finnish: “Anisió Ferreira harkitsee bisneksen lopettamista. Parhaimpina vuosina hän kertoo myyneensä 2000 hevosta kuukaudessa. Nyt kaupaksi menee enää noin 100...”

business. On June 21, 2013, in the same issue where article 2/3 was published, *HS* also included a separate “background” article titled “EU Does Not Revise All Slaughterhouses Approved by the Commission.”<sup>142</sup> In this isolated piece, the only quoted voice belonged to a Finnish expert, who attributed the responsibility of the whole situation to the *European Union* – not for demanding paperwork per se, but for not making sure that the approved slaughterhouses had the capacity to meet such requirements. Now, was the EU quoted at this point? No. The Finnish businesses were no longer quoted, either.

Part 2/3, which featured the voices of the Brazilian farmers and truck drivers, contained a link to both part 1/3 – the story so far – as well as to the “background” article featuring the voice of the Finnish expert. Thus, unlike the American national newspaper *NYT*, the Finnish national newspaper in its coverage of this specific story *did* provide links to type 2 context. But unlike *CNN* or *Time*, the links were *not integrated* in the middle of the article, but rather, only *at the end*; Finnish readers were expected to read them only *after* completing the original article and then put all of the various angles together in their minds to form the big picture.<sup>143</sup> Unlike in American news, these segmented, yet related, stories in the Finnish news did not summarize the situation from other angles either – to pass this particular college course, students needed to read all the relevant articles, one by one.

**Tausta: EU ei tarkasta kaikkia komission hyväksymiä teurastamoita**

21.6.2013 2:00

**Ruokayhtiöt salaavat ulkomaisen lihan reitin Suomeen** 20.6.2013 5:40

Illustration 6: Segmented links to related coverage in *HS* article 310, part 2/3 of an article series, and where only Brazilians were quoted. The first link led to a “background” article, where only a Finnish expert was quoted, and the link below, to part 1/3, that is, to the story so far (type 2 context).

<sup>142</sup> Original in Finnish: “EU ei tarkasta kaikkia komission hyväksymiä teurastamoita”

<sup>143</sup> While I have not detected integrated links in my Finnish sample, that is, in news materials published between 2006 and 2014, as an active news reader I *have* certainly spotted such links in Finnish online news more recently, at least related to domestic coverage. The incorporation of such integrated context in Finnish news may result from the increasing possibilities of technology, making at least the online news more interspectival in Finland as well. Again, more current developments will be discussed later on in the dissertation.

But there is more – part 3/3 of the article series was published four days later, on June 25, 2013, under the title “I Did Not Even Know That Horse Meat Is Being Shipped to Europe from Here.”<sup>144</sup> This final part gave exclusive voice to a Brazilian marketing manager in the port city of Paranaguá, where the meat was being loaded and shipped to Europe. The central concern of this last article, as explained by the *HS* journalist, was to try and trace the horse meat bought and sold by the Ferreira brothers to the slaughterhouse (covered in part 2/3), and to see where exactly it would be shipped. But, the container could not be found; it turned out that the particular slaughterhouse was not even registered in the harbor’s data system. The harbor’s marketing manager was quoted at this point, explaining that “it is common that an outside freight company is hired to deliver the freight to, for example, Europe. This is much cheaper than to deliver it by themselves.”<sup>145</sup> In light of this information, the Finnish businesses quoted in the first article, which claimed that they had no information regarding the origins of the meat, now looked more credible. The Ferreriras and the representatives of the slaughterhouse, quoted extensively in article 2/3, were no longer quoted in article 3/3, to offer their perspectives on why their information was lacking in the harbor database. Still, this information was seemingly implicit in part 2/3, where they were paraphrased as lamenting the fact that Europeans require too much paperwork, forcing them to resort to whatever means necessary to save time and resources. At the end of article 3/3, a link was again provided to “the story so far,” part 2/3.

What is notable in this story, in comparison to the American spying-related coverage, is that while the Finnish business voices were given exclusive quoting space in the first article, doing substantial symbolic violence to the Southern fields involved, the Finnish businesses were then completely silenced in the second and third articles, when it was the turn of the Southern fields to express their views, *even though Finnish interests were still essentially at stake*.<sup>146</sup> In the American spying-coverage, both countries and institutions involved were systematically quoted in all of the articles, but in unequal proportions, with Americans receiving substantially less space. In the Finnish coverage, only one field was quoted per article, but once quoted, the space allotted for it to speak was exclusive, regardless of how negatively this particular field had been defined in a previous article. Both the Finnish and American coverage contained context, but while in the American coverage the same background knowledge was repeated, and thus, type 2 context – the story so far – became less relevant, in the Finnish news context was not repeated, which is why it was essential for the reader to expose him/herself to the earlier coverage. If Finnish readers had missed

---

<sup>144</sup> Original in Finnish: “En edes tiennyt, että tätä kautta lähtee hevosenlihaa Eurooppaan.”

<sup>145</sup> Original in Finnish: “Usein ulkopuolinen rahtifirma hoitaa yrityksen lihakontin rahdin esimerkiksi Eurooppaan. Se on halvempaa kuin viedä itse, HS:lle kerrotaan.”

<sup>146</sup> Though a Finnish voice *was* quoted, it was included only in a separately published column, where the Finnish expert attributed the claim to the EU. Finnish businesses or the EU were not quoted at all.

“the story so far” – even one part of many relevant parts – then their vision of the social reality would have become dictated and contextualized by some particular field. If, for instance, a reader had chosen to read just part 1 of the three-part series, then (s)he might have ended up thinking that the Brazilian institutions involved were completely irresponsible, without understanding the impact of European policies and requirements on the subsistence of the Brazilians involved.

### Textual Segregation in Finnish News

My next example is taken from *HS*'s coverage of South Africa, and it is in many ways similar to the first *NYT* article examined in the “American intersperspectival logic” section, as it dealt with the socioeconomic status of blacks in South Africa. While the black South African individuals quoted in the *HS* story were wealthier than the workers interviewed in *NYT* article no. 124, this particular *HS* story also dealt with the legacy of apartheid and the way in which the post-apartheid ANC government was expected to provide support for different groups of people. Therefore, this story also allows me to quite directly compare how deep historical context is incorporated in *HS* in comparison with the *NYT*.

*HS*'s sample coverage of South Africa consists of three separate news articles, published in the same issue on May 29, 2010, but under different titles (and in the online edition, under separate titles and links). The first story (no. 281), titled “We Are Middle Class Now,”<sup>147</sup> described the situation of black South Africans in post-apartheid South Africa (paragraph 2): “Mondli Hlatshwayo grew up in poverty in the countryside and attended school in a city slum, but now his and his wife Lucy's life is economically stable. ‘We have had a hard time. I can appreciate all this,’ Mrs. Hlatshwayo says, sitting on a couch in her home.”<sup>148</sup> A *Human Interest* frame was used to describe their surroundings and relative wealth (paragraph 2): “There is a car, there is a flat-screen television, a nursery full of toys. A housekeeper is busying herself in the kitchen of this elegant five-room apartment.”<sup>149</sup> Paragraph 5 added more historical context through more dimensions of the *Human Interest* frame on the positive side, which also overlapped with some positive dimensions of the *Impact* frame, describing how circumstances have improved since the apartheid era: “Her husband is working on a doctoral dissertation in the social sciences at the University of

---

<sup>147</sup> Original in Finnish: “Olemme nyt keskiluokkaa.”

<sup>148</sup> Original in Finnish: “Mondli Hlatshwayo kasvoi maaseudun niukkuudessa ja kävi koulua kaupungin slummissa, mutta nyt hänen ja vaimo Lucyn elämä on taloudellisesti kunnossa. ‘Olemme kulkeneet vaikean tien. Osaan antaa tälle arvoa,’ sanoo rouva Hlatshwayo kotisohvalla.”

<sup>149</sup> Original in Finnish: “On auto, on taulutelevisio, on lastenkamari täynnä leluja. Tyylikkään viisihuoneisen asunnon keittiössä häärii kotiapulainen.”

Johannesburg, which, during the apartheid era, was reserved for whites only. ‘Now, blacks can get scholarships, too.’”<sup>150</sup>

But in paragraph 6, the tone turned negative – in the subsequent paragraphs, the overlapping *Human Interest* and *Impact* frames were accompanied by a *World Order* frame to explain the ongoing struggles in South Africa: “‘We fought for years, and finally we achieved democracy. But now South Africa has the highest level of income inequality in the world,’ Mondli Hlatshwayo says.”<sup>151</sup> The problem of inequality was attributed to the South African government through negative *Responsibility* and *Conflict* frames (paragraph 8):

According to Mondli Hlatshwayo, the bitterness of the poor blacks is not directed primarily towards the whites, but towards the government under black leadership, which has not been able to improve the living conditions of the majority of people in 16 years. “Now we have a union of a black political elite and white money. Only a minority of blacks has been invited to that party...”<sup>152</sup>

In the final part of the story, various dimensions of the negative *Impact* and *Responsibility* frames overlapped with a *Human Interest* frame, as the Hlatshwayos described, beginning in paragraph 14, how the government’s decision to host the World Cup had affected their lives: “In the winter nights of May, there have been several power failures. The family blames this on the construction work taking place in Johannesburg for the upcoming World Cup. (paragraph 15) Mondli Hlatshwayo thinks the event is a waste of time and does not believe that the football fever will unite the people.”<sup>153</sup>

The Hlatshwayo family’s voice was the only one quoted/paraphrased in the whole article. The South African political field was framed negatively in 12.2% of the article space, but it was *not quoted at all*, leading to equal proportions (12.2%) of symbolic violence. As in the American news, news frames overlapped in this Finnish news article: the *Human Interest*, *Impact*, and *Responsibility* frames created a broader framework for explaining the failure of the post-apartheid government to eradicate inequality while still deciding to host the sports event, and how these policies had been affecting people’s lives. Modest dimensions of the

---

<sup>150</sup> Original in Finnish: “Aviomiies tekee yhteiskuntieteiden väitöskirjaa Johannesburgin yliopistolla, joka apartheidin aikaan oli varattu vain valkoisille. ‘Nyt stipendejä annetaan mustillekin.’”

<sup>151</sup> Original in Finnish: “‘Me taistelimme vuosia, ja lopulta saimme demokratian. Mutta nyt Etelä-Afrikka on tuloeroiltaan maailman eriarvoisin maa,’ Mondli Hlatshwayo sanoo.”

<sup>152</sup> Original in Finnish: “Mondli Hlatshwayon mukaan köyhien mustien katkeruus ei kuitenkaan kohdistu ensisijaisesti valkoisiin, vaan mustien johtamaan hallitukseen, joka ei ole 16 vuodessa saanut parannettua enemmistön elinoloja. ‘Nyt meillä on mustan poliittisen eliitin ja valkoisen rahan liitto. Vain pieni osa mustista on kutsuttu niihin juhliin...’”

<sup>153</sup> Original in Finnish: “Toukokuun talvi-iltoina sähköt ovat usein katkeilleet. Perhe syyttää siitä rakennustöitä, joita Johannesburgissa tehdään jalkapallon MM-kisoja varten. (15) Mondli Hlatshwayo pitää kisoja ajanhukkana eikä usko jalkapallohuelman yhdistävän kansaa...”

*World Order* frame added global context by describing how South Africa was still one of the most divided countries in the world. Still, the story was segmented: the first part was positive, while all the negative descriptions could be found from paragraph 6 onwards until the end.

Curiously, the separate, yet related, *HS* article no. 282, published on the same day, added a *white citizens' perspective* on the same situation, under the title "We Are Considering Emigrating."<sup>154</sup> Following a similar storyline as article no. 281, article no. 282 began with a description of a wealthy white South African family's home, mentioning that the family also had a maid (paragraph 4). But this story, too, soon turned negative. Just like the black Hlatswayo family in the previous article, this white family also pinned the blame for their troubles on the post-apartheid ANC government, providing background knowledge from a different angle:

Haupt has a job as an information technology engineer, and Roos does temporary work as a stylist. However, the government's employment programs in public administration and private companies favor blacks and coloreds, that is, people who were oppressed during apartheid. Haupt thinks that this keeps segregation still alive. "It may be very difficult for whites to get certain jobs..."<sup>155</sup>

Toward the ends, as in article no. 281, article no. 282 made reference to the World Cup, but in contrast to the black Hlatswayos, who were quoted as arguing that the World Cup would not unite the people, the white family viewed the tournament much more optimistically, even if not fanatically:

He remembers the 1995 rugby World Cup as a moment when South Africans started to feel shared pride in their country. Would that happen now as well, during the soccer World Cup? "I barely follow soccer. But it would still be great if everybody supported the national team. I hope that this will happen."<sup>156</sup>

In other words, as in article no. 281, the only voice quoted/paraphrased was that of South African individuals – only this time, the couple interviewed was *white*. This *HS* coverage shows how the Finnish segmentation logic not only separates ideologically and culturally/geographically distant fields into distinct articles, but also stresses subdivisions within fields, as speakers with different habituses (or here, also *race*) are each quoted in

---

<sup>154</sup> Original in Finnish: "Harkitsemme maastamuuttoa."

<sup>155</sup> Original in Finnish: "Hauptilla on työ it-insinöörinä, ja Roosilla keikkoja stylistina. Hallituksen työllistämishjelmat kuitenkin suosivat valtionhallinnossa ja yksityisfirmoissa mustaihoisia ja värillisiä, eli apartheidin aikana sorrettuja ihmisiä. Hauptin mielestä se pitää rotuerottelua yhä elossa. 'Valkoisten voi olla todella vaikea saada tiettyjä töitä.'"

<sup>156</sup> Original in Finnish: "Hän muistelee vuoden 1995 rugby-kisoja hetkenä, jolloin eteläafrikkalaiset alkoivat tuntea yhteistä ylpeyttä maastaan. Kävisikö nyt jalkapallokisoissakin niin? 'En juuri seuraa jalkapalloa. Mutta olisi hienoa, jos kaikki tukisivat maajoukkuetta. Toivon, että niin käy.'"

their own designated, isolated space.<sup>157</sup> While this may seem like a form of “textual segregation” imposed by the Finnish journalist, this segmentation also aptly depicted the country’s realities: many scholars have indeed emphasized that South African blacks and whites then and now live their lives in completely separate spheres (see, e.g., Dowden 2009, 409). While the interviewed black and white families had had very different life experiences, both families framed the South African political field and the ANC government as responsible; for its part, the government was denied a chance to speak for itself in these two stories. The black and white families both provided deep historical context, but from different angles; that is, they provided *segmented context*.

A third article on the same topic was also published in the same newspaper. Article no. 283, titled “In Need of Mandela Again,”<sup>158</sup> gave exclusive voice to Mr. Etienne van Eck, Nelson Mandela’s former bodyguard, who was given the chance to explain the position and original ideals of the post-apartheid ANC party. True enough, Mr. van Eck did not exactly represent the South African political field, but rather, the law and order field. However, due to the age and fragile condition of former President Nelson Mandela, as was also explicitly mentioned in the article,<sup>159</sup> and given van Eck’s close affiliation with Mandela, van Eck can be considered a representative of a proximate field. The article explained via a *Responsibility* frame that,

In South Africa, soccer is mainly a sport of the blacks. Therefore, in comparison with 1995, the situation is now the reverse. Now, whites should support the soccer team, loved by blacks, and simultaneously embrace the whole World Cup, the organization of which the current black-led government considers to be an indication of its capability. “Afrikaners should remember what Mandela did on our behalf,” van Eck says. “It would be time to return the favor.”<sup>160</sup>

A vigilant reader who read the entire series of articles, comparative to the student who “persisted through the whole college course” on race relations in South Africa, one taught

---

<sup>157</sup> The tendency to quote different socioeconomic classes in separate articles was also detected in other *HS* coverage, especially in its coverage of Brazil. For instance, article no. 321 (“São Paulo’s Elite Uses Helicopters to Avoid Traffic Jams”) only quoted privileged Brazilian individuals and business leaders, while article no. 324 only quoted Brazilian individuals representing the upper middle class; most *HS* articles on Brazil, however, quoted underprivileged individuals. This phenomenon will be further discussed in chapter 8, where I analyze the dynamics within fields and interactions among civilians.

<sup>158</sup> Original in Finnish: “Taas tarvittaisiin Mandelaa.”

<sup>159</sup> Original in Finnish: “Mandela on nyt 91-vuotias ja heikossa kunnossa. Entinen presidentti näyttäytyy enää harvoin julkisuudessa.”

<sup>160</sup> Original in Finnish: “Jalkapallo on Etelä-Afrikassa pääasiassa mustien laji. Niinpä tilanne on käänteinen vuoteen 1995 verrattuna. Nyt valkoisten pitäisi tukea mustien rakastamaa jalkapallomaajoukkuetta ja samalla koko MM-turnausta, jonka järjestämisestä mustien johtama nykyhallitus pitää osoituksena kyvykkyydestään. ‘Afrikanerien olisi syytä muistaa, mitä Mandela teki puolestamme,’ van Eck sanoo. ‘Olisi vastapalveluksen paikka.’”



in this instance by *HS*, would now pause and think: this is exactly what the Afrikaner – Mr. Haupt – was quoted as saying in the previous article, that is, while acknowledging that he was not that much into the sport, he had embraced the event as offering the possibility to unite the people. In the first article, again, the black family was framed as protesting the World Cup because they had already become skeptical of its chances at bringing about unity. Putting all these viewpoints together, a much wider context is revealed.

While the black and white individuals quoted in the previous stories blamed the government for the problems, Mr. van Eck was given 16.9% of article space in the third story to defend the post-apartheid ANC government. In many ways, then, this third story significantly balanced out the coverage: if the three stories were examined as one big article, it would be 1092 words long, and the negative framing of the South African political field would take up 10.6% of the total article space and the voice of Mr. Eck would account for 6.5% of the total article space. That is, there would still be symbolic violence towards the political field, but it would be reduced to 4.1%. But the citizens were still given more quoting space than Mr. Eck: the black Hlatseyos were given 12.0% of total space and the white Roos family, 9.7%. As shown already in figures 2–5 and discussed in chapter 6, the symbolic violence towards the Southern political fields was so systematic that it also stands out at the overall sample level.

In each story, the news frames overlapped to some extent, as in the American news, creating broader frameworks – still, in the Finnish stories they overlapped less than in the American news. All of the *HS* stories also contained positive and negative “blocks”; several subsequent paragraphs depicted realities through a particular frame and tone, describing how particular people had benefited from the changed historical realities before moving on to describe how they had been affected, what they liked and disliked about the situation and who they blamed for it. The reader was expected to grasp these different viewpoints and ultimately create a big picture of such a reality by combining them. To facilitate this process, each story contained a link to a related story, but as with the coverage of the Brazilian meat controversy, it was only included at the end:




Illustration 7: Segmented link to related coverage in a *HS* article. The link connects an article where only white middle-class South African individuals were quoted with a separate article published on the same day, where only black middle-class South African individuals were quoted. Both sources attributed responsibility to the South African government, which was not quoted in either of the articles, but only in a third article published in the same paper. That is to say, this particular article series reflects segmentation within a single newspaper.

Having examined Finnish coverage in relation to both Brazil and South Africa, where explicit links to other related coverage were clearly included, I will now proceed to my final example regarding the Finnish coverage and explore Finnish articles that were *not* explicitly connected to any previous coverage (that is, articles that did not contain any links to *the story so far*), even though the stories still quoted just one field or a few proximate fields. Still, the isolated stories formed part of a greater “whole,” which became apparent when analyzing coverage over a longer time span in *HS* and in other Finnish media. Now, the reader were not only expected to mix the different flavors in their minds, but also to independently “gather the separate ingredients for the fruit salad” without any explicit recipe. Or, in other words, the teacher did not provide a list of readings required for the college course, but rather, the student was asked to attend every class to ensure that (s)he did not miss out on anything.

In this final example, I compare Finnish coverage directly with American coverage on the same topic. The American news is similar also in that it lacks any concrete reference to any previous stories. That is, neither the American nor the Finnish college course instructor provided a list of readings in this instance. But unlike the Finnish teacher, the American one *did* try to summarize all the relevant angles in each class.

#### Partial vs. More Complete Context: Direct Comparison of the NYT's and HS's Coverage of the Transforming Favelas

Amid the preparations for the World Cup and the Olympics, authorities in Rio de Janeiro ordered a series of “cleaning operations” in Rio’s slums to eradicate crime and drugs and make the areas safer for tourists as well as local people. However, such operations also caused alarm, as the policemen involved were said to be abusing and killing the poor people, sometimes actually in cooperation with the drug dealers, rather than bringing about peace and order. In this section, I present a direct comparison of Finnish and American coverage of the transformations of these neighborhoods to further illustrate the multiperspectival and interspectival forms of the news.

*HS* article no. 301, “Cleaning the Hills of Rio,”<sup>161</sup> published on December 16, 2012, quoted underprivileged Brazilian individuals and non-governmental Brazilian associations working in the slums. The quoted fields, which were proximate both ideologically as well as culturally, took a very negative stance towards the police (the law and order field) (paragraphs 13–14):<sup>162</sup>

The power of the drug organizations grew – as well as the corruption of the police. “The police sold my cousin and two other residents of Providência to another criminal

---

<sup>161</sup> Original in Finnish: “Puhdistus Rion rinteillä.”

<sup>162</sup> This story also contained negative framing of the Brazilian political field, but since this has already been so thoroughly treated in chapter 6, I have excluded a discussion of it here to save space.

organization to be executed. My cousin was not even a criminal,” Hora says. The police also got to shoot in the slum without consequences. “Six policemen here shot 46 people in two years. None of the cases were investigated.”<sup>163</sup>

In this story, the police (law and order field) were framed negatively in 9.0% of article space. Yet, as is typical of Finnish multiperspectival logic, the law and order field was not quoted at all. However, less than two months later, on February 8, 2013, *HS* published a story titled “Police Fed Up in São Paulo”<sup>164</sup> (art. no. 306). This story, in turn, explained the situation from the perspective of the Brazilian police (paragraphs 4–5):

Last year, over 450 police resigned in the largest city of São Paulo, Brazil. The year before, the number was 332. The mass resignations are due to the life-threatening danger of the work. Last year, over one hundred policemen were shot in São Paulo (...) 77 of these killings took place while the police were off duty...<sup>165</sup>

In contrast to the earlier article, this second story framed the Brazilian police’s action in the slums above all as *a positive attempt* rather than as a criminal act (paragraph 9): “In Rio de Janeiro, the police have, with the help of the army, successfully cleaned many of the slums, or favelas, in the hills of the downtown area.”<sup>166</sup> Moreover, the story now gave voice to the police (the law and order field). The story (no. 306) was exceptional in that, in addition to the Brazilian police, the article quoted an unaffiliated Finnish individual living in São Paulo – that is, a person who represented an ideologically distant field, and culturally too, if considering his Finnish origin. However, the only quote by the Finn was placed *at the end* of the article and not integrated with the general dialogue with representatives of the Brazilian police. Moreover, his quote was utilized to further *acknowledge* the efforts of the police, as the quoted Finnish man claimed that he did not even take notice of crime in his adopted home city: “When I read the newspapers, I find it unbelievable that they are

---

<sup>163</sup>Original in Finnish: “Huumejärjestöjen valta kuitenkin kasvoi – ja poliisin korruptio. ‘Poliisit luovuttivat serkkuni ja kaksi muuta Providêncian asukasta maksua vastaan toisen slummin rikollisjärjestön teloitettavaksi. Serkkuni ei edes ollut rikollinen,’ Hora sanoo. Poliisit myös saivat ampua slummeissa ilman seurauksia. ‘Kuusi poliisia ampui täällä 46 ihmistä kahdessa vuodessa. Yhtäkään tapausta ei tutkittu...’”

<sup>164</sup>Original in Finnish: “Poliisin mitta täyttyi São Paulossa.”

<sup>165</sup>Original in Finnish: “Yli 450 poliisia irtisanoutui Brasilian suurimmassa kaupungissa São Paulossa viime vuonna. Edellisenä vuonna luku oli 332. Joukkoirtisanoutumiset johtuvat työn hengenvaarallisuudesta. São Paulossa ammuttiin yli sata poliisia viime vuonna (...), heistä 77 virka-ajan ulkopuolella...”

<sup>166</sup>Original in Finnish: “Rio de Janeirossa poliisi on armeijan avulla puhdistanut onnistuneesti monia keskustan kukkuloiden slummeja, faveloita...”

talking about my home city,' Pasi Loman, a Finn who has lived in São Paulo for six years, explains. He has not been robbed in São Paulo even once."<sup>167</sup>

In this article, the story so far context – that is, accusations that the police were corrupt and guilty of unwarranted killings in the slums, covered extensively in the previous article – was briefly summarized in one paragraph (no. 12): "The policemen are quick on the trigger; the number of dead people from policemen's guns has given rise to criticism."<sup>168</sup> However, in the same paragraph, right before this statement, the article emphasized that the police officers' salaries did not compensate for the dangerousness of their work: "The starting wage is only 600–700 euros a month, and many police officers have another job as well."<sup>169</sup> Hence, the fact that the police were guilty of shooting too often was explained by their lack of resources and the related fact that they were exhausted and torn between working several jobs in order to make a living. Overall, the background knowledge (type 1 context) included in the article by the journalist was meant to *support* the Brazilian police. The journalist did not quote the underprivileged individuals, who had spoken with excessively loud voices in the previous article, even though their interests – their very lives – were at stake. Readers were expected to count 1+1=2 and note that at least in part, the *lack of resources* had led to those deaths and the maltreatment of the underprivileged individuals in the slums, not (or not at least exclusively) the prejudice of the police. Even if police violence is unacceptable, the article made the perspective of the police officers much more understandable.<sup>170</sup>

In American news, the experiences and viewpoints of the police officers and citizens were typically intertwined in each news article. For instance, article no. 145, titled "In Rough Slum, Brazil's Police Try a Soft Touch" (NYT, October 10, 2010) began by quoting an underprivileged Brazilian individual, Leonardo Bento, whose brother had been killed by a police officer – but who had then changed his perception when becoming acquainted with another police officer, Eduardo da Silva told the journalist: "I began to realize that the police officer in front of me was just a human being and not the monster I had imagined in my head,' Mr. Bento, 22, said." This kind of *direct interaction* between the citizens and the police was repeated throughout the whole article, resulting in positive epiphanies as well as mutual contempt. Whereas the Finnish news stories covered the alleged corruption

---

<sup>167</sup> Original in Finnish: "Kun luen sanomalehtiä, en voi uskoa, että he puhuvat kotikaupungistani', São Paulossa kuusi vuotta asunut suomalainen Pasi Loman kertoo. Häntä ei ole edes ryöstetty São Paulossa kertaakaan."

<sup>168</sup> Original in Finnish: "Liipasinsormi on herkässä, poliisin aseista kuolleiden määrät herättävät arvostelua."

<sup>169</sup> Original in Finnish: "Alkupalkka on vain 600–700 euroa kuukaudessa, ja useat poliisit tekevät toista työtä."

<sup>170</sup> In chapter 6, I made a similar observation about contextualizing the questionable policies of President Mbeki in the South African context.

of the police separately, this particular NYT article managed to capture the “goodness” and “malice” of the police even in the same sentence, while also placing them in deeper historical context (paragraph 6): “They [the police] devote themselves to winning over residents scarred by decades of violence – some at the hands of the police.” Paragraphs 12 and 13 quoted citizens of the slums mocking the police: “‘There goes the Elite Squad,’ said one man from a doorway, chuckling as the three officers passed by.” Right after this, the article recognized and contextualized the sentiments of the citizens: (paragraph 14) “The hostility is not hard to understand,” followed by (paragraphs 23–24): “‘I am scared even to say good afternoon to the police here,’ said Beatriz Soares. (...) When a policeman came to her door one day, she said her 3-year-old son ‘asked him if he was going to kill them.’” Yet, following this negative take on the police, the positive efforts and successes of the police were again acknowledged (paragraph 25): “Still, it is clear that the police presence has changed lives for the better throughout City of God.”

One and a half months later (on Nov. 28, 2010), the NYT published another article titled “Brazilian Forces Claim Victory in Gang Haven” (no. 148), which, in a very similar manner, quoted both citizens and officers, praising the efforts of the police but also emphasizing that the police were guilty of serious wrongdoings. For instance, paragraph 6 described how “residents congregated around televisions in bars and restaurants, cheering on the police as they would their favorite soccer teams, even as occasional gunfire peppered the sunny skies.” But a bit later in the story, for example in paragraph 24, the story explained that “corrupt politicians and police officers took bribes and kickbacks to look the other way.” What is more, the article also emphasized the lack of resources and how this was affecting the police officers’ ability to do their work properly (paragraph 20): “Mr. Beltrame, Rio’s security secretary and the architect of the pacification program, has previously said that he did not expect to have enough officers to occupy either Alemão or Rocinha, either violent slum overhanging the city’s affluent South Zone, until next year.”

Finally, yet another article (no. 149), published on December 9, 2010, likewise included both the citizens’ as well as police officers’ viewpoints, explaining, for instance: “While the vast majority of Rio’s residents here support the [pacification] program, which involves taking over the slums and then installing a community police force, little is being done to reform Rio’s notoriously corrupt police officers.” These three NYT stories, published within a period of just a few months, were not interconnected in any way. Each of the stories summarized the position of the citizens and the police from different angles; by reading just one of these three stories, readers became exposed to the complex nature of the relationship between the citizens and the police. In the Finnish news, the corruption and lack of resources, as well as the efforts by the police, were treated in separate articles. In line with the multiperspectival logic, a “more complete context” could only be formulated after reading both articles.

In the fall of 2013, the aggressive behavior of the Brazilian police became the focus of global attention, as Brazil was shaken by the largest protests since the end of the previous dictatorship. During this time, the police became involved in serious confrontations with Brazilian citizens, spraying tear gas and injuring a number of people, including journalists. However, researchers have noted that most of the citizens involved were part of the “old,” rather than the “new,” middle class; the residents of the slums were not there for a number of reasons (Custódio 2013). Indeed, the coverage by the American and Finnish media of the protests mostly quoted individuals from more privileged backgrounds. Hence, I will not include an analysis of such quotes in this section on the transformation of the slums. However, one story did deal specifically with the protests, a story which I believe merits closer attention in this section, not only because it focused on underprivileged individuals from the slums, but also because both the *NYT* and *HS* covered it around the same time, but each newspaper did so guided by their own multiperspectival or intersperspectival logic. The story described the youth of the slums taking over luxurious shopping malls in São Paulo. Following the 2013 protests, these events were generally framed as a continuation of Brazilian mass gatherings, and as leading to a clash with the police. Both the *NYT* and *HS* began by providing background information:

(The *NYT*, art. no. 227, paragraph 4): Called *rolezinhos* (little strolls) in the slang of São Paulo’s streets, the rowdy gatherings may be going beyond mere flash mobs to touch on issues of public space and entitlement in a society in which living standards for the poor have improved and social classes are in flux.

(*HS*, art. no. 322, paragraph 5): In those *rolezinho* meetings, hundreds and even thousands of young people gather at shopping malls to meet friends and to flirt. Many come from poor suburbs and have received an invitation via the social media service Facebook.<sup>171</sup>

Following these descriptions, the *HS* article proceeded to quote one of the young people involved, named Bruno Santos Rodriguez, on why it was important for him and others to be allowed into the malls (from paragraph 6): “According to Rodrigues, parks are scarce and crowded with drug users, while the police tell the youth to stay off the streets. In Rodriguez’s opinion, the police are a bigger problem than the drug trade. ‘The police hit without asking, because they do not know who is who...’”<sup>172</sup> In addition to Mr. Rodriguez, whose voice took up 17.0% of total article space, the story gave much less voice (4.1% of article space) to a Brazilian anthropologist, who described the young people’s desire to take part in Brazil’s “culture of consumption” (paragraph 11). The anthropologist merely

---

<sup>171</sup> Original in Finnish: “Niissä [rolezinho-tapaamisissa] sadat ja jopa tuhannet nuoret kokoontuvat ostoskeskuksiin tapaamaan kavereita ja flirttailemaan. Monet ovat kotoisin köyhistä esikaupungeista ja saaneet kutsun yhteisöpalvelu Facebookissa...”

<sup>172</sup> Original in Finnish: “Puistot ovat harvassa, ja niissä on Rodriguesin mukaan aina huumekäyttäjää. Kadulta taas poliisi käskää nuoret pois. Rodriguezin mukaan poliisi on isompi ongelma kuin huumekauppa. ‘Poliisi lyö kysymättä, koska he eivät tiedä, kuka on kuka...’”

provided more background information in support of the young people. Finally, the story ended by quoting more young people.

The NYT article on the same topic proceeds by including the perspective of the Brazilian political field (paragraphs 6–7), the law and order field (paragraph 8), and the Brazilian academic field (paragraphs 9–11), followed by a quote from the Brazilian journalistic field (paragraphs 13–14) and then again one from the youth in the malls (paragraph 16), then contrasted with the law and order field (paragraph 17), which claimed that the “participants could cause public disorder,” before again quoting the young people involved (paragraph 18): “Gizele Martins (...) said doing so was a ‘political act, to tell the society we belong to it, that we’re not on the margins of it.’” But paragraph 20 challenged this claim with another quote from the Brazilian journalistic field, this time the news magazine *Veja*: “A multitude of barbarians invading a private property to do turmoil isn’t a protest or a *rolezinho* but an invasion, a sweep, delinquency.” Finally, to conclude the story, the floor was again given to the youth themselves, who re-stated their position and cause.

Thus, while both stories addressed the experiences and feelings of youth from the favelas, the *HS* story did not really reach beyond this angle, while the *NYT* tried to contextualize the situation more broadly by also incorporating the voices and viewpoints of different fields condemning the actions of the youth. The *HS* article did not contain any references or links to the earlier coverage on the Brazilian protests in June–July of 2013. The only reference to the earlier mass protests could be found in paragraph 6, which briefly stated: “The leadership of Brazil, on alert due to the massive protests last year, held an emergency meeting to discuss the meetings at the malls.”<sup>173</sup> The *NYT* provided more background information, for instance, in paragraph 6:

Unnerved by the street protests that shook cities across the country last year, the authorities are carefully trying to evaluate ways to react to the gatherings, which began heightening in size and intensity in December. All too aware that the street protests mushroomed after the harsh police response, officials in Brasilia, the capital, are warning against using force to dislodge teenagers from the malls.

The fact that such protests had occurred previously was also apparent in the title of the *NYT* article (*italics added*): “*Brazil’s Latest Clash with its Urban Youth Takes Place at the Mall.*” This was not the case with the *HS* title: “The Mall Parties of Young People Agitate in Brazil.”<sup>174</sup> A reader of the *NYT* article who had not followed the previous coverage on mass protests in Brazil could, after reading this single story, nevertheless perceive the situation in a larger historical context and from different angles. A Finnish reader who may

---

<sup>173</sup> Original in Finnish: “Brasilian johto, joka on varpaillaan viime vuoden suurmielenosoitusten vuoksi, piti tapaamisten takia hätäkokouksen.”

<sup>174</sup> Original in Finnish: “Nuorten kauppakeskusjuhlat kuohuttavat Brasiliassa.”

have skipped the coverage of the mass protests in Brazil was given only a small hint at the larger historical context – *there were* mass demonstrations last year – but how the current gatherings in the mall were related to those earlier protests, and what was the role of the police in both, was not revealed. Obviously, all of this had been clearly explained in the previous coverage, and it was assumed that the reader *just knows* – or if not, that the reader would obediently go and find out.

When the protests began to fade and became rarer and more random, the narrative about transforming the slums continued in both the *NYT* and *HS*, both of which described the realities and “pacification” efforts in the Brazilian slums. While the American news stories continued to incorporate both citizen views and voices of the law and order and political fields, accompanied by quotes from academics and the local media,<sup>175</sup> the Finnish news persistently framed the situation from the perspective of the underprivileged citizens, who defined the police (law and order field) quite negatively without allowing them to offer a word in their defense. This was the case, for instance, in *HS* article no. 330, titled “Rio de Janeiro is Fighting for Its Favelas,”<sup>176</sup> published on May 17, 2014, and in article no. 340, titled “In Brazil, the Police Kill Without Consequences,”<sup>177</sup> published on August 15, 2014. The latter article included the following quotes: “‘The police have been trained for violent confrontations. They cannot bring about peace,’ Gonçalves says,” followed by (paragraph 25): “‘The police do not help us when we need them to,’ one of the men explains.”<sup>178</sup> Before drawing more conclusions about partial and more complete forms of context, I will examine how the transformation of Rio’s slums was covered in other Finnish and American media.

---

<sup>175</sup> For example, in article no. 174 the political field was first quoted, justifying its actions (paragraph 19): “Authorities insist that evictions, when deemed necessary, abide by the law, with families receiving compensation and new housing. ‘No one is resettled if not for a very important reason,’ said Jorge Bittar, the head of Rio’s housing authority.” The very next paragraph introduced a very different perspective on the local people (20): “But some favela residents accuse the authorities of contributing to already considerable inequalities.” The same contrast between the viewpoints presented in these two fields was repeated throughout the article, for instance in paragraphs 26 and 27: “‘Vila Autodromo has absolutely no infrastructure,’ said Mr. Bittar, the Rio housing official. ‘The roads are made of dirt. The sewage network goes straight into the lagoon; it’s an absolutely precarious area.’ Many in Vila Autodromo see things differently. Many have spacious houses that they built by themselves...”

<sup>176</sup> Original in Finnish: “Rio de Janeiro käy taistelua faveloista.”

<sup>177</sup> Original in Finnish: “Poliisi tappaa Brasiliassa ilman seuraamuksia.”

<sup>178</sup> Original in Finnish: “‘Poliisi on koulutettu väkivaltaisia yhteenottoja varten. Se ei voi tuoda rauhaa,’ Gonçalves sanoo... (paragraph 25) ‘Poliisi ei auta meitä silloin kun tarvitsemme sitä,’ yksi miehistä selittää. Ciconellon mukaan poliisi lavastaa konfliktitilanteen usein jälkikäteen laittamalla esimerkiksi aseiden tai huumeita uhrin haltuun. Sellaista käy etenkin Brasilian slummeissa eli faveloissa, joissa ihmisten mahdollisuudet perätä oikeuksiaan ovat vähäisemmät...”



Depth vs. Surface: Context in News Articles and Videos by YLE and CNN

To continue with the example of Rio's slums, I will discuss how a similar type of segmentation shaped coverage in other Finnish media, but in slightly different ways. In July 2013, YLE produced an article, one that also featured a video report, on the "cleaning" of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, titled "Favela is a Home and a Warzone."<sup>179</sup> In this video, only the voices of the citizens of the favelas were quoted: mainly, that of a dance teacher named Cargamel, who explained how much the situation had *improved* since the police pacified the area. Focusing the camera on lots of local people dancing and smiling, the story presented the image of a very happy place that had been radically *transformed in a positive way* since the police came. Unlike the other coverage examined in the previous section, the YLE article contained explicit links to previous coverage – the list of relevant viewpoints required to complete the college course. That is to say, below this particular text and video, YLE had included a much shorter video from the year 2002, which offered the *police officers' perspective*. It showed them describing the difficulty of the work and featured multiple voices from the law and order field. Here, the journalist provided additional background knowledge by emphasizing how dangerous the favelas were for police officers. Implicitly, this second video helped the reader to understand how the favelas had changed over time, from 2002 to 2013. In this way, both of the first two videos supported the idea that positive change had occurred.

A third video, from 2005, was also included that provided a critical political perspective, showing how President Lula da Silva's policies *increased* violence in the slums. Finally, YLE included a fourth video on the same page from April 2014. This final video depicted the work of award-winning Finnish photo journalist Meeri Koutaniemi, who had traveled to the slums of Rio de Janeiro to cover the "cleaning" operation by the police. The police were shown up close, and the video even showed the journalist speaking with a police officer, but the police officer's voice could not be heard and no translation was offered to clarify what he had said in Portuguese. Instead, the video, like the first video published on the same page, quoted *the individuals* residing in the slums. But the difference is that this last video framed the transformation of the slums very *negatively*: the favelas were depicted as insecure places and their residents as devastated and trying to cope as they were being evicted from their homes as a result of the "cleaning" operation and the World Cup. Hence, all four videos included in YLE's coverage promote different Brazilian perspectives – the first and the last video promoted the citizens' perspective, but from opposite angles. Rather than including all of these diverse viewpoints in a single video, the different speakers were given their own space to frame their realities. Only by watching all four

---

<sup>179</sup> Original in Finnish: "Favela on koti ja sotatanner."

videos was the audience exposed to the complex realities in Brazil and the favelas in particular.

The American news site CNN also created news articles with related news videos on the transformations of Rio's slums. For instance, the article "Rio's Slum Faces Challenges After Police Pacification," from November 15, 2011, began by describing how thousands of "troops seized control of the hilltop favela, wresting it from the hands of drug traffickers. They declared victory in just two hours, without firing a single shot." After this confrontation, a police officer made the point on camera that some drug traffickers were still hiding and needed to be found. Then, the slum's citizens had the chance to praise the operation and describe the transformation of their suburb: "'Thank god it's over,' said Giovanni, a food vendor. 'It's 100% better. It's better than normal.'" But this positive view was immediately contrasted with the following observation by the journalist: "Still, in many ways, the hard work has only just begun." The next paragraph described the poverty of the slums and how the infrastructure must be improved too, not just the crime situation. Following this observation, a citizen who had "lived in Rocinha for 40 years" noted that the drug dealers did do good things, too, while he was not sure whether this could still be expected after the ongoing transformation: "'The system trapped young people in a life of crime. But it's also true that they [the criminals] helped people when they needed it,' he said. 'We'll have to see if things are better or worse under the police.'"

The structure and content of the video formed another intersperspectival story – repetition of the same complexity that was stated in the article. It is not possible to characterize either the video or the article as simply offering a "positive" or a "negative" description of the transformation because CNN's coverage included both angles – optimistic and pessimistic – in an intertwined manner. Moreover, this story contained a link to another news video, published four days earlier and titled "Rio Police Storm City's Largest Slum." This video likewise began by describing the troops entering the favela and noting that they were now in "full control." After making this point, a resident was interviewed, followed by Rio's governor. Finally, the journalist appeared on the screen, providing deep historical context through a negative *Responsibility* frame by noting that "for decades" the citizens had not been able to count on the police, and therefore, the police must make a serious effort at winning their trust.

That is, each of the three fields – politics, law and order, and citizens – which YLE had separated into four individual videos, created at different times, were included in each and every video by CNN. In yet another video, titled "Drug Gangs Rule Favelas Away From World Cup Crackdown," published on May 29, 2014, CNN even included an interview

with *the drug dealers themselves* – current as well as former.<sup>180</sup> As with the coverage of the NSA spying scandal, each CNN story again featured a “Story Highlights” box, which revealed many sides of the issue in a condensed manner.



Illustration 8: A story highlights box in a CNN story “Drug Gangs Rule Favelas Away from World Cup Crackdown,” which summarized the main points of the coverage in a concise form; “complexity in a nutshell.”

But even while CNN’s coverage contained multiple viewpoints and revealed the complexity of the situation in each article, the proportions were not entirely balanced. What is more, as in the *NYT*’s coverage of the topic, even if the fields were able to receive considerable article space, their ideas were scattered and intertwined throughout the story. So essentially, whenever a particular field was given the chance to speak, representatives did not get to say very much before having their viewpoints contrasted with viewpoints from the other fields. For instance, in *NYT* article no. 164, “Rio Slum is Pacified in Advance of Games,” paragraph 10 quoted a doorman living in the slum of Vidigal, who commented on the occupation of the slums by soldiers and the police: “For me, it’s fine.” An alternative view was immediately added by anonymous “critics,” who claimed that “the operation, called ‘Shock of Peace,’ seemed somewhat overdone.” What the individual meant by “fine” and what the critics meant by “overdone” were not explained in more detail, as the story rushed to quote Mr. Soares, representing the law and order field, who reproached the Brazilian media for “feeding the middle class’s exaggerated fears.” But before the reader could truly figure out what these fears might be, a perspective again defending the occupation of the slums already followed in the very next paragraph (14): “Still, the operation allowed officials to highlight the security gains of recent years, which have made parts of the city considerably safer.”

In the news videos, time seems to have been more of an issue than in the articles, where the quotes were at least printed out so that the audience could read them at their own leisure. In the CNN news video “Rio’s Slum Faces Challenges After Police Pacification,” a

---

<sup>180</sup> In the video, the CNN journalist sat down with the drug dealers and interviewed them as they sold drugs in broad daylight.

resident of the slum was given just a few seconds to speak before the story rushed forward to another point of focus. Of course, the audience could have gone back and watched the interview again, but there is no guarantee that they would have done so. Given the speed of the coverage and the way in which the viewer was not allowed any time to “process” the ideas presented by the interviewees before new information was already being provided, the audience may have struggled to reproduce each particular viewpoint in their minds after watching the video, even if generally having understood that the situation was complex. The “Story Highlights” box may have been helpful here, but it offered only a general recapitulation at surface level.

It has already been previously noted that interdisciplinary studies have sometimes been criticized for being superficial – not thoroughly grasping the logics of the different fields involved. Likewise, it can be argued that the American news audience may struggle to grasp the particular *essence* of the different ingredients used in the interspectival “smoothie” form of news, regardless of whether the news is presented in the form of an article or a video. Given the lack of connection between stories and the way that each story kind of “starts from zero” in order to summarize the story so far, the quoted fields are also given a fresh makeover; a new chance to explain and contextualize their positions in every article. Still, the pace with which American news proceeds does not necessarily allow the fields – or even the journalist – to develop their points as fully as they would want or need to.

Finnish news is not balanced either, even when examining the proportions of perspectives over time and across different media. As already shown in Figures 2–5 (see chapter 6), the civic voice was the loudest in *HS*’s coverage of Brazil, while the law and order field was among the quietest of the Southern fields. But while the reality depicted through *HS*’s window was partial, some of the panes at least provided a very thorough view. The *HS* correspondent who stayed in Rio de Janeiro for the year 2014 had clearly taken advantage of the opportunity to interview the local, more underprivileged, people in the favelas – now much more accessible than from a desk in Helsinki – and letting them soundly explain their situations. The same phenomenon could be detected in *YLE*’s coverage of Brazil: the videos concerning the transformations of the favelas in 2013 (10 minutes) and 2014 (29 minutes) were much longer than the video about the police from 2002 (3 minutes). Hence, Finnish news created a *deep but partial* or *segmented context* by allowing one or only a few fields to explain their situations one at a time and further contextualizing their realities, which helped the audiences understand at least one part of the situation quite thoroughly.

### Merging Media Systems and Intermediate Forms of News

Having illustrated what I mean by American “interspectival” and Finnish “multiperspectival” news by making an analogy with interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary studies, I now focus on the intermediary forms of news that exist between these two extremes. Scholars point out how, when moving from multidisciplinary to interdisciplinarity, the degree of integration increases, starting with “partial integration” (multidisciplinary) and ending with “full integration” (inter/transdisciplinary). In this section, I analyze “exceptional” American and Finnish coverage – articles that fell into a gray/liminal area between interspectivalness and multiperspectivalness. I find that these two terms also helpful for testing whether the Finnish Democratic Corporatist media system may be becoming more like the American system, or vice versa (see chapter 3; see also Benson 2013, 147; Hallin and Mancini 2012, 284).

Exceptional Finnish news articles – articles that quoted both ideologically *and* culturally distant fields and engaged in direct interaction, rather than separating the voices into their own compartments, and/or that also quoted the object field, regardless of distance – usually included references to other European or American media. This would suggest that Finnish journalists created such stories on the basis of other foreign coverage. For instance, *HS* article no. 305, “Over 230 Died in a Disco Fire,”<sup>181</sup> published on January 28, 2013, gave voice to unaffiliated Brazilian individuals *and* to the law and order field – even though they were only quoted indirectly via three different Western media sources: the *BBC*, *AFP*, and *NYT*. Indeed, this particular *HS* story was in many ways similar to *NYT* story no. 187, titled “Frenzied Scene as Toll Tops 200 in Brazil Blaze,” published a day before the *HS* story, on January 27, 2013.<sup>182</sup> Both stories contained an exceptionally large *Human Interest* frame (74.1% of the article space in the *NYT* and 80.1% in *HS*). However, it is notable that the *NYT* gave almost the same amount of article space to the Brazilian political field (6.8% of the article space) as it did to the unaffiliated individuals involved in the fire (7.8%), whereas *HS* used other Northern media as a source to mainly incorporate civic voices, which made up 14.5% of the article space, compared with 4.9% for the political field and 2.4% for the law and order field. In other words, even if “copying” other media and thus incorporating a wider range of sources in one article than usual, the proportions were still in line with the Finnish tendency to give a large volume of space to civil sources.

In most of the articles where other Northern media were mentioned as sources, however, *HS* still followed its “segmented” logic. For instance, article no. 276, “Jacob Zuma Ascends from a Circle of Scandals to Become the Leader of South Africa,”<sup>183</sup> contained a reference

---

<sup>181</sup> Original in Finnish: “Diskopalossa kuoli yli 230.”

<sup>182</sup> In addition, the *NYT* published another story on January 29, 2013, titled “After Fire, Some Brazilians Fault a Nation’s Sense of Fatalism,” which is story no. 188 in my sample.

<sup>183</sup> Original in Finnish: “Jacob Zuma nousee skandaalien kierteestä Etelä-Afrikan johtoon.”

to *The Economist* magazine, according to which “nothing can prevent Zuma from becoming South Africa’s, and simultaneously the whole of Africa’s, next big man.”<sup>184</sup> The Liberal media system influence in this story may be manifested in the high number of anonymous sources used to frame the South African political field in a negative light, and the way in which the Southern political field was able to speak for itself and introduce its own perspective in the same story. Still, the only quoted voice (in addition to *The Economist* magazine and anonymous sources) was from the Southern political field. In other words, the introduction of critical anonymous sources made the story more complex than Finnish stories usually are, but other fields were still not allowed to join in the debate at individual article level.

But it was not always clear whether or not the “more intersperspectival” *HS* coverage had been influenced by foreign media. The “most intersperspectival” article in my whole *HS* sample is article no. 261, “South African Foreign Policy Accused of Abandoning Ideals,”<sup>185</sup> published on February 10, 2007. This article quoted a range of ideologically as well culturally distant fields, including the American political field, the South African political field, a Finnish individual residing in South Africa, the African Union, a South African expert, and a South African bishop – but not any other media. In any case, my study still does *not* indicate whether or not the tendency for “intersperspectivalness” in Finnish news will increase over time. In other words, the few exceptions in the Finnish coverage that I found were not systematically bound to any particular news topic or time. As for American news, the opposite seems to be the case: as I showed with my charts in chapter 6, the later American coverage of Brazil was systematically more segmented than the earlier coverage of South Africa (but the difference was not great, either).

Some *NYT* articles were explicitly based on press conferences organized in Brazil or South Africa by some local institution. In such cases, the organizer of the press conference was usually given highly dominant, sometimes even exclusive, quoting space, which resembled the Finnish type of coverage where only one field was able to speak at a time and define realities on behalf of others. For instance, *NYT* article no. 237, “Brazilian President Rejects Criticism Over World Cup,” published on June 3, 2014, only quoted President Dilma Rousseff, who was granted 39.2% of the total article space to express her views. Paragraph 11 helps explained why she was able to speak so loudly (*italics mine*): “Ms. Rousseff, a member of the leftist Workers Party that has governed Brazil since 2003, vigorously defended her economic record *in an hour-long interview at the presidential palace* in the modernist capital, Brasilia.” Yet, anonymously expressed “criticisms” of President Rousseff’s government, also mentioned in the title, took up 19.1% of the total article space,

---

<sup>184</sup> Original in Finnish: “Mikään ei voi estää Zumaa nousemasta Etelä-Afikan ja samalla koko Afikan seuraavaksi suureksi mieheksi.”

<sup>185</sup> Original in Finnish: “Etelä-Afikan ulkopoliittikkaa syytetään ihanteiden hylkäämisestä.”

adding background knowledge from different angles and revealing that there was more to the truth than Ms. Rousseff's perspective. Hence, here again, one form of symbolic violence (President Rousseff having opportunity to define realities on behalf of others) was countered and lessened by including another form of symbolic violence, that is, the use of anonymous sources to frame the Southern political field negatively without revealing the ideological and cultural distance between the framer and the framed (see chapter 6).

In NYT article no. 113, titled "For Final, South Africans Put Past Aside," published on July 10, 2010, the South African sports field was allotted 12.3% of the article space and 34.0% of the quoting space, but many other fields were quoted as well, ranging from South African individuals to politicians to American voices. In this regard, the story seems "intersperspectival." But whenever quoted, the South African sports field, adopting neighboring positions with respect to the South African political field, attempted to frame and contextualize the post-apartheid situation *on behalf of the other fields involved* – in fact, on behalf of *the whole nation* (e.g., paragraph 8): "We forgive and we forget," Radebe said. 'You've got to live in the world and you want to do it in peace. Mandela said we had to tolerate each other. Somebody has to give in so we can make our way forward. Sport has the power to unite people...' With such statements, the local sports field justified the event and related spending politically as well as historically.

What is exceptional is that the views expressed by the sports field were *not contrasted* with opinions offered by the other fields involved. The views were, first of all, supported by the American journalist, who further expanded the *World Order* frame (the mere usage of which is also quite exceptional in American coverage, as described in chapter 6) by combining it with the positive *Conflict and Peace* and *Impact* frames: "This represented a sign of progress, recognition of deep historical and cultural connections and a confirmation of Nelson Mandela's belief in the healing power of sports." What is more, the more silent voices of unaffiliated individuals also systematically *concurred* with the statements expressed by the sports field: "I will cheer the Dutch because they contributed a lot to democratizing and developing this country," Ngcobo (a black business owner from Johannesburg) said" (paragraph 21). The whole article repeated the same point from multiple angles: the World Cup had united South Africa.

Curiously, article no. 113 did *not* summarize the earlier, quite recent, NYT's coverage of the event, which had described the World Cup event as *separating* South Africans from one another even more. For instance, article no. 89, titled "Cost of Stadium Reveals Tensions in South Africa," published on March 12, 2010 (less than half a year earlier), provided a very different view on the World Cup and its impact on South Africa: "Simon Magagula lives in a mud house accessible by a dirt road whose cavities deepen with each rainfall. His doorway is a short jaunt to the new stadium. 'Those who'll benefit from this are the wealthy that already have plenty in their hand,' he said, not in resentment so much as weariness"

(paragraph 8). By *not* incorporating a summary of the “story so far” (type 2 context) from this individual’s perspective, and by selecting those historical details that supported the story about South Africa’s democratization and unification, article no. 113 gave a rather partial description of the impact of the World Cup on South Africa. Still, such “segmented context” can only be found in this particular story – even though other stories concerning the event also accentuated positive aspects of the event, they also contextualized it in a more interspectival way, creating a much more complex view of it.

Why was article no. 113 on “the healing power of sport” so segmented, then? I believe article no. 113 may have represented a conscious effort by the American journalist to acknowledge how far South Africa had come, and for once, not to keep making reference to all of the ongoing struggles – taking the risk that a “student who enters on week five” might think that South Africa is unambiguously a happy place – for one day. This idea of “momentum” was also implicit in the title (*italics mine*), “*For Final, South Africans Put Past Aside.*” Only two days later, on July 12, the NYT published two articles, “Who Really Won in South Africa” (no. 117) and “South Africa Wonders What Lies Beyond the Cup” (no. 118), both of which emphasized the longstanding inequalities in the country and the fact that many people were not benefitting at all from the event (article 117, paragraph 16). Both of the articles were more negative than positive in character. But they also included many voices that continued to perceive the event positively, thus again creating a more complex, “interspectival view” throughout the article space.

### The Changing Vision of the World in the American Journalistic Field

As with the NYT’s coverage of the World Cup in South Africa, its coverage of the event in Brazil as well used deep historical context to illustrate how the sport had previously separated people, but also had the potential to unite them. The following excerpt is from article no. 218 (“Pick-up Soccer in Brazil Has an Allure of its Own”), beginning in paragraph 6:

Before midnight, the game included students, day workers and beach bums; after midnight, busboys and waiters and valets arrived, kicking and running and sweating their way toward morning. (...) (paragraph 25) Some believe the roots of Brazil’s attachment to joga bonito, or the tenet that one must “play beautifully” or not at all, was born from the country’s long history with racism. (...) (paragraph 26) There was a time, the theory goes, when a dark-skinned Brazilian could not even touch a white man without fear of retribution or punishment. Because of that, some say, the silky, slippery, slinky feints and shimmies that Brazilian players hone while playing pelada were developed as a form of survival: the goal was to get past an opponent without even grazing him, lest a societal code be broken.

In the NYT’s coverage of Brazil, this deep historical context supported the *citizens*, especially the most underprivileged ones, who were mostly depicted as *playing beautifully*, whereas the Brazilian national team, the organizers of the event, the government, and FIFA were



framed as responsible for the *decay* of the beautiful game due to their tendency for corruption and greed. Even though the NYT's coverage of the event did not contain links to any prior coverage, the message of the citizens taking part in the 2013 demonstrations was repeated throughout most of the coverage related to the World Cup in 2013 and 2014. An excerpt from article no. 230, paragraphs 6–7, reads as follows:

Some economists say the troubled projects reveal a crippling bureaucracy, irresponsible allocation of resources, and bastions of corruption. Huge street protests have been aimed at costly new stadiums being built in cities like Manaus and Brasília, whose paltry fan bases are almost sure to leave a sea of empty seats after the World Cup events are finished...

Even though the NYT's coverage of the World Cup in Brazil was still primarily intersperspectival in that the articles included debate and dialogue between different speakers throughout the coverage and the political field was still given a more pronounced voice than the citizens, much larger proportions of article space were *contextualized* by the American journalist in a way that helped readers understand the concerns of *the citizens*, while much smaller proportions of the article space provided background knowledge to explain why the leaders so eagerly wanted to organize this event in Brazil. I believe this may reflect a changing perception of the world by the American journalists, in connection with an increasing amount of segmentation; a tendency to intentionally focus the coverage on some particular, rather partial, angle rather than striving for overall balance.

Another possible manifestation of the American journalists' changing perception of the surrounding world could be found in the significant proportions of deeper historical context used to frame the *Northern fields* as responsible. The following excerpt is from op-ed article no. 235, by the Brazilian author Vanessa Barbara, titled "Brazil is Tired of Being Scolded," which included deep historical context:

Brazilians, long treated as obedient children on the world stage, have always submitted to the superior wisdom of foreign authorities. (...) In the '80s and '90s, we quietly complied with the austerity and debt restructuring programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund – even if they meant undermining of our national sovereignty and the suffering of the poor. (...) We're famous for being an easy-going nation that happily gives away some of its oil field exploration rights to foreign companies. We're friendly, acquiescent and cheerful. We like to please. But there is a growing feeling that FIFA and the Olympic Committee are taking the demanding parent act a bit too far.

By granting a Brazilian author 927 words to promote such critical views in the NYT – in both its print *and* online editions – the American journalistic field was seemingly acknowledging her claims, too.

I will conclude this subchapter by offering one more example of American journalists' attitudes towards Brazil – this example is not related to the World Cup. Much earlier in

this chapter, I discussed the NYT's coverage of the American and Brazilian spying controversy, showing how background knowledge about the severity of the American spying efforts was included in the stories over and over again, regardless of the fact that it did not benefit the Americans. In fact, it had quite the opposite effect: it supported the position of the *Brazilian* political field. In this next example, the background information regarding the Brazilian people's perspective was not repeated, thus in a way making the second story much less complex. But I will also argue that in this particular context, such relative simplicity can be justified and even encouraged. I will go as far as to suggest that the segmented context provided in this coverage may reflect a gradually increasing understanding of the complex situations that different people around the world find themselves in.

The first of the two NYT stories (no. 159) examined here was just as interspersive as any typical American article. Titled "Fishermen in Amazon See a Rival in Dolphins," and published on April 16, 2011, the article reported that local fishermen had developed the habit of killing pink dolphins in the Amazon River. The reason they killed the dolphins, they claimed, was because the dolphins continually fed on the catfish that the fishermen wanted to catch and sell in order to support their families: the more dolphins in the river, the less catfish the fishermen managed to catch and the smaller their income. But right after describing the fishermen's situation, the story quoted experts who said that, because of this practice by the fishermen, the dolphins were on the verge of extinction. Thus, the fishermen were depicted negatively using the *Responsibility* and *Impact* frames, but an overlapping *Human Interest* frame helped add type 1 context: their personal situations, the lack of money, and why they felt they must kill the dolphins.

Paragraph 15 added global perspective through the *Impact* frame, explaining that there was a growing demand for catfish in neighboring Colombia. The Brazilian government officials in charge of environmental issues were framed as acknowledging the problem (positive *Responsibility* frame), but mostly blamed for not visiting the community where this unauthorized fishing was taking place (negative *Responsibility* and *Credibility* frames). In paragraph 10, a Portuguese researcher was quoted as saying that the fishermen were "killing their culture, their folklore." Some local people interviewed in a market place said they did not mind the killing of the dolphins. Finally, the story ended as it began, quoting the fishermen on how much they hated the dolphins: "He kept coming closer and the fish were leaving, so I harpooned the dolphin. I couldn't stand it anymore..." Even though the fishermen were framed quite negatively (14.7% of the article space), they were able to speak even more than the officials (21.5% of the article space); therefore, no symbolic violence was committed against the fishermen. Their realities and socio-economic circumstances were contextualized in a way that probably helped readers at least understand, even if not

accept, their actions. Still, they were framed above all as being hostile to the environment around them.

Three years later, on November 12, 2014, the NYT published another article (no. 255) on fishermen in the Amazon – only this time, it framed them using very positive *Responsibility* and *Impact* frames, as can be detected already in the title of the article: “Fishermen in Brazil Save a River Goliath.” The story explained that “their effort to save the fish is yielding a pioneering conservation success story in the Amazon while offering a strategy for fending off a broader freshwater extinction crisis, according to fisheries experts who track the depletion of big fish in the world’s rivers and waters.” Yet these fishermen, just like the ones quoted and described in the earlier article, *depended on this animal for their income*. What had changed was the fact that these fishermen now had official permission to ensure their means of livelihood, unlike the dolphin killers had had – the Brazilian government’s new policy allowed the local people to catch rare fish and animals, but the practice was prohibited for everybody else. Even though these Amazonian fishermen were making a living by catching animals on the verge of extinction, they were still framed first and foremost as *friends of nature*, trying their best to *help* the authorities *conserve* their surroundings by simply keeping watch so that outsiders did not catch the animals also. The story mentioned that in this particular region, animals were traditionally “harpooned,” indicating that the local people described in the story were no so culturally distant from the people described in the earlier 2011 story. But the government’s policy and the possibilities for collaboration had changed over time, now making the fishermen’s attitudes and actions look completely different.

Curiously, by *not* adding type 2 context (the story so far); by *not* providing a link to or a summary of the earlier story where Amazonian fishermen were depicted as enemies of nature and as the major threat to dolphins (even if for understandable reasons), this second story made the Brazilian realities and people look much more mature and responsible. Thus here, the question of whether type 2 context should have been added or not in the second story takes on a normative quality (see chapter 2): Is it better that Brazilian people are framed as both responsible and irresponsible in the same story, revealing the complex ways in which the region is often being protected and destroyed by the very same people? Or, is it better that the local people are depicted merely as friendly allies of the government with a new environmental strategy? If the year 2014 brought about a positive change in nature protection, was there then a need to dig into the deeper historical past and show that things have not always been so easy? The latter story on the river goliath contained a quote from a fishing technician from the Mamirauá Sustainable Development Reserve, who said that, “just a short while ago, we feared that wild piracucu [traditional name for the goliath] could disappear from the Amazon” (paragraph 15). This mention introduced some negative dimensions into the otherwise quite positive depiction of Brazilian realities

– but the threat of the fish’s disappearance was not attributed to the local fishermen, but rather, expressed quite vaguely.

These stories on the dolphins and goliaths were written by two different journalists: the first by Alexei Barrionuevo, the second by Simon Romero, both of whom were permanent staff in the NYT’s foreign bureau in Brazil. Obviously, three years had passed between the writing of the two articles. Regardless of whether there was any conscious, implicit connection between the two stories or not, this coverage was seemingly one of those moments when the journalist in question consciously aimed for a narrower, more specific view so that those readers who had started to follow the topic “on week five” would only be exposed to the positive framing.

### Homophonic Meets Polyphonic: Towards a Finnish-American Harmony

In the course of this chapter, I have explained how multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches – and hence, multiperspectival and intersperspectival news – can be compared to a fruit salad and a smoothie/cake, building on Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta (2007). Based on my analysis, I would add that multiperspectival and intersperspectival coverage can also be illustrated via reference to *homophonic and polyphonic music*. In Finnish multiperspectival coverage, one voice tends to dominate in each article, but it is often accompanied by other voices, the expressions of which nevertheless mainly support this dominant voice rather than further developing their own, distinct stories from a different angle. Finnish journalists tend to provide background knowledge and deep historical context in support of the dominant field in the article, that is, they provide partial context. Likewise, homophonic music consists of one dominant melody, and the purpose of the other sounds included in the piece is mainly to accompany the melody. This kind of accompaniment enriches the melody, but does not interfere with it. But of course, if many homophonic songs are combined, the music already starts to sound more complex.

In American news, many diverse fields are quoted as a means of presenting differing viewpoints throughout each piece. Likewise, polyphonic music does not consist of only one melody, but of many, overlapping melodies that cannot easily be separated from one another (unless you are Mozart); they become a mix, “a smoothie.” Even if one of the melodies is played *forte* and others *mezzo piano* or *piano* – that is, even if they appear in different proportions, with one being more voluminous than the other – the melodies still seem to belong inseparably together, creating a complex sound.




Illustration 9: Polyphonic "intersperspectival" coverage, which does not have one melody that would clearly stand out, but rather, many overlapping and distinct melodies that make the piece very complex.



Illustration 10: Homophonic "multiperspectival" coverage, which tends to promote one melody over others; the other sounds included are meant to accompany the main melody.

Depending on the *intervals*, that is, on the relative distance between the different sounds included in the piece, homophonic and polyphonic music can contain both dissonance and harmony, variation of which also makes the music more complex. Still, homophonic music tends to be simpler in character. Both homophonic and polyphonic music can be written in a "happy" tone (major) or in a more "sad" tone (minor), but it is also common to combine both tones in a single piece, another practice by which the composer can make the work more versatile. Moreover, many musical pieces are not clearly homophonic or polyphonic, but rather, they occur as mixtures and intermediate forms of the two. The beginning of a song can be homophonic or even monophonic, and then become polyphonic later on, or vice versa.

Such diverse ways of creating music have been developed at different times in different countries, becoming trends that individual composers have occasionally challenged in order to develop new, distinct forms of artistic expression. Depending on the rigidity or flexibility of the institutions in which the composers work, and the amount of symbolic capital that they possess in their respective field and subfield (arts, music), their new ideas may be rejected, or praised, or both. Nevertheless, the favored forms tend to change from time to time, thanks to innovative composers who have the courage to try something new.

In the same way, as I have already described in chapters 5 and 6, American and Finnish journalists are tied to the *rules of the game* of the journalistic field they work in which have shaped their habituses. The journalists are inevitably influenced by other writers around them, as well as by the journalistic *form* – homophonic/multiperspectival or polyphonic/intersperspectival – that they are expected to use when publishing melodies. They are also expected to compose the melodies with considerable speed and via a set

routine. The ability of the journalists to modify the form, tone, or rhythm of their coverage depends on the amount of symbolic capital at their disposal, as they engage with other agents – colleagues, editors – in the journalistic field and beyond when seeking out sources. To determine the quality of the pieces they compose, journalists may also struggle with *excessive proximity*, as defined by Bourdieu (1988, 1). Thus, journalistic practice needs to be examined from a farther distance in order to understand the impact and potential of their work, by other fields that may help place this journalistic content in a wider context. Here, the role of academia is important. But, of course, such a study should in and of itself be able to embrace diverse forms of composing rather than merely holding on to established paradigms – that is, it should not simply impose the logic of some particular academic field upon the logic of the journalistic field under study.

Mikkeli and Pakkasvirta (2007, 67) emphasize that the differences between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary do not mean that one approach would be better than the other. Based on my analysis in this chapter, I argue that the “most harmonious” Finnish-American journalism can be achieved somewhere along a scale between the multiperspectival and interspectival approaches – between segmented and integrated forms of journalism. Such coverage would be analogous to a musical piece that combines polyphony with homophony in such a way that each melody is allowed to stand out and be clearly heard without the others constantly interfering with it. But the piece, or coverage, should also introduce many such melodies so that no voice would be subordinated to a role of merely accompanying another, more dominant voice. I also argue that, while a college course instructor – to conclude with Rosen’s example – would not necessarily have to provide students with a complete summary of all the relevant angles every time, it would still be good to provide a list of relevant readings with the links included. In this way, the more enthusiastic students who missed a class or two could then easily catch up, while those that are not so much into reading could nevertheless get a glimpse of the range of important work to be considered before making any definitive conclusions about the phenomenon being discussed. I will now conclude by providing concrete examples from my research materials to illustrate how such harmony could be achieved.

#### *1) The Room for Debate Format – Segmented In-Depth Views in a Single Ensemble*

The first example is from the NYT’s coverage of Brazil – from a genre titled “Room for Debate” (see screenshot illustration on the next page). My whole sample only contains four such articles, and these all related to Brazil, with the earliest having been published in 2012. I find that the development of such stories may well be related to the possible gradual “segmentation” of the American media, for the trick of this genre is precisely that the different speakers involved are each given their own “segment” in which to speak their minds (see also Benson 2013, 211–212). However, this genre is different from the Finnish coverage that I presented earlier in that 1) the speakers involved discuss a common theme,

clearly explained in an introduction that serves simultaneously as a summary of the different, contradictory viewpoints (like the “Highlights Box” in CNN’s coverage) and 2) all the viewpoints are *visible at the same time*. The reader can – and in fact needs to – read the segments one by one, fully focusing on each melody individually, but at the same time the audience cannot escape the holistic view which portrays all the speakers and their standings. While the speakers do not get interrupted when quoted, as each one is allowed to develop their points in their own designated space, the format assures that the reader becomes aware of all the included angles and their relevance simultaneously. Hence, this format contains in-depth readings, while also offering a complex view from first glance. Still, ultimately the readers have to put the pieces together in their minds after reading all the individual pieces. What is more, this format clearly depicts the amount of space given to each speaker, making the proportions and relative volume of each speaker more transparent and easy to detect.



Illustration 11: The “Room for Debate” format in the NYT, which allows different speakers to develop their viewpoints continuously with no interruptions, but which also makes all the viewpoints visible from first glance, so that readers are exposed to all of them at the same time, comprehending complexity. The screenshot above illustrates the general view; the lower screenshot illustrates the view of an individual view belonging to the ensemble.



In my sample, the diverse perspectives included in these four Room for Debate articles mostly represented those of *experts or academics*, who approach a common topic from the perspective of their own background. In that sense, the coverage shown above is actually closer to “multidisciplinary” than interdisciplinary. Still, this would then represent a form of *wide multidisciplinary* (see Repko 2012, 286), bringing together fields that are quite distant. The coverage in the example on the previous page quoted a Brazilian professor of international political economy; a Brazilian city planner and NGO representative; an American professor of Brazilian studies; an American director of an academic program focusing on strategic partnerships and innovation; an American professor of Brazilian history; a Brazilian sociologist, and an American pediatrician and public health consultant. My suggestion is that this format should be elaborated on to include more diverse speakers from ideologically and culturally distant fields beyond just the academic field.

As the Room for Debate format clearly displays the affiliations and cultural backgrounds of the speakers involved while making it more difficult to include anonymous sources, an increasing use of such formats could lead to more transparent coverage. Finnish journalists and sources are already used to expressing their viewpoints quite directly rather than having to disguise them in anonymous quotes. Hence, it could be that the Finnish media could actually adopt this American ensemble format more easily than the American media, even if the format was originally created by the NYT.

## *2) YLE's Video Ensemble and Journalistic Self-Reflexivity*

My second example regarding forms of news that could enhance balanced, in-depth coverage is actually a Finnish version of the American multiperspectival “Room for Debate” ensemble discussed above, taken from YLE’s ensemble of news videos and articles that I discussed earlier in relation to the topic of the transformations of the slums in Rio de Janeiro. Here, news videos created and published at different times and from different angles were incorporated in the same online page. Each video was limited to a particular viewpoint on the realities of the slums in Rio and, to obtain the big picture, consumers needed to watch all of the videos: video 1, a depiction of how the police presence had transformed the slums in a positive way, narrated exclusively from a citizen’s perspective; video 2, earlier coverage of police officers and the challenges they faced when trying to suppress the drug gangs, narrated by the police; video 3, how the policies of Lula da Silva’s government had transformed the slums, featuring voices from representatives of the government; and video 4, which presented the views of citizens whose lives had deteriorated since the government and police had begun to “clean” the slums for the World Cup.

In this particular ensemble, the videos promoting the viewpoints of citizens were significantly longer than the videos promoting the view of the law and order field. I would suggest that, even though a high volume of civic voices in the news should certainly be



encouraged and embraced, the viewpoints of the police should also be given more volume to balance out the viewpoints included in the news. As has already been discussed, reading about the Brazilian police maltreating citizens would probably not cause the reader to change sides, regardless of how much background knowledge was included. But it could make the police look more human, and the conditions under which they were working more understandable, which again could have an impact on the way that the country and its people are perceived globally.

I am not arguing that CNN and other American media should abandon their intersperspectival logic and start producing news videos that only feature one perspective. In fact, unless the different videos are gathered together in such a way on the same page, I would suggest that the Finnish media should consider making *more intersperspectival* articles and videos to ensure that audiences are exposed to multiple viewpoints. But if American journalists can (and I do not see why they could not) organize article and video content into an ensemble format, like the NYT's Room for Debate format presented earlier, they could also produce news videos that dig deeper into the lives of particular sources from a particular angle. They could do so by taking YLE's coverage as an example, rather than rushing from one angle to another and leaving the interviewees unable to express themselves fully enough.

Finally, there is one more aspect in this YLE video collection that I believe deserves closer attention. This comes from the last video, which was actually a co-production between an YLE journalist and the Finnish photo journalist, Meeri Koutaniemi, who was residing in Rio de Janeiro at the time (in 2014). While depicting the lives of the local people, this video simultaneously revealed the journalist's own experiences – Koutaniemi's sentiments, goals, and challenges. The following quote is from Koutaniemi as she walked around the favela Complexo de Manguinhos exploring the harm caused by officials to the local people:

It is not my purpose to moralize, I am also equally part of everything that I criticize. And that is what makes this work interesting – the fact that here I am, also exploring different sides of my life, that I can improve. While here, I am educating myself somehow, hopefully to become a wiser or a better person.<sup>186</sup>

Koutaniemi also talked about different limitations upon her work, which may have had an impact, for instance, on how she selected the people who became objects of her photos:

In this particular favela, it is not recommendable to walk alone, since there are quite a few drug dealers as well as drug addicts here, and the local people here are very stressed about

---

<sup>186</sup> Original in Finnish, based on my transcription from the video: "Mun tarkoitus ei ole moralisoida, mä oon yhtä lailla osa sitä kaikkea, mitä mä kritisoin. Ja se tekee tästä työstä jotenkin kiinnostavaa, että tässähän mä tutkin myös oman elämäni puolia, joita parantaa. Mä koulutan tässä itteeni jollain tavalla, toivottavasti viisaammaksi tai paremmaksi ihmiseksi."

the current situation, which causes many tensions. I rather prefer to work with others and not walk alone, also because whenever I want to talk with people or interview them, I need an interpreter...<sup>187</sup>

My point is that the Finnish photo journalist did not even pretend to be objective or neutral or completely prepared to cover everything surrounding her. Instead, she engaged in *journalistic reflexivity*. This kind of openness and revelation about the realities that journalists in the field deal with provided background knowledge for the audience, that is to say, it *contextualized the journalist*. In chapter 6, I described the tendency of American journalists to promote neutrality and objectivity, compared with the more “open bias” of Finnish journalists. David Boeyink (1990, 240–241) argues that including explanations in the news as to why each anonymous source is granted anonymity *helps add context* to the coverage. I insist that, should American journalists be more open about their own habituses and journalistic experiences, their coverage would become not only more transparent, but also more contextualized, providing background knowledge on why different stories were produced in a particular way. Similar claims have been made by Ahmed Al Omran (2014, 24–25), who insists that foreign correspondents should be transparent and open about their backgrounds by providing links to their previous work.

### 3) Including Integrated Links and Condensed Complexity

Finally, my Finnish-American comparison has shed light on the fact that American foreign news articles – those of CNN in particular – contain integrated links to other related stories. In my Finnish sample, I was able to find links only *at the end* of the Finnish online articles. Given the Finnish segmented form of presenting the news, such links could help assure that even if reading just one article written from some particular perspective, a reader could easily access other kinds of viewpoints. Integrating the links, like CNN does, rather than only including them at the end, as HS does, would help the reader by introducing the missing perspective in crucial places, thereby facilitating the immediate debate” in his/her mind. The reader also always has the opportunity to just ignore the link – but at least, (s)he would learn that such an article and perspective can be found and that it is relevant to the overall story. I would also recommend adding “Story Highlights” boxes in the Finnish news – even if the actual story contained less viewpoints, which would be then developed thoroughly later on, this could be a good way to include a reminder of many crucial viewpoints.

---

<sup>187</sup> Original in Finnish: “Tässä nimenomaisessa favelassa ei kannata liikkua yksin, täällä on sekä aika paljon huumeilureita että huumeitten käyttäjiä, sekä nää paikalliset ihmiset on hyvin stressaantuneita tästä nykyisestä tilanteesta joka aiheuttaa monia jännitteitä. Mä mieluummin teen töitä toisten kanssa enkä kulje niinkään yksin ja ihan senkin takia että halutessa jutella ihmisille tai tehdessä haastattelua niin mä tarvitsen tulkin.”

---

## 8. Dynamics and Relative Volume of Southern Subfields in Northern News

---

In this final analysis chapter, I “zoom in” on the different Southern fields, the framing and total volume of which have already been discussed in the previous chapters, to examine more precisely *whose* viewpoints the fields actually represent and contextualize. In other words, my focus is on the *agency* (Bourdieu 2005, 30; see also Benson 1999, 467) within fields and between fields. I concentrate mostly on the three loudest Southern fields in the NYT’s and HS’s coverage, as illustrated in figures 2–5; namely, the South African and Brazilian political fields, civic societies consisting of unaffiliated individuals and non-governmental associations, and the academic fields.

For Pierre Bourdieu (2005, 30), “a field is a field of forces within which agents occupy positions (...), these position-takings being aimed either at conserving or transforming the structure of relations of forces that is constitutive of the field.” To examine this “structure of relations of forces” in each of the three fields, I have measured the relative volume of different quoted agents, forming subfields within each field, and have examined the ways in which they claim ideological proximity or distance from one another. In this chapter, I also analyze the degree to which different agents are quoted framing other agents negatively beyond the agents’ ability to speak for themselves, resulting in symbolic violence *within* these Southern fields.

Bourdieu (1987, 13) emphasizes that fields are engaged in a constant struggle, each aiming to impose its particular vision of the social world onto society as a whole. In the words of Rodney Benson (2013, 183), “[t]he journalistic field is both the important site on which this struggle takes place, and a field of its own logic that contributes to the content and form of public discourse.” In chapter 7, I showed how the Finnish multiperspectival and American interspectival forms of news shape the ways in which different field perspectives are elaborated on and combined in the news. In the final part of this chapter, which also concludes the analytical section of this dissertation, I investigate the relative share of article space granted to different institutions within the South African and Brazilian journalistic fields and this way, assess the dynamics within the global journalistic field.

RELATIVE VOLUME OF SOUTHERN POLITICAL SUBFIELDS

THE NEW YORK TIMES ON SOUTH AFRICA

HELSINGIN SANOMAT ON SOUTH AFRICA





Figure 14: Relative volume of South African political subfields in the *NYT* and *HS*.

THE NEW YORK TIMES ON BRAZIL

HELSINGIN SANOMAT ON BRAZIL





Figure 15: Relative volume of Brazilian political subfields in the *NYT* and *HS*.

## Dynamics and Relative Volume of Southern Political Subfields

As the figures on the previous page show, the governing parties – the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil<sup>188</sup> – were given substantial volume to speak in both the *NYT* and *HS*, whereas the voices of many less prominent parties were lacking completely in the coverage. While the ANC had a majority in the South African Parliament at the time, the other members of the South African Tripartite Alliance – the Congress for South African Trade Unions, known as COSATU, and the South African Communist Party SACP – were also quoted, but in much smaller proportions. These voices have been counted as part of the ANC's voice, since many news articles referred to “the government” in general, without revealing which particular agent within this alliance was speaking. Still, in most cases, the speaker was identified as explicitly representing the ANC. In the Brazilian context, the news also often simply referred to the “Brazilian government,” suggesting that, in principle, the speakers might have represented some other major party as well, but then in the same articles, usually only PT representatives were quoted by name.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa and the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) in Brazil – the major opposition parties during the time of the coverage – received only a small percentage of the quoting space on average. The “other parties” category mainly consists of quotes by significant parties, such as Independent Democrats (ID) in South Africa and the Socialist Party (PSB) in Brazil. More marginal parties that had not gained seats in the national parliaments, such as the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) or the Green Party (GPSA) in South Africa and the Christian Labor Party (PTZ) or the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) in Brazil, had absolutely no voice in American and Finnish foreign news coverage. But the number of parliamentary seats did not directly correlate with the share of quoting space either, given the fact that, for instance, the Brazilian Democratic Labor Party (PDT) had representatives both in the Senate as well as in the Chamber of Deputies, but was not quoted in my sample. The Brazilian Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) was mentioned, but it lacked a sufficient enough voice to be heard at the overall sample level, even though voices of this social movement could have significantly enriched the news coverage as a whole.<sup>189</sup> Curiously, also the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) was characterized by silence, regardless of its remarkable role in

---

<sup>188</sup> The PT is no longer the governing party in Brazil, since in 2016 the Senate voted to remove President Dilma Rousseff from office for manipulating the budget. Michel Temer of the PMDB party was sworn in as president.

<sup>189</sup> The MST has, in Dave Zirin's (2014, 80) words, been “one of the most important organizations for social change in Brazil.” In the 1980s and 1990s, the MST embarked on a campaign of land invasions as a protest against Brazil's highly unequal land ownership policies. The MST has also been engaged in various conflicts with the government; see Reid 2014, 203–204.

South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle and the way it had previously been allowed, during the Cold War, to define the ANC's "communist" stances on the ANC's behalf in Western news (see chapter 2).

However, the exceptionally loud voices given to the ANC in the South Africa coverage and to the PT in the Brazil coverage were balanced out by a remarkable amount of criticism of these particular parties: practically all the negative framing concerning these Southern political fields as a whole, depicted in Figures 10–11 (see chapter 6), was aimed at these governing parties, whereas the silenced smaller parties were not criticized. In this sense, the relatively high volume at which the major parties had a chance to speak can be justified as their chance to defend themselves against the criticism by anonymous sources and the other quoted fields and subfields.

Still, I argue that this practice of completely ignoring the smaller parties' voices embodies symbolic violence: the Northern journalistic field was systematically allowing the major parties to frame and contextualize the countries' political situations on behalf of the smaller parties involved. This form of symbolic violence, expressed as silence, is similar to the systematic decision not to use of the *World Order* frame in the American news, as I discussed in chapter 6; my argument was that even just using the negative dimensions of this frame would have been better than leaving it out completely, since its inclusion on the negative side would have at least suggested that the existence of these two Southern countries and their institutions had been taken into account and not ignored completely. When taken as a national whole, the political fields were certainly not ignored: quite the opposite. But when zooming in, my analysis shows that the focus was only on the largest parties and most influential voices. Hence, I argue that this coverage represented another form of symbolic violence expressed as silence: they were *denied* their agency (see also Benson and Wood 2015, 818).

The question is whether such alternative political voices would have been easily available to the Northern journalists or not. My analysis in the final part of this chapter, on the dynamics within the global journalistic field, shows that Northern journalists mainly quote Southern mainstream media rather than also trying to incorporate voices from a wider range of publications in each country. I found that the range of voices representing different political parties in both the South African and Brazilian contexts not only should, but also *could*, be expanded in the *NYT* as well as *HS* without too much effort from the journalists.

The "local governors, party not mentioned" category consists of the voices of mayors and governors in charge of different municipalities in South Africa and Brazil. They were not presented as anonymous sources, as has been explained in chapter 5; their names and affiliation to their countries' political field as a whole were made clear, but their more precise political affiliations to specific parties were not mentioned in the news texts. In

those exceptional cases where the local governors' political affiliations *were* revealed, the emphasis of the story was usually at the national government level. For instance, when the former governor of São Paulo, José Serra of the PSDB, became a presidential candidate, his background in municipal politics was explained in more detail in the coverage. Through these local governors, smaller parties in different regions were also able to make their ideas heard in the press, but due to a lack of information regarding the party these politicians represented, readers were not able to associate their ideas with these particular political institutions. In other words, by simply mentioning each quoted local politician's party or other ideological affiliation in the news articles, the journalists could also easily expand the range of different institutions being quoted in the coverage.

To make sure that the political coverage met the normative goals of *ideological multiperspectivalness* (see chapter 2; see also Benson 2009, 408; Gans 2011), I would argue that the inclusion of voices representing many different parties is not enough, because different parties may still promote very similar ideologies. Likewise, the same party may be divided between representatives who disagree significantly among themselves. Brazil in particular is known for having an exceptionally high number of political parties, and representatives often defect from one party to another (Reid 2014, 267). Hence, the next phase in my analysis examines the dynamics within the parties quoted, that is, it further zooms in on the different subfields, as represented in figures 14–15. I will start by examining the internal dynamics of the ruling ANC and PT parties and their opposition parties as well as the interaction between them. This section on the dynamics of the Southern political fields will be concluded with an analysis of the coverage of other parties and governors.

### Contesting Ideas in the African National Congress

The principal difference between the NYT's and HS's coverage of the South African ANC party and the Brazilian PT party is that while interactions within the PT were mostly depicted via positive dimensions of the *Conflict and Peace* frame, indicating *agreement* between the distinct agents involved, the ANC was constantly framed as *torn up* by disagreements between its own members. These differences can be explained by the historical realities in these countries during the time period of the coverage examined in this study: 2006–10 in South Africa and 2010–14 in Brazil. While conflicts between agents representing these parties reportedly occurred in both countries during these times, a review of the scholarly literature revealed that the leadership of the PT in Brazil was still relatively unified in comparison with the ANC in South Africa. For instance, R. W. Johnson (2013, 222–271) describes Thabo Mbeki's presidency between 1999 and 2008 as going "from triumph to disaster." Among other issues, Mbeki ended up firing Jacob Zuma, his former deputy, in 2005; while this happened before my sample period started, the incident still marred the relationship between the two leaders. Later, Mbeki himself was

pressured by other ANC members to resign from the presidency in 2008, and Zuma was democratically elected in 2009 as the country's new president. Thus, it is not surprising that the conflict between these two principal agents shaped the *NYT*'s and *HS*'s coverage as well.

The most influential individual agents who expressed opposing viewpoints within the ANC included Mbeki, Zuma, and Julius Malema, leader of the ANC Youth League. To a lesser extent, the *NYT* also quoted different health ministers in the subsequent governments of Mbeki and Zuma, politicians representing the ANC but who had radically different opinions. Finally, the news also quoted Nelson Mandela, even though his voice was not particularly loud, either. All of these voices represented the highest ranks of the ANC in the national government; "lower level" representatives were not quoted in my sample. (However, unaffiliated individuals speaking in support of the ANC party *were* quoted, including many poor and lower middle class people. But as these people were not party members, but rather, people who had only voted for these more privileged representatives, their voices and socioeconomic statuses will only be examined in the forthcoming section on dynamics within the country's civic society.)

Due to the multiperspectival form of news provided by *HS*, as has been already discussed in chapter 7, each *HS* article tended to quote and fully contextualize a particular viewpoint, representing one or a few proximate field perspectives, and only in subsequent coverage were contrary viewpoints also presented in a thorough manner. Due to this way of presenting the news, the opposing viewpoints of Mbeki and Zuma were often contextualized in separate articles. For instance, *HS* article no. 276 explained, via negative dimensions of the *Responsibility* and *Conflict* frames, that "many South Africans believe that Zuma was the victim of a political conspiracy directed by Mbeki, as Mbeki was trying to undercut Zuma's path to the presidency"<sup>190</sup> (paragraph 7). Hence, this particular article framed Mbeki as an irresponsible president. Yet, an earlier *HS* article, no. 272, titled "South Africa's President Mbeki Was Pressured to Resign"<sup>191</sup> provided a more positive context from Mbeki's perspective, listing his accomplishments: (paragraph 12) "During Mbeki's presidency, South Africa grew into Africa's strongest economy, showing five percent growth," and (paragraph 14) "In foreign policy, Mbeki's merits have been praised. He has acted as arbitrator in several African crises. His last accomplishment was the conciliation of Zimbabwe's long-term governmental crisis last week."<sup>192</sup>

---

<sup>190</sup> Original in Finnish: "Monet eteläafrikkalaiset uskovat, että Zuman ajohdind takana oli Mbekin ohjailema poliittinen salaliitto, joka pyrki katkaisemaan Zuman tien presidentiksi."

<sup>191</sup> "Original in Finnish: "Etelä-Afrikan presidentti Mbeki painostettiin eroamaan."

<sup>192</sup> Original in Finnish: "Mbekin kaudella Etelä-Afrikka kasvoi Afrikan vahvimaksi taloudeksi ja osoitti viiden prosenttia kasvua. (...) (paragraph 14) Ulkopoliitikassa Mbekin ansioita on kiiteltä."



As is characteristic of the American intersperspectival form of news, also discussed in chapter 7, the NYT tended to quote, criticize, and contextualize fields expressing opposing viewpoints in each article. I found that this same form of news also structures debates *within* fields and subfields, including the ANC, in the American news. For instance, NYT article no. 18 told the story of Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, “one of the most talked-about figures in South Africa these days” (paragraph 3), and the way she first became health minister and was then fired by Mbeki. Coverage of the debate within the ANC reads as follows (paragraph 7):

Ms. Madlala-Routledge’s supporters say she was the lone voice of principle in a Health Ministry sullied by its lackadaisical response to South Africa’s AIDS crisis. (8) To her supporters, the dismissal is fresh evidence of a deep antipathy toward AIDS science on the part of both Mbeki and his political ally, the much-maligned health minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. (...) (paragraph 9) On the other hand, Ms. Madlala-Routledge’s critics say she is a headline-grabbing gadfly. In mid-August, Mr. Mbeki devoted his weekly Internet essay to a harsh attack on Ms. Madlala-Routledge, calling her a “lone ranger” who willfully ignored orders. Any suggestion that her dismissal will affect South Africa’s AIDS strategy, he wrote, is “extraordinarily absurd.”

In addition to Madlala-Routledge and Mbeki, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was also quoted (paragraph 19). The story also paraphrased academics – saying Madlala-Routledge was “no pushover,” in paragraph 14 – and a South African journalist who, in turn, attributed a large part of the responsibility to Madlala-Routledge herself: “In the last few months, I’ve been rather shocked at how reckless she has been in her public statements,’ said Kelly Currinan, a veteran reporter on medical issues” (paragraph 25). In other words, in line with the American intersperspectival form of news and the tradition of internal pluralism, this particular article did not cover the issue solely from one side or the other – either Mbeki’s or Madlala-Routledge’s – but both, revealing the complexity of the situation throughout the article. Still, Madlala-Routledge spoke more voluminously (16.7% of the total article space and 60.2% of the total quoting space) than Mbeki (4.8% of the total article space and 17.1% of the quoting space) and Tshabalala-Msimang (1.0% of the article space and 3.7% of the quoting space). Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang were also framed negatively in greater proportions (9.3% of the total article space) than Madlala-Routledge (4.5%), suggesting that at least in this context, the journalist had deemed Madlala-Routledge’s ideas as more legitimate than those of Mbeki.

In the NYT, dynamics within the ANC were addressed in connection with the topic of AIDS in subsequent articles as well. Following the dismissal of Mbeki, NYT article no. 79 described, via positive dimensions of the *Responsibility* and *Impact* frames, how Mbeki’s

---

Hän on toiminut sovittelijana useissa Afrikan kriiseissä. Hänen viimeisimmäksi saavutukseksi jäi Zimbabween pitkäaikaisen hallituskriisin sovittelu viime viikolla.”

departure had brought about an ideological change within the ANC (paragraph 2), hence framing Zuma as the agent with the potential to transform the field:

President Jacob Zuma last week definitely rejected his predecessor's denial of the viral cause of AIDS and of the critical role of antiretroviral drugs in treating it. (...) (7) After Mr. Mbeki's ouster from the presidency a year ago by his own party, the African National Congress, which has governed the country since 1994, a caretaker president appointed a new health minister, Barbara Hogan, who said in an interview that what she called 'the era of denialism' was over. (...) (paragraph 8) Dr. Aaron Motsoaledi, her successor as health minister under Mr. Zuma, has accepted the government's responsibility for past failings and begun charting a more comprehensive approach to the AIDS crisis here.

NYT article no. 79 also provided a summary of the story so far and historical context, reminding readers of Mbeki's ignorance, in the event that they had "enrolled in the college course on week five" (see chapter 7). For example, paragraph 3 explained that "President Thabo Mbeki first suggested that AIDS-drugs could pose 'a danger to health' in an Oct. 28, 1999 speech in Parliament." The same paragraph then highlighted the ideological distance between Mbeki and his successor: "Mr. Zuma declared Thursday in the same chamber, 'Knowledge will help us to confront denialism and the stigma attached to the disease.'"

But the NYT soon revealed that Zuma's stance on AIDS was not very credible either. NYT article no. 85, titled "Paternity Claim Challenges Zuma's Stance on AIDS," explained through negative *Credibility*, *Conflict and Peace*, and *Human Interest* frames that, "Jacob Zuma, the polygamous president of South Africa, was upbraided Monday by commentators and political rivals after a newspaper reported that he had fathered his 20<sup>th</sup> child, the mother being a much younger family friend and not one of his three wives" (paragraph 2). Paragraphs 11-12 again provided background knowledge, reminding readers that Zuma had also been to court facing accusations of rape: "The trial also opened him to ridicule. The woman involved was HIV positive, and Mr. Zuma testified that to minimize his risk from infection he took a shower" (paragraph 12). Paragraph 14 quoted a local newspaper, which framed Zuma via very negative *Credibility* and *Responsibility* frames: "In a front-page commentary with the huge headline 'Shame of the Nation,' the Sowetan newspaper said that in other democracies Mr. Zuma would be compelled to give up the presidency, adding that none of what he said on World AIDS day 'came from the heart.'"

But this negative statement by the Sowetan newspaper was immediately challenged by the *American journalist*, who now again reminded readers of Zuma's ideological distance from Mbeki's previous policies in a positive tone, stating that, "However heartfelt, the speech was more than talk. It was accompanied by a tangible step up in providing AIDS treatment and preventing the infection in newborns. The new policies were welcomed by the health community" (paragraph 15). The same NYT article provided more historical context in a

way that helped explain the situation from Zuma's perspective through positive dimensions of the *Credibility* as well as the *Exoticism* frames: (paragraph 17) "He took office in May, and his popularity remains high," and (paragraph 18) "Polygamy is legal here, and there is general acceptance of its practice." Zuma was also allowed to speak for himself: "'As a culture, as my culture,' he answered, 'polygamy does not take anything from me, from my political beliefs and everything, including the belief in the equality of women'" (paragraph 19). Similar complexity can be detected in further NYT's coverage, for example in article no. 95, which emphasized both Zuma's "extraordinarily open conversation about sex, AIDS, and HIV prevention" (paragraph 3) and quoted anonymous "critics who argue that Mr. Zuma's own behavior has undermined the government's push for safe sex" (paragraph 10).

The conflict between Zuma and Mbeki culminated in the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE), a group which separated from the ANC in 2009 in protest of Mbeki's dismissal (Johnson 2013, 637–638). NYT article no. 48, titled "Rift Unsettles South Africa's Top Party," explained it as follows (paragraph 2): "A well-known stalwart of the African National Congress took steps on Wednesday to break with the party and start another, arguing that the ANC had turned its back on democracy." In subsequent paragraphs, beginning with paragraph 8, the story provided the background knowledge and historical context necessary to understand the situation:

The party has been badly fractured for more than a year. In a contentious ANC conference last December, Mr. Zuma unseated Mr. Mbeki for the party presidency. In the months since, the nation had two competing centers for power. (...) (paragraph 10) [M]any South Africans objected to the manner in which Mr. Mbeki was deposed. (...) (paragraph 12) Some supporters of Mr. Zuma have vowed to 'kill' if the criminal corruption case against him keeps him from the presidency.

A total of 16.5% of the article space was given to Mosiuoa Lekota, a founding member of the COPE faction, while President Zuma received only 1.9% of the total article space and members of COSATU 7.3% of the total article space. But the largest share was taken up by South African social scientists (19.5% of the total article space), one of whom stated the following about Lekota: "'What we have here is a spoiled brat who cannot come to terms with losing power,' he said. 'People like him have been rejected by their own party'" (paragraph 14). And yet, in the same article, Lekota's background was connected with the anti-apartheid struggle and the particular social movement that had managed to release Mandela from prison, suggesting that Lekota was also *an anti-apartheid hero* (paragraph 6) and, hence, a very legitimate agent within the ANC subfield, with the potential to transform the ANC and the South African political field as a whole. Thus, I argue that this particular news article on the formation of COPE and the crisis of democracy within the ANC was *in itself democratic* in the sense that it incorporated the most relevant views within this split party in the same story, highlighting both positive and negative features of all the

agents involved.<sup>193</sup> No single agent was framed solely positively or negatively, as completely legitimate or illegitimate, allowing readers to see the complex circumstances leading to the split in the party.

But while the NYT's coverage may have been democratic, it also contained a substantial amount of anonymous sources, which were used to criticize the different ANC agents involved without revealing the position or relative distance of the negative framers. In chapter 6, I argued that American journalists systematically use anonymous sources to disguise political biases. In the words of Martin Meredith (2011, 672), "Mbeki's free-market strategy won him the approval of foreign investors and the business community, but infuriated the ANC's traditional allies – the trade unions and the Communist party." The United States is among South Africa's principal foreign investors, and trade unionism has not been a popular movement in the U.S., at least not in comparison with South Africa. As explained in chapter 2, during the Cold War the U.S. government took a strong stance against "communist" movements in South Africa. Thus, anonymous sources could have been used to criticize COSATU and the Communist party as a hidden way to promote American national interests in the coverage provided by American journalists.

Not so surprisingly, many of the anonymous criticisms I found in the NYT's coverage of the ANC indeed targeted COSATU and the Communist party. For instance, article no. 63 described how "[u]nion leaders are still bitter that they were sidelined in the Mbeki years when the government pursued neoliberal, free-market policies. *Analysts say* COSATU backed Mr. Zuma not so much because he was an ideological soul mate, but in a tactical move to win greater influence" (paragraph 22, italics added to highlight anonymity). But I also found that, as is typical of the American interspersed form of news, COSATU and its political allies within the ANC field were also systematically given the *chance to speak for themselves* in the same article where they were criticized: "We fear employers will exploit it [a time-limited wage subsidy] to restructure labor relations,' Zwelinzima Vavi, general secretary of COSATU, said in an interview. 'They will have the workers at very low wages and fire them at will'" (article 63, paragraph 17). Furthermore, COSATU's perspective in the article was not just limited to this particular quote by the representative, as COSATU's position *was further contextualized by the American journalist* in a way that *helped* COSATU defend itself against the claims presented by the anonymous sources. This particular context allowed readers to see, beginning in paragraph 11, *why* jobs were an important issue and thus why the trade unions were pushing their goals so ardently within the ANC:

---

<sup>193</sup> Obviously, as I have already noted, the coverage does not quote the ANC members in more marginal positions and in this sense, it may not be regarded as democratic. Here, I refer to this particular situation, most relevant angles being included in the coverage: Zuma's, COSATU's, Mbeki's, and the splitting party COPE's as well as the political scientists' and other experts'.

The rise of unemployment since the country's liberation from white minority rule in 1994 has afflicted the lives of millions and contributed to crime, poverty, and inequality. (...) (paragraph 13) Mr. Zuma also endorsed a more ambitious "industrial policy," which unions have pushed, to bring greater state intervention into parts of the economy with the potential to generate jobs making cars, clothing, and other goods.

To summarize so far: even if the way that anonymous sources were imposed by the American journalistic field upon the Southern fields and subfields involved led to a form of symbolic violence, as I have previously argued, it should also be emphasized that the NYT still covered the conflict within the ANC in a complex manner, contextualizing and explaining the positions of the different agents and their allies within the field and its subfields rather than unambiguously backing up or lynching some particular agent, regardless of their political ideology. The Finnish multiperspectival and the American intersperspectival forms of news were used to highlight the dynamics within the ANC field in a way that introduced and contextualized the diverse perspectives for readers, but while in the Finnish news the balance between the conflicting viewpoints was again segmented across different articles and over a longer time span, American news, in line with the tradition of internal pluralism and balance (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 29), incorporated them in the same article and often even in the same paragraph.

The ANC was quite divided already before assuming power in 1994 (see, e.g., Welsh 2009, 42). In his autobiography, remembering the year 1985 and his initial negotiations with the white pro-apartheid government, Mandela ([1994] 2013, 526) writes: "The ANC is a collective, but (...) I did not have the security or the time to discuss these issues with my organization. I knew that my colleagues upstairs would condemn my proposal (...) There are times when a leader must move out ahead of the flock." Describing Mandela's release from Robben Island in 1990, after spending 27 years imprisoned, Johnson (2013, 20) writes that "his long incarceration had made him a mythical figure and thus the inevitable leader. (...) At some point some Afrikaners present objected that what they were being told was not what they understood Mandela had intimated. Mbeki exploded, throwing his pencil in the air with irritation: 'Mandela said that! Ha! So God has spoken.'"

In my sample, however, Mandela was *the only* quoted agent who was *not* framed negatively in any context, at least not by directly using his name.<sup>194</sup> A slight exception was NYT article

---

<sup>194</sup> However, one NYT article did paraphrase Nelson Mandela's ex-wife, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, who framed Nelson Mandela in a critical light: "She was quoted in the London newspaper *The Evening Standard* this week as saying that her former husband, South Africa's first democratically elected president, had let the black majority down. 'He agreed to a bad deal for the blacks,' she was quoted as saying. 'Economically, we are still on the outside.'" However, this article, titled "Winnie Mandela's Remarks Raise Stir" (March 10, 2010), was excluded from my sample because it was so strongly based on the British *Evening Standard*. Evaluating Winnie Madikizela-Mandela's criticism of her ex-husband Nelson Mandela's policies is also problematic given the vague boundary between

no. 90, where Julius Malema, the ANC Youth League leader, claimed a certain ideological distance from “veteran ANC stalwarts.” Mandela, though, was not explicitly mentioned here either; rather, the article focused on Malema’s criticism of COSATU and the Communist wing. In my sample, Mandela was frequently framed as the most capable and legitimate agent in the ANC subfield, one whose ideals his followers were failing to live up to. In other words, while the ANC’s current leaders were frequently quoted criticizing *each other* for why Mandela’s goals had *not* been met, they *did not criticize Mandela himself* or his goals per se – Mandela’s honor was the only thing all ANC members, with perhaps the exception of Julius Malema, seemingly *agreed* on in my sample.

Mandela was not quoted voluminously either; praise of his accomplishments was mostly introduced by the American and Finnish journalists in order to provide historical context for their stories, while the criticism of Mandela’s followers stemmed from the other Southern fields being quoted both within and beyond the political field. Mandela’s relative silence in the coverage in comparison with the voices of the contemporary ANC leaders likely resulted from the fact that during my sample period (2006–10), he was already old and fragile, no longer very active in the country’s political life, and not often giving interviews; this was also explicitly explained in the news articles.<sup>195</sup>

In his autobiography, Mandela ([1994] 2013, 520) describes an experience during his imprisonment in the 1980s: “I had one not-so-pleasant visit from two Americans, editors of the conservative newspaper the Washington Times. They seemed less intent on finding out my views than on providing that I was a Communist and a terrorist.” *The Washington Times*, which did not form a part of my sample, has generally been characterized as a publication inclined towards the central-right politically,<sup>196</sup> while the NYT has generally been defined as “liberal” in its orientation (see chapter 3). Even though I would hypothesize that *The Washington Times* in the post-Cold War period and following the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk (see chapter 2) would have expanded its viewpoints on Mandela and his ideologies, this experience by Mandela, as described in his autobiography, also suggests that my findings based on the NYT coverage

---

their political and intimate relationship (see Mandela, [1994] 2013, 599–601). Johnson (2013, 69) describes how “each time Mandela wanted to sack Winnie, Mbeki played the desperate middleman...”

<sup>195</sup> For instance, *HS* article no. 265, explained that, (paragraph 6) “physically weaker and weaker, Mandela is still the symbol of change in South Africa. (...)” (paragraph 8) He only seldom appears in public, and has not given personal interviews since October 2004.” Original in Finnish: “Fyysisesti yhä hauraammaksi muuttunut Mandela on edelleen Etelä-Afrikan muutoksen symboli. (...)” (paragraph 8) Julkisuudessa [Mandela] on hyvin harvoin, eikä hän ole antanut henkilökohtaisia haastatteluja kesäkuun 2004 jälkeen.”

<sup>196</sup> *The Washington Times* has defined itself as “a conservative news outlet”; see: <http://www.allsides.com/news-source/washington-times>.

should not be overly generalized, or at least it should be done with caution, when describing current American news coverage of Mandela and the ANC more broadly.

In the media's coverage of South Africa, the opposition party Democratic Alliance (DA) was not only represented as unified (contra the very fragmented ruling ANC party), but also represented by *a single voice*, one belonging to the party's leader Helen Zille. That is to say, whenever the DA was quoted, the speaker was Helen Zille. In *HS*, the DA party was not quoted at all – not even Zille. A journalist and a former anti-apartheid activist, Zille is a celebrated politician and famous for her many critical opinions of the ANC. Such views were also abundant in the *NYT*'s coverage. For instance, in *NYT* article 41, titled "Judge Dismisses Corruption Charges Against Leader of South Africa's Ruling Party," Zille was quoted as saying that, "[w]e are still no closer to knowing whether Zuma is innocent or guilty of the corruption charges brought against him" (paragraph 15).

#### Alliance of Agents in the Brazilian Workers Party

I will now proceed to explain how in the *NYT*'s and *HS*'s coverage of Brazil, the Workers Party PT – the ruling party during the time of the coverage – was framed as unified, while the opposition party was depicted as more fragmented; in the South Africa-related coverage, this had been the other way around.

My Brazil-related sample, published between 2010 and 2014, covered two presidential elections: first in 2010, Brazilians voted for the PT's Dilma Rousseff to replace the PT's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as president; later, in 2014, Rousseff was re-elected. Scholars' descriptions of da Silva's and Rousseff's different *habituses* sound much like differences between Mbeki and Zuma in South Africa: Rousseff, like Mbeki, is generally defined as a "serious intellectual," while da Silva, like Zuma, is known for his charm and playfulness, his lack of formal higher education, and his commitment to labor movements (see, e.g., Johnson 2013, 56; Reid 2014, 3–4). Yet, their relationships could not have been more different: while da Silva hand-picked Rousseff as his favorite candidate to succeed him, and strongly supported her throughout the election process and beyond (see Reid 2014, 155–163), Mbeki and Zuma mainly competed against one another, as was already explained in the previous section.

Preceding the presidential elections of 2010, da Silva had often exuberantly praised Rousseff, which was also reported in the American and Finnish news. My study shows that, while the interspectival and multiperspectival forms of news shaped American and Finnish coverage in ways that made their coverage of South Africa and Brazil in many ways quite similar, as has already been discussed in chapters 6 and 7, local specific circumstances also became clear: the split within the ANC and the relative pacification of the PT. Previous studies have found that world news tends to focus on conflicts (see Hamilton and Lawrence 2010, 631), but, based on my analysis, I would claim that foreign news does not impose a

negative *Conflict* frame upon circumstances that are deemed peaceful. Another question is whether such “peace” actually exists or whether dissident voices are simply silenced.

For example, in NYT article no. 137, titled “Brazil’s President Works to Lend Popularity to a Protégée,” paragraph 4 quoted da Silva as saying, “‘today there is no one more prepared to govern our country than our future president, our comrade,’ (...) pointing to Ms. Rousseff seated nearby.” In the same story, paragraph 22 described how “[o]n Friday night, in his 51-minute address, Mr. da Silva praised Ms. Rousseff’s managerial experience and related her biography, telling supporters she had been tortured by the military regime, then noting that ‘Jesus Christ was tortured.’” HS article no. 295, with a very similar title, “Leaning on Lula’s Shoulder,”<sup>197</sup> paraphrased the same Jesus-related comment by da Silva in paragraph 26, adding briefly that, “for some Brazilians, this [comment] was too much.”<sup>198</sup> But this conflict was not elaborated upon any further in the article. NYT article no. 137 further emphasized the unity of da Silva and Rousseff *against* other fields and subfields annoyed by da Silva’s praise of Rousseff, rather than noting that this stand had also caused conflicts within the PT. Beginning in paragraph 26, the article explained how

[l]ast week, Sandra Cureau, deputy attorney general for elections, warned that Mr. da Silva could be charged with abusing his political power for publicly crediting Ms. Rousseff. (paragraph 27) The President, in turn, responded by accusing the media and a prosecutor he did not identify – but clearly meaning Ms. Cureau – of trying to prevent him from campaigning. “What they want is to pressure me so that I pretend that I do not know my comrade Dilma,” he said.

In the coverage of Rousseff’s presidential candidacy, Rousseff’s own voice was much more silent than da Silva’s. For instance, in article 137, she was not quoted until paragraph 23, which began by stating, through negative dimensions of the *Credibility* frame, that “Ms. Rousseff struggled to inspire the audience in her 24-minute address, which followed. She promised to ‘lift the people of the country, all of the people.’” In the next paragraph (24), Rousseff, though still given a chance to speak, was merely quoted as giving the credit to da Silva rather than expressing any ideas of her own: “She said that Mr. da Silva had given her ‘the most important opportunities in my life’ and that his government had ‘carried out the biggest peaceful revolution this country has ever seen.’” While the PT party received 8.8% of the total article space and 27.3% of the total quoting space (105 words in total),<sup>199</sup> da Silva’s share of the party’s total space was 66 words (62.9%), compared with 39 words (37.1%) for Rousseff. As the article’s title also suggests, da Silva was framed as “the principal” politician and Rousseff as his “protégée,” rather than as an independent

<sup>197</sup> Original in Finnish: “Lulan olkapäähän nojaten.”

<sup>198</sup> Original in Finnish: “Tämä [kommentti] oli osalle brasilialaisista liikaa.”

<sup>199</sup> Here, I refer to the total quoting space vis-a-vis *other* fields beyond the political field. As is often the case, the PT was the only political subfield quoted in the whole article; thus, in this article it received 100% of the political field’s total quoting space.



politician and successor with her own ideas. While da Silva was not quoted as criticizing Rousseff (quite the contrary in fact), these proportions suggest that Rousseff was less powerful than da Silva: the journalist did not frame her as someone who could transform the PT field, but, rather, she was expected to play by the rules of the game already created and legitimized by da Silva, the most capable agent in the PT subfield. Similar proportions and patterns can be found in related *HS* coverage.

Even after Rousseff assumed the presidency, both the *NYT* and *HS* continued to give quoting preference to da Silva, framing him mostly through positive dimensions of the *Responsibility* and *Impact* frames. With time, however, Rousseff's own voice gradually strengthened while da Silva's diminished, and simultaneously, the emphasis shifted from da Silva's ideas to Rousseff's ideas.<sup>200</sup> For instance, *NYT* article no. 153 explained how "Ms. Rousseff's personal story of torture and imprisonment during Brazil's dictatorship has informed a determination to adopt a stronger stance on human rights in Iran and elsewhere than her predecessor did. American officials have welcomed the shift" (paragraph 12). However, while this passage contained dimensions of the *Human Interest*, *Impact*, *Credibility*, *Responsibility*, and *Conflict and Peace* frames, they were all neutral or positive in nature; the frames did not depict any dissension within the PT, but instead indicated an agreement between the PT's new policies and the American political field. Moreover, da Silva was *not* quoted as contradicting Rousseff; she defended his previous policies. By this point – March 17, 2011 – Rousseff seems to have gained enough symbolic capital to have begun transforming the PT's rules of the game and defined these new rules in news with her own voice, without opposition from da Silva. Rousseff's and da Silva's relationship was framed as peaceful throughout the coverage in the years 2010–2014, and the few other PT agents quoted in the stories were not framed as causing any turbulence within the field either.

There *were* conflicting incidents within the PT party during the time frame of my coverage, but the incidents could barely be detected in the news coverage. Mainly, I refer to the scandal known as *Mensalão* – the "big monthly stipends" paid by the PT treasurer Delúbio Soares to dozens of Congress members in return for their votes in support of government bills, leading to the forced resignation of some of da Silva's closest advisers (see, e.g., Zibechi 2014, 36). According to Reid (2014, 148), the *Mensalão* was "shaking Lula's administration

---

<sup>200</sup> The gradual strengthening of Rousseff's voice is apparent, for instance, in the *NYT* article no. 146, titled "In a First, Brazil Elects a Woman as President," ( paragraph 6): "In choosing Ms. Rousseff, who has no elected political experience, voters sent a message that they preferred to give the governing Workers Party a chance to broaden the successful economic policies of Mr. da Silva, whose government deepened economic stability and lifted millions of Brazilians out of poverty and into the lower middle classes. (paragraph 7) In her victory speech, Ms. Rousseff pledged to focus on eradicating poverty (...) She has indicated that she favors giving the state greater control over the economy, especially the oil industry, potentially steering the country further to the left."

to its foundations.” Even though the scandal had been originally revealed already in 2005, the related trial was concluded in 2012, leading to the imprisonment of several PT members in da Silva’s immediate circle. In its coverage of the corruption trial, NYT article no. 184 contained the following description of the PT’s reactions to the judgment: “Brazil’s former president, Mr. da Silva, was not charged, and his successor, Dilma Rousseff, has refrained from commenting on the scandal while attempting to reinforce her image as a leader cracking down on corruption. Still, their party is grappling with the resonance of the trial in Brazilian society” (paragraph 14). There was no mention of any conflicts within the PT party caused by the trial or scandal beyond this short paragraph.

NYT article no. 209, titled “A Blunt Chief Justice Unafraid to Upset Brazil’s Status Quo,” focused on the judge in charge of the *Mensalão* trial, framing him through both positive and negative dimensions of the *Responsibility*, *Impact*, and *Credibility* frames. No tension within the party was described in this story either. The most explicit reference to a conflict within the PT party as a result of the *Mensalão* trial could be found in HS article no. 303, titled “Barbosa is the Swindlers’ Nightmare,”<sup>201</sup> where paragraph 17 explained briefly how “one of the men sentenced in the corruption trial, Marcos Valerio, who has been active in advertising circles, nevertheless claimed that Lula himself was involved in the plan to purchase votes. Lula denies the claim.”<sup>202</sup>

Three different stories – no. 184 and no. 209 in the NYT and no. 303 in HS – mostly framed the *Mensalão* incident and related trial through *positive* dimensions of the *Impact*, *Credibility*, and *Responsibility* frames, emphasizing that “[t]his trial shows that Brazil’s institutions are functioning with vigor,” said Thiago Bottino, a law professor at Fundação Getúlio Vargas, an elite Brazilian university” (paragraph 7). Still, within the political field, the idea that Brazilian institutions were “functioning with vigor” was promoted mostly by the most privileged and known leaders, such as da Silva and President Rousseff. Since both leaders were framing realities on behalf of the leading party as a whole, the inevitable question is as follows: Were there agents within the PT who would have disagreed with these mainstream voices had they simply been given the chance to speak up? While the coverage of the ANC in the South African context was also “elitist” in the sense that only politicians in the most privileged of positions were quoted, at least they disagreed among themselves to the extent that the image of their party seemed much more realistic and dynamic than the image of the PT in Brazil.

---

<sup>201</sup> Original in Finnish: “Barbosa on rötösherrojen painajainen.”

<sup>202</sup> Original in Finnish: “Yksi korruptio-oikeudenkäynnin tuomituista, mainosbisneksessä pyörinyt Marcos Valerio, on kuitenkin väittänyt Lulan itsensä olleen mukana äänien ostamissuunnitelmassa. Lula kiistää väitteen.”

Despite the treatment of the conflicts within the Brazilian PT as having been much more limited than the dynamics within the South African ANC in my sample, the unity and legitimacy of the PT was certainly challenged by *other* Brazilian parties, and even more so, by the Brazilian *people*. The PT also frequently attributed claims to the *other* Brazilian parties rather than (at least publicly) accusing its own members. Curiously, the other Brazilian parties involved were simultaneously framed as much more fragmented than the seemingly united PT, while in the South African case the opposite was true; in this way, the journalists managed to enhance the complexity of the coverage in both contexts.

For example, NYT article no. 137, which concerned the 2010 presidential elections, said the following about the Brazilian Social Democratic opposition party's (PSDB) candidate José Serra (paragraph 28):

In his own campaign, Mr. Serra has seemingly taken a page from Mr. da Silva's playbook, vowing to increase significantly the number of families receiving subsidies and the amount of payments. But he has also said that Mr. da Silva's Workers Party had connections to the FARC. Mr. Serra's running mate, Indio da Costa, even suggested that the Workers Party could be linked to drug trafficking, a comment that led a columnist in a Brazilian newspaper to call him "Serra Palin," referring to the American vice-presidential candidate.

NYT article 143, "Scandal Puts Bumps in Path of Brazil Leader's Protégée," also concentrated on the contest between the presidential candidates representing the PT and the PSDB ahead of the 2010 elections. Paragraph 5 provided background knowledge by informing readers that, "Erenice Guerra, the former right-hand woman of Ms. Rouseff, resigned Thursday amid a flurry of local news reports accusing her of trafficking." But rather than causing any internal conflicts within the PT party, *the PSDB* was blamed for having caused her situation: "Ms. Guerra has denied the allegations and tried to blame the opposition for them, referring to Ms. Rouseff's rival candidate, José Serra, as 'unethical and already defeated.' In her resignation letter she wrote of a 'sordid campaign to defame' her image, her work and her family..." (paragraph 7). Paragraph 18 went on to explain that "Mr. Serra, an experienced politician and a popular former governor, has run an ineffectual campaign in which he has tried to show he is a better continuation candidate than Ms. Rouseff."

The same article then defined Serra's ideological distance *from other members of his own PSDB party*: "He [Serra] also alienated former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, fearing that Mr. Cardoso was too unpopular with the masses, even though he set the stage for Brazil's recent economic success and has been a unifying opposition force" (paragraph 22). In other words, even though the article's title referred to a "scandal" related to the PT (concerning Erenice Guerra), the story ended up framing the *opposition party* as *more fragmented* than the then "scandalous" PT itself. A brief summary of this "scandal" (the story so far, or type 2 context; see chapter 7) was included in the subsequent NYT article (no. 144), titled

“Brazilian Leader’s Protégée Likely to Prevail in Election,” where paragraph 12 explained that, “Two weeks ago, media reports here accused Erenice Guerra (...) of participating in an influence-peddling scheme. (...) Mr. da Silva swiftly asked for Ms. Guerra’s resignation and managed to contain the scandal.” There were no further references to the incident in this or any other article, and all that the news audience was able to hear on dynamics within the PT was about “Mr. da Silva swiftly asking for Ms. Guerra’s resignation”; this was mentioned without stirring up any further drama.

Similar patterns of PT unity against opponents could be detected in the coverage of the elections in 2014, when Rousseff was challenged by another PSDB candidate, Aécio Neves. For instance, NYT article no. 254 wrote the following (paragraphs 3–4):

In one barb epitomizing the acrimony in Brazil’s presidential race, the leftist leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declared that the campaign of the centrist challenger was attacking the incumbent, Dilma Rousseff, and her supporters “like the Nazis did in World War II.” Meanwhile, Aécio Neves, who is seeking to unseat Ms. Rousseff, compared her campaign strategist to Hitler’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels.

The NYT’s and HS’s coverage of the 2014 presidential elections also brought up the scandal known as “Operation Car Wash,” *Petrolão* or *Mensalão* 2.<sup>203</sup> Still, both media framed the *Petrolão* as affecting both candidate parties – the PT and PSDB – and creating a conflict *between* them rather than within them. For instance, after acknowledging “the prevalence of corruption inside the executive suites of Petrobras” (NYT article no. 252, paragraph 24), Rousseff was next quoted making reference to “a string of corruption scandals within Mr. Neves’s political party” (paragraph 26). HS article no. 350 likewise simply noted that “the scandal has predominantly stained the reputation of the labor party, even though the ex-president of Neves’s PSDB party is also being accused” (paragraph 12).<sup>204</sup>

In a subsequent article (no. 256) focusing more exclusively on the *Petrolão*, the NYT mentioned that the scandal was “shaking Brazil’s oil industry and the government of President Dilma Rousseff” (paragraph 3), but the story did not further explain this “shaking” within the government in any way. HS article no 355, titled “The Dark Secrets

---

<sup>203</sup> The *Petrolão* scandal began to take shape in March 2014, when the Brazilian federal police arrested Petrobras’s former chief, Paulo Roberto Costa, in suspicion of money laundering. Later that same year, the Brazilian police arrested a great number of executives from Brazil’s six largest construction firms. Most of the alleged bribe takers were members of the PT, and much of the bribery took place while Rousseff was energy minister and chairman of Petrobras during the presidency of da Silva. Source: report by Transparency International, available at: [https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/brazils\\_carwash\\_task\\_force\\_wins\\_transparency\\_international\\_anti\\_corruption](https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/brazils_carwash_task_force_wins_transparency_international_anti_corruption).

<sup>204</sup> Original in Finnish: “Skandaali on tahrannut etenkin työväenpuoluetta, joskin syytösten kohteena on myös Nevesin PSDB-puolueen ex-puheenjohtaja.”

of the Oil Giant Are Being Revealed,”<sup>205</sup> explained that both the positions of Rousseff and Maria das Graças Foster, formerly hired by Rousseff as Petrobras’s general manager, would be “tightened” because of the scandal (paragraphs 25–26).<sup>206</sup> But the article did not refer to any direct conflict between the women. While the *NYT* and *HS* both suggested that the PT was in trouble, they framed the party as facing the issue as a collective front rather than suggesting that individual agents were in trouble.

#### Segmented vs. Integrated Forms of Political Debate

While *HS* did not quote any other parties in its South Africa coverage (with the exception of municipal governors, whose party affiliation was not mentioned), other parties – mainly, the Green Party and the Socialist Party – played an important role in shaping the dynamics within the Brazilian political field in *HS*’s coverage. These two parties were mainly represented by the same agent, who was first affiliated with the Green Party and later the Socialist party. This particular agent was Marina Silva, whose views especially on the need to conserve the Amazon rain forest received substantial article space in *HS*. Simultaneously, Silva was quoted as criticizing the PT’s environmental and other policies. In those particular articles in which Silva was quoted in *HS*, she was also the only quoted speaker in the Brazilian political field.

For instance, *HS* article no. 298, titled “Rubber Collector Became Brazil’s Green Voice,”<sup>207</sup> gave 21.5% of the total article space to Marina Silva, while no other agents in the political field were quoted. Yet, 8.2% of the article space framed the PT and Dilma’s government negatively. In addition, the story quoted unaffiliated individuals, who received 5.8% of the total article space, speaking in *support* of Silva. The journalist also contextualized Brazil’s environmental realities from a perspective that helped promote Silva’s cause. *HS* article no. 346, “Challenger from the Amazonian Jungle,”<sup>208</sup> profiled Silva as a presidential candidate. In that story, Silva had opportunity to say only a few words on her behalf, but two individual supporters were given substantial article space – 22.9% of the total article space – to define her policies.<sup>209</sup> An excerpt from paragraph 11 reads as follows:

“When Marina was minister, she was ahead of her time. She understood the value of the environment long before Brazilian society did, and this is why she was labelled a radical.” According to him [one of the supporters], the critics underestimate Silva’s political experience. “Those who know Marina know that she listens to people and is capable of

---

<sup>205</sup> Original in Finnish: “Öljyjätin synkät salaisuudet paljastuvat.”

<sup>206</sup> Original expression in Finnish: “Syvenevä skandaali kiristää heidän molempien asemaansa.”

<sup>207</sup> Original in Finnish: “Kuminkerääjästä tuli Brasilian vihreä ääni.”

<sup>208</sup> Original in Finnish: “Haastaja Amazonin viidakosta.”

<sup>209</sup> These particular speakers were coded as representing civic society rather than the political field, but given the way in which they praised Silva, they are examined here as part of the political coverage.

dialogue, but that she has her own principles. She is not a traditional politician, who would just think about her own party,” Setubal says.<sup>210</sup>

Regardless of not having a voice, the PT was mildly criticized in the article: “It is not good to have the same party in power for over ten years, like the PT. It becomes the victim of its own success,” Oliveira says” (paragraph 17).<sup>211</sup> But my *HS* sample also contains many news articles where the PT was the only quoted party, and the whole emphasis was on its accomplishments. Thus, again, as is typical of Finnish multiperspectival news, the newspaper offered a variety of thoroughly contextualized stories, each of which focused on a particular viewpoint – the dynamics of the political field as a whole gradually formed in the reader’s mind as (s)he began putting all the viewpoints from the different subfields together after reading a number of articles on the topic.

In the *NYT*, Marina Silva was also quoted as criticizing the PT on the party’s environmental policies, but following the norms of the American interspectival form of news, the PT was always quoted as well. What is more, in the *NYT* the PT was systematically quoted *more voluminously* than the parties represented by Silva. For instance, *NYT* article no. 251, titled “Clashing Visions of Conservation Shake Brazil’s Presidential Vote,” gave 8.5% of the total article space to Rousseff and 4.5% of the total article space to Silva, who defined each other negatively in direct confrontation. For example, beginning in paragraph 8 and continuing in paragraph 9, the article states:

“I want to know where the setbacks have been,” Ms. Rousseff said in one caustic remark directed at Ms. Silva in their exchanges over deforestation. (paragraph 9) Ms. Silva, a former environmental minister, contends that Ms. Rousseff’s policies are responsible for the increase in deforestation and an erosion of Brazil’s international standing on environmental issues.

A debate between Silva and Rousseff was also included in the *NYT*’s coverage of the protests in 2013. In *NYT* article no. 201, their differing opinions were summarized in paragraph 6:

Ms. Rousseff herself has voiced some support for the protests, while also warning against the violence that marred demonstrations. “She spoke more than listened,” Marina Silva, a former environment minister who placed third in the 2010 presidential election, said. (...) “It was obvious that doing a marketing-focused discourse wasn’t going to work.”

---

<sup>210</sup> Original in Finnish: “Kun Marina oli ministeri, hän oli edellä aikaansa. Hän ymmärsi ympäristön arvon paljon ennen kuin brasilialainen yhteiskunta, ja siksi hänet leimattiin radikaaliksi.” (...) Hänen mukaansa arvostelijat aliarvioivat Silvan poliittisen kokemuksen. ‘Marinan tuntevat tietävät, että hän kuuntelee ihmisiä ja kykenee vuoropuheluun, mutta hänellä on omat periaatteensa. Hän ei ole perinteinen poliitikko, joka ajattelisi vain puoluettaan,’ Setubal sanoo.”

<sup>211</sup> Original in Finnish: “‘Ei ole hyvä, että sama puolue on vallassa yli kymmenen vuotta, kuten PT. Se muuttuu oman hallintonsa menestyksen orjaksi,’ Oliveira sanoo.”

In short: while at the overall core sample level on Brazil both the *NYT* and *HS* gave the loudest voice to the PT and a more quiet voice to other parties, in the *NYT* these same proportions shaped coverage at the article level, featuring direct confrontations, whereas in *HS* Marina Silva and agents of the PT party were given full article space in turns. The same phenomenon was detected in the *NYT*'s coverage of other parties in the South African context: such voices were without exception marginal, cited quietly by the side of the much louder voices of members of the elite parties. The other parties did not speak at all in *HS*'s coverage of South Africa, which can at least partly be explained by the relatively smaller sample and the fact that the newspaper did not have a traditional correspondent in South Africa.

### Disguised Dynamics: Political Affiliation Unknown

As was stated at the beginning of this analytical section on the relative volume of Southern political subfields, the voices of mayors and governors quoted in the news often enriched the coverage by providing more locally influenced viewpoints. They also offer the potential of widening the scope of political institutions quoted in news. But this diversity would be much clearer, if the journalists simply mentioned their affiliation.

Occasionally background information was provided without revealing a person's party affiliation, enabling readers to understand how a particular regional governor's view conflicted with the views of different parties. For instance, *HS* article no. 267 quoted Stellenbosch's city councilman, Jannie Gagiano, in relation to Bok van Blerk's song "De la Rey," which caused a row in the country, as many people felt the song was promoting racist ideas from the apartheid era. Gagiano was quoted as claiming that "'the ANC has overreacted to the song. No real threat can be expected from the part of the Afrikaners, so distant they are from politics. As long as they stick to their own circles, the ANC leaves them alone. But as soon as some signs from Afrikaner nationalism appear, they overreact,' Gagiano, an Afrikaner himself, says in his home in Stellenbosch" (paragraphs 13–15).<sup>212</sup> Here, the mention of Gagiano being an "Afrikaner" provided both personal as well as political background knowledge; he represented the white minority speaking out against the ANC.

Some articles also quoted regional authorities, whose affiliations were explained not in the terminology of modern party politics, but with the help of deep historical context (see chapter 7). *NYT* article no. 102 introduced readers to "the handsome young king of the Bafokeng people," who "conjured a 39,000-seat stadium from the bush in the hope that

---

<sup>212</sup> Original in Finnish: "ANC on ylireagoanut lauluun. Todellista uhkaa afrikaanereiden suunnalta ei ole odotettavissa, niin etääntyneitä he ovat politiikasta. 'Niin kauan kuin he pysyttelevät omissa oloissaan, ANC antaa heidän olla. Mutta heti kun jostain nousee merkkejä afrikaanereiden nationalismista, he ylireagoivat,' itsekin afrikaaneri Gagiano sanoo kotonaan Stellenboschissa."

one day the World Cup would come to this dusty overgrown village” (paragraph 2). This article, titled “Royal Host to World Cup Invests in His Subjects,” was one of the most positive stories in my whole sample, explaining the traditional governmental system of the Bafokeng people while interviewing its “current monarch,” King Leruo Tshekedi Molotlegi. While this story made no direct reference to any political parties in South Africa, it served as a great reminder that the ANC, whose viewpoints predominated in the news I studied, was not the only South African political institution with a vision of a tolerant post-apartheid South Africa. The story explained in detail how the Bafokeng people were “still afflicted with poverty” (paragraph 11), but “re-inventing education here (...), and goading school administrators to make sure the toilets are working... ‘It is not a school for the wealthy (...)’, King Leruo said” (paragraph 17).

As figures 14–15 demonstrate, regional authorities had a louder voice within the Brazilian political field than the South African political field in both the *NYT*’s and *HS*’s coverage. In the Brazilian context, most of these regional political voices without an explicit political affiliation represented the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, and they were quoted in the context of the Olympics or the World Cup. For instance, *NYT* article no. 148, titled “Brazilian Forces Claim Victory in Gang Haven,” explained that “Sergio Cabral, the governor of Rio State, was resoundingly re-elected in October vowing to deepen the pacification program and to break the grip of the ‘parallel power’ of the drug gangs” (paragraph 26). But nowhere did the article mention the fact that Cabral represented the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) (see Reid 2014, 268). In another story, titled “Deadly Mudslides in Brazil, Concern Turns to Preparedness,” Rio’s environment secretary, Carlos Minc, expressed strong concern for the lives of civilians in the city (paragraph 17). But the article did not mention that Minc was one of the founders of the Green Party and affiliated with the PT party.<sup>213</sup> Hence, the interactions between Minc and Cabral in the coverage concerning Rio’s safety reflected the dynamics between three different Brazilian parties, none of which were mentioned in any of the coverage on regional politics.

Even if the majority of the regional political voices could be traced to Rio, municipal government officials in other Brazilian regions were quoted as well. For instance, *NYT* article no. 168, titled “Haitians Take Arduous Path to Brazil, and Jobs,” quoted Valdecir Nicácio, “a human rights official in the state of Acre,” stating that “‘Haiti is recovering from an extreme period of crisis, and Brazil is in a position to help these people.’ (...) ‘Before getting here, they are at the mercy of human traffickers,’ he said. ‘Brazil is big enough to absorb Haitians who just want jobs’” (paragraph 13). Nicácio’s political affiliation was not specified in the article, but the web pages of the state of Acre and a

---

<sup>213</sup> See Carlos Minc’s home page at: <https://minc.com.br/>.



Google search revealed that he was in fact a PT affiliate.<sup>214</sup> A subsequent story (no. 173), titled “Influx of Haitians into the Amazon Prompts Immigration Debate in Brazil,” described the concerns by officials from the highest ranks of the federal government: “President Dilma Rousseff addressed the immigration issue on a visit to Haiti last week, saying that Brazil remained open to Haitians, but that new rules were needed to keep Haitians from falling victims to traffickers” (paragraph 13). The article also mentioned that “[t]he authorities in the state of Acre, a place of entry for the Haitians in the Brazilian Amazon, have also differed with federal authorities on the issue” (paragraph 12). But the political affiliation of the “authorities” in Acre was not revealed, and Valdecir Nicácio was not interviewed in this second article. If he was a supporter of the PT – or if the article had even mentioned that at least some of the officials defending the arrival of Haitians in Acre represented the PT – then the coverage would clearly have revealed dynamics and disagreement *within the PT* party. Instead, this was mostly lacking in the coverage, as I have previously shown.

Only in those instances when the emphasis was on politics at the national level – presidential elections or other issues connected with the national government – were the affiliations of local politicians mentioned, and not even necessarily then. NYT article no. 260, titled “Decline of a Political Family Opens the Way for a Shift in Brazil,” told the history of José Sarney and his family: “a former president of Brazil and chief of the political dynasty that has held sway over the vast northeast state of Maranhão for five decades” (paragraph 2). The story also made brief reference to the dynamics between political parties in Brazil – but *without mentioning which particular parties Sarney and his “dynasty” actually represented*: “While President Dilma Rousseff is from the leftist Workers Party, she has little choice but to forge alliances with centrist or conservative parties, some led by old-school political chiefs” (paragraph 13). Hence, the dynamics between the parties were defined vaguely, the PT against “centrist or conservative parties,” without providing further background knowledge on the ideologies of these parties or their mutual relationships.<sup>215</sup>

While my general argument is certainly that journalists should be more explicit about the ideological affiliations of the quoted sources, I also believe it is important to take into account the fact that especially in Brazil, the parties are quite loosely defined, especially in comparison with North European political institutions.<sup>216</sup> Larry Rohter (2012, 256–257) describes Brazilian politics with the term “confusing diffusion of representation,” explaining that,

---

<sup>214</sup> See: <http://ptacre.org/setoriais/>.

<sup>215</sup> José Sarney is currently an affiliate of the PMDB. Previously, he was affiliated with the UDN, ARENA, PDS, and PFL (see Reid 2014, 118–119).

<sup>216</sup> I thank Daniel Hallin for this important observation.

[there is] very little competition between parties during campaigns and a great deal of conflict within parties, with an obvious edge going to those candidates who have access to the most money. This leads not just to a lack of loyalty but also to parties that are chronically weak and undisciplined. One consequence is that politicians often hop from one party to another, looking for the best deal for themselves and their followers. It is not uncommon for a legislator to be elected as the candidate of one party, shift to another party once he arrives in Congress, and conclude his term as a member of a third.

Thus, institutional ties to political parties in Brazil may not reveal much about the quoted person's political ideology. In this sense, it may not seem so important for the journalists to mention them at all. Still, I argue that my analysis clearly suggests that the political viewpoints presented were quite *elitist* (Ferree et al. 2002, 206–210), given that the quoted speakers are relatively well-known and privileged politicians in South Africa and Brazil, as compared to less known representatives of new and/or more marginal movements. Even if political party affiliation may not clearly reveal the representative's own ideology, mentioning the affiliations at local level as well would still help reveal whether the quoted mayors and governors also represent the country's most established institutions or perhaps give a voice to more distinct or marginal political institutions and movements in different regions.

The next subsection on the dynamics of the Southern civic societies will demonstrate that when it came to quoted unaffiliated individuals, elitism was certainly not the rule, but rather, the exception. In other words, next to political elitism, the news produced by the NYT and HS promoted *popular inclusion and citizen empowerment*, and in this sense, the coverage by both media met the normative criteria discussed in the final part of chapter 2 (see also Benson 2008, 2593–2595; Ferree et al. 2002, 212). My aim is also to demonstrate that these voices were dynamic and challenged one another: while some people were quite happy with the performance of these particular political parties, other individuals, from similar socioeconomic backgrounds, were far from satisfied.

## Dynamics and Relative Volume of Underprivileged, Middle Class, and Wealthy Southern Individuals and NGOs

Before presenting my findings on the dynamics between South African and Brazilian civic societies and individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds, I want to include a brief reminder and specification about the analytical categories used in these measurements (see chapters 2 and 5). As has been emphasized, South Africa and Brazil are among the most unequal countries in the world (for example, Zirin 2014, 156). Larry Rohter (2012, 163) describes how in Brazil, “between 2006 and 2008 (...) the number of millionaires increased nearly 70 percent (...) Only nine countries have more millionaires than Brazil.”<sup>217</sup>

---

<sup>217</sup> Rohter (2012, 163) refers to a study by the Boston Consulting Group.

My “wealthy individuals” category (see Figures 16–17) refers to precisely such very privileged people.

Defining the middle class has been more challenging given the complex and contradictory ways that this term has been used in different contexts. The University of Cape Town’s Unilever Institute of Strategic Marketing has defined middle-class South Africans as “those who earn between \$1550 and \$4800 per month or who meet certain criteria, such as having a white-collar job and owning a car.”<sup>218</sup> In the Brazilian context, middle class has been defined as referring to people with a monthly income between \$1000 and \$2750 (Reid 2014, 170–71; see also Zibechi 2014, 47–48). Given the fact that the gap between the richer and poorer people classified as middle class is significant, scholars have further divided the middle class category into the “new” and “old” middle class, the “new” referring to those people who have only recently left poverty behind and who still have to make many sacrifices in order to provide for their children (see Custódio 2013).

In the South African context, Mthuli Ncube and colleagues<sup>219</sup> see the middle class as consisting of three sub-classes: 1) the most vulnerable, “just out of poverty and with the potential to slip back” into it; 2) the lower middle class, those who are more stable but still far from comfortable; and, 3) the upper middle class, those with enough resources to spend freely without constant calculating and thinking. The issue of middle class is also discussed in the book written by HS’s Brazil correspondent, Maria Manner, in collaboration with Teivo Teivainen (2016, 70–71). They provide the example of a Brazilian family they are friends with, dentists by profession, who live in a spacious apartment in the fashionable neighborhood of Zona Sul in Rio de Janeiro and have a housekeeper. Still, according to Manner and Teivainen, their dentist friends classified themselves as part of the “middle class.” In this section on the dynamics within civic society, the “upper middle class” category refers to the type of “dentist families” discussed by Manner and Teivainen, or then to the “old middle class” people as defined by Custódio in the Brazilian context, and also to Ncube and colleagues’ sub-class 3, in the South African context. The “lower middle class/poor individuals” category refers to the first two categories as defined by Ncube and colleagues, and to the “new middle class” as described by Custódio.<sup>220</sup>

---

<sup>218</sup> See article “A Toast to South Africa’s Black Middle Class” by Benjamin Dürr, available at: <http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/toast-south-africas-black-middle-class>


<sup>219</sup> I refer to a report by Mthuli Ncube, Charles L. Lufumpa, and Steve Kayizzi-Mugerva for the African Development Bank, titled “The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the Middle Class in Africa” and published in 2011, available at:

[https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid\\_The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf](https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid_The%20Middle%20of%20the%20Pyramid.pdf).

<sup>220</sup> Of course, as also discussed in chapter 5, the news does not usually reveal the precise income of the people interviewed; however, this task has been facilitated by the background knowledge and other types of context (see chapter 7) provided by the news articles.

RELATIVE VOLUME OF SOUTHERN NGOS AND INDIVIDUALS WITH  
DIFFERENT SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS

THE NEW YORK TIMES ON SOUTH AFRICA



HELSINGIN SANOMAT ON SOUTH AFRICA





Figure 16: Relative volume of South African NGOs and individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds in the NYT and HS.

THE NEW YORK TIMES ON BRAZIL



HELSINGIN SANOMAT ON BRAZIL




Figure 17: Relative volume of Brazilian NGOs and individuals with different socioeconomic backgrounds in the NYT and HS.

As Figures 16–17 on the previous page show, “wealthy individuals” comprised one of the smallest slices of all of the pies depicted; in *HS*’s coverage of South Africa, this slice was lacking completely (but could have been indirectly represented via the large “socioeconomic status unclear” category). *HS* article no. 321, titled “São Paulo’s Elite Use Helicopters to Avoid Traffic Jams,”<sup>221</sup> is a good example of only privileged individuals being quoted: it focused on people who were rich enough to buy or rent a helicopter and use it on a daily basis to go to work, easily bypassing the endless traffic jams on the ground below, and in this way, saving time. This particular story on rich people using helicopters was written in the Finnish multiperspectival form: no other people from different socioeconomic backgrounds were quoted in the same article. Still, the charts on the previous page show that the voices of poor and lower middle class individuals were recorded at a substantial volume at the overall sample level, especially in *HS*’s Brazil-related coverage. Thus, my research clearly challenges claims that poor and underprivileged people are not allowed to speak for themselves in international news (e.g., Lugo-Ocando 2015, 62). In other words, contra Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge (1965, 68, 72), my findings lead me to argue that substantial cultural distance does not necessarily lead to the domination of elite perspectives; instead, ordinary people *are* given the chance to represent themselves, at least in my *NYT* and *HS* sample on South Africa and Brazil.

Thus, to balance out the views of the helicopter users, both the *NYT* and *HS* interviewed a great number of people who spent hours trying to get to their destinations via public transportation. For example, *NYT* article no. 87, titled “A Bus System Reopens Rifts in South Africa,” described how “[s]ince the days of apartheid, when blacks were required to live in distant townships like this, Susan Hanong, a 67-year-old maid, has commuted to the wealthy northern suburbs of Johannesburg, one of the spectral figures trudging through darkened streets on long trips to wash white people’s clothes and mind their children” (paragraph 2). Both media’s coverage of the 2013 protests in Brazil also revolved around the topic of bus rides, which underprivileged people urgently needed; both papers interviewed people from the lower and upper middle classes on the issue. An excerpt from *NYT* article no. 191 reads as follows: “‘Today’s protests are the result of years and years of depending on chaotic and expensive transportation,’ said Érica de Oliveira, 22, a student who was among the demonstrators” (paragraph 24).

In other words, the helicopter story played an important role in the coverage as a whole, as it revealed the “rich extreme” against which to measure the other extremes of people who could barely afford a bus ticket, with upper middle class people falling in between.<sup>222</sup> Given

---

<sup>221</sup> Original in Finnish: “São Paulon eliitti kulkee helikoptereilla välttääkseen ruuhkat.”

<sup>222</sup> Of course, given the multiperspectival form of news, there is the possibility that some Finnish reader only saw the “helicopter angle” and missed the previous and later stories describing the views of poor people, and thus ended up thinking that it was commonplace for people in Brazil to use

the relatively silent volume of the voice of rich people quoted at the overall sample level, especially in the Brazil-related coverage, their voice was like a small window next to the much bigger window (Tuchman 1978, 1) depicting the lives of much poorer people, but still adding significant context to the overall coverage. Similar complexity was detected in my NYT sample: descriptions on the ease with which rich people lived and moved around in South Africa and Brazil were contrasted with stories describing the difficulties experienced by poor people, in this way creating a symbolic distance between individuals from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, even if their ideas were not always placed in direct confrontation in the stories.

I found that in my sample, positive and negative dimensions of the *Impact* frame were often used in the same context, describing, first of all, how some South African or Brazilian people *did have* access to certain resources and how some other people *lacked* access to those same resources. With the help of the *Inequality* frame within the *Impact* frame (see Table 1, chapter 4), I discovered that many American and Finnish news articles emphasized inequality in the two countries, even if such a focus on inequality was not always made explicit. For instance, *HS* article no. 262, titled “South Africa Divides the People into Two Again,”<sup>223</sup> began with the following description in paragraph 2 and continued as follows:

Black 26-year-old Puleng lives in an abandoned garage, facing an ever-present threat of eviction. Three women share a small space, with rags of paperboard replacing windows and those covered by dirty flowery curtains. (paragraph 3) On the other side of Johannesburg, 29-year-old black Adrian Shiplana lives in an American-style neighborhood, surrounded by electrical fences and guards. He has two luxurious cars, a brand new Harley-Davidson and eight security cameras watching out for possible unauthorized intruders. (paragraph 4) The new South Africa fits between these two extremes of reality.<sup>224</sup>

These South African realities were historically contextualized by the Finnish journalist, who explained that “[i]t has been 13 years since the white racist apartheid-government collapsed, but its heavy inheritance is slow to dismantle. The colonial rule and apartheid lasted for hundreds of years altogether” (paragraph 5).<sup>225</sup> In this way, the journalist also tied

---

helicopters. But given the much higher volume of the voices of lower middle class individuals in comparison with the elite, this was not likely to occur.

<sup>223</sup> Original in Finnish: “Etelä-Afrikka jakaa taas kansan kahtia.”

<sup>224</sup> Original in Finnish: (paragraph 2) “Musta 26-vuotias Puleng asuu hylätyssä autotallissa jatkuvan häättöuhan alla. Kolme naista jakaa pienen tilan, jossa ikkunoiden tilalla on pahvinriekaleet ja niitä peittämässä likaiset kukikkaat verhot. (paragraph 3) Toisella puolella Johannesburgia 29-vuotias musta Adrian Shiplana asuu sähköaitojen ja vartijoiden suojaamalla amerikkalaistyyllisellä asuinalueella. Hänellä on kaksi luksusautoa, tuliterä Harley-Davidson ja kahdeksan valvontakameraa valvomassa mahdollisia luvattomia tunkeutujia. (paragraph 4) Näiden kahden ääritodellisuuden väliin mahtuu uusi Etelä-Afrikka.”

<sup>225</sup> Original in Finnish. “Valkoisten rasistisen apartheid-hallinnon kaatumisesta on 13 vuotta, mutta sen raskasta perintöä on hidas purkaa. Siirtomaavalta ja apartheid kestivät yhteensä satoja vuosia.”

the issue of inequality in South Africa to deeper questions of race as well as to *global structures of power*, attributing responsibility partly to the former European colonizers involved. Inequality was also addressed in coverage related to the World Cup. For instance, *HS* article no. 278 noted that “White Booth grew up in the luxurious beach community of Fish Hoek. The current captain of Bafana, Teko Modise, comes from the most miserable shacks of Soweto, where tap water is still a luxury” (paragraph 8).<sup>226</sup> Another *HS* article, no. 284, provided substantial proportions of deep historical context to explain how apartheid bolstered the feelings of inequality among black and white South Africans.

The inequality issue also stood out with respect to the university students quoted in the news. *NYT* article no. 126, titled “Campus that Apartheid Ruled Faces a Policy Rift,” described, beginning in paragraph 22, how:

[o]n a campus where township students worry whether their families have enough to eat while rich students ride around in new sports cars, many also sat in clusters divided not only by race, but by wealth. “The coolest kids on the U.C.T. campus are divided in two, the black elite and the white elite,” said Mr. Mgobozi, the son of a corporate sales manager and former high school English teacher.” (...) (paragraph 25) Lwando Mpotulo, 23, would never have been admitted to study for a medical degree here. His mother died when he was 15 and his father was unemployed most of his childhood. He went to high school in Khayelitsha, a sprawling black township of half a million people, 15 miles and a world apart from the wealthy heart of Cape Town. Mr. Mpotulo lived there in a tiny, rundown house that often had no electricity. (...) (paragraph 31) “I sympathize with a white student, doing very well, who can’t become a student here because of affirmative action,” he said, “but I think it’s an absolute necessary evil.”

Besides emphasizing the level of inequality between rich and poor people, the different dimensions of the *Impact* frame also revealed how the articles depicted inequality and disagreement *within* different socioeconomic classes. For instance, *HS* article 293 explained that “there is a clear order of precedence in the favela. The lower in the hill the house is, the richer are its residents” (paragraph 10).<sup>227</sup> In another *HS* article, no. 343, titled “The Soccer World Cup Was a Disappointment to Brazilian Sex Workers,”<sup>228</sup> a Brazilian expert explained that “there was a heavy feeling of disappointment among the prostitutes, because

---

<sup>226</sup> Original in Finnish: “Valkoinen Booth kasvoi Fish Hoekin yllellisessä merenrantayhteisössä. Bafanan tämänhetkinen kapteeni Teko Modise tulee Soweton kurjimmista hökkeleistä, joissa vesijohto on edelleen yllisyys.”

<sup>227</sup> Original in Finnish: “Favelassa on selkeä arvojärjestys. Mitä alempana rinteessä talo on, sitä varakkaampia ovat asukkaat.”

<sup>228</sup> Original in Finnish: “Jalkapallon MM-kisat olivat pettymys Brasilian seksityöntekijöille.”

they expected to receive a lot of money” (paragraph 18).<sup>229</sup> But in the same article, the paper quoted a prostitute who *had* benefited from the event, unlike most of her colleagues.<sup>230</sup>

Exploring the poor neighborhoods and townships of Brazil and South Africa, respectively, the American and Finnish journalists interviewed a great number of lower middle-class/poor people who lived and worked in similar circumstances, but who seemed to have very different ideas about their surroundings and home countries. Such underprivileged voices were especially loud in *HS*’s coverage of Brazil. For instance, *HS* article no. 319, “Rio de Janeiro Regained Its Confidence,”<sup>231</sup> first quoted an 89-year-old “general worker,” Antônio Ferreira, who was playing cards in a lower middle class neighborhood. Ferreira listed his three biggest wishes (with a smile): “That God would help Brazil organize the World Cup and become the champion, and that he would help me stay alive until the event” (paragraph 6).<sup>232</sup> He did not seem to have any complaints. When commenting on the World Cup-related construction work in his neighborhood, he said, “[l]ife becomes more beautiful. Brazil changes for the better. This is what progress is about” (paragraph 14).<sup>233</sup>

However, his friend, apparently from a similar socioeconomic status and playing cards with Ferreira in the same neighborhood, said that the “continuing construction work is interfering with people’s daily lives.”<sup>234</sup> Next, the journalist interviewed a woman, Germana Helena do Carmo, who lived “on a nearby hill” and was out bathing her grandchildren: “Do Garmo has lived here for 54 years and she is happy with what is happening around her these days” (paragraph 17).<sup>235</sup> But, the story added, “not everybody is as hopeful. ‘This is a difficult and chaotic time,’ says Mareia Lucia Pereira, a temporary cleaning woman and mother of two. Beads of perspiration flow down on her body...”<sup>236</sup>

---

<sup>229</sup> Original in Finnish: “Prostituoitujen parissa oli suuri pettymyksen tunne, koska he odottivat saavansa paljon rahaa.”

<sup>230</sup> *HS* art. no. 343, paragraph 14, described how the journalist had interviewed a 27-year-old sex worker named Bianca, who had been planning to go to Copacabana. The journalist explained that after the tournament, Bianca sent several messages through social media saying that she was very happy with the income she was able to receive from the foreign tourists.

<sup>231</sup> Original in Finnish: “Rio de Janeiro sai takaisin itseluottamuksensa.”

<sup>232</sup> Original in Finnish: “‘Että Jumala auttaisi Brasiliaa järjestämään MM-kilpailut ja voittamaan ne, ja että hän auttaisi minua pysymään elossa kisoihin saakka.’”

<sup>233</sup> Original in Finnish: “Elämä muuttuu kauniimmaksi. Brasilia muuttuu paremmaksi. Sellaista on edistys.”

<sup>234</sup> Original in Finnish: “Jatkuva rakentaminen häiritsee ihmisten arkea.”

<sup>235</sup> Original in Finnish: “Do Garmo on asunut täällä 54 vuotta ja tyytyväinen siihen, mitä ympärillä näinä aikoina tapahtuu.”

<sup>236</sup> Original in Finnish: “Kaikki eivät ole yhtä toiveikkaita. ‘Tämä on vaikeaa ja sekasortoista aikaa,’ sanoo Mareia Lucia Pereira, keikkasiivooja ja kahden lapsen äiti. Hikipisarat valuvat pitkin hänen vartaloon...”



While the article (no. 319) adopted the typical Finnish multiperspectival form (as described in chapter 7), in that in the whole article, only one broad field – Brazilian civic society – was quoted, it was quite exceptional in that in this story the underprivileged individuals framed and contextualized their realities from *different* angles, creating a complex view about the lives of poor and lower middle class people in Brazil. The old man, Ferreira, was also interviewed in a subsequent *HS* story (no. 333), and he continued to insist that “[t]his World Cup will be the finest ever. A lot of money has been invested in the construction projects. I believe that it will benefit Rio and Brazil as a whole” (paragraph 17).<sup>237</sup> Other Brazilians from a somewhat similar habitus, quoted in the same article, expressed completely different opinions: “‘It would be best if Brazil lost. If Brazil wins, people will forget everything and politicians will get a feather in their caps,’ says Antonio Carlos” (paragraph 8).<sup>238</sup>

As in these examples, I found that in most cases when individuals with a similar socioeconomic status were reported as disagreeing with one another, the news topic was related to soccer and the World Cup. It seems that while some of the lower middle class individuals who were quoted focused on the inequality aspect, emphasizing that the event was *taking something away from them*, other more optimistic individuals were keener on noting the symbolic *gains* and the simple joy of loving the game. However, in the same *HS* stories, those persons who were not content were also quoted as criticizing the political field, which was *not* quoted in most stories. The range of voices was limited to lower middle class individuals, but they still revealed ideological differences between the various individuals and, thus, made the coverage richer and more multifaceted.

Members of the upper middle class were also quoted, often revealing strong ideological differences from one another. *HS* articles no. 281 and no. 282 described how upper middle class black and white South Africans experienced their realities in completely different ways: while both groups had considerable wealth, the blacks felt relatively comfortable in their home country, while many whites reported plans to emigrate. Curiously, as was already discussed in chapter 7, the voices of blacks and whites, as representatives of different “races,” were quoted in separate articles rather than being brought together. When read as an article series, the two articles reflected considerable symbolic distance between the different agents representing South Africa’s upper middle class.

Descriptions of suffering in the news were not limited to the experiences described by the poor. In the Brazilian context, both the *NYT* and *HS* highlighted the high prices in Brazil and how they affected those in the *upper* middle class as well. *HS* article no. 324, titled

---

<sup>237</sup> Original in Finnish: “MM-kisoista tulee kaikkien aikojen hienoisimmat. ‘Rakennustöihin on käytetty paljon rahaa. Uskon, että se hyödyttää Rioa ja koko Brasiliää.’”

<sup>238</sup> Original in Finnish: “‘Parasta olisi, jos Brasilia häviäisi. Jos Brasilia voittaa, ihmiset unohtavat kaiken ja poliitikot saavat sulan hattuunsa,’ sanoo Antonio Carlos.”

“Expensive Prices Annoy Brazilians,”<sup>239</sup> explained how: “Ivan and Rosiane Nobriga, who live in Rio de Janeiro, travel to the United States approximately on a yearly basis for shopping. ‘We go to Miami, but also elsewhere. In the United States, everything is much cheaper. The prices in Brazil are absurd,’ Rosiane Nobriga says” (paragraph 20).<sup>240</sup> NYT article no. 207, which had a similar focus and was titled “Prices Fuel Outrage in Brazil, Home of the \$30 Cheese Pizza,” likewise described the phenomenon of flying to Miami in order to “buy products like digital monitors, strollers, pacifiers, and even Pampers wipes” (paragraph 18).

While the upper middle class people interviewed in articles no. 207 and 324 were obviously nowhere near the poorest extreme, these particular dynamics also revealed an important aspect of “the New Brazil” (Zibechi 2014), that is, that there are people who feel “obligated” to do their shopping in Miami without considering themselves rich, but quite the opposite: complaining about how they cannot afford anything in their home country. These dynamics presented a very different idea of economic realities in Brazil than the images generally associated with “the developing world” (see chapters 2 and 6). Hence, I argue that the discussion on the price of cheese pizza, clothes, Pampers baby wipes, and high-tech products was actually an important part of the coverage. Even if these products were beyond the reach of the poorest people, the news articles presented readers with a more complex idea about Brazil’s economic situation and its people and how contemporary realities in Brazil were not so different from realities in the U.S. and Finland. In chapter 3, I discussed inequality in the U.S. and Finland, posing the question of whether American and Finnish journalists would be able to grasp the complexity of social realities in South Africa and Brazil. My findings would suggest that they indeed did so.

The coverage was also multifaceted in the sense that even in those news articles that focused on the extremes – the inequality between the very richest and the very poorest in South Africa and Brazil – the stories did *not* usually frame such rich and privileged individuals negatively, at least not simply because of the mere fact that they were wealthy. Rather, the *institutions* that allowed some people to become so rich while others remained so poor were often framed as absurd and irresponsible by both the journalists and the individuals being quoted. For instance, NYT article no. 189, titled “Brazil, Where a Judge Made \$361.500 a Month, Fumes Over Pay,” explained how “these ‘super salaries,’ as they have become known here, are feeding newfound resentment over inequality in the country’s unwieldy bureaucracies” (paragraph 7). Through deep historical context, the story also associated Brazil’s inequality problem with the country’s colonial past: “Some historians blame

---

<sup>239</sup> Original in Finnish: “Kalliit hinnat riepovat brasilialaisia.”

<sup>240</sup> Orig in Finnish: “Rio de Janeirossa asuvat Ivan ja Rosiane Nobriga käyvät Yhdysvalloissa noin vuosittain ostosmatkalla. Käymme Miamiassa, mutta myös muualla. ‘Yhdysvalloissa kaikki on paljon halvempaa. Brasilian hinnat ovat absurdeja,’ Rosiane Nobriga sanoo.”

Portugal, the former colonial ruler, for creating a powerful public bureaucracy in which mandarins wield great influence and earn outsize salaries” (paragraph 14).

To summarize so far: both the *NYT* and *HS* quoted individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds, individuals who framed their situations quite differently and whose different experiences revealed complex issues of inequality in both countries. But while these interactions were dynamic in that a range of diverse ideas could even be found among representatives of the same social class, those individuals did not blame *each other* for their problems, but rather, the negative framing originating in this field was aimed at the other fields and at the political fields and at the ruling ANC and PT parties in particular.

### Citizens' Frustration and Gratitude toward the Political Fields

Unaffiliated individuals were among the most critical voices framing the local political fields. For instance, *HS* article no. 264 explains, beginning in paragraph 11 and continuing onto paragraph 12, that:

Many think that in February, Mbeki finally conceded to the concern of South Africans when promising to increase the number of policemen and make the judicial system more efficient. (paragraph 12) However, promises have been heard before. Phindile Mlamvo, a shopkeeper in Hillbrow, just buried a friend who died in a car hijacking. (...) “The police cannot do anything. The government is promising to improve the situation, but nothing happens,” Mlamvo curses.<sup>241</sup>

The voices of South Africa's and Brazil's non-governmental organizations were also mostly heard in this context: expressing the complaints of united citizens with particular concerns directed at the governments in question. *HS* article no. 280 accentuated such claims by providing historical context, beginning in paragraph 8 and continuing onto paragraph 9:

Already during apartheid, Soweto was the center of political fermentation. The Freedom Charter, the declaration of the freedom of the blacks, was signed on a soccer field in Soweto. Now, the activists demanding for better life conditions are taking advantage of the attention granted by the World Cup. (...) (paragraph 9) “For us, the World Cup is a chance to bring up our dissatisfaction,” says Thandi Sangweni, leader of the Soweto Concerned Citizens group.<sup>242</sup>

---

<sup>241</sup> Original in Finnish: “Helmikuussa Mbeki monien mielestä viimein tunnusti eteläafrikkalaisten huolen, kun hän lupasi lisätä poliisien määrää sekä tehostaa oikeusjärjestelmää. (...) (paragraph 12) Lupauksia on tosin ennenkin kuultu. Hillbrowlainen kauppias Phindile Mlamvo hautasi juuri autokaappauksessa kuolleen ystävänsä. (...). ‘Poliisi ei pysty tekemään mitään. Hallitus lupaa parantaa tilannetta, mutta mitään ei tapahdu,’ Mlamvo manaa.”

<sup>242</sup> Original in Finnish: “Soweto oli jo apartheidin aikaan poliittisen kuohunnan keskus. Mustien vapautusjulistus Freedom Charter allekirjoitettiin sowetolaisella jalkapallokentällä. Nyt parempia elinoloja vaativat aktivistit käyttävät MM-kisojen huomionarvoa hyväkseen. (...) (paragraph 9) Kisa-

In some articles, dialogue between the lower middle classes and the ANC was particularly direct. An excerpt from NYT article no. 98 featured both negative and positive dimensions of the *Conflict and Peace* frame, accompanied with a *Human Interest* frame (paragraph 2):

President Jacob Zuma, the son of a widowed maid, tried to reason with the rowdy crowd in this restive township. He had come to fix their broken public services, he assured them, but their angry heckling kept drowning him out. Finally, like a glowering patriarch, he lectured and scolded them, threatening to leave. "This means you will live forever in poverty!" he exclaimed. "If we do not listen to each other, how can we fix anything?" Suddenly, the rage of the throng dissipated. There was a chorus of apologies. A voice shouted, "Sorry, Baba!" Then a cry arose for the president to sing his trademark song from the anti-apartheid struggle, "Bring Me My Machine Gun." "You want it?" he asked. "Yes!" they shouted. And like an aging entertainer obliging with a golden oldie, Mr. Zuma, 68, crooned and boogied onstage.

A lone, but historically contextualized voice by a South African individual, quoted in an earlier NYT article (no. 60), helped explain this love-hate relationship between the poor people and the ANC: "This is not about Zuma being president; it's about the ANC remaining in charge," said Jabu Khoza, 34, an unemployed man living in a Johannesburg shantytown. "The ANC rescued us from the evils of the past" (paragraph 12).

In the Brazilian context, the PT was also the object of both praise and criticism, expressed mostly by the poor and lower middle classes. For example, in article no. 291, a single mother who made a living picking sugar cane described how she had benefited from the Bolsa Familia payment granted by the government. Yet, NYT article no. 141 lamented the fate of a woman being evicted from her home for a second time: "Now, after starting a new life in Altamira, the government is telling her she needs to leave again, this time to make way for the Belo Monte dam, which will flood a large swath of this city, displacing thousands of people. 'This dam is a threat to me because I no longer have the energy I once did...'" (paragraph 4).

Finally, in connection with their interactions with the political field, many individuals quoted in the coverage described how their socioeconomic statuses had *changed* for the better or else had worsened during the preceding decades. An example from HS article no. 262 on South Africa reads as follows (paragraphs 9–11):

The rich suburbs are divided by wide streets, and well cared-for yards can be glimpsed behind the walls. (...) "Even young women have beautiful houses and apartments. We never had them. Young people can live where they want and go out when they want," pensioner Joseph Gshabalala says. In his youth, parks, busses and public spaces were still being divided for

---

ovat meille mahdollisuus tuoda esiin tytytmättömyytemme,' sanoo Thandi Sangweni, joka johtaa Soweto Concerned Residents -kansalaisryhmää."

“Europeans” and “non-whites.” Back then, skin color and even the curliness of a person’s hair would define the person’s social status.<sup>243</sup>

Thus, many quoted people, when seeing positive change around them, expressed their anger at the *past pro-apartheid government* rather than the current government; realizing all the rights and benefits they could have had in their own lives, their complaints created a certain type of historical dynamic between these fields.<sup>244</sup>

The news stories also revealed how changes in the socioeconomic positions of different individuals had had a further impact on other individuals. In their coverage of Brazil, both the NYT and HS addressed the topic of housekeepers and their wages. NYT article no. 160, titled “Upwardly Mobile Nannies Move into the Brazilian Middle Class,” explains how (paragraph 5):

[i]n a decade working as a nanny, Andreia Soares finally clambered up the ladder into Brazil’s middle class. With the money she saved, she bought a two-bedroom apartment with granite kitchen countertops and a small veranda, a house for her mother, a plot of land for her brother and a Louis Vuitton purse from Paris that she proudly pulls from the closet. Later this year, with her monthly salary of \$3,100, which she earns caring for a 10-month old girl in an upscale neighborhood, she plans to buy a \$39,000 car – in cash. “I have always had this dream of buying a house and a car,” said Ms. Soares, 38. “Today that dream is closer than ever for nannies.”

The same story by the NYT explained how the situation was changing the realities for “old middle class” people; those people who had always been used to having a nanny or a housekeeper could no longer afford one: “As their expectations for a better quality of life rise, nannies are increasingly seeking to work for the very wealthy and becoming less affordable for many middle-class families” (paragraph 7). The article quoted both middle-class people as well as wealthy people about their needs for a nanny and whether it was still affordable or not. While one middle-class woman explained that she had “changed the nannies about 10 times in the past year, searching for someone affordable yet qualified enough” (paragraph 20), the wealthy people reportedly had no trouble at all: “‘I don’t ever want her to leave,’ said Ms. Parodi, 38, who is considering promoting her to personal assistant” (paragraph 26). Hence, wealthy, upper middle class, and formerly lower middle

---

<sup>243</sup> Original in Finnish: “Rikkaiden esikaupunkialueita halkovat leveät tiet, ja muurien takaa pilkottavat hyvin hoidetut pihat. (...) ‘Jopa nuorilla naisilla on kauniita taloja ja asuntoja. Meillä ei ollut niitä koskaan. Nuoret voivat asua missä haluavat ja käydä ulkona milloin haluavat,’ eläkeläinen Joseph Gshabalala sanoo. Hän itse oli nuori silloin, kun puistot, bussit ja julkiset tilat jaettiin vielä ‘eurooppalaisille’ ja ‘ei-valkoisille’. Silloin ihonvärillä ja jopa tukan kiharuudella määriteltiin ihmisen sosiaalinen asema.”

<sup>244</sup> Methodological note: When past governments, such as the NP apartheid government in South Africa or the dictatorship-era rulers in Brazil, were framed negatively in the news, this was *not* coded as negative framing of the current political fields; see chapter 5.

class people were all quoted in this article, and while they did not explicitly disagree about anything, their interactions still revealed shifting dynamics within the Brazilian civic society as a whole.

A corresponding *HS* article (no. 331), titled “Brazil Has the Largest Number of Household Servants in the World,”<sup>245</sup> contextualized the situation from the perspective of the privileged people: “In Caroline Mauricio’s family, servants have always taken care of the cooking, dishes, groceries, cleaning, laundry, ironing, and gardening. As often in well-to-do families, Mauricio or her three siblings were never expected to take part in the household chores” (paragraph 19).<sup>246</sup> But this same *HS* article also emphasized the transformation of the situation and the agency of this particular upper middle class individual as she aspired to challenge the rules of the game in her particular subfield: “Despite the easiness of everyday life, Mauricio thinks her parents’ way of life is old fashioned. She believes that servants living in homes are a relic from colonial times and slavery. She is not planning to hire anyone to live in her home, and no one in her nearest circles any longer does so” (paragraph 22).<sup>247</sup>

To conclude, the *NYT*’s and *HS*’s coverage of South Africa’s and Brazil’s civic societies revealed inequality between as well as within the different social classes, but the coverage also showed how people’s realities were changing, and while some formerly lower middle class people had started to feel more capable and wealthy, the opposite was happening to many people in the “old middle class,” who could no longer hire nannies or shop in their home country before. The most underprivileged people especially were framed as having many different experiences: some felt that their situation had improved substantially, while others lamented the persistent misery in their lives. These diverse sentiments were targeted mostly at the political field rather than framed as conflicts within civic society per se; the extent to which and occasions upon which the political field was able to respond depended on the form of news.

The next section focuses on the dynamics of the Southern academic fields.

---

<sup>245</sup> Original in Finnish: “Brasiliassa on eniten kotiapulaisia maailmassa.”

<sup>246</sup> Original in Finnish: “Caroline Mauricion perheessä apulaiset ovat aina huolehtineet ruuanlaitosta, tiskeistä, ostoksista, siivouksesta, pyykinpesusta, silityksestä ja puutarhasta. Kuten usein hyväosaisissa perheissä, Mauricion tai hänen kolmen sisaruksensa ei ole ikinä odotettu osallistuvan kotitöihin.”

<sup>247</sup> Original in Finnish: “Arjen helppoudesta huolimatta Mauricio pitää vanhempiansa elämäntapaa vanhanaikaisena. Kodeissa asuvat palvelijat ovat hänen mielestään jääne siirtomaa-ajalta ja orjuudesta. Itse hän ei aio palkata ketään omaan kotiinsa asumaan, eikä juuri kukaan hänen lähipiiristään enää tee niin...”

## RELATIVE VOLUME OF SOUTHERN ACADEMIC SUBFIELDS




Figure 18: Relative volume of South African academic subfields in the NYT and HS.




Figure 19: Relative volume of Brazilian academic subfields in the NYT and HS.

## Dynamics and Relative Volume of Southern Academic Subfields

Figures 18–19 on the previous page show that representatives from the social sciences accounted for the loudest-quoted voices in the Southern academic subfield throughout the coverage in both media. Yet, I would *not* argue that this would necessarily imply that the field of social sciences is more powerful or tries to impose its views on the other sciences or journalists. Rather, I believe that the relatively high volume of quotes from this subfield results from the fact that so much of the news that I studied was related to politics – in this context, it is only logical that the most frequently quoted Southern specialists were political scientists. But the news also quoted Southern sociologists and economists (also coded as social scientists), anthropologists and historians (coded as arts and humanities), and health specialists, environmentalists, and engineers (coded as natural sciences and engineering) in notable proportions.<sup>248</sup>

According to a report published by the *Kuka* project in March 2017, Finnish news does *not* quote experts in a multiperspectival manner – the study found that the same experts are quoted in the news over and over again, while the majority of potential experts are not approached by the journalists and are not able to comment on anything at all, even if their ideas and expertise were valid and relevant for the topic of public discussion. Journalists, working in a hurry, turn to those sources with which they are most familiar and comfortable.<sup>249</sup> The findings of the study, though, are based on analyses concerning Finnish domestic news on economics and politics, not world news. Given the way in which world news has generally been defined as a *less multiperspectival* genre than domestic news (e.g., Hamilton and Lawrence 2010, 631), I was surprised to find a broad range of different Southern experts quoted in the *NYT* and *HS* in their coverage of both South Africa and Brazil.<sup>250</sup>

---

<sup>248</sup> Methodological note: In my paragraph-level and article-level coding, I have drawn more accurate lines between the different disciplines and coded them accordingly. However, given that some fields were quoted so seldom and that their share of the overall volume was so small, I decided to merge these categories for the present illustrations (see Benson 2013, 8–9).

<sup>249</sup> *Kuka* is a project supported by the Helsingin Sanomat Foundation, which aims to promote more mutual understanding and connections between journalists and academics in Finland. Its initial report justified the need for such a project, given the fact that most academics did not get their voices heard in the news. The report, published on March 1, 2017, is available at: <https://www.kuka.io/>.

<sup>250</sup> For instance, *HS* article no. 261 contained a quote from the South African Institute for Security Studies; *HS* article no. 262, the IDASA research department; *HS* article no. 264, the CSVR Institute on Violence; *HS* article no. 266, an expert affiliated with the South African Institute for International Affairs; and *HS* article no. 288, the Africa Institute of South Africa and the South African Institute of Race Relations. The *NYT*'s coverage of South Africa contained quotes from a professor of development studies affiliated with the University of KwaZulu-Natal in article no. 63;



### Media's Symbolic Violence with Scientific Reason

Given the Finnish multiperspectival form of news, experts quoted in the Finnish news usually had more extensive article space to express their viewpoints than scholars quoted in the American news. For instance, in its coverage of the protests and strikes in Brazil in 2013, *HS* quoted Brazilian scholar Leonardo Custódio.<sup>251</sup> In article no. 312, Custódio was the only quoted speaker, his voice framing paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 18. The *NYT*, in its coverage of the protests, for instance in article no. 191, quoted the Brazilian social scientist Fabio Malini, but he only had opportunity to speak in paragraphs 27 and 29, and the article also contained quotes by Brazilian individuals and artists. In a subsequent *NYT* article (no. 192), a professor from the University of Campinas was quoted, but his speaking space was limited to paragraph 23. Another Brazilian scholar, Marcelo Ridenti, defined as “a prominent sociologist,” was quoted in the same article. But he only had a chance to speak in paragraphs 25 and 26. This particular *NYT* article also quoted the Brazilian political field, sports field, and unaffiliated individuals. Hence, the Finnish segmented form of news tended to promote one (academic) viewpoint per story, giving an expert substantial space to do so, while in the *NYT* an expert's space was much more limited, given the interspectival form of news and the debate structure. Then again, the American form of news tied the quoted academic more directly to the ongoing societal and international debate.<sup>252</sup>

---

in article no. 65, a member of the South African Human Sciences Research Council; in article no. 74, the South African Institute of Race Relations; and in article no 112, a scholar affiliated with the Forced Migration Studies Program at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. In *HS*'s coverage of Brazil, the list of diverse speakers was even longer and more diverse than in its South Africa coverage. For instance, *HS* article no. 323 quoted a professor of social sciences affiliated with the Federal University of São Paulo; *HS* article no. 332, an assistant professor of philosophy from the Catholic University; article no. 352, a political scientist affiliated with the Federal University of Minas Gerais; article no. 355, a professor of economics from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro; and article no. 361, a renowned Brazilian anthropologist currently affiliated with the American University of Notre Dame. *NYT* article no. 167 quoted a political scientist from the University of Campinas; article no. 173, a sociologist from the University of Campinas; article no. 190, a Brazilian energy consultant; article no. 191, a scholar who analyzed data patterns in social media at the Federal University of Espirito Santo; and article no. 192, a professor of social sciences from the University of Campinas.

<sup>251</sup> Custódio was affiliated at the University of Tampere in Finland at the time of the *HS* interview, but not permanently; also, he had returned from Brazil just before the interview. Thus, he was coded here as a “Brazilian scholar” (see chapter 5).

<sup>252</sup> I have also noted this phenomenon – academics getting to be the lone speaker and speaking voluminously – in other Finnish media and in regard to other topics. For instance, in its coverage of the Brazilian protests, the Finnish financial paper *Taloussanommat* gave exclusive quoting space to researcher Mikael Wigell from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (“Bussilippu oli Brasiliassa viimeinen niitti,” June 20, 2013). In my analysis of *HS* and *YLE* on the discoveries of geoglyphs in Amazonia, I found that Finnish researcher Martti Pärssinen was the only quoted

In some Finnish articles, academics were also quoted only briefly, just to add further context to the story, narrated much more voluminously by some other field. For instance, *HS* article no. 322 on the protests staged by young people at Brazilian malls (discussed already in chapter 7) quoted lower middle class individuals, granting them 17.1% of the total article space and 79.4% of the total quoting space compared with only 4.4% of the total article space and 20.6% of the total quoting space allotted to a Brazilian anthropologist quoted briefly in paragraph 11. In a subsequent *HS* story (no. 323), which continued with the topic of the protests, likewise a substantial proportion – 29.9% of the article space and 80.9% of the total quoting space – were given to Brazilian individuals compared with 6.6% of the article space and 18.0% of the quoting space allotted to a social scientist, who had opportunity to speak in only one paragraph (no. 13). In neither of these *HS* articles (no. 322 and 323) did the scholars who were interviewed get to present any viewpoints that contrasted with those presented by the “loud” individuals being quoted; the only purpose served by including the scholars was to add more background knowledge to the situation in a way that supported and further contextualized the perspective provided by those representing the “main field” (essentially accompanying the homophonic melody, as expressed metaphorically in the end of chapter 7). In other words, the agency of certain academics was restricted; their viewpoints were subordinated to those of the dominant speaker, whereas in other Finnish news, other academics were the dominant speakers.

In these particular *HS* articles (no. 322 and 323), as well as in *NYT* articles 191 and 192, the quoted scholars were most likely not given the chance to express themselves as fully as they would have liked to – or perhaps the interview in itself lasted longer, but the journalist then decided to edit most of their ideas out from the text, selecting just those passages that (s)he felt best supported the overall purpose of the article. This implies that *the journalistic field imposed its logic upon the academic field*, leading to “media’s symbolic violence with scientific reason” (see Benson 1999, 478; Bourdieu 1988; 1998; 2005). Charly Saloniuss-Pasternak, a researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and a frequently quoted expert in Finnish international news, has experienced situations where the journalist has tried to impose a particular angle, regardless of the academic’s own stance; the viewpoint of the article has simply been decided in advance by the journalist and his/her editor, even before approaching the academic.<sup>253</sup> However, Saloniuss-Pasternak has also pointed out that most professional journalists have engaged in a dialogue seeking to better understand the subject, at times even changing the framing of the entire article based on academic research. On the other hand, Saloniuss-Pasternak has also emphasized that,

---

speaker, whereas in the *NYT*’s and *CNN*’s coverage of similar discoveries in the same region multiple different scholars were quoted in each article (see Cheas 2016).

<sup>253</sup> This comment was made by Saloniuss-Pasternak during the seminar “Media Power in International Politics,” organized by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) on September 10, 2015 in Eteläranta, Helsinki.

even if given continuous article space and being the sole researcher interviewed for an article, as I found to be the case in many Finnish news, the reality in a given foreign country that the researcher is expected to explain in the news may be so complex that the space granted by the news article is still too limited.<sup>254</sup>

I found that the NYT turned to the *same* academic sources *more often* than HS. These interviewees included, for instance, political scientists Amaury de Souza, quoted at least in NYT articles no. 133 and 136, and Matias Spektor, quoted at least in NYT articles 163 and 253. As for experts affiliated with American universities, the same names recurred even more frequently.<sup>255</sup> Even though these particular experts were always expected to repeat the “story so far” (see chapter 7) in each story, they still probably had a better chance to express themselves than those American academics quoted only once – and perhaps, to a similar extent as the Finnish experts quoted extensively in a single article. At the same time, this tendency promoted inequality among researchers: those who were able to express their ideas more fully and frequently compared with those who were not.

As a way of reducing the media’s symbolic violence via scientific reason, incorporating more diverse viewpoints of different academics, and situating their viewpoints in a broader context, I propose using the NYT’s “Room for Debate” model (presented in chapter 7). Such a model makes it possible to combine American interspersive and Finnish multiperspersive forms of the news, with each speaker receiving his/her own space to express a particular viewpoint with the angles presented varying in length depending on how much each researcher has to say. A range of different viewpoints on the issue can be displayed the whole time, so that readers do not make the mistake of thinking that just a single perspective is enough to capture the complexity of the situation.

### *Inequality and Political Constraints in the Academic Field*

Even though researchers have found that the academic field is also engaged in constant struggle (e.g., Becher and Trowler 2001; Bourdieu 1988, 2005; Klein 1996; Moran 2002), with Bourdieu (2005, 36) noting that “the homo academicus of the social-science variety has his or her head full of couples of opposition,” such dynamics and strong oppositions are not reflected in my sample, at least not in the sense that academic experts would frame each other negatively or oppose one another directly. The exceptional and most conflictual section within the Southern academic field was the subfield of school teachers, who were, especially in the NYT’s coverage, quoted in the context of framing some of their colleagues negatively. However, their claims were more broadly related to the issue of inequality and

---

<sup>254</sup> Personal communication and email correspondence with Charly Saloni-Pasternak in September 2015 and in August–September 2017.

<sup>255</sup> For instance, American political scientist Julia Sweig, affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations, was quoted in the following NYT articles: 134, 151, 153, 213, and 226.

a lack of resources in South Africa and Brazil. For example, NYT article no. 75, titled “Eager Students Fall Prey to Apartheid’s Legacy,” began by describing how “Seniors here at Kwamfundo high school sang freedom songs and protested outside the staff room last year because their accounting teacher chronically failed to show up for class” (paragraph 3). Paragraph 5 quoted the principal of the school, Mongezeleli Bonani, who said that “there was little he could do beyond giving the teacher a warning.” Later in the article, the situation was contextualized by a South African scholar (paragraph 9):

“If you are in a township school, you don’t have much chance,” said Graeme Bloch, an education researcher at the Development Bank of South Africa. “That’s the hidden curriculum – that inequality continues, the white kids do reasonably well and black kids don’t really stand a chance unless they can get into a formerly white school or the same number of black schools that work.”

However, later the same article emphasized that, “South Africa’s schools also have problems for which history cannot be blamed, including teacher absenteeism, researchers say” (paragraph 18). Then President Zuma was quoted, highlighting the tension between the South African political field and the field of education (paragraph 19):

“We must ask ourselves to what extent teachers in many historically disadvantaged schools unwittingly perpetuate the wishes of Hendrik Verwoerd,”<sup>256</sup> he recently told a gathering of principals, implicitly challenging the powerful South African Democratic Teacher’s Union, which is part of the governing alliance.

Paragraph 21 added a critical perspective on the Teacher’s Union from within the academic field, further contextualizing the situation through negative dimensions of the *Responsibility*, *Credibility*, and *Conflict and Peace* frames: “‘We have the highest level of teacher unionization in the world, but their focus is on the rights, not responsibilities,’ Mamphele Ramphele, former vice chancellor of the University of Cape Town, said in a recent speech.” In paragraphs 29–30, a leader of a vocational college was quoted as saying that “‘most teachers are dedicated, but some could be naughty like kids.’” As is typical of American news, the article framed the situation in a complex manner, equally emphasizing the *positive* characters of the teachers. Beginning in paragraph 38, it explained, through positive *Responsibility*, *Human Interest*, and *Impact* frames, how:

later that day, Arthur Mqgweto, a math teacher, strode into the classroom, jauntily wearing a township take on the fedora called a square. He teaches more than 200 students each day for a salary of \$15,000 a year. His students describe him as a friend, a mother, a father, a guide. (...) (40) “I love that teacher,” said Olwethu, the student leader. “I love him.”

---

<sup>256</sup> Paragraph 14 of the same article explained: “Hendrik Verwoerd, the prime minister who was the architect of apartheid, said ‘Bantu’ must not be subjected to education that shows him ‘the green pastures of European society in which he was not allowed to graze.’”

Hence, this article (no. 75) not only reflected dynamics within the subfield of teachers and its dynamic relationship with the country's political field, and with the COSATU/Teacher's Union subfield in particular, it also revealed *inequality within the academic field*; separation of those teachers committed to teaching in poor neighborhoods and township schools vs. those who worked in much more privileged and elitist institutions. Similar tensions could not be detected within the other sections and disciplines that formed part of the academic field. But, of course, those academics working at universities, quoted and paraphrased in the news stories in the role of experts, were part of a more privileged group: as the NYT article clearly explained, most black students simply do not get the chance to climb onto even the first rungs of the socioeconomic and educational ladder. Hence, by incorporating the voices of teachers working in more underprivileged institutions as part of the coverage and by also contextualizing the situation from their perspective – low income and poor working conditions – the news managed to cover the realities of the South African academic field in a more complex way.

Even if the tensions within the academic field were limited to confrontations between privileged and “irresponsible” underprivileged teachers, the tensions between the academic field and the political field shaped the coverage more broadly. For instance, in NYT article no. 126 a South African professor took a strong stance against the local government for its education policies (paragraph 9):

Professor Alexander, who spent a decade imprisoned on Robben Island with Nelson Mandela, insists that the University of Cape Town, which is public, must resist pressure from the government to use racial benchmarks in determining how well the university is performing. “The government under apartheid did the same and we told them to go to hell,” he said in one standing-room-only campus debate.

Similar controversies and dynamics between the academic field and the political field could be found in the NYT's coverage of Brazil. For instance, article no. 183, titled “Brazil Enacts Affirmative Action Law for Universities,” described how (paragraph 6):

critics contend that enforcing expansive quotas will undercut the quality of Brazil's public university system, given the nation's relatively weak public elementary and secondary schools. “You don't create capable and creative people by decree,” said Leandro Tessler, institutional relations coordinator at the University of Campinas.

Paragraph 14 then explained how “Brazil's former president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, said in an interview that he was ‘completely in favor’ of the quotas: ‘Try finding a black doctor, a black dentist, a black bank manager, and you will encounter great difficulty,’ Mr. da Silva said.” But while the PT party was again framed as unified with respect to the quotas issue, a contradictory claim by the opposition party created tension within the Brazilian political field vis-à-vis the academic field: “Some prominent Brazilians have expressed concern about the scope of the quotas. ‘It's important to compensate people, but the way to do that cannot

be a copy of what has been done in one moment in the US,' Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Mr. da Silva's predecessor as president, said in an interview" (paragraph 16).

A good and final example of how the academic field was framed as taking a stance against the political field was found in NYT article no. 183, titled "Brazil Expands Mines to Drive Future, But Cost is a Treasured Link to Its Past." The article framed Brazilian humanists as taking a stance against Vale, the Brazilian mining giant, partly owned by the Brazilian government and the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES (paragraph 7):

"This is a crucial moment to learn about the human history of the Amazon, and by extension the peopling of the Americas," said Genival Crescêncio, a caver and historian at Pará state, which includes Carajás. "We should be preserving this unique place for science, but we are destroying it so the Chinese can open a few more car factories."

But the story was also contextualized from the perspective of the Brazilian government and Vale, emphasizing, through positive dimensions of the *Impact* and *Responsibility* frames, how the mining project would benefit Brazil as a whole. Beginning in paragraph 18, the article emphasized that:

Thanks largely to its Carajás complex (...) Vale accounts for 16 percent of Brazil's total exports. Vale has said it plans to create 30.000 jobs in the expansion of iron-ore mining at Carajás. (...) (paragraph 21) To comply with regulations governing archaeological sites, Vale executives said, the company hired archaeologists and a team of speleologists, or cavers, to survey the caves, which are clustered around the open-pit Carajás mine. (...) (paragraph 22) "For us there is just one procedure, and that is being transparent," said Gleuza Josué, Vale's environmental director.

Hence, in this last quote by the company director, the concerns of the academics were acknowledged. But the end of the article situated a Brazilian archaeologist within the middle of a conflict between the Brazilian political field, the field of economics, and his peers in the Brazilian academic field (paragraph 26):

Renato Kipnis, a respected archaeologist in São Paulo whom Vale hired to survey the caves of Carajás, said that Vale had prohibited him from discussing their archaeological significance, because of a confidentiality agreement Vale had required him to sign. Later, a Vale spokeswoman allowed Mr. Kipnis to be interviewed by email, but only if the company was allowed to vet in his replies. In written replies screened by Vale, he marveled at the importance of the caves. "The great challenge," he said, "is finding middle ground between preservation and development."

Thus, while this particular NYT article again managed to reveal the complexity of the situation by quoting and contextualizing the positions of different agents in the different fields involved, the story also demonstrates that academic opinions may be restricted in the news due to reasons other than a lack of sufficient article space; mainly, to the researcher's

affiliations with different political and economic institutions. Here, the academic agent's voice was suppressed or at least limited by the more dominant fields involved.

As already discussed in chapter 6, American news in particular frequently refers to anonymous "analysts" and "experts" without revealing their names, subfields of specialization, or academic affiliation. Such a practice was often found in contexts where the Southern political fields in particular were framed negatively by such "experts." The use of anonymous academic sources was also illustrated previously in this chapter with respect to the anonymous negative framing of COSATU. However, neither in this COSATU example nor anywhere else in my sample was the anonymity of such experts explained or justified in any way. Thus, I did not code such anonymous sources as representing the academic field, but rather separately, as part of the general "anonymous" source category.

By using such critical anonymous sources against the political field, and by attributing them to the academic field without any evidence of their origin, the Northern journalistic field contributed – whether intentionally or unintentionally – to a further widening of the ideological distance between the academic fields and the Southern political fields in particular, without revealing the ideological position of the journalistic field itself. This may have contributed to increasing tensions between the academic and Southern political fields, with the worst scenario being that academics no longer feel the courage to speak critically with their names, leading to a vicious circle of anonymity.

The particular stance by the Northern journalistic field is the focus of the next and last analytical section of this chapter.

RELATIVE VOLUME OF SOUTHERN JOURNALISTIC SUBFIELDS




Figure 20: Relative volume of South African journalistic subfields in the NYT and HS.




Figure 21: Relative volume of Brazilian journalistic subfields in the NYT and HS.



## Dynamics and Relative Volume of Southern Journalistic Subfields

As Figures 20–21 on the previous page show, most *NYT* and *HS* news articles that referred to South African or Brazilian media as their sources relied on *mainstream media* in those countries rather than on alternative media. In both South Africa and Brazil, mainstream media has historically been characterized as *elitist* (Albuquerque 2012, 78; Steyn and de Beer 2004, 390–391; see also Wasserman and de Beer, 2009). In the words of Colin Sparks (2011, 15):

As part of the mass movement against the apartheid regime, there was a flourishing alternative media [in South Africa]. (...) Sadly, few if any of the alternative titles lived on into democracy, and the demand to empower the people faded from discussions on the media. In this, South Africa is in the mainstream of transitions to democracy: similar processes can be found everywhere, from Brazil to Poland. (...) In reality, of course, many of the existing community media fail to live up to their title, and the MDDA [Media Development and Diversity Agency] is grotesquely underfunded for the tasks it faces. The democratic alternative to the domination of the media by capitalism lies in changing those realities. It lies in rebuilding community and alternative media, and reconnecting them with the struggles in the factories and townships, in order to realise the promise of giving people a voice.

Echoing Sparks's claim that poor and lower middle class people "in the factories and townships" do not have a voice in the South African mainstream media, Custódio (2016, 74) argues that the voices of underprivileged Brazilian citizens and their perspectives are of no interest to the country's mainstream media: "Journalists make news for non-favela residents. (...) Critical voices from favelas who question the unequal and unjust structure of Brazilian society go largely unheard in mainstream journalism despite the widespread echoes in social networks."

A closer look at the references to mainstream South African and Brazilian media included in the *NYT*'s and *HS*'s coverage revealed that the Southern media sources being quoted certainly did not tend to promote the views of poor people. For instance, *NYT* article no. 12, concerning the song "de la Rey," which many black and poor South Africans consider racist, included a reference to *The Sunday Independent*, which the *NYT* defined as "perhaps South Africa's most renowned newspaper." According to this particular source, the song "answers a deep sadness in Afrikaner's souls, a feeling that they have not merely fallen from power but have been marginalized in South African society – tossed into history's dustbin, as Ronald Reagan once said of the Soviets" (paragraph 22). Here, the South African "renowned" newspaper promoted the viewpoint of Afrikaners, that is, the viewpoint of a white, relatively wealthy minority. As for Brazil, *NYT* article no. 173 referred to a column on the Brazilian *R7* news' web site, which argued that "we have enough poor people

manufactured right here. (...) Brazil doesn't need Haitian immigrants, and Haiti doesn't need Brazil." The article also reflected dynamics between the Brazilian journalistic field and different local and federal agents representing the PT: it quoted municipal officials in Acre (whose political affiliation was not revealed in the story) who welcomed the Haitians, while it also cited federal PT representatives who were more hesitant on the matter and a news site that was outright opposed to them.

Custódio (2013, 3) describes how during the protests of 2013, the mainstream Brazilian media depicted poor black activists as "vandals." By choosing to quote the mainstream news media, such claims ended up in the *NYT* as well. Article no. 198, for instance, explains: "The television channel *O Globo* showed video of recent protests in which they highlighted the faces of young men committing acts of vandalism, such as smashing automatic teller machines in a bank and knocking over a light pole" (paragraph 7). My findings, however, show that, despite relying on mainstream South African and Brazilian media, both the *NYT* and *HS* devoted significant article space to the voices of poor and lower middle class individuals as well as to non-governmental organizations. This relatively high volume of underprivileged civic voices would suggest that neither the *NYT* nor *HS* based their coverage too heavily on the coverage provided by the mainstream South African and Brazilian media.

Indeed, even though mainstream media received the most space within the South African and Brazilian journalistic fields being quoted, Figures 20–21 (see also figures 2–5 in chapter 6) also show that the voices of these particular Southern journalistic fields as a whole were relatively *silent*, accounting for only 3.7–4.8% of the total quoting space, in comparison with the much louder civic society (14.2–29.9%), academia (11.0–13.2%), and the political arena (14.8–29.4%). Hence, my study shows that both the *NYT* and *HS* *reached beyond* the range of voices promoted by the South African and Brazilian mainstream media, though those voices had also been quoted by Northern news media.

This difference can be explained by the fact that, since the South African and Brazilian mainstream media are consumed mostly by privileged people who can afford it, the news is more likely to feature stories these privileged people are interested in and willing to purchase. Finnish media has been shaped by the early development of mass circulation press and high literacy rates, establishing "regular reading habits among the working class. (...) The political culture of the Democratic Corporatist countries tends to emphasize the duty of the state to provide conditions of full participation of all citizens and all groups in social life" (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 146–153, 161). This is why the Finnish state has a history of providing subsidies to the press, so that this democratic ideal can be accomplished regardless of whether such coverage "sells" enough to be financially profitable (*ibid.*). Even though Finnish media in general and *HS* in particular are nowadays fully dependent upon subscriptions and advertising, as are the American media and the

mainstream South African and Brazilian media quoted in the Northern news, the rules of the game and the political culture in the Finnish journalistic field were shaped early on by the idea of “media as a social institution and not as purely private enterprise” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 196). Hence, I argue that the logic of the Finnish media system can help explain the relatively wide range of voices included in *HS* in comparison with those quoted by mainstream South African and Brazilian news sites.

As already discussed in chapter 3 of the dissertation, economic inequality is in general greater in the United States than in European welfare states like Finland (see Hallin and Mancini 2004, 239; Juutinen and Kähkönen 2016, 34–35). Moreover, countries with a Liberal media system are not leaders in newspaper circulation, as are Finland and other countries with a Democratic Corporatist system; newspaper consumption in the U.S. is more “elitist” than in Northern Europe. Then again, the *NYT* is one of those American newspapers that has for generations been committed to the values of promoting general public interest as opposed to only being commercially profitable (see chapter 3; see also Folkenflik 2011, xi). The *NYT* also has substantial resources, resulting from its reputation as a prestigious newspaper with subscribers around the world. In general, then, the *NYT* can be expected to promote a wider range of different viewpoints than most other American media, and I have certainly found its coverage of South Africa and Brazil to be in many ways multiperspectival.

I believe the *NYT* and *HS* did not quote South African or Brazilian news media nearly enough for me to make any generalizations about the contents of such Southern media more broadly. I am here only elaborating on my observation that, in the quotes used by the *NYT* and *HS* found in mainstream Southern media stories, the relative lack of poor and lower middle class people’s voices is notable.

Of course, American and Finnish journalists could have also chosen to use such specific excerpts from Southern media sites on purpose, ignoring quotes from other persons or organizations. That is, Southern media sites may be used in Northern and especially American news also to serve a political function, namely, to incorporate criticism toward Southern institutions, allowing American journalists to discretely avoid writing such criticism themselves (at least with their own name). The quotes by Southern mainstream media incorporated in the *NYT* also contained negative descriptions of South Africa and Brazil in general rather than just directing criticisms at particular fields or the agents representing them. In *NYT* article no. 188, for example, both Brazilian politicians and citizens are criticized: “In another caustic assessment of the nightclub fire, the newspaper *O Globo* said in an editorial on Tuesday that an array of factors, involving ‘administrative ineptitude, corruption, omission of public authorities and conformity of the common citizen’ contributes to a loss of life in Brazil that is at once alarming and banal” (paragraph 11).

Curiously, in its coverage of the same incident in Brazil, *HS* (article no. 305) also quoted *O Globo*. But rather than using this source to criticize the authorities, *HS* paraphrases *O Globo*'s quote from particular *Brazilian individuals* involved in the fire: "‘We were looking at the roof in front of the stage and it was on fire,’ Luana Santos Silva, 23, who survived the fire, told the local Globo News channel" (paragraph 8).<sup>257</sup> This suggests that at least *HS* tried to use local media to incorporate local citizens' viewpoints when possible.

### Responsibilities and Transparency in the Global Journalistic Field

The NYT seems to have been quite conscious of the problems associated with mainstream South African and Brazilian media, given the fact that my NYT sample also contained an article titled "Proposed Restrictions on the News Media Cause Alarm in South Africa" (no. 120). According to this article, authored by a NYT journalist and beginning in paragraph 12,

[t]he official hostility to journalists is palpable. In a July 29 party document the ANC described portions of the press as having an "anti-ANC stance," and accused the print media of "an astonishing degree of dishonesty." (...) (paragraph 15) Even some in the journalistic fraternity acknowledge there are problems with the tone and precision of some reporting, but the party's harsh proposals have led to a circling of the wagons. (paragraph 16) "Has there been a problem with accuracy?" asked Anton Harber, a former editor who heads the journalism department at the University of the Witwatersrand. "Absolutely. Has there been reluctance to apologize timeously and appropriately? No doubt." He said the editors were having behind-the-scenes conversations about how the press can strengthen standards, but added that it was hard to pursue these aggressively when the government has mounted a frontal attack on basic freedoms.

The NYT had similar knowledge of the Brazilian media. Article no. 260, concerning Jose Sarney's policies in Brazil, states the following (paragraph 17):

The Sarney family has managed to assemble a powerful collection of mass media holdings, including the newspaper *O Estado de Maranhão* and TV Mirante, an affiliate of the Globo television network, enabling the clan to celebrate its achievements and attack its critics. "The media constantly extol the great things Sarney and his allies have done and are doing," said Sean Mitchell, an anthropologist at Rutgers University who has conducted extensive research at Maranhão.

Given this awareness of the problems related to mainstream South African and Brazilian media, it is then fully justified to ask why American journalists would *quote* mainstream South African media in their own coverage as a reliable source without more specifically mentioning the problems being experienced by their South African peers. Such mentions

---

<sup>257</sup> Original in Finnish: "‘Katsoimme kattoa lavan edessä ja se oli tulessa,’ palosta selviytynyt Luana Santos Silva, 23, sanoi paikalliselle Globo News -televisiokanavalle."

would not only help the Southern journalists quoted in the global coverage of such stories, struggling to be accurate amid the political pressures facing them, but it would also enhance the openness of American journalism as to why such sources were used in the first place.

As Figures 20–21 show, the NYT did quote less prominent and alternative media as well. For instance, in NYT article no. 203, “For Brazilian Official and Family, Controversy Over a Trip,” paragraph 10 explained: “Online, the sentiment was similar. ‘Only a cynic, a nut, or a completely uninformed person could have ignored everything that’s happened in the country in recent weeks and do this,’ wrote Kiko Nogueira on the alternative news site *Diário do Centro do Mundo*. ‘It’s as if he were saying, You guys are suckers to think something would change.’” Some sources used, like the Sowetan newspaper (excerpt included in the section on dynamics within the political fields) can no longer be considered alternative media, given that the last-mentioned has become the country’s third largest newspaper despite its origins as the community media of a poor neighborhood.<sup>258</sup> Still, given its roots in black political consciousness, its use added an interesting nuance to the mainstream media mostly quoted.

In NYT article 277, titled “Brazil’s Latest Clash With Its Urban Youth Takes Place at the Mall” (discussed already briefly in chapter 7), which had to do with the protests in Brazil, the *dynamics between a new media start-up, alternative/community media, and mainstream media*, all quoted in the same article, not only revealed complexity, but also the specific stance of the well-known mainstream magazine *Veja*. Paragraphs 13–14 first clarified the position of a new media start-up:

In a widely distributed essay on the rolezinhos, Leandro Beguoci, the editor in chief of F451 digital, a new media start-up, cautioned against attributing an overtly politicized character to the gatherings, pointing out that the biggest events were convened not in upscale areas but in relatively new malls in less prosperous parts of São Paulo. “These are the children of the C-class, for whom consumerism is glorious,” referring to Brazil’s expanding middle class.

Paragraph 18 promoted an alternative viewpoint:

Gizele Martins, who writes for a community newspaper in Complexo da Maré, an area in Rio of favelas, or slums, said doing so was a “political act, to tell society we belong to it, that we’re not on the margins of it.”

The stance of the mainstream magazine was finally revealed in paragraph 20:

Going further in expressing some of the alarm in elite circles, Rodrigo Constantino, a columnist for the newsmagazine *Vega*, lashed out with degrading language at what he called the “caviar left” for defending the rolezinhos. “A multitude of barbarians invading a private

---

<sup>258</sup> See: <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/>.

property to do turmoil isn't a protest or rolezinho but an invasion, a sweep, delinquency," he writes.

What is exceptional here is not only the fact that three different Brazilian media perspectives were included in the same story, clearly revealing the tensions between them, but also the clear stance taken by the American journalist *contra Veja* when stating that the language was "degrading" and the perspective was that of "elite circles." In other NYT articles where *Veja* was quoted – e.g., article no. 177, paragraph 9 – no evaluation was made of its political or ideological stance, which I find particularly interesting, since in this particular context *Veja* was quoted describing the "downgrade" of President Dilma Rousseff's state visit to the U.S.

I want to make clear that I am not arguing that journalists should include an evaluation of each source used each and every time, since alternative media can promote highly biased political news just as the mainstream media. But alternative media – at least those operating in the poverty-stricken communities of South Africa and Brazil – often tends to be clearer about their position, sourcing, goals, and resources, making it also easier for the journalist using the source to clarify its roots and stance for the readers. Leonardo Custódio (2016, 82–83, 114) describes how:

In over four years of fieldwork (2011–2014), there were innumerable cases in which favela residents used online and offline media as instruments and platforms for exchanging information to publicly organize different forms of political activities. I observed the circulation of community newspaper reports, blog posts, mobile phone videos, documentaries, and photographs denouncing the violence of city officials in evictions. (...) Favela residents raise critical awareness among peers, generate public debates, and mobilize actions against or in reaction to material and symbolic conditions of social inequality in their everyday lives. (...) Specifically in Rio de Janeiro, a 2009 study used Internet searches to identify about 110 alternative media initiatives. (...) To distribute the editions of the newspapers around Complexo da Maré, journalists, volunteers, and part-time workers deliver the paper from door to door, in local shops and even in the lively street market.

Custódio (ibid., 93) also mentions seminars, organized by volunteer journalists from community newspapers, as well as material available online and on *YouTube*. Some of this material could thus be available to American and Finnish journalists even if they are not physically present in Brazil.

Both *HS* and the *NYT* also quoted unaffiliated journalists. For instance, in article no. 320, *HS* quoted from a blog by a Brazilian journalist and his ideas about how the country should have hosted the World Cup using fewer soccer stadiums. *HS* journalist Maria Manner described the Brazilian journalist's approach as "interesting," making an implicit suggestion to the reader that there was something unique and different in this blog post worth considering. In short: by quoting more community media sources as well as local

blogs and texts by different authors, the journalists could not only expand the range of voices representing different socioeconomic backgrounds and ideas – politicians and citizens alike – quoted in their news stories, but the newspapers could also *increase their level of transparency*, which, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, is the most important step toward more non-violent forms of communication.

#### Final Remarks: Ideas about Inequality and Distant Suffering Revisited

My analysis of the relative share of different voices representing the Southern political subfields as well as subfields within civic society, academia, and journalism has shown that some agents have more power than others. More marginal political movements and alternative media received very little space in my sample. On the other hand, a large number of poor and lower middle class individuals was quoted by the papers, especially in HS's coverage of Brazil.

Lilie Chouliraki (2008, 329–330) has argued that,

the ways in which the media portray and narrate the suffering of faraway others has always been controversial. In the past, it has raised critical questions about the power relations between the West and the rest, about stereotypes of the 'poor South' and about compassion fatigue among Western audiences...

My study has revealed that American and Finnish news also depict suffering among upper middle class individuals – their worries being quite similar to the worries felt by American or European middle class people, who do not go hungry but who still feel frustrated by rising prizes, dishonest politicians, and so forth. What is more, many of the poor and underprivileged individuals were not quoted as complaining. Quite the contrary: their voices also featured many *positive* experiences. By introducing the voices of poor and lower middle class people lamenting their situations vis-à-vis the voices represented by individuals in symbolically neighboring positions, but who framed their realities much more positively, the American and Finnish journalists shed light on the complex realities in the rapidly transforming societies of South Africa and Brazil.

I certainly found that American journalists in particular still strive for objectivity in their coverage, which was reflected in the persistent incorporation of many viewpoints and use of anonymous sources to incorporate criticism. Still, I would disagree with Jairo Lugo-Ocando (2015, 59) when he claims that, “by embracing objectivity as a paramount value, journalists (...) have become ‘one-dimensional’ fact finders that selectively choose those events and voices that can somehow reinforce that socially constructed reality that has already been preconceived.” Instead, I found that, rather than depicting one particular socially constructed reality, the journalists reveal many, and the mixed proportions of positive and negative dimensions should help the reader understand that the realities in these countries and among their people are anything but simple.





---

## 9. Conclusions: Proportions of Perspectives, Context, and Transparency in Northern News on the South

---

This study was originally inspired by a practical necessity to create world news that would abound in both depth and a number of different perspectives. My background in Latin American Studies had made me – an aspiring journalist – realize that the only way European and North American audiences can comprehend the complex nature of realities in regions of “the Global South” is by exposing them to multiple voices and viewpoints, many of which should originate in these very regions rather than being imposed from distant positions in the North. I thought it would be fundamental to find a way to elaborate on these perspectives to the extent that they would fully capture the ideas and experiences of those whose lives were becoming the objects of increasing global media attention.

To accomplish such a task, I began creating a methodology that would reach beyond the traditional tendency to merely count the number of different perspectives in the news in order to systematically measure their breadth as well; that is, the methodology employed in the study assesses the relative size of the news frames and the volume of the different Southern and Northern voices quoted and paraphrased in American and European news. Due to the many structural similarities between South Africa and Brazil, explored in chapter 2 of this dissertation, I chose news coverage concerning the transformation of these societies ahead of the World Cup events of 2010 and 2014 as my point of focus. Considering the changing world order and the ways in which countries in the Global South, including South Africa and Brazil, have increasingly begun to defy their former dominators – the United States in particular – in the international public sphere, I wanted to assess what the proportions of perspectives would reveal about power relations between the countries and institutions involved.

Challenging prevailing claims that American and European world news is ethnocentric and narrow (e.g., Hamilton and Lawrence 2010, 631; Sreberny and Paterson 2004, 8; Uskali 2007, 26–27), my measurements revealed that Southern institutions and individuals are given substantial quoting space in comparison with Northern institutions in the news: in the *NYT*, Southern voices accounted for 80.3% of the total quoting space on average in coverage related to South Africa and 72.3% on average in coverage related to Brazil. In *HS*, Southern institutions predominated, too, accounting for 76.7% of quoting space on average in its South Africa coverage and 72.5% on average in its Brazil coverage. The loudest Southern fields included the South African and Brazilian political

fields, academic fields, and civic societies. My analysis of the dynamics of fields, elaborated on in chapter 8, also shows that poor and lower middle class Southern individuals were able to speak considerably loudly in comparison with more privileged Southern individuals. *HS*'s coverage of Brazil allotted more than 50% of Brazilian civic society's total quoting space to voices representing poor and lower middle class individuals, indicating that claims about low-income Southern people's "subaltern" role in Northern news (e.g., Figenschou 2010, 86; Galtung and Ruge 1965, 72; Lugo-Ocando 2015) should not be taken for granted. The title of this dissertation – *Broadening Views in Tabloids and Tablets* – denotes this positive change; the fact that Northern coverage, including tabloid-size *HS* and online editions of both the *NYT* and *HS*, depict a broad and multifaceted view of Southern realities.

But next to these optimistic observations, when examining the share of these quotes vis-à-vis total article space, my study also shows that in the *NYT*, less than one-third of the article space consisted of quotes on average, while in *HS* it was only around one fifth: the rest of the article space was taken up by American or Finnish journalists. This demonstrates that American and Finnish journalists are still in a much more powerful position than their Southern sources are when it comes to telling the story and framing realities in countries of the Global South.

My analysis of frame proportions shows that, in the same manner as with institutional fields, some frames are larger than others: *Responsibility*, *Conflict and Peace*, and *Impact* frames received most emphasis. My research highlights that the dimensions of these frames are combined in many creative ways – the complexity of South African and Brazilian realities is underscored by means of combining and integrating positive and negative dimensions of the frames, thereby creating a broader and more nuanced framework for the coverage. For instance, in news concerning topics like poverty or corruption, the positive dimensions of the *Responsibility*, *Credibility*, and *Impact* frames accentuated improvements in the way the countries and their institutions dealt with these historically rooted issues, while negative dimensions of the same frames reminded readers about the persistent problems that still need to be fixed.

American and European news has generally been deemed as primarily reinforcing negative assessments (Esser et al. 2017a, 71), especially in regard to "the developing world" (Hess 1996, 28–59; Pietiläinen 1998, 104–106; Uskali 2007, 26–27). Yet, my study shows that each frame contained notable proportions of positive dimensions: some frames averaged as much as 40% positive dimensions. Of course, this means that such frames were still 60% negative. But I also argue that if world news were "too" positive, stories would not manage to reveal the complexity of realities in the way I found in my study: this is because the same realities can be positive or negative for different people, depending on the angle. For instance, many American and Finnish news articles described how South African and

Brazilian lower middle class individuals were happy because of the World Cup: they expressed excitement about their home countries finally making it onto the global stage, creating jobs for their families in construction work and other projects, and inspiring their kids to practice soccer with more dedication. Other lower middle class people were quoted as being miserable, having been evicted from their homes to make way for the new stadiums and not being able to afford to attend any of the games. Some people even lost their loved ones in accidents at the construction sites due to the irresponsibility of the local institutions in charge. As this example from the World Cup coverage shows, had the news been substantially more positive on average, the coverage would probably not have been very multiperspectival. Rather than complaining about the “negativity” of news, then, I argue that researchers should focus, first of all, on the interplay between different positive and negative views presented by different sources and how they are balanced, creating a multidimensional view behind the news window.

### Objects of Framing, Anonymous Sources, and Symbolic Violence

One of the central findings of my research was that, especially in the case of the *NYT*, the quoted Southern fields did most of the negative framing, taking aim at the realities and institutions in their own countries, while most of the neutral and positive framing originated in the Northern journalistic space. Many of these negative depictions can be traced to the South African and Brazilian civic societies, with people formulating their disappointments at feeling their governments had in many ways failed to deliver on important promises – less inequality, better education, health care, infrastructure, and so forth. I would say that the *NYT* and *HS* provide an important international forum for voicing these concerns, as many studies have shown that the mainstream news in South Africa and Brazil has historically tended to ignore the voices of poor and lower middle class individuals (for instance, Custódio 2016; Sparks 2011). But simultaneously, I argue that the ways in which and the extent to which these negative framings targeted Southern political fields in the Northern news raises questions about the transparency and openness of the journalists in charge of the coverage.

My concerns about journalistic ethics arose upon discovering that, in addition to the quotes by Southern and Northern institutions, American and Finnish news also quoted a substantial number of anonymous sources, which were systematically used to frame the Southern institutions, and the Southern political fields in particular, in a negative light. In the *NYT*, these anonymous sources, such as “critics” and “analysts,” in which neither the name nor the institutional affiliation of the speaker was revealed in the article, accounted for 8.9–11.4% of total quoting space on average, whereas in *HS* their share was 7.5–10.9% of total quoting space on average. I also found that such anonymous sources were frequently used in contexts where American political and/or economic interests were at

stake, for instance when criticizing Brazilian or South African intentions to restrict foreign trade or nationalize enterprises involving American capital.

When combining the relatively loud voices of the Southern institutions and agents infuriated by the actions of the political parties in their respective countries with the high volume of critical anonymous sources, in addition to the critical voices stemming from critical agents within these political fields, the proportion of negative attention directed at the Southern political fields in the news becomes significant. When comparing the average volume of space in which the local political fields had a chance to speak for themselves in these news with the amount of space where they were framed negatively by the other fields involved, my measurements show that at the overall sample level, the negative framing was more voluminous than when the political field was able to speak with its own voice. In other words, the South African and Brazilian political fields were the object of negative framing by the other fields involved beyond these political fields' ability to speak for themselves. This is what, building on Pierre Bourdieu (1987, 13–15), I have defined as a form of symbolic violence in news.

More specifically, I have conceptualized symbolic violence as the ability of a field to impose its logic on another field and to frame a situation or a problem concerning another field on this other field's behalf. In line with my frame and field analysis, rather than simply determining the “presence” or “absence” of symbolic violence in news or the quantity of such occurrences, I have argued that it is vital to consider the *proportions* of symbolic violence in news. My important argument is that high proportions of symbolic violence in news reflect a lack of journalistic transparency. The more transparency and the more balance that is included between the different perspectives, the smaller the proportions of symbolic violence. I found that Finnish news used anonymous sources quite heterogeneously, with Finnish journalists also tending to take negative stances and openly express negative viewpoints regarding Southern institutions with their own voices, whereas American news systematically used anonymous sources to promote negative framing of the Southern institutions involved. In the American journalistic space, openly expressed negative viewpoints concerning Southern fields were much more difficult to find.

I believe these differences can be explained by the American tradition of a neutral commercial press and a form of journalistic professionalization centered on the principle of objectivity, characteristic of the Liberal media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 67, 219). While Finnish journalists today uphold similar values, the North European Democratic Corporatist media systems are historically rooted in more partisan forms of journalism, a tradition which may still allow them more space to express their own viewpoints than American journalists (*ibid.*, 160). But I would also suggest that these differences in the level of Finnish and American openness and use of anonymous sources may reflect the fact that, given Finland's much more marginal role in global politics, at

least in comparison with the United States, Finnish national interests are not really at stake in the issues being covered, at least not most of the time and in similar ways as are American interests. Likewise, given the way that *HS* used some anonymous sources to incorporate more critical views, I believe it would be overly optimistic to say that anonymous sources are not, or will not be, an issue in the Finnish news.

Besides the proportions of negative framing vis-à-vis the amount of space given to the object field to speak for itself, I argue that the severity of symbolic violence also depends on the relative distance between the framer and the framed. When creating world news and interviewing sources, American and Finnish journalists are not only faced with different habituses than their own, which I have defined as ideological distance, but they must also deal with cultural (and geographical) distance. In other words, the journalist must also know the particular context to comprehend the local rules of the game that have shaped the habituses of the people that (s)he is interviewing and framing. Bourdieu (2000, 610) has emphasized that nonviolent communication can be facilitated through social proximity and familiarity. Hence, the less familiar the journalist is with the object fields whose realities are being covered, the greater the potential for committing an act of symbolic violence.

Still, I am not arguing that Northern coverage of the South is foredoomed to be symbolically violent in nature. What I am arguing in regard to symbolic violence and cultural/ideological distance and transparency is that, for the coverage to be nonviolent, the journalist has to reveal his/her own proximity or distance as well as the distance of the sources used, vis-à-vis the fields that are the objects of these (negative) definitions. The main problem with anonymous sources is that, since the sources are unidentified, it is impossible to determine their relative distance from their object field. As noted by David Boeyink (1990, 235), “an attack based solely on an anonymous source denies the accused an opportunity to confront his/her accuser.” Not revealing the relative distance gives reason to suspect that these anonymous sources might be imposed by the Northern fields, that is, by culturally and ideologically distant fields, making this form of symbolic violence particularly severe. Turo Uskali (2007, 45) has argued that the way that editorial staffs in the United States and elsewhere have started to accept the use of anonymous sources in stories has led to forgeries and deceit in journalistic coverage (see also Carlson 2011, 31; Duffy 2014, 252). Michael Sheehy (2008, 29) has found that anonymous sources abound especially in foreign news (see also Sobel and Riffe 2016, 299). My research leads me to concur with Uskali (2007, 45) when he emphasizes the importance of naming sources in good foreign reporting, as well as with Ahmed Al Omran (2014, 24), who argues that foreign correspondents must work transparently.

I want to emphasize that there *are* moments when the distance between the source and the object field *cannot* be revealed. In my view, granting anonymity to protect sources revealing

delicate information and fearing for their lives is completely understandable and often highly recommendable, given that without such a practice many important voices of individuals in vulnerable positions would be lacking completely. Both the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) have suggested that journalists should keep confidential sources secret (see Duffy 2014, 249).

But importantly, the ASNE has simultaneously emphasized *transparency as default* for such practice (ibid.). Likewise, *The Reporter's Handbook* and guidelines established by leading American newspapers including the NYT have maintained that journalists should at least try to *explain* to audiences *why* a source was granted anonymity (ibid., 256–261).<sup>259</sup> And yet, very few of the articles I analyzed provided any explanations whatsoever on the usage of anonymous sources. In other words, in most of the articles using anonymous sources, the safety of the sources or any other motive to grant anonymity was not mentioned or referred to in any way. Thus, my study leads me to agree with the ombudsmen and scholars who have argued that the NYT does not follow its own rules regarding the usage of anonymous sources (see Duffy 2014, 236–237).<sup>260</sup> As expressed by Matt Carlson (2011, 33), “unnamed sourcing practices go awry not because of the very existence of anonymity, but because of how it is implemented.”<sup>261</sup>

In his article lamenting the widespread use of anonymous sources in international news, Sheehy (2008, 24) observes that the practice of using unnamed sources “illuminates the delicate relationship between journalists seeking to acquire information and sources trying to manipulate the media.” As said, I found anonymous sources to be used to criticize Southern, rather than Northern, institutions, in a way that also promoted Northern interests, suggesting that these sources were of Northern, rather than Southern, origin. Steven Esposito (1999, 17–18) has observed that when one particular source, such as the White House, is allowed to speak anonymously, and simultaneously more voluminously, than some other source, whose interests are equally at stake, the former has a better chance of shaping the coverage than the latter. My study is concerned with multiperspectivalness of world news and the extent to which Northern world news can promote global democracy and inform American and Finnish citizens about developments in the Global South. But as Carlson (2011, 37–38) aptly observes, lack of transparent debate may eliminate the ability of readers to adequately evaluate the different opinions presented. Based on my

---

<sup>259</sup> See also the NYT Standards Editor Phil Corbett's memo on the usage of anonymous sources and related explanations, available at <http://gawker.com/5627330/new-york-times-warns-newsroom-on-anonymous-sources>.

<sup>260</sup> See also the NYT Public Editor article “Those Persistent Anonymous Sources,” available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/opinion/22pubed.html>.

<sup>261</sup> Carlson (2011, 35) also quotes an article by the *New York Observer*, which “specifically criticized the *Times* for its over-reliance on unnamed sources, writing that it takes a ‘decoding machine’ to understand its anonymous attribution techniques.”

analysis, I argue that journalists should be more careful, as to the extent to which they are willing to grant anonymity to different sources possibly trying to impose their viewpoints in a hidden way.

Figures 6–7, included in chapter 6, show that the *World Order* frame was the only frame that was larger in *HS* than in the *NYT* on average. In *HS*, the frame was used to emphasize South Africa's and Brazil's economic and social transformations as well as their increasing involvement in global politics. More than 50% of the frame was still negative on average, and certainly many of the *HS* articles that featured this frame described how these countries still had not mastered proper leadership skills, had failed to develop proper infrastructures, and so forth. What I find curious is the complete lack of this frame in many American news stories related to similar topics. That is to say, rather than emphasizing the rise or fall of South Africa/Brazil on the global stage, their existence on the world map is ignored completely. Rodney Benson and Tim Wood (2015, 804) have pointed out that “ideologies are often expressed in silences.” Concurring with this claim, I argue that the *NYT* is doing symbolic violence to the South African and Brazilian political fields by ignoring a frame for seemingly implicit political reasons. Even though *HS* uses this frame for many negative purposes as well, it does so transparently, whereas this form of symbolic violence by the *NYT* is again characterized by reticence, as in the case of the use of anonymous sources for negative framing.

Throughout this study, I have emphasized how both American and Finnish journalists have succeeded at revealing the complexity and multiperspectivalness of realities in South Africa and Brazil, giving substantial voice to local people – essentially including poor and underprivileged citizens – and challenging claims that Northern news on the Global South is simplistic and ignorant of Southern perspectives. But I have also quoted David Boeyink (1990, 240–241) who has emphasized that explaining why a certain source is quoted anonymously helps add context in the coverage. My study suggests that if journalists would manage to reduce the amount and volume of anonymous sources in news, or at least include more explanations justifying this practice in different contexts, thus increasing their level of transparency, the news could be even more reflective of a new world order, and growing Northern respect toward emerging leaders in the South.

### The Multiperspectival and Interperspectival Forms of News

A central argument I have developed throughout the dissertation is that any analysis of symbolic violence must be conducted in connection with an analysis of the characteristics of the particular media system in question and the logic of the journalistic field providing the coverage. Chapter 7 explored what I define as Finnish “multiperspectival” and American “interperspectival” forms of news, which resemble multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches in academia. I found that these forms of news shape both print and online media content in both countries, thus supporting Pablo Boczkowski's

observation (2004, 73–76) that the NYT tends to recreate its print norms in online settings (see also Powers and Benson 2014, 249). My study also provides support for Rasmus Kleis Nielsen's (2013, 393) claim that the American and Finnish media systems have maintained their structural differences with respect to both print and online news. Even though in chapter 7 I also described how some American news sources have become more segmented over time, especially with regard to the Brazil coverage in my study, and some Finnish news articles tend to be rather intersperspectival in form, most Finnish news articles in my sample were clearly multiperspectival, while American articles were intersperspectival in their structure and form.

To illustrate the Finnish “multiperspectival” logic, I described, for instance, *HS* article no. 297, which told of the increasing numbers of Europeans immigrating to Brazil in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. I find that this article is a great example of the Finnish framing and quoting logic, not only because it openly quoted young Europeans as they framed Brazilian realities negatively, but also because they were the only quoted field in the whole story. Brazilians did not have an opportunity to say anything at all, even though their country and its institutions were being framed in a highly negative tone by Northern sources.

Most *HS* articles quote individuals from more than one field, but the structure of the stories is still segmented – rather than engaging in direct debate, each field has its own physical space, and when this particular space ends, so too does that particular field's chance to speak, an opportunity which is then given exclusively to the next field. But regardless of whether there are one, two, or even three quoted fields in an article, another important characteristic of Finnish news is that all of the quoted fields tend to be proximate to one another, either culturally, ideologically, or both. These proximate fields then contextualize South African or Brazilian realities from their particular perspectives. Likewise, in article no. 297 on European immigration to Brazil, European individuals frame the Brazilian political and economic fields negatively regardless of both ideological as well as geographical distance.

I have argued that such Finnish news articles certainly contain symbolic violence. But I have also developed the argument that this symbolic violence is imposed by the Finnish form of news and connected to the related form of democracy rather than resulting (solely) from the individual journalist writing the article. The Finnish Democratic Corporatist system is characterized by the early development of a mass circulation press and high rates of newspaper circulation (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 67). Finnish people are known to actively follow the news, and Finland is also famous for its relatively high levels of public knowledge regarding international topics (Curran et al. 2009, 17; see also McChesney and Nichols 2010, 51). Therefore, I have argued that Finnish journalists may feel confident that their readers will actively expose themselves to the whole range of coverage. In chapter 7, I showed how Finnish news stories often do not repeat the relevant background



knowledge needed to comprehend the reality from other angles; the journalists assume that readers know the story so far, and if not, then readers are expected to seek it out. Thus, rather than inserting a wide range of different viewpoints into each news article, diverse voices and views have been scattered throughout a range of articles published over a longer time span. I have cautiously connected this finding with Hallin and Mancini's (2004, 29) ideas about segmented pluralism in the Democratic Corporatist media system, suggesting that current foreign news in these media systems may reflect the early existence of separate sub-communities and media's commitment to promoting the views of a particular segment of society, rather than all of them. In other words, the Finnish tendency to isolate perspectives of people with different cultural, ideological, and socioeconomic backgrounds may be a relic of an early logic which was used to foster such divisions within the Finnish society. Through such segmented practice, I found that Finnish news has managed to add a significant level of depth to the perspectives offered each in its turn, while also increasing the transparency of the journalists.

In the *NYT*, I could barely find stories where ideologically and geographically distant fields were not quoted in the same article. These diverse fields are also placed in direct interaction, with many paragraphs containing quotes from more than one field, and each news article tends to contextualize the reality in focus from multiple different angles. In this way, the *NYT* strives for balance and internal pluralism (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 29). What is more, American news strives for neutral coverage in general (*ibid.*); the American journalists clearly refrain from openly criticizing the Southern fields involved, and the Southern fields are expected to negatively frame the other Southern fields together with anonymous sources. That is, while in Finnish news, the negative framer is usually explicitly identified but the object of the framing is not necessarily quoted, in American news the object field is quoted, but the source of the negative framing is often not identified. Thus, the object field is able to speak for itself, but without knowing whose logic is being imposed upon it in the article and whether such a negative definition is local or global (culturally proximate or distant) in nature.

In chapter 3 and the analysis section, I elaborated on the observation that not as many people read newspapers regularly in the U.S. as in Finland (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 22–23; see also McChesney and Nichols 2010, 31, 110–111). In chapter 7, I described how American news tends to repeat the story so far, contextualizing each news article from scratch as if readers had not been following any of the earlier coverage. In other words, unlike Finnish journalists, American journalists do not expect citizens and news audiences to actively expose themselves to many viewpoints – rather, different perspectives are offered in the same newspaper coverage each time over and over again. While this is a good way to ensure that readers comprehend the complexity of the situation, the viewpoints are not expressed and contextualized as comprehensively as in the much more segmented Finnish news. Finally, since each article includes – and is assumed to include – a range of opposing

perspectives, readers are not encouraged, as in the Finnish system, to complement their understanding by seeking out additional sources.

Throughout this dissertation, I have emphasized Hallin and Mancini's (2012, 283) argument that the different kinds of pluralisms inherent in different media systems can promote different types of democracy (see also Benson 2008, 2591–2592; 2013, 48). The Finnish segmented approach reflects a different logic about how best to bring diverse viewpoints together than the American integrated approach. Both forms of news have their merits and pitfalls: while the American interspersed form of news manages to expose readers to multiple viewpoints simultaneously, revealing a particular reality in a complex manner to even the busiest of readers, it does so at a more surface level and does not so much promote the role of the active citizen. The Finnish multiperspectival form of news manages to add depth, but the increasing numbers of Finnish newspaper readers who have cancelled their newspaper subscriptions highlight the fact that less people will wind up with an overall view of the Southern realities depicted.

#### Toward Even Wider Views and Forms of Nonviolent Communication: Lessons Learned in the Research Process

Since the end of my sample period in 2014, both the American and Finnish journalistic fields have experienced serious turbulence. In the United States, Donald Trump was elected President, and even before assuming office in early 2017, he began attacking journalists for supposedly using anonymous sources to depict him negatively. In September 2016, for instance, Trump tweeted: “Anytime you see a story about me or my campaign saying ‘sources said,’ DO NOT believe it. There are no sources, they are just made up lies!”<sup>262</sup> Since becoming the leader of the U.S., Trump has continued to openly attack what he calls the “fake news media,” which, according to him, “makes up stories and ‘sources.’” Yet, American journalists have repeatedly managed to show how Trump himself has acted incorrectly.<sup>263</sup> The Finnish media, on the other hand, has recently been reproached by the country's prime minister, Juha Sipilä, for its critical coverage of his suspicious financial connections. Sipilä's aggressive reactions to the coverage by YLE have led to the resignations of several journalists and a heated discussion about the contested autonomy of the Finnish public media.<sup>264</sup> In other words, both American and Finnish journalists are working in even more difficult circumstances than during the coverage I examined.

---

<sup>262</sup> Tweet available at <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/781755469488615424>.

<sup>263</sup> See, e.g., [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/counting-donald-trumps-lies/2016/05/25/bc0d93a8-229f-11e6-aa84-42391ba52c91\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.2bbf325e0a8e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/counting-donald-trumps-lies/2016/05/25/bc0d93a8-229f-11e6-aa84-42391ba52c91_story.html?utm_term=.2bbf325e0a8e), and <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/opinion/campaign-stops/the-lies-trump-told.html>.

<sup>264</sup> See, e.g., <https://suomenkuvalehti.fi/jutut/kotimaa/ylen-toimittaja-susanne-paivarinta-irtisanoutui-syyttaapaatoimittajaa-sensuurista/>.

The original, principal goal of my Finnish-American comparison was to explore different forms of news and their potential for creating in-depth, democratic news. I thought that if they could better understand the pros and cons of the American and Finnish media systems – how they promote and/or inhibit democratic coverage – then Finnish and American journalists could feel encouraged to adopt framing and quoting practices from one another, and in this way, enhance the quality of their coverage. My research has convinced me that, if able to learn from one another, American and Finnish journalists could significantly increase the diversity and depth of the perspectives presented as well as the transparency of their coverage. These are especially important challenges given the increasing tension between the American and Finnish journalistic and political fields, as described above. The title of this research also denotes the possibilities for further broadening of views in tabloids and tablets, through lessons learned from cross-national comparative research and implementing best practices in both countries.

My first concrete suggestion for improving journalistic practices is simply to increase transparency without necessarily changing the form of news as such. In the Finnish context, this may simply mean noting, whenever contextualizing a story from a limited angle, that indeed, “this story has been contextualized from a limited angle.” In this way, readers can expect partial, but profound, viewpoints on a specific reality. I would also suggest that Finnish journalists should not increase the use of anonymous sources so as to avoid the kinds of conflicts currently occurring in the U.S. For American journalists, increasing transparency would indeed mean using less anonymous sources in critical political coverage. When such sources are used, their purpose should always be clearly explained. If, in the current American political climate, a journalist fears for his/her own safety rather than just his/her source’s safety – the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has already reported that American political journalists experience harassment and even receive death threats – then that particular journalist could also have the option of not including his/her own name in the article as the author in order to maintain a standard of transparency in the criticism being presented. In this way, the main responsibility of the statements made would fall on the medium itself (as is the case with editorials), which is more difficult for politicians to “harass” than a more vulnerable individual journalist. Hence, I am also essentially arguing that a reduction in the use of anonymous sources and aspirations for greater levels of transparency should be a collective effort.

Of course, my study focused on South Africa and Brazil, not on American domestic political news, and so I cannot claim that my findings would in any way manage to describe the ways in which American journalists use anonymous sources to cover their own country’s political issues. My principal argument is that, regardless of the news topic being addressed, the more evidence there is to show that journalists use anonymous sources to protect the security of their sources, rather than to hide their own or some other source’s political agendas, the better the journalists can justify the use of anonymous sources in

situations where these sources reveal delicate information, thereby continuing to produce critical investigative journalism in the future as well.

For the production of more democratic news on global affairs, I would still encourage broadening the scope of voices incorporated from different Southern fields. Whereas in chapter 8, I found that the voices included from South African and Brazilian civic societies and academic fields were substantially diverse, with the newspapers also giving significant volume to more underprivileged voices from different parts of South Africa and Brazil, I also discovered that the voices representing the Southern political fields were quite elitist, limited only to the major parties and the most respected positions in the national governments. In chapter 8, I also suggested that when quoting journalistic content produced by South African and Brazilian media, American and Finnish media should quote more alternative community media, as Custódio (2016), for instance, has discussed with respect to Brazil. Incorporating the viewpoints of more marginal political movements and different forms of local journalistic coverage would help increase both the ideological as well as the institutional multiperspectivalness (Benson 2009; 2013) of the coverage.

My next suggestion would be to increase journalistic self-reflection. Throughout the analysis presented in chapters 6–8, I noted how both American and Finnish journalists from time to time contemplated the limits of their abilities to cover the complexity of Brazilian and South African realities as fully and comprehensively as they would deserve to be covered. However, given that the Finnish journalists are generally more open about their positions, such self-reflection was more common in the Finnish than in the American coverage – a phenomenon I have also tied to the tradition of political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini 2004). In a video published by YLE and analyzed in chapter 7, a Finnish photo journalist was filmed walking around Rio de Janeiro’s slums while simultaneously discussing her sentiments, goals, and challenges as well as the different limitations of her work, including a lack of sufficient command of Portuguese. Hence, this Finnish journalist did not even pretend to be objective or neutral or completely prepared to cover everything that was surrounding her – she was being transparent about her lack of ability to produce “perfect” journalism. Simultaneously, her account contextualized the story in a way that helped viewers understand why this journalist was in a specific favela, interviewing certain people instead of other certain people.

I would also encourage journalists and especially foreign correspondents to write books and personal blog posts about their experiences in the field. For instance, the former chief for the NYT’s Rio de Janeiro bureau, Larry Rohter, has written a book entitled *Brazil on the Rise: A Story of a Country Transformed* (2012). The introductory chapter in particular contains interesting personal background on how the author arrived in Brazil for the first time and “had very little idea what to expect.” He describes his study program at the time, his

“strongest initial impressions,” how the hotels he would stay at “felt less like a Third World Country,” and how (ibid., 2),

at a noisy, stiflingly hot Sunday fair outside a half-finished coliseum whose construction had been abandoned, I listened as migrants from the northeast of Brazil, a drought-ridden region that has traditionally been the country’s poorest, sang songs that spoke of their suffering and frustrated hopes with a plaintiveness that reminded me of the blues I had heard growing up in Chicago.

I find that this part of the book offers a fascinating glimpse into the life of a NYT correspondent based in Brazil, helping readers understand his habitus: what he did there and why. While much of the book focuses on Brazilian history and politics, and the author distances himself from the narrative in such parts, at other moments the “I” of the author steps in and describes a personal experience, such as how he learned to employ *jeito* (ibid., 36). *Jeito* is also described in a recent book published by HS correspondent Maria Manner, written in collaboration with Professor Teivo Teivainen (2016). Besides *jeito* (ibid., 54), Manner and Teivainen (ibid., 70–72) elaborate on their ideas about the Brazilian middle class and who does and does not belong to it, making it much more understandable and transparent why Manner had chosen to quote lower middle class and underprivileged individuals so voluminously in her coverage. But she also explains why she interviewed those people who travelled to work by helicopter (ibid., 7). Manner also keeps a blog.

Thus, even when journalists feel obligated to try and be “neutral” or “objective” in “regular” news coverage, and not reveal their personal stances and feelings so openly, they can always contextualize their journalistic choices in more personal writings, such as books and blogs. I would hope that these additional publications could be promoted in connection with the journalist’s news articles, so that readers would know to look for them as a way of deepening and broadening the perspectives offered in the news coverage. As expressed by Al Omran (2014, 25), whose work also focuses on foreign news: “Journalists should make it easy for the audience to find out more about them and their backgrounds by providing links to their bios and previous work. As a reporter, don’t be afraid to show your human side on social media...”

Another thought for making American and Finnish news coverage more transparent and democratic would be to adopt the genre used by the NYT titled “Room for Debate,” presented and examined in chapter 7 (see also Benson 2013, 211–212). In such a format, the different fields involved discuss a common theme, one clearly defined in an introduction provided by the journalist. Each discussant develops his/her viewpoints in a “section” of his/her own. Even when reading an “individual viewpoint,” all the viewpoints are still visible on the page at the same time. While the speakers are not interrupted when expressing their viewpoints and continue to develop their points in the designated space, the format also ensures that readers become aware of all the included angles and their

relevance simultaneously. Ultimately, readers will put the pieces together in their minds after reading all of the individual pieces, which encourages independent thinking and an active role as citizens. What is more, this format clearly shows the amount of space taken up by each speaker, making the proportions and relative volume of each speaker more transparent and easily notable.

However, as already noted in chapter 7, this format would still need to be developed further for the purposes proposed here, as in the current format, as published by the *NYT* in regard to Brazil at least, almost all the speakers involved represented different sectors of the academic field; a few speakers also represented NGOs and other institutions. Besides developing this format to incorporate a much wider range of speakers from different national and international fields (politics, economics, academics, etc.) to discuss a common topic, this format could also be used to reflect the dynamics within various subfields. For instance, individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds, or politicians representing different parties, could each express their views on a common theme, such as education quotas, a popular topic with respect to both South Africa and Brazil. This format would also be a great way to incorporate more marginal political voices as part of the national political debate, easily situating their claims in a broader ideological context.

My final suggestion would be to integrate links to earlier coverage in the news texts. My own news consumption experiences indicate that this practice is already occurring in most American and Finnish online news, but as I noted in chapter 7, it would be important to systematically adopt this practice for the sphere of foreign news coverage as well. Given the Finnish segmented form of news, such links would ensure that even if reading just one article written from one particular perspective, the reader could easily access the story so far and obtain a broader perspective on the matter. In American news, links can help deepen the particular perspectives included in the interspersed coverage. Integrating the links, like *CNN* does, rather than only including them at the end of an article, as tends to be the custom with *HS* and *YLE*, would also help readers find the missing perspectives in crucial places, facilitating the creation of a broader picture in their minds. I would also recommend incorporating “Story Highlights” boxes in Finnish news, following the example of *CNN*, as illustrated in chapter 7 – a good way to include a summary of many crucial viewpoints for a busy reader.

#### Broadening Perspectives in the Field of Media Studies: Final Remarks and Suggestions for Further Research

I still want to emphasize that, within the limits of their particular media systems and “the rules of the game” for their journalistic fields, I found that both American and Finnish journalists make a conscious effort to introduce diverse viewpoints to readers so that they can understand the complexity of the realities being covered. When a Southern political field is framed negatively by an anonymous source, there is also emphasis on the

accomplishments and efforts made by this particular field being criticized. In Finnish news, such a contrasting viewpoint usually only follows in some later article, while in American news it can usually be detected in nearby paragraphs. Regardless of where the journalistic form of news places this viewpoint of the object being negatively framed, it is evident that no particular institution is solely criticized, and even when describing the most appalling incidents – for instance, South Africa’s president Thabo Mbeki denying that HIV causes AIDS – the journalists have also tried to contextualize the issue from such a questionable perspective, helping readers understand why a Southern person or institution has acted in a particular way.

To explain questionable stances of the Southern agents and institutions involved, journalists have aptly used and combined different frames and tones. For instance, when trying to explain why Mbeki would want to support Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe despite his numerous human rights violations, the NYT journalist used the *Human Interest* frame to describe the friendship between these two men, while also adding significant proportions of historical context (through positive dimensions of the *Responsibility* frame) by explaining how they had fought together against repressive pro-apartheid governments. Based on this coverage, the men’s current actions did not seem any more acceptable, but they were more understandable. The *Human Interest* frame, as often also the *Conflict* frame, has generally been associated with sensationalism and generally deemed as somehow “inferior” coverage compared to more “serious” forms of “sober” journalism (see Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, 106). Rather than complaining so much about “sensationalism” or the negativity of news, I would hope that researchers would spend more time investigating how different perspectives can be broadened and mixed, to contextualize and humanize news about complex issues. By incorporating “softer” viewpoints, different kinds of audiences can be more easily exposed to realities they did not know they had an interest in (see Benson 2008, 2594). My study also shows that even small proportions of these “sensationalist” frames can help add significant context in news.

Since the “closure” of my sample in December 2010 on South Africa and in December 2014 on Brazil, many complex developments have shaken the political fields in these two countries. In South Africa, the ANC continues to be internally divided due to further allegations of criminal activity in Mr. Zuma’s government. In 2016, Zuma faced a rebellion of senior ANC members in his cabinet, which almost led to his dismissal, as had happened to Mbeki earlier. In Brazil, President Dilma Rousseff was forced to step down in April of 2016, following an impeachment vote provoked by substantial evidence of her having manipulated the federal budget in an effort to conceal the nation’s mounting economic problems for her own benefit. Dilma Rousseff and her supporters have called the impeachment a “coup,” also insisting that the Brazilian mainstream media, specifically mentioning *Grupo Globo*, took a firm stance against her, framing her as guilty and not

allowing her to explain her position.<sup>265</sup> In an article published on August 31, 2016, the NYT described her removal from office as “the capstone of a power struggle that has consumed the nation for months and toppled one of the hemisphere’s most powerful political parties.”

Transparency International, alarmed by the increasing number of revelations regarding corruption in these and other African and Latin American countries, argues that “[t]o escape the vicious cycle corruption creates for disadvantaged groups, people need to be able to speak up for their rights and demand accountability from their leaders.”<sup>266</sup> My present study has shown that American and Finnish news media have provided an important forum for South African and Brazilian poor and lower middle class citizens, often excluded from the coverage by their own countries’ mainstream media, to speak up and define their situations in their own words. Thus, it would be highly important to expand the analysis presented here to include more current news materials on these countries and the Global South in general and assess whether the voices of these disadvantaged groups have strengthened or diminished in the news over time. Given the tightened atmosphere in the American and Finnish journalistic fields, resulting from recent developments in these countries’ political fields, it would also be vital to measure the proportions and role of anonymous sources in more recent coverage.

The method I have elaborated in this study has combined quantitative and qualitative approaches to measure frame and field proportions at the manifest level. I believe my method could and should be converted into a more ambitious and sophisticated statistical model, one that would enable systematic measurements of a substantially larger and more heterogeneous sample while also expanding the scope of the media included. But I hope I have also shown the potential of qualitative analysis. I agree with Hallin and Mancini (2012, 217; 2017, 168), who encourage many styles of comparative analysis coexisting side by side; some large-scale and others small-scale, some quantitative and others qualitative (see also Esser 2013, 122).

I would insist, though, that the methodology used must be transparent and systematic. Throughout this study, I have cited many studies that have lamented the fact that the Global South is “voiceless” in Northern news. For instance, Jairo Lugo-Ocando (2015, 62) claims that, in the “type of news report that often dominates the coverage of poverty on an international level, not a single source from the affected country itself is included and the whole story is articulated through the voices of Westerns.” In contrast, my analysis found that the number of voices of South Africans and Brazilians included in the coverage was quite substantial. Even if the voices of American and Finnish journalists still dominate the

---

<sup>265</sup> Public lecture by and scholarly meeting with Dilma Rousseff, September 29, 2017, University of Helsinki.

<sup>266</sup> See [https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity/poverty\\_and\\_corruption\\_in\\_africa](https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity/poverty_and_corruption_in_africa).



coverage, the voices of Southern institutions and lower middle class individuals were far from non-existent, and much louder than the voices of the Northern/Western institutions that were quoted. Of course, some of these differences in the findings may result from the fact that my work dealt with regions neither torn by wars nor famine – countries which have emerged as leaders within the so-called developing world and beyond. But just as I do not want to impose my results on all studies focusing on world news, the reverse should be true as well – even if people in the Global South were found to be “voiceless” in the coverage of a particular issue or region, such findings should not be generalized without caution.

I will go as far as to suggest that the persistent claims about the South lacking a voice may partly be a problem of the research methodology. In the title of her epilogue to a book focusing on the international coverage of events, published two decades ago, Ullamaija Kivikuru (1998, 200) wondered whether foreign news will ever change. I believe her title captures the core problem – the persistent idea that foreign news has not changed and will not change. Some news may not have changed, but my point is precisely that the methodology used should be such that it would allow the researcher to be surprised; the results should not be determined in advance.

Rodney Benson (2015, 258) notes that “as research begins to flow in multiple directions – the West studying the non-West, the non-West studying the West (...) – questions of epistemology, of the limits and biases of forms of knowledge, come to the fore.” Postcolonial theory was developed to address such challenges – but these approaches must also be constantly updated and re-elaborated as countries in the Global South increasingly challenge the prevailing world order. Some scholars have claimed that “the ordinary gets ignored in Africa” and that “editors and journalists do not dig into the complexities of Africa” (e.g., Dowden 2009, 5). But other scholars have claimed that “there are countless books devoted to Africa, but they all speak of a different place: yesterday’s Africa” (e.g., Severino and Ray 2011, 1). Just as there are new books appearing about the “new Africa,” there are news articles appearing about the new Africa, new Latin America, and the new Global South. I have argued throughout this dissertation that Northern news on the “new realities” in the South should obviously still contain deep historical context, explaining the past struggles and Northern/Western responsibility for them. But I also believe that these “new news,” and the journalists producing them, should be given a fair chance. Therefore, in short, I insist that the tools and methods used in studies on Northern coverage of the South must be transparent to demonstrate that the findings are not imposed by the researcher, but rather, reveal existing proportions in current news stories.

Hopefully, my study has managed to show again the potential of cross-national comparative research (as in Benson 2013; Esser 2013; Hallin and Mancini 2004, 2012, 2017) – how the specific practices of different media can become clearer and more understandable when

comparing contents produced in different regions and media systems. I admire and would strongly encourage further development of projects such as The Worlds of Journalism Study, founded to assess the state of journalism around the world while promoting connections between communication scholars in different countries.<sup>267</sup>

It has been argued that the field of journalism studies does not interact sufficiently or successfully with other academic fields (see Zelizer 2004, 3). I find that the field of journalism studies, and world news studies in particular, would greatly benefit from more dialogue with different branches of the academia, for it is only through multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary means that a researcher can fully understand any local context – the “big window” depicting realities that are the focus of the news stories being studied. Area and cultural studies, for instance, offers a fruitful approach for understanding the transformations taking place in the realities of different regions, which I would regard as fundamentally important so as to avoid making the kinds of assumptions described above.

I will conclude by stressing that it is fundamental for researchers to also reveal their own ideological positions and relative distance from the objects of study. This is why, for instance, I have included a subchapter on normative theories of the press: to explain exactly what the press is expected to do, why, and how I will measure it. To my understanding, the more transparent the method and the purpose of the study, the more likely researchers will be able to engage in nonviolent forms of communication with the journalists whose lifework they are scrutinizing. This said, content analyses should also be complemented with interviews with the journalists, which, along with developing the method further, will be my very next step. Comparative analyses are ambitious, and not nearly everything can be accomplished by a single research project – or even by a single discipline, department, or university. Rather than isolating ourselves in distant fields, intending to impose our own particular viewpoint of the social world and its divisions on the society as a whole, as Bourdieu (1987, 13–14) has argued, we academics and journalists should try to reach beyond our comfort zones in a joint effort to increase and deepen understandings of the surrounding world.

---

<sup>267</sup> I thank Turo Uskali for introducing me to this project: <http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/>.

## References Cited

ADAMS, Paul

2007: *Atlantic Reverberations: French Representations of an American Presidential Election*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

AL OMRAN, Ahmed

2014: A Toolkit: Eight Tactics for the Digital Foreign Correspondent. In: *The New Global Journalism: Foreign Correspondence in Transition*, edited by Ann Cooper and Taylor Owen, pp. 19–28. New York: Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University, available at: <http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-New-Global-Journalism-1.pdf>. Last accessed November 27, 2017.

ALBERT, Mathieu

2017: Field, Habitus, Boundary Work, and STS: Studying Knowledge Production Through a Bourdieusian Perspective. Working paper in the seminar “Pierre Bourdieu on Science, Knowledge, and Power.” February 17, 2017, University of Tampere, Finland.

ALBUQUERQUE, Afonso de

2012: On Models and Margins: Comparative Media Models from a Brazilian Perspective. In: *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*, edited by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, pp. 72–95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

APPIAH, Kwame Anthony

2015: Race in the Modern World. In: *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2015, pp. 1–8.

BARBER, James

1999: *South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History – In Search of a Nation State*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

BARNHURST, Kevin

2010: The Form of Reports on US Newspaper Internet Sites, an Update. In: *Journalism Studies* 11(4), pp. 555–566.

BARNHURST, Kevin and John NERONE

2001: *The Form of News: A History*. New York and London: The Guilford Press.

BECHER, Tony and Paul TROWLER

2001: *Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual Enquiry and the Culture of Disciplines*. Philadelphia: The Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press.

BELLOS, Alex

2014: *Futebol: The Brazilian Way of Life*. New York: Bloomsbury.

BENSON, Rodney

1999: Field Theory in Comparative Context: A New Paradigm for Media Studies. In: *Theory and Society* 28(3), pp. 463–498.

2005: Mapping Field Variation: Journalism in France and the United States. In: *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, edited by Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu, pp. 85–112. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Pluto Press.

2008: Journalism: Normative Theories. In: *The International Encyclopedia of Communication*, Vol. VI, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach, pp. 2591–2597.

2009: What Makes News More Multiperspectival? A Field Analysis. In: *Poetics* 37, pp. 402–418.

2010: Comparative News Media Systems: New Directions in Research. In: *Routledge Companion to News Media and Journalism Studies*, edited by Stuart Allan, pp. 614–626. London: Routledge.

2013: *Shaping Immigration News: A French-American Comparison*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2015: Public Spheres, Fields, Networks: Western Concepts for a De-Westernizing World? In: *Internationalizing International Communication*, edited by Chin-Chuan Lee, pp. 258–280. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

BENSON, Rodney and Daniel HALLIN

2007: How States, Markets and Globalization Shape the News: The French and U.S. National Press, 1965–1997. In: *European Journal of Communication* 22(1), pp. 27–48.

BENSON, Rodney and Eric NEVEU

2005: Introduction: Field Theory as a Work in Progress. In: *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, edited by Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu, pp. 1–25. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Pluto Press.

BENSON, Rodney and Tim WOOD

2015: Who Says What or Nothing at All? Speakers, Frames, and Frameless Quotes in Unauthorized Immigration News in the United States, Norway, and France. In: *American Behavioral Scientist* 59(7), pp. 802–821.

BERGER, Meyer

1951: *The Story of the New York Times 1851–1951*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

BOCZKOWSKI, Pablo

2004: *Digitizing the News: Innovation in Online Newspapers*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

BODEN, Margaret

1999: What is Interdisciplinarity? In: *Interdisciplinarity and the Organization of Knowledge in Europe*, pp. 13–24. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communication.

BOEYINK, David

1990: Anonymous Sources in News Stories: Justifying Exceptions and Limiting Abuses. In: *Journal of Mass Media Ethics* 5(4), pp. 233–246.

BORAH, Porismita

2011: Conceptual Issues in Framing Theory: A Systematic Examination of a Decade's Literature. In: *Journal of Communication* 61, pp. 246–263.

BOURDIEU, Pierre

1977: *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1987: What Makes a Social Class: On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups. In: *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32, pp. 1–17.

1988: *Homo Academicus*. Translated by Peter Collier. Cambridge: Polity Press.

1998: *On Television*. New York: The Free Press.

2000: Understanding. In: *The Weight of the World*, edited by Pierre Bourdieu, pp. 607–625. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

2005: The Political Field, the Social Science Field, and the Journalistic Field. In: *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, edited by Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu, pp. 29–47. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Pluto Press.

BOURDIEU, Pierre and Loïc WACQUANT

1992: *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

CARLSON, Matt

2011: *On the Condition of Anonymity: Unnamed Sources and the Battle for Journalism*. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

CARR, David

2011: Print is Dead: Long Live the New York Times. In: *Page One: Inside the New York Times and the Future of Journalism*, edited by David Folkenflik, pp. 11–21. New York: Public Affairs.

CARRAGEE, Kevin and Wim ROEFS

2004: The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research. In: *Journal of Communication*, June 2004, pp. 214–233.

CHANG, Tsan-Kuo, Brian SOUTHWELL, Hyung-Min LEE, and Yejin HONG

2012: A Changing World, Unchanging Perspectives: American Newspaper Editors and Enduring Values in Foreign News Reporting. In: *International Communication Gazette* 74(4), pp. 367–384.

CHEAS, Kirsi

2010: *Voiman ja vaaran järvi: Etnokategoriat ja Titicacan pyhyys alkuperäiskansojen myyteissä ja muistelmassa*. Master's thesis, Department of World Cultures, University of Helsinki.

2016: From Multidisciplinary Research to Multiperspectival News: Proportions of Perspectives in Finnish and US World News Articles Concerning Brazil. In: *Multidisciplinary Latin American Studies: Festschrift in Honor of Martti Pärssinen*, edited by Harri Kettunen and Antti Korpisaari, pp. 87–105. Renvall Institute Publications 33, University of Helsinki.

CHONG, Dennis and James DRUCKMAN

2007: Framing Theory. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, pp. 103–126.

CHOULIARAKI, Lily

2006: *The Spectatorship of Suffering*. London: SAGE.

2008: The Symbolic Power of Transnational Media: Managing the Visibility of Suffering. In: *Global Media and Communication* 4(3), pp. 329–351.

COOK, Nicolas

2013: *South Africa: Politics, Economy, and U.S. Relations*. CRS Report, Congressional Research Service. Available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43130.pdf> (last accessed November 27, 2017).

CURRAN, James, Shanto IYENGAR, Anker Brink LUND, and Inka SALOVAARA-MORING

2009: Media System, Public Knowledge, and Democracy. In: *European Journal of Communication* 24(1), pp. 5–26.

CUSTÓDIO, Leonardo

2013: Keskiluokkien konflikti Brasilian nuorisovetoisissa protesteissa. In: *Nuorisotutkimus* 31(3), pp. 5–26.

2016: *Favela Media Activism: Political Trajectories of Low-Income Brazilian Youth*. Doctoral Dissertation, School of Communication, Media, and Theater, University of Tampere. Tampere: Tampere University Press.

D'ANGELO, Paul and Jim KUYPERS

2010: Introduction: Doing News Framing Analysis. In: *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, edited by Paul D'Angelo and Jim Kuypers, pp. 1–13. New York: Routledge.

DE VREESE, Claes, Jochen PETER, and Holli SEMETKO

2001: Framing Politics at the Launch of the Euro: A Cross-National Comparative Study of Frames in the News. In: *Political Communication* 18, pp. 107–122.

DIMITROVA, Daniela and Jesper STRÖMBÄCK

2009: Looks Who's Talking: Use of Sources in Newspaper Coverage in Sweden and the United States. In: *Journalism Practice* 3(1), pp. 75–91.

DOWDEN, Richard

2009: *Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles*. New York: Public Affairs.

DUFFY, Matt

2014: Anonymous Sources: A Historical Review of the Norms Surrounding Their Use. In: *American Journalism* 31(2), pp. 236–261.

EDGECOMBE, D. R.

1978: Non-Racial Franchise in Cape Politics, 1853–1910. In: *Kleio* 10(1–2), pp. 21–37.

ENTMAN, Robert

1993: Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. In: *Journal of Communication* 43(4), pp. 51–58.

2004: *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

2006: Punctuating the Homogeneity of Institutionalized News: Abusing Prisoners at Abu Ghraib versus Killing Civilians at Fallujah. In: *Political Communication* 23, pp. 215–224.

2010: Framing Media Power. In: *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*, pp. 331–355. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

ESPOSITO, Steven

1999: Anonymous White House Sources: How They Helped Shape Television News Coverage of the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky Scandal. In: *Communications & the Law* 21(3), pp. 1–18.

ESSER, Frank

1999: 'Tabloidization' of News: A Comparative Analysis of Anglo-American and German Press Journalism. In: *European Journal of Communication* 14(3), pp. 291–324.



2013: The Emerging Paradigm of Comparative Communication Enquiry: Advancing Cross-National Research in Times of Globalization. In: *International Journal of Communication* 7, pp. 113–128.

ESSER, Frank, Sven ENGESSER, Jörg MATTHES, and Rosa BERGANZA

2017a: Negativity. In: *Comparing Political Journalism*, edited by Claes de Vreese, Frank Esser, and David Nicolas Hopmann, pp. 71–91. London and New York: Routledge.

ESSER, Frank, Claes DE VREESE, and David Nicolas HOPMANN et al.

2017b: The Explanatory Logic: Factors that Shape Political News. In: *Comparing Political Journalism*, edited by Claes de Vreese, Frank Esser, and David Nicolas Hopmann, pp. 22–32. London and New York: Routledge.

FAUSTO, Boris

1999: *A Concise History of Brazil*, translated by Arthur Brakel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FERREE, Myra Marx, William GAMSON, Jürgen GERHARDS, and Dieter RUCHT

2002: *Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

FIGENSCHOU, Tina Ustad

2010: A Voice for the Voiceless? A Quantitative Content Analysis of Al-Jazeera English's Flagship News. In: *Global Media and Communication* 6(1), pp. 85–107.

FREIRE, Paulo

[1970] 2000: *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: Bloomsbury.

FOLKENFLIK, David

2011: Introduction. In: *Page One: Inside the New York Times and the Future of Journalism*, edited by David Folkenflik, pp. ix–xvi. New York: Public Affairs.

FRIEDLAND, Roger

2009: The Endless Fields of Pierre Bourdieu. In: *Organization Articles* 16(6), pp. 1–31.

GALTUNG, Johan and Marie Holmboe RUGE

1965: The Structure of Foreign News. In: *Journal of Peace Research* 2(1), pp. 64–91.

GANS, Herbert

2011: Multiperspectival News Revisited: Journalism and Representative Democracy. *Journalism* 12(1), pp. 3–13.

GEERTZ, Clifford

[1973] 2000: *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books.

GITLIN, Todd

1980: *The Whole World is Watching*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

GO, Julian

2008: Global Fields and Imperial Forms: Field Theory and the British and American Empires. In: *Sociological Theory* 26(3), pp. 201–229.

2013: For a Postcolonial Sociology. In: *Theory and Society* 42 (1), pp. 25–55.

GOFFMAN, Erving

[1974] 1986: *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. York, PA: Northeastern University Press.

GOLDBLATT, David

2014: *Futebol Nation: The Story of Brazil Through Soccer*. New York: Nation Books.

GUENDUEZ, Ali Asker, Kuno SCHEDLER, and Dumitru CIOCAN

2016: Generic Frames and Tonality: Mapping a Polarizing Issue in a Multifaceted Context. In: *European Journal of Communication* 31(5), pp. 584–599.

HALLIN, Daniel

1994: *We Keep America on Top of the World: Television Journalism and the Public Sphere*. London: Routledge.

2005: Field Theory, Differentiation Theory, and Comparative Media Research. In: *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field*, edited by Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu, pp. 224–243. London: Polity Press.

HALLIN, Daniel and Paolo MANCINI

2004: *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2012: Conclusion. In: *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*, edited by Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, pp. 278–304. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2017: Ten Years After Comparing Media Systems: What Have We Learned? In: *Political Communication* 34, pp. 155–171.

HAMILTON, John Maxwell

1976: Ho hum, Latin America. In: *Columbia Journalism Review*, May/June, pp. 8–10.

2009: *Journalism's Roving Eye: A History of American Foreign Reporting*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

HAMILTON, John Maxwell and Regina LAWRENCE

2010: Introduction, and Bridging Past and Future: Using History and Practice to Inform Social Scientific Study on Foreign Newsgathering. *Journalism Studies* 11(5), pp. 630–633 and 683–699.

HANKIMO, Heikki, Kirsi KOLARI, and Päivi LEHTOVIRTA (eds.)

2012: *Päivälehti – Helsingin Sanomat: A Survey*. Publication of the Päivälehti Archive.

HARDEN, Bryant Edward

2014: The Diplomatic Ambitions of the BRIC States: Challenging the Hegemony of the West. In: *Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy* 2(2), pp. 1–18.

HAWTHORNE, Walter

2010: *From Africa to Brazil: Culture, Identity, and an Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1830*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

HEGEL, Georg

[1837] 2001: *Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree. Ontario: Batoche Books.

HELLMAN, Heikki

2010: Täysi vai täydentävä palvelu? In: *Yleisradio median murroksessa*, edited by Airi Leppänen, Timo-Erkki Heino, and Eeva Mäntymäki, pp. 43–66. Tampere: Vastapaino.

HERTOG, James and Douglas MCLEOD

2001: A Multiperspectival Approach to Framing Analysis: A Field Guide. In: *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*, pp. 139–161. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

HESS, Stephen

1996: *International News and Foreign Correspondents*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

HIRST, Monica

2013: *Understanding Brazil–United States Relations: Contemporary History, Current Complexities, and Prospects for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão. Available at: [http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/1043-Understanding\\_Brazil\\_-\\_United\\_States\\_relations.pdf](http://funag.gov.br/loja/download/1043-Understanding_Brazil_-_United_States_relations.pdf). Last accessed November 27, 2017.

IYENGAR, Shanto

1991: *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

JOHNSON, R. W.

2013: *South Africa's Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since the End of Apartheid*. New York: the Overlook Press.

JONES, Timothy, Peter Van AELST, and Rens VLIEGENTHART

2013: Foreign Nation Visibility in U.S. News Coverage: A Longitudinal Analysis (1950–2006). In: *Communication Research* 40(3), pp. 417–436.

JUUTINEN, Marko and Jyrki KÄKÖNEN

2016: *Blokkien paluu: BRICS-maiden nousu, USA ja Suomi*. Helsinki: Into Kustannus.

KALTMEIR, Olaf

2015: Global South. In: *Concepts of the Global South – Voices from Around the World*, p. 10. Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany. Available at: <https://www.rgs.org/NR/rdonlyres/6AFE1B7F-9141-472A-95C1-52AA291AA679/0/60sGlobalNorthSouthDivide.pdf>. Last accessed November 27, 2017.

KAPHLE, Anup

The Foreign Desk in Transition: A Hybrid Approach to Reporting from There and Here. In: *The New Global Journalism: Foreign Correspondence in Transition*, edited by Ann Cooper and Taylor Owen. Available at: <http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-New-Global-Journalism-1.pdf>. Last accessed May 23, 2017.

KEETON, Gavin

2014: Inequality in South Africa. In: *The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation* 74, pp. 26–31.

KIVIKURU, Ullamaija

1998: Epilogi: Koskaan et muuttua saa? In: *Uutisia yli rajojen: Ulkomaanuutisten maisema Suomessa*, edited by Ullamaija Kivikuru and Jukka Pietiläinen, pp. 200–221. Helsinki: Helsingin yliopiston Lahden tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus.

KIVIKURU, Ullamaija and JUKKA PIETILÄINEN

1998: Esipuhe. In: *Uutisia yli rajojen: Ulkomaanuutisten maisema Suomessa*, edited by Ullamaija Kivikuru and Jukka Pietiläinen, pp. 200–221. Helsingin yliopiston Lahden tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus.

KLEIN, Julie Thompson

1996: *Crossing Boundaries: Knowledge, Disciplinarity, and Interdisciplinarity*. Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia.

KOLAMO, Sami

2014: *FIFAN valtapeli: Etelä-Afrikan jalkapallon MM-kisat 2010 keskitettynä mediaspektaakkelina*. Jyväskylä: Nykykulttuuri.

LAIDI, Zaki

2011: The BRICS Against the West? In: *Ceri Strategy Papers* No. 11, November 2011, pp. 1–12.

LEE, Jennifer 8

2011: How the New York Times Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Blog. In: *Page One: Inside the New York Times and the Future of Journalism*, edited by David Folkenflik, pp. 47–57. New York: Public Affairs.

LUGO-OCANDO, Jairo

2015: *Blaming the Victim: How Global Journalism Fails Those in Poverty*. London: Pluto Press.

LUHTAKALLIO, Eeva

2012: Esipuhe [Preface]. In: *Vuorovaikutuksen sosiologia*, authored by Erving Goffman and translated by Kaisa Koskinen, pp. 7–21. Tampere: Vastapaino.

MANDELA, Nelson

[1994] 2013: *Long Walk to Freedom: Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*. New York, Boston, and London: Little, Brown and Company.

MANNER, Maria and Teivo TEIVAINEN

2016: *Brasilia*. Helsinki: Siltala.

MÄNTYMÄKI, Eeva

2010: Johdanto: Julkisen palvelun puolustus – Taistelu tuulimyllyjä vastaan? In: *Yleisradio median murroksessa*, edited by Airi Leppänen, Timo-Erkki Heino, and Eeva Mäntymäki, pp. 13–21. Tampere: Vastapaino.

MAY, Julian

2010: Poverty Eradication: The South African Experience. Paper prepared for the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Social Policy and Development and Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Development and NEPAD Division Expert Group Meeting on Poverty

Eradication. Available at:  
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/social/meetings/egm10/documents/May%20paper.pdf>. Last accessed on November 27, 2017.

MCCHESNEY, Robert and John NICHOLS

2010: *The Death and Life of American Journalism: The Media Revolution that Will Begin the World Again*. Philadelphia: Nation Books.

MCNAIR, Brian

2011: Managing the Online News Revolution: The UK Experience. In: *News Online: Transformations and Continuities*, edited by Graham Meikle and Guy Redden, pp. 38–52. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

MEADE, Teresa

2010: *A Brief History of Brazil*. New York: Checkmark Books.

MEIKLE, Graham and Guy REDDEN

2011: Introduction: Transformation and Continuity. In: *News Online: Transformations and Continuities*, edited by Graham Meikle and Guy Redden, pp. 1–19. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

MEREDITH, Martin

2011: *The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence*. New York: Public Affairs.

MIKKELI, Heikki and Jussi PAKKASVIRTA

2007: *Tieteiden välissä? Johdatus monitieteisyyteen, tieteidenvälisyyteen ja poikkitieteisyyteen*. Helsinki: WSOY.

MORAN, Joe

2002: *Interdisciplinarity*. London and New York: Routledge.

NEWELL, William

1998: Professionalizing Interdisciplinarity. In: *Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature*, edited by William Newell, pp. 529–563. New York: the College Board.

NEWELL, William and William GREEN

1982: Defining and Teaching Interdisciplinary Studies. In: *Improving College and University Teaching* 30(1), pp. 23–30.

NIELSEN, Rasmus Kleis

2013: The Absence of Structural Americanization: Media System Developments in Six Affluent Democracies, 2000–2009. In: *The International Journal of Press and Politics* (18)4, pp. 392–412.

NISBET, Matthew

2010: Knowledge into Action: Framing the Debates over Climate Change and Poverty. In: *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, edited by Paul D'Angelo and Jim Kuypers, pp. 43–83. New York: Routledge.

NUMMENMAA, Lauri

2009: *Käyttätymistieteiden tilastolliset menetelmät*. Helsinki: Tammi.

OBAMA, Barack

2010: Foreword. In: *Conversations with Myself*, by Nelson Mandela, pp. xi–xiii. New York: Picador.

O'NEILL, Jim

2001: Building Better Global Economic BRICs. Goldman Sachs: *Global Paper* 66, pp. 1–15.

PAKKASVIRTA, Jussi

2008: *Pulp and Fiction: Tarinoita globalisaatiosta ja sellutehtaasta*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

PAPA, Mihaela

2013: BRICS' Pursuit of Multipolarity: Response in the United States. Working Paper: Harvard Law School and the Center for BRICS Studies at Fudan University. Available at: <http://www.brics-info.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/BRICS%E2%80%99Pursuit-of-Multipolarity-Response-in-the-United-States.pdf>. Last accessed November 27, 2017.



PAPATHANASSOPOULOS, Stylianos and Ralph NEGRINE

2011: *European Media: Structures, Policies, and Entity*. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press.

PÄRSSINEN, Martti, Denise SCHAAN, and Alceu RANZI

2009: Pre-Columbian Geometric Earthworks in the Upper Purús: A Complex Society in Western Amazonia. In: *Antiquity* 83, pp. 1084–1095.

PEDELTY, Mark

1995: *War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents*. London and New York: Routledge.

PELTOLA, Pekka and Iina SOIRI

1999: *Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa*. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.

PIETILÄINEN, Jukka

1998: Ulkomailta Suomeen: Määrällinen analyysi. In: *Utisia yli rajojen: Ulkomaanuutisten maisema Suomessa*, edited by Ullamaija Kivikuru and Jukka Pietiläinen, pp. 84–108. Helsinki: Helsingin yliopiston Lahden tutkimus- ja koulutuskeskus.

PIRTTIJÄRVI, Jouni

1998: Ystävyyttä ja solidaarisuutta. In: *Kahvi, pahvi ja tango: Suomen ja Latinalaisen Amerikan suhteet*, edited by Jukka Aronen ja Jussi Pakkasvirta, pp. 99–104. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

PJESIVAC, Ivanka and Rachel RUI

2014: Anonymous Sources Hurt Credibility of News Stories across Cultures: A Comparative Experiment in America and China. In: *The International Communication Gazette* 76(8), pp. 641–660.

PORTO, Mauro

2007: Frame Diversity and Citizen Competence: Towards a Critical Approach to News Quality. In: *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 24(4), pp. 303–321.

POWERS, Matthew and Rodney BENSON

2014: Is the Internet Homogenizing or Diversifying the News? External Pluralism in the U.S., Danish, and French Press. In: *The International Journal of Press and Politics* 19(2), pp. 246–265.

REESE, Stephen

2010: Finding Frames in a Web of Culture: The Case of the War on Terror. In: *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, edited by Paul D'Angelo and Jim Kuypers, pp. 17–42. New York and London: Routledge.

REICH, Zvi

2009: *Sourcing the News: Key Issues in Journalism – An Innovative Study of the Israeli Press*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

REID, Michael

2014: *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

REPKO, Allen

2012: *Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory*. Los Angeles: SAGE.

RETA, Meseret Chekol

2000: US Media Coverage of the 1994 Elections in South Africa. In: *Gazette* 62(6), pp. 523–536.

RIFFE, Daniel, Charles AUST, Ted JONES, Barbara SHOEMAKE, and Shyam SUNDAR

1994: The Shrinking Foreign Newshole of the New York Times. In: *Newspaper Research Journal* 15(3), pp. 74–88.

ROHTER, Larry

2012: *Brazil on the Rise: a Story on the Country Transformed*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

ROSEN, Jay

2011: The Three Different Kinds of Context Missing in the News System as it Stands. In: *Public Notebook* blog, available at

<https://publicnotebook.wordpress.com/2011/07/31/three-different-kinds-of-context-were-missing/>. Last accessed November 27, 2017.

RYFE, David

2012: *Can Journalism Survive: An Inside Look at American Newsrooms*. Cambridge and Malden: Polity.

SALEEM, Noshima

2007: U.S. Media Framing of Foreign Countries' Image: An Analytical Perspective. In: *Canadian Journal of Media Studies* 2(1), pp. 130–162.

SAURI, Tuomo and Robert PICARD

2012: Mediatalous. In: *Suomen mediamaisema*, edited by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Osmo Wiio, pp. 35–64. Tampere, Vastapaino.

SEMETKO, Holli and Patti VALKENBURG

2000: Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News. In: *Journal of Communication*, Spring 2000, pp. 93–109.

SERRA, Sonia

2000: The Killing of the Brazilian Street Children and the Rise of the International Public Sphere. In: *Media Organizations in Society*, edited by James Curran, pp. 151–171. London: Arnold.

SEVERINO, Jean-Michel and Olivier RAY

2011: *Africa's Moment*. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press.

SHEEHY, Michael

2008: Foreign News Stories More Likely to Include Unnamed Sources. In: *Newspaper Research Journal* 29(3), pp. 24–37.

SILVO, Ismo

2010: Yle ja journalismin odotettu kriisi. In: *Yleisradio median murroksessa*, edited by Airi Leppänen, Timo-Erkki Heino, and Eeva Mäntymäki, pp. 239–247. Tampere: Vastapaino and Radio- ja televisiotoimittajien liitto.

SOBEL, Meghan and Daniel RIFFE

2016: Newspapers Use Unnamed Sources Often in High-Stakes Coverage. In: *Newspaper Research Journal* 37(3), pp. 299–311.

SPARKS, Colin

2000: Introduction: The Panic over Tabloid News. In: *Tabloid Tales: Global Debates Over Media Standards*, edited by Colin Sparks and John Tulloch, pp. 1–40. Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

2011: South African Media in Comparative Perspective. In: *Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies* 32(2), pp. 5–19.

SPIVAK, Gayatri

1988: Can the Subaltern Speak? In: *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, pp. 66–111. London: Macmillan.

SREBERNY, Annabelle and Chris PATERSON

2004: Introduction. In: *Shouting from the Rooftops: Reflections on International News in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, edited by C. Paterson and A. Sreberny, pp. 3–27. London: John Libbey.

STERNADORI, Miglena and Esther THORSON

2009: Anonymous Sources Harm Credibility of All Stories. In: *Newspaper Research Journal* 30(4), pp. 54–66.

STEYN, Elanie and Arnold de BEER

2004: The Level of Journalism Skills in South African Media: A Reason for Concern within a Developing Democracy? In: *Journalism Studies* 5(3), 387–397.

STRANGE, Susan

2012: The Declining Authority of the States. In: *The Globalization Reader*, Fourth edition, edited by Frank Lechner and John Boli, pp. 219–236. West Sussex: Wiley.

SWARTZ, David

1997: *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

TAALAS, Janne

2015: YK: Seitsenkymppisen näytön paikka. In: *Ulkopolitiikka* 3/2015, pp. 44–47.

TEIVAINEN, Teivo

2003: *Pedagogía del poder mundial: Relaciones internacionales y lecciones del desarrollo en América Latina*. Lima: El Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación.

TEPPERMAN, Jonathan

2016: Brazil's Antipoverty Breakthrough: The Surprising Success of Bolsa Familia. In: *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2016, pp. 34–44.

TEPPO, Annika

2004: *The Making of a Good White: A Historical Ethnography of the Rehabilitation of Poor Whites in a Suburb of Cape Town*. Research Series in Anthropology, University of Helsinki.

THUSSU, Daya Kishan

2012: Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow: In: *The Globalization Reader*, Fourth edition, edited by Frank Lechner and John Boli, pp. 352–357. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

TUCHMAN, Gaye

1978: *Making News: A Study on the Construction of Reality*. New York: Free Press.

USKALI, Turo

2007: *Ulkomaanuutisten uusi maailma*. Tampere: Vastapaino.

VÄLIVERRONEN, Esa

1996: *Ympäristöuhkan anatomia: Tiede, mediat ja metsän sairaskertomus*. Tampere: Vastapaino.

2009: Journalismi kriisissä? In: *Journalismi murroksessa*, edited by Esa Väliaverronen, pp. 13–31. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

VALTONEN, Pekka

2001: *Latinalaisen Amerikan historia*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

VAN GORP, Baldwin

2010: Strategies to Take Subjectivity Out of Framing Analysis. In: *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, edited by Paul D'Angelo and Jim Kuypers, pp. 85–109. New York: Routledge.

VAZ DE CAMINHA, Pêro

[1500] 2010: The Letter of Pero Vaz de Caminha. In: *Early Brazil: A Documentary Collection to 1700*, edited by Stuart Swartz and translated by Clive Willis and Stuart Swartz, pp. 8–9. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WACQUANT, Loïc

2013: Symbolic Power and Group-Making: On Pierre Bourdieu's Re-framing of Class. In: *Journal of Classical Sociology* 13(2), pp. 274–291.

WASSERMAN, Herman and Arnold de BEER

2009: Afro-Optimism/Afro-Pessimism and the South African Media. In: *Critical Arts* 23(3), pp. 377–395.

WEISS, Thomas

2009: Toward a Third Generation of International Institutions: Obama's UN Policy. In: *Washington Quarterly* 32(3), pp. 141–162.

WELCH, James

2009: Interdisciplinarity and the History of Western Epistemology. In: *Issues in Integrative Studies* 27, pp. 35–69.

WELSH, David

2009: *The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

WIGELL, Mikael

2011: Assertive Brazil: An Emerging Power and Its Implications. *Briefing Paper* 82. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

ZELIZER, Barbie

2004: *Taking Journalism Seriously: News and the Academy*. Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi: SAGE.

ZIBECHI, Raúl

2014: *The New Brazil: Regional Imperialism and the New Democracy*. Edinburgh, Oakland, and Baltimore: AK Press.

ZIRIN, Dave

2014: *Brazil's Dance with the Devil: The World Cup, the Olympics, and the Fight for Democracy*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.





Table 5 (Appendices): Institutional fields: Proportion of articles where quoted and negatively framed (% of total sample).

THE NEW YORK TIMES ON SOUTH AFRICA

	POLIT. S.A.	POLIT. Other Southern	POLIT. North	POLIT. Intergov. North	ECON. South	ECON. North	LAW South	NGOs South	NGOs North	UNAFF. INDIV. South	UNAFF. INDIV. North	SPORTS South	SPORTS North	JOURN. South	JOURN. North	ACAD. South	ACAD. North	OTHER FIELDS, South	ANON.
quoted	78.5	3.8	7.7	10.0	11.5	-	29.1	23.1	6.9	36.2	1.5	6.2	6.2	23.8	7.7	46.9	12.3	10.0	50.0
neg. framed	68.5	2.3	6.2	1.5	3.8	-	10.8	3.8	-	-	-	3.8	3.1	1.5	0.8	2.3	0.8	1.5	-

THE NEW YORK TIMES ON BRAZIL

	POLIT. Brazil	POLIT. Other Southern	POLIT. North	POLIT. Intergov. North	ECON., South	ECON., North	LAW South	NGOs South	NGOs North	UNAFF. INDIV. South	UNAFF. INDIV. North	SPORTS South	SPORTS North	JOURN. South	JOURN. North	ACAD. South	ACAD. North	OTHER FIELDS, South	ANON.
quoted	78.5	6.9	16.9	9.2	22.3	-	22.3	19.2	4.6	43.8	3.8	12.3	6.9	26.2	-	50.0	21.5	6.2	59.2
neg. framed	59.2	11.5	16.9	2.3	14.6	-	20.0	-	-	3.0	0.8	4.6	3.8	3.1	-	-	-	1.5	-

HELSINGIN SANOMAT ON SOUTH AFRICA

	POLIT. S.A.	POLIT. Other Southern	POLIT. North	POLIT. Intergov. North	ECON. South	ECON. North	LAW South	NGOs South	NGOs North	UNAFF. INDIV. South	UNAFF. INDIV. North	SPORTS South	SPORTS North	JOURN. South	JOURN. North	ACAD. South	ACAD. North	OTHER FIELDS, South	ANON.
quoted	53.6	10.0	7.1	7.0	-	-	2.0	7.0	-	25.0	3.5	15.9	7.1	7.0	10.7	17.9	3.5	10.4	14.3
neg. framed	42.9	32.1	-	-	-	-	7.1	-	-	-	-	-	3.4	-	-	-	-	-	-

HELSINGIN SANOMAT ON BRAZIL

	POLIT. Brazil	POLIT. Other Southern	POLIT. North	POLIT. Intergov. North	ECON., South	ECON., North	LAW South	NGOs South	NGOs North	UNAFF. INDIV. South	UNAFF. INDIV. North	SPORTS South	SPORTS North	JOURN. South	JOURN. North	ACAD. South	ACAD. North	OTHER FIELDS, South	ANON.
quoted	39.0	-	-	1.2	16.7	6.9	8.3	16.7	13.7	27.8	2.8	2.8	5.6	15.3	16.7	22.2	-	5.6	29.2
neg. framed	30.6	-	2.8	1.4	2.8	5.6	13.9	-	-	-	1.4	4.2	2.8	1.4	-	-	-	-	-

Table 5: Proportion of articles where different fields are quoted and negatively framed, vis-à-vis total sample size. Note: this table does not indicate *volume* of voices, but relative *quantity* of *articles*.



Table 6 (Appendices): Dimensions of news frames: translated excerpts from *HS*

DIMENSION NO.	ITEM to detect the particular dimension of frame at the paragraph level	EXCERPTS FROM <i>HS</i> SAMPLE Paragraphs illustrating the character of each dimension; English translation	ORIGINAL IN FINNISH
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FRAME			
2 (pos.)	Does the article credit some individual/institution/country with having resolved a situation?	Art. no. 271, par. 10: The newspapers contained special supplements about Mandela and he was also praised on the radio throughout the day. Many people remembered the birthday hero with warmth. "He gave us freedom," said student Barbara Phoho in Johannesburg.	Sanomalehdissä oli erityisliitteitä Mandelasta, ja radiossa suitsutettiin häntä pitkin päivää. Moni ajatteli lämmöllä syntymäpäiväsankaria. "Hän antoi meille vapauden," sanoi opiskelija Barbara Phoho Johannesburgissa.
3 (neg.)	Does the article suggest that some individual/institution/country does not have the ability to fix a situation?	Art. no. 264, par. 12: "The police are unable to do anything. The government keeps promising to improve the situation, but nothing happens," Mlamvo curses.	"Poliisi ei pysty tekemään mitään. Hallitus lupaa parantaa tilannetta, mutta mitään ei tapahdu," Mlamvo manaa.
5 (neg.)	Does the article describe how an individual/institution/country is ignoring or downplaying a particular problem?	Art. no. 261, par. 7: "By relying on legality-related and technical perspectives, they gave the impression that they regard human rights as of secondary importance," thought Tom Wheeler, director of the South African Institute for Security Studies.	"Tukeutumalla laillisuus- tai teknisiin näkökohtiin he antoivat käsityksen, jonka mukaan he pitävät ihmisoikeuksia toissijaisina," arvioi eteläafrikkalaisen South African Institute for Security Studies -instituutin johtaja Tom Wheeler.
HUMAN INTEREST FRAME			
8 (pos.)	Does the article describe people's level of happiness and excitement?	Art. no. 278, par. 2: "Awesome. This makes me feel proud of South Africa," said Matu Zonke, who lives in the neighborhood and brought his three-year-old son Simthandile to see the trophy.	"Upeata. Tämä saa minut tuntemaan ylpeyttä Etelä-Afrikasta," sanoi kulmilla asuva Matu Zonke, joka toi kolmivuotiaan poikansa Simthandilen katsomaan pystiä.
10 (pos.)	Does the article describe how individuals have benefited from a particular situation?	Art. no. 284, par. 28: "Soccer gave us self-respect and helped us nurse hope," says Dikgang Moseneke, a young charismatic prisoner.	"Jalkapallo antoi meille omanarvontuntoa ja auttoi pitämään elossa toivoa," sanoo Dikgang Moseneke, se nuori karismaattinen vanki.
11 (neg.)	Does the article describe personal lives in a negative light; people being miserable?	Art. 284, par. 18: For Isaacs, Solomon, Moseneke, and other "enemies of the state," the work on the island was to pound rock. From sunrise to sunset. The men slept their nights on the hard floor of multi-occupant open cells.	Isaacsin, Solomonin, Moseneken ja muiden "valtion vihollisten" työ saarella oli hakata kiviä. Auringonnoususta sen laskuun. Yönsä miehet nukkuivat usean hengen avoselleissä kovalla lattialla.

Table 6 (appendices, continued through pages 311–314): Items for identifying the negative and positive dimensions of frames and excerpts from *Helsingin Sanomat*, with English translations. Note: Only three items are presented per frame, out of six in total (see Table 1 in chapter 4).

DIMENSION NO.	ITEM to detect the particular dimension of frames at the paragraph level	EXCERPTS FROM SAMPLE Paragraphs illustrating the character of each dimension; English translation	ORIGINAL IN FINNISH
CONFLICT AND PEACE FRAME			
13 (neg.)	Does the article describe explicit disagreement/confrontation between individuals/institutions/countries?	Art. no. 318, 15: The education director of Rio de Janeiro used the teachers of Finland and other countries [as an example] to justify the “teachers with multiple skills” model, in which teachers can teach all subjects at different grades. The trade union opposes this model.	Rio de Janeiron koulutusjohtaja perusteli Suomen ja muiden maiden luokanopettajilla “moniosaajien” mallia, jossa opettajat voivat opettaa kaikkia aineita eri luokka-asteilla. Ammattiliitto vastustaa sitä.
15 (neg.)	Does one individual or institution reproach another?	Art. no. 327, par. 4: Last year, over a million people marched in the streets of Brazil, protesting against the rising costs of public transportation, police violence, and corruption. Central topics of criticism included the expanded costs of the World Cup and the soccer federation FIFA.	Viime vuonna yli miljoona ihmistä marssi Brasilian kaduilla joukkoliikenteen hinnankorostuksia, poliisiväkivaltaa ja korruptiota vastaan. Keskeisiä arvostelun aiheita olivat MM-kisojen paisuneet kustannukset ja jalkapalloliitto FIFA.
16 (pos.)	Does one individual institution/country apologize to or politely approach another?	Art. no. 309, par. 15: President Rousseff has said that he is proud of the demonstrators and has promised to listen to their voice.	Presidentti Rousseff on sanonut olevansa ylpeä mielenosoittajista ja luvannut kuunnella heidän ääntään.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT FRAME			
19 (neg.)	Is the emphasis on how something is/has not been/will not be profitable for an institution/country (materially and/or symbolically)?	Art. no. 288, par. 10: It is hard to say to what extent the unrest was due to pure xenophobia and to what extent South Africa is simply suffering from a post-World-Cup hangover – dealing with the fact that the Cup left nothing for the poor and the unemployment percentage is still near thirty.	On vaikeaa sanoa, minkä verran levottomuuksissa oli kyse puhtaasta muukalaisvihasta ja minkä verran Etelä-Afrikassa podetaan vain MM-kisojen jälkeistä krapulaa – sitä, ettei kisoista jäänyt köyhille mitään käteen ja työttömyysprosentti hipoo edelleen kolmekymmentä.
20 (pos.)	Is the emphasis on how something is/has been/will be profitable for an institution/country (materially and/or symbolically)?	Art. no. 280, par. 14: Joordan remarks that many of the investments made because of the Cup will benefit South Africa for a long time. A completely new airport was constructed in Durban in a couple of years. Roads and railways have been improved. Even in Soweto, public busses now run for the first time in history. The World Cup creates up to 40 000 jobs, the government estimates.	Joordan huomauttaa, että suuri osa kisasatsauksista hyödyttää Etelä-Afrikkaa pitkään. Durbaniin rakennettiin parissa vuodessa kokonaan uusi lentokenttä. Teitä ja rautateitä on ehostettu. Sowetossakin kulkevat nyt julkiset bussit ensi kertaa historiassa. MM-turnaus luo jopa 40 000 työpaikkaa, arvioi hallitus.
24 (pos.)	Does the article emphasize how pursuing or not pursuing a particular course	Art. 325, par. 6: According to Niinistö, the Brazilians were very interested in what the Finns have to offer. “The	Niinistön mukaan brasilialaiset olivat erittäin kiinnostuneita siitä, mitä suomalaisilla on tarjottavana. “Brasilialaiset

## (IMPACT FRAME CONT.)

	of action has had/has/could have a positive impact on something?	Brazilians obviously want to invest in this. Their economic growth has slowed down to a point that the next step is to do things more productively. With environmentally friendly solutions, the productivity of the branch will increase," he says.	haluavat selvästi panostaa tähän. Heidän talouskasvunsa on hidastunut sen verran, että seuraava askel on tehdä tuottavammin sitä, mitä tehdään. Ympäristötehokkailla ratkaisulla toimialan tuottavuus paranee,' hän sanoo.
C R E D I B I L I T Y   F R A M E			
25 (neg.)	Does the article contain expressions of concern or doubt as to whether South Africa/Brazil/their institutions can handle an issue/problem because of some difficult circumstances/situation?	Art. 306, par. 15: Brazil is in a hurry. In 2014, São Paulo will host some of the most important games of the World Cup, and the goal is that the criminal organization will then not have armed control over any part of São Paulo seen by the World Cup tourists.	Brasilialla on kiire. Vuonna 2014 São Paulossa järjestetään osa jalkapallon MM-kisojen tärkeimmistä peleistä ja tavoitteena on, että rikollisjärjestö ei silloin hallitse aseellisesti mitään osaa kisaturistien näkemästä São Paulosta.
27 (neg.)	Does the article evaluate how South Africa/Brazil or some institution in these countries has been acting/behaving worse than expected in a particular situation?	Art. 269, par 4: However, South Africa has protected the Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, rather than using its influence to persuade Mugabe to acknowledge – or even publish – the results of the presidential election, held at the end of March...	Etelä-Afrikka on kuitenkin suojannut Zimbabwen presidenttiä Robert Mugabea sen sijaan, että olisi käyttänyt vaikutusvaltaansa kannustaakseen häntä hyväksymään – tai edes julkistamaan – maaliskuun lopussa pidettyjen presidentinvaalien tuloksen...
28 (pos.)	Does the article evaluate how South Africa/Brazil or some institution in these countries has been acting/behaving according to or above expectations in a particular situation?	Art 287, par. 2: South Africa is proud. It was awarded the soccer World Cup and organized a wonderful tournament. At the time of the German tournament four years ago, the whole world had doubts as to how the soccer circus would fare in South Africa in the summer of 2010. It turned out fine.	Etelä-Afrikka on ylpeä. Se sai jalkapallon MM-turnauksen ja järjesti loistavat kisat. Koko maailma epäili Saksan turnauksen aikaan neljä vuotta sitten, että mitä siitä tulee, kun jalkapallon sirkus pyörii kesällä 2010 Etelä-Afrikassa. Hyvä siitä tuli.
E X O T I C I S M   F R A M E			
32 (pos.)	Is a South African/Brazilian individual/institution/pheno menon described as traditional/special/unique in a neutral/positive light?	Art. no. 320, par. 13: But the matches will be played, and the streets will be filled with music. It is difficult to imagine a more fascinating place for the tournament than Brazil. For the World Cup is always a big party, and the Brazilians certainly know how to throw a party.	Mutta pelit pelataan, ja kaduilla soi. On vaikea kuvitella kisoille kiehtovampaa paikkaa kuin Brasilia. Sillä maailmanmestaruuskisat ovat aina iso juhla, ja juhlia brasilialaiset todellakin osaavat järjestää.
33 (neg.)	Description of South African/Brazilian reality: What does the country look/smell/feel like? Negative adjectives.	Art. 322, par. 14: The plan reveals something about São Paulo: The largest city of Brazil does not have many public spaces. Parks are scarce, and, according to Rodriguez, there are always drug addicts.	Suunnitelma osoittaa São Paulosta jotain: Brasilian suurimmassa kaupungissa on vähän julkisia tiloja. Puistot ovat harvassa, ja niissä on Rodriguezin mukaan aina huumeidenkäyttäjää.

Table 6 (continued through pages 311–314): Items for identifying the negative and positive dimensions of frames and excerpts from *Helsingin Sanomat*, with English translations.

34 (pos.)	Description of South African/Brazilian reality: What does the country look/smell/feel like? Positive adjectives.	Art. 281, par. 17: The amazing silhouette of Table Mountain is visible from their home yard. The relaxed and beautiful Cape Town opens up all around. The diving spots of the Atlantic Ocean are a short drive away.	Kotipihan nurmelta näkyy Pöytävuoren mahtava siluetti. Ympärillä aukeaa rento ja kaunis Kapkaupunki. Pienen automatkan päässä ovat sukelluspaikat Atlantin valtameressä.
WORLD ORDER FRAME			
39 (neg.)	Does the articles describe how cultural, political and/or economic circumstances have worsened (or remained equally bad) in South Africa/Brazil?	Art. no. 325, par. 10: "Fifty years later, we are still witnessing oppression. The dictatorship is not over," said Cecilia Coimbra of the Tortura Nunca Mais human rights organization, in an event organized this week at the State University of Rio de Janeiro.	"50 vuoden jälkeen todistamme yhä sortoa. Diktatuuri ei ole päättynyt," sanoi Cecilia Coimbra Tortura Nunca Mais -ihmisoikeusjärjestöstä Rio de Janeiron valtionyliopistossa tällä viikolla järjestetyssä tilaisuudessa.
40 (pos.)	Does the article describe how cultural, political and/or economic circumstances have improved (or remained equally good) in South Africa/Brazil?	Art. no. 319, par. 9: Rio is experiencing a new golden era, a renaissance, the most enthusiastic people say. The newspaper O Globo wrote that "Rio is regaining its self-confidence," which it lost when, in 1960, the capital was transferred to Brasília, built inland.	Rio elää uutta kultakautta, renessanssia, sanovat innokkaimmat. Sanomalehti O Globo kirjoitti, että Rio on "saamassa takaisin itsentuntonsa," jonka se kadotti, kun pääkaupunki vuonna 1960 siirrettiin sisämaahan rakennettuun Brasiliaan.
42 (pos.)	Does the article describe South Africa/Brazil/their institutions as a leader/donor?	Art. no. 269, par. 2: South Africa has excellent qualifications to help Zimbabwe escape from the maelstrom it is in. Besides bordering Zimbabwe and being by far its largest trading partner, South Africa is by far the most powerful political and economic player in southern Africa.	Etelä-Afrikalla on erinomaiset edellytykset auttaa Zimbabwea pääsemään kurimuksestaan. Sen lisäksi että Etelä-Afrikka on Zimbabwen rajanaapuri ja ylivoimaisesti tärkein kauppakumppani, se on muutenkin ylivoimainen poliittinen ja taloudellinen vaikuttaja eteläisessä Afrikassa.

Table 6 (appendices, continued through pages 311–314): Items for identifying the negative and positive dimensions of frames and excerpts from *Helsingin Sanomat*, with English translations.

Table 7 (Appendices): Core sample: List of numbered NYT and HS articles

\* Editorials=Edit.; Op-Ed articles=OpEd; Columns=Col.; Room for Debate=RfD

Art. no.	*	Medium and date of publication	Title of the article
1		NYT, Apr 10, 2006	A highly charged rape trial tests South Africa's ideals
2	Edit.	NYT, May 10, 2006	The 'she asked for it' defense wins
3		NYT, Aug 19, 2006	U.N. official assails South Africa on its response to AIDS
4	Edit.	NYT, Aug 30, 2006	For people with AIDS, a government with two faces
5		NYT, Sep 8, 2006	AIDS cited in the climb in in South Africa's death rate
6		NYT, Sep 17, 2006	Cartels battle for supremacy in South Africa's taxi wars
7		NYT, Sep 23, 2006	A stormy test for democracy in South Africa
8		NYT, Oct 10, 2006	South Africa to seize 2 white-owned farms
9		NYT, Nov 3, 2006	Poachers' way of life is endangering the abalone's
10		NYT, Nov 3, 2006	Under fire, South Africa shakes up its strategy against AIDS
11		NYT, Nov 7, 2006	South African who bribed top politician loses appeal
12		NYT, Feb 27, 2007	Song wakens injured pride of Afrikaners
13		NYT, Mar 24, 2007	South Africa lowers voice on human rights
14		NYT, Apr 23, 2007	South Africa vs. itself, in race to get ready for World Cup
15		NYT, Jun 13, 2007	South Africa strike foreshadows political contest
16		NYT, Aug 10, 2007	South Africa fires official praised for anti-AIDS work
17		NYT, Aug 18, 2007	5 former officials are sentenced for apartheid-era crime
18		NYT, Sep 8, 2007	Taking on apartheid, then a nation's stance on AIDS
19		NYT, Sep 28, 2007	South Africa's top policeman in legal trouble, reports say
20		NYT, Oct 12, 2007	Party power struggle enthalls South Africa
21		NYT, Nov 9, 2007	U.S. says South Africa impedes U.N. motion to condemn rape as a tactic
22		NYT, Nov 15, 2007	Break-in at nuclear site baffles South Africa
23		NYT, Nov 28, 2007	Mbeki's support erodes in party vote in South Africa
24		NYT, Dec 5, 2007	South African miners strike for better safety conditions
25	OpEd	NYT, Dec 12, 2007	South Africa grows up
26		NYT, Dec 17, 2007	Leadership battle grips South Africa's dominant party
27		NYT, Dec 19, 2007	Zuma is chosen to lead ANC
28	Edit.	NYT, Dec 26, 2007	Democracy and South Africa
29		NYT, Dec 30, 2007	One test and 600,000 destinies in South Africa
30		NYT, Jan 31, 2008	Power failures outrage South Africa
31		NYT, Mar 9, 2008	Rift over AIDS treatment lingers in South Africa
32		NYT, Mar 25, 2008	TB patients chafe under lockdown in South Africa
33		NYT, Apr 23, 2008	China may give up attempt to send arms to Zimbabwe
34		NYT, May 19, 2008	Anti-immigrant violence in Johannesburg
35	Edit.	NYT, May 24, 2008	The failures of Thabo Mbeki
36		NYT, May 29, 2008	South Africa weighs plan to shelter refugees
37		NYT, Jun 25, 2008	Ally warns outsiders not to push Zimbabwe
38		NYT, Jun 27, 2008	Complex ties lead ally not to condemn Mugabe
39	OpEd	NYT, Jul 3, 2008	Mbeki's shame
40		NYT, Aug 21, 2008	Parole in 'Lion's Den' case still stirs anger

41		NYT, Sep 12, 2008	Judge dismisses corruption charges against leader of South Africa's ruling party
42		NYT, Sep 17, 2008	Case against Zuma may be revived in South Africa
43		NYT, Sep 20, 2008	South Africa's president to quit under pressure
44		NYT, Sep 21, 2008	Forced from office, Mbeki says farewell
45		NYT, Sep 25, 2008	South Africa picks president, but uncertainty remains
46	Edit.	NYT, Sep 26, 2008	Thabo Mbeki's fall
47		NYT, Oct 5, 2008	Post-apartheid South Africa enters anxious era
48		NYT, Oct 8, 2008	Rift unsettles South Africa's top party
49		NYT, Nov 2, 2008	In South Africa, defectors seek to topple a legacy
50		NYT, Nov 25, 2008	Study cites toll of AIDS policy in South Africa
51		NYT, Dec 16, 2008	New South African party picks ex-official as chief
52		NYT, Dec 27, 2008	Early American echoes in South Africa?
53		NYT, Jan 10, 2009	Governing party, facing challenge, moves left in South Africa
54		NYT, Jan 23, 2009	Desperate children flee Zimbabwe, for lives just as desolate
55		NYT, Jan 23, 2009	In South Africa, a justice delayed is no longer denied
56		NYT, Mar 10, 2009	Waiting to helm South Africa: President or convict? Or both?
57		NYT, Mar 31, 2009	3 found guilty in 2007 killing of reggae star in South Africa
58		NYT, Apr 6, 2009	South Africa drops charges against leading presidential contender
59	OpEd	NYT, Apr 13, 2009	South Africa's last chance
60		NYT, Apr 18, 2009	South African party leader shrugs off suspicions
61		NYT, Apr 21, 2009	South African voters grumble, but favor A.N.C.
62	Edit.	NYT, Apr 24, 2009	South Africa's Mr. Zuma
63		NYT, Jun 10, 2009	South Africa's jobless hope Zuma delivers work
64		NYT, Jun 29, 2009	Constant fear and mob rule in South Africa slum
65		NYT, Jul 8, 2009	World Cup in Africa stumbles over strike
66		NYT, Jul 28, 2009	New effort to fight TB in South Africa
67		NYT, Jul 31, 2009	South African president faces test, from allies
68		NYT, Aug 7, 2009	Clinton seeks South African support on Zimbabwe
69		NYT, Aug 8, 2009	Clinton and South African discuss Somalia
70		NYT, Aug 24, 2009	South Africa embraces study critical of health policy
71	Edit.	NYT, Aug 30, 2009	Hope in South Africa
72	Edit.	NYT, Sep 2, 2009	South African angst
73		NYT, Sep 6, 2009	South Africa's poor renew a tradition of protest
74		NYT, Sep 9, 2009	A Stir over a faraway view of black and white
75		NYT, Sep 19, 2009	Eager students fall prey to apartheid's legacy
76		NYT, Sep 22, 2009	Mixed verdict in South African lesbian murder trial
77		NYT, Sep 24, 2009	South African children push for better schools
78		NYT, Oct 18, 2009	Love of designer threads adds flair to trial
79		NYT, Oct 31, 2009	Zuma rallies S. Africa to fight AIDS
80		NYT, Nov 17, 2009	South Africa is divided on gesture by educator
81		NYT, Dec 8, 2009	Spilling the blood of bulls to preserve Zulu tradition
82		NYT, Dec 16, 2009	Holiday of white conquest persists in South Africa



83		NYT, Dec 28, 2009	World Cup whose meaning goes beyond soccer
84	OpEd	NYT, Jan 5, 2010	Paying the price for apartheid
85		NYT, Feb 1, 2010	Paternity claim challenges Zuma's stance on AIDS
86		NYT, Feb 11, 2010	On Mandela's release anniversary, Zuma seeks high ground
87		NYT, Feb 21, 2010	A Bus system reopens rifts in South Africa
88		NYT, Mar 5, 2010	State visit revives a history of stereotypes
89		NYT, Mar 12, 2010	Cost of stadium reveals tensions in South Africa
90		NYT, Mar 16, 2010	Leaders' lavishness gives rise to 'lifestyle audits'
91		NYT, Apr 4, 2010	Zuma seeks to calm South Africa after killing
92		NYT, Apr 10, 2010	S. Africa president rebukes a disciple
93		NYT, Apr 25, 2010	South Africa redoubles efforts against AIDS
94		NYT, May 8, 2010	South Africa comes far but has far to go
95		NYT, May 14, 2010	In South Africa, an unlikely leader on AIDS
96		NYT, May 16, 2010	Amid Cup fervor, revisiting pain of apartheid
97		NYT, May 23, 2010	South Africa pushes to make the Cup its own
98		NYT, Jun 7, 2010	The promise and unfulfilled potential of South Africa's president
99	OpEd	NYT, Jun 7, 2010	South Africa's World Cup moment
100		NYT, Jun 10, 2010	South Africa's hopes extend beyond field
101		NYT, Jun 10, 2010	Youth league fights AIDS with soccer
102		NYT, Jun 11, 2010	Royal Host to World Cup invests in his subjects
103		NYT, Jun 16, 2010	Soweto recalls the power and courage of one
104		NYT, Jun 17, 2010	South African hopes die amid a more lasting victory
105	OpEd	NYT, Jun 17, 2010	Freedom's blaring horn
106		NYT, Jun 22, 2010	South African soccer pride gets a shot in the arm before a kick in the gut
107		NYT, Jun 27, 2009	Scrutiny for South Africa year before World Cup
108	OpEd	NYT, Jun 28, 2010	The black and white of it
109		NYT, Jul 2, 2010	South Africa convicts ex-police chef
110		NYT, Jul 5, 2010	Origins of tournament in an infamous prison
111		NYT, Jul 6, 2010	Blank spaces fill World Cup's crime scorecard
112		NYT, Jul 9, 2010	South Africa braces for new attacks on immigrants
113		NYT, Jul 10, 2010	For final, South Africans put past aside
114		NYT, Jul 10, 2010	Celebrating South Africa and a job done well
115		NYT, Jul 11, 2010	Games give South Africa hope in fighting woes
116		NYT, Jul 11, 2010	In host's success, change triumphs
117		NYT, Jul 12, 2010	Who really won in South Africa?
118		NYT, Jul 12, 2010	South Africa wonders what lies beyond the Cup
119		NYT, Aug 2, 2010	In South Africa, a push for industrial growth
120		NYT, Aug 22, 2010	Proposed restrictions on the news media cause alarm in South Africa
121		NYT, Aug 27, 2010	Season of labor unrest empties South African hospitals
122		NYT, Sep 3, 2010	H.I.V. prevention gel hits snag: money
123		NYT, Sep 6, 2010	South Africa unions' strike suspended
124		NYT, Sep 26, 2010	Wage laws squeeze South Africa's poor
125		NYT, Nov 19, 2010	South Africa fears millions more HIV infections
126		NYT, Nov 22, 2010	Campus that apartheid ruled faces a policy rift

127	Edit.	NYT, Aug 14, 2007	Firing an AIDS fighter
128		NYT, Oct 5, 2007	South Africa closes mine that trapped 3200
129		NYT, Jun 14, 2007	South Africa's city workers join spreading strike for higher wages
130		NYT, Nov 20, 2008	South Africa is aiming to ease dangers of digging for gold
131		NYT, Jan 16, 2010	With world watching, Rio focuses on security
132	OpEd	NYT, Mar 2, 2010	An American in Brazil
133		NYT, Apr 14, 2010	Rain multiplies woes of Rio de Janeiro's squatters
134		NYT, May 14, 2010	Brazil's Iran diplomacy worries U.S. officials
135		NYT, May 16, 2010	Brazil and Turkey near nuclear deal with Iran
136		NYT, May 24, 2010	Iran deal seen as spot on Brazilian leader's legacy
137		NYT, Jul 25, 2010	Brazil's president works to lend popularity to a protégée
138		NYT, Jul 28, 2010	Brazil on track for 2014 despite early criticism of stadium plan
139		NYT, Aug 1, 2010	Brazil's president offers asylum to woman facing stoning in Iran
140		NYT, Aug 2, 2010	Brazil's plea for asylum for Iranian facing stoning seems to fail
141		NYT, Aug 16, 2010	Bypassing resistance, Brazil prepares to build a dam
142		NYT, Sep 4, 2010	Educational gaps limit Brazil's reach
143		NYT, Sep 20, 2010	Scandal puts bumps in path of Brazil leader's protégée
144		NYT, Oct 2, 2010	Brazilian leader's protégée likely to prevail in election
145		NYT, Oct 10, 2010	In rough slum, Brazil's police try soft touch
146		NYT, Oct 31, 2010	In a first, Brazil elects a woman as President
147	OpEd	NYT, Nov 4, 2010	Embracing Lula's pragmatic legacy
148		NYT, Nov 28, 2010	Brazilian forces claim victory in gang heaven
149		NYT, Dec 9, 2013	After operation, Rio's forces greeted by wariness
150		NYT, Dec 16, 2010	Amnesty for Brazil dictatorship is challenged
151		NYT, Dec 31, 2010	Brazil's new leader begins in shadow of predecessor
152		NYT, Jan 16, 2011	After deadly mudslides in Brazil, concern turns to preparedness
153		NYT, Mar 17, 2011	In Obama visit, Brazil's leader aims to mend fences
154	OpEd	NYT, Mar 18, 2011	Mr. Obama, meet the new Brazil
155		NYT, Mar 19, 2011	Amid crises, Obama lands in South America
156		NYT, Mar 20, 2011	President under-scores similarities with Brazilians, but sidesteps one
157		NYT, Apr 5, 2011	Brazil rejects panel's request to stop dam
158		NYT, Apr 16, 2011	Brazilian criticizes wealthy nations' policies
159		NYT, Apr 16, 2011	Fishermen in Amazon see a rival in dolphins
160		NYT, May 19, 2011	Upwardly mobile nannies move into the Brazilian middle class
161		NYT, Jun 11, 2011	Brazil, after a long battle, approves an Amazon dam
162		NYT, Oct 27, 2011	Brazilian Amazon groups invade site of dam project
163		NYT, Nov 4, 2011	Brazil's long shadow vexes some neighbors
164		NYT, Nov 13, 2011	Rio slum is pacified in advance of Games
165		NYT, Nov 18, 2011	Brazil tries pragmatism, not politics
166	OpEd	NYT, Dec 2, 2011	Brazil shatters its wall of silence
167		NYT, Dec 20, 2011	An uneasy search for truth as ghosts from military rule start to stir

168		NYT, Jan 6, 2012	Haitians take arduous path to Brazil, and jobs
169		NYT, Jan 9, 2012	In Brazil, officers of the law, outside of the law
170		NYT, Jan 23, 2012	Iranian adviser accuses Brazil of ruining relations
171		NYT, Jan 24, 2012	In Brazil, fears of a slide back for Amazon protection
172		NYT, Jan 27, 2012	Latin America looks at West's fiscal crises, and sees its own past
173		NYT, Feb 7, 2012	Influx of Haitians into the Amazon prompts immigration debate
174		NYT, Mar 4, 2012	Slum dwellers are defying Brazil's grand design for Olympics
175	RfD	NYT, Mar 29, 2012	Brazil's Racial Identity Challenge
176	OpEd	NYT, Apr 3, 2012	Can Brazil stop Iran?
177		NYT, Apr 9, 2012	Brazil and U.S. accentuate the positive
178		NYT, May 5, 2012	Amid Brazil's rush to develop, workers resist
179		NYT, May 16, 2012	Brazil's leader faces a defining decision on bill relaxing protection of forests
180		NYT, Jun 9, 2012	Violence hits Brazil tribes in scramble for land
181		NYT, Jun 30, 2012	The dam boom in the Amazon
182		NYT, Aug 7, 2012	Brazil gains business and influence as it offers aid and loans in Africa
183		NYT, Aug 30, 2012	Brazil enacts affirmative action law for universities
184		NYT, Oct 2, 2012	Brazilian corruption case raises hopes for judicial system
185		NYT, Nov 30, 2012	Brazil registers anemic growth, surprising economists
186		NYT, Dec 15, 2012	Brazil expands mines to drive future, but cost is a treasured link to its past
187		NYT, Jan 27, 2013	Frenzied scene as toll tops 200 in Brazil blaze
188		NYT, Jan 29, 2013	After fire, some Brazilians fault a nation's sense of fatalism
189		NYT, Feb 10, 2013	Brazil, where a judge made \$361,000 in a month, fumes over pay
190		NYT, Mar 26, 2013	Petrobras, once symbol of Brazil's oil hopes, strives to regain lost swagger
191		NYT, Jun 17, 2013	Thousands gather for protests in Brazil's largest cities
192		NYT, Jun 19, 2013	Brazil's leftist ruling party, born of protests, is perplexed by revolt
193	RfD	NYT, Jun 19, 2013	Will the protests in Brazil lead to change?
194		NYT, Jun 20, 2013	Sweeping protests in Brazil pull in an array of grievances
195	Edit.	NYT, Jun 20, 2013	Social awakening in Brazil
196		NYT, Jun 21, 2013	Brazil tries to calm protester concerns, rebuking violence
197		NYT, Jun 21, 2013	How angry is Brazil? Pele now has feet of clay
198		NYT, Jun 22, 2013	Despite assurances by Brazil's president, another day of demonstrations
199		NYT, Jun 24, 2013	Responding to protests, Brazil's leader proposes changes to system
200		NYT, Jun 27, 2013	Public rage catching up with Brazil's congress
201		NYT, Jun 29, 2013	After protests, Brazilian president's popularity plummets
202		NYT, Jun 30, 2013	Brazilian police break up a protest
203		NYT, Jul 3, 2013	For Brazilian official and family, controversy over a trip
204		NYT, Jul 7, 2013	Brazil voices deep concern over gathering of data by U.S.

205		NYT, Jul 13, 2013	Brazil's president's attempts to placate protesters backfire
206		NYT, Jul 14, 2013	Brazil's plan isn't what doctors would order
207		NYT, Jul 22, 2013	Prices fuel in Brazil, home of the \$30 cheese pizza
208		NYT, Aug 13, 2013	In Brazil, Kerry is told spying sows 'distrust'
209		NYT Aug 23, 2013	A blunt chief justice unafraid to upset Brazil's status quo
210		NYT, Sep 2, 2013	Brazil angered over report N.S.A. spied on President
211		NYT, Sep 6, 2013	Obama tries to soothe Brazil and Mexico over spying reports
212		NYT, Sep 9, 2013	N.S.A spied on Brazilian oil company, report says
213		NYT, Sep 17, 2013	Brazil's leader postpones state visit to Washington over spying
214	RfD	NYT, Sep 24, 2013	As Brazil snubs the U.S., who loses?
215		NYT, Sep 24, 2013	Building a World Cup stadium in the Amazon
216		NYT, Oct 7, 2013	Brazil's leader asks Canada to explain its spying
217	Edit.	NYT, Oct 8, 2013	Brazil's next steps
218		NYT, Oct 18, 2013	Pickup soccer in Brazil has an allure all its own
219		NYT, Oct 31, 2013	A yellow card, then unfathomable violence, in Brazil
220		NYT, Nov 4, 2013	Brazil says it spied on U.S. and others inside its borders
221		NYT, Nov 10, 2013	A Brazilian boom town of 'eternal beauty' faces its troubled side
222		NYT, Nov 25, 2013	A Divided Rio de Janeiro, overreaching the world
223		NYT, Nov 27, 2013	Deadly accident at stadium raises worry on Brazil's World Cup aims
224		NYT, Dec 17, 2013	Snowden offers help to Brazil in spy case
225		NYT, Dec 21, 2013	Now taking World Cup bookings, Rio's slums
226		NYT, Dec 29, 2013	Brazil forging economic ties with Cuba, while hiring its doctors
227		NYT, Jan 19, 2014	Brazil's latest clash with its urban youth takes place at the mall
228		NYT, Apr 11, 2014	Police clash with squatters in Rio de Janeiro slum
229		NYT, Apr 11, 2014	In Brazil, usual Olympics worry with unusual validity
230		NYT, Apr 12, 2014	Grand visions fizzle in Brazil
231	Edit.	NYT, Apr 15, 2014	Losing ground in the Amazon
232		NYT, Apr 29, 2014	Preparations for Rio Olympics 'the worst', Committee official says
233		NYT, May 18, 2014	Note to Olympic sailors: Don't fall in Rio's water
234		NYT, May 26, 2014	To prepare for the World Cup, a host city could use extra time
235	OpEd	NYT, May 26, 2014	Brazil is tired of being scolded
236		NYT, May 30, 2014	Rio grapples with violence against police officers
237		NYT, Jun 3, 2014	Brazilian president rejects criticism over World Cup
238		NYT, Jun 5, 2014	Forget the World Cup - Brazil posts double win with simultaneous soy boom and de-forestation drop
239		NYT, Jun 9, 2014	Brazil on edge as World Cup exposes rifts
240		NYT, Jun 9, 2014	Making holidays of Brazil's World Cup games
241		NYT, Jun 12, 2014	Soccer and internal discord, on display for world to see
242		NYT, Jun 14, 2014	A piece of the game beyond the walls
243		NYT, Jun 17, 2014	At the World Cup, doomsday predictions give way to smaller hiccups in Brazil

244		NYT, Jun 22, 2014	Brasília, a capital city that's a place apart
245		NYT, Jun 28, 2014	The dazzle and the desolation of stadiums in World Cup host stadiums
246		NYT, Jul 8, 2014	Goal, goal, goal, goal, goal, goal, goal, and Brazil's day goes dark
247		NYT, Jul 11, 2014	After soccer loss, Dilma Rousseff soothes Brazil with a song
248		NYT, Jul 12, 2014	World Cup revelry overwhelms beloved neighborhood in São Paulo
249		NYT, Jul 13, 2014	Success for Brazil, just not on the field
250		NYT, Jul 15, 2014	Kite fight
251		NYT, Oct 3, 2014	Clashing visions of conservation shake Brazil's presidential vote
252		NYT, Oct 19, 2014	Scandal over Brazilian oil company adds turmoil to the presidential race
253	RfD	NYT, Oct 24, 2014	Challenges for Brazil's next President
254		NYT, Oct 25, 2014	As Brazil's Presidential race draws to close, voters lament its ugliness
255		NYT, Nov 12, 2014	Fishermen in Brazil save a river goliath, and their livelihoods
256		NYT, Dec 7, 2014	Brazil prepares indictments in oil company graft case
257		NYT, Dec 10, 2014	Brazil releases report on past rights releases
258		NYT, Dec 10, 2014	Drug trade transforms an Amazon outpost
259		NYT, Dec 25, 2014	Decline of a political family opens the way for a shift in Brazil
260		NYT, Dec 3, 2014	Brazil's red-scare nostalgia
261		HS, Feb 10, 2007	Etelä-Afrikan ulkopoliittikkaa syytetään ihanteiden hylkäämisestä
262		HS, Jun 3, 2007	Etelä-Afrikka jakaa taas kansan kahtia
263		HS, Jun 3, 2007	Hillbrowta siistitään jalkapallon MM-kisojen edellä
264		HS, Jun 11, 2007	Etelä-Afrikan maine maailman rikollisimpana maana säilyy
265		HS, Jul 18, 2007	Nelson Mandela julkistaa tänään uuden vanhimpien neuvoston
266		HS, Aug 16, 2007	Eteläisen Afrikan huippukokous jättäneen Zimbabwe rauhaan
267		HS, Aug 19, 2007	Valkoiset etsivät edelleen paikkaansa uudenlaisessa Etelä-Afrikassa
268		HS, Aug 12, 2007	Rasismilla naurattaja
269	Edit.	HS, Apr 17, 2008	Etelä-Afrikan pitää auttaa Zimbabwea
270		HS, May 23, 2008	Tuhannet pakenevat Etelä-Afrikan mellakoita
271		HS, Jul 19, 2008	Nelson Mandela vaati köyhyyden nujertamista
272		HS, Sep 21, 2008	Etelä-Afrikan presidentti Mbeki painostettiin eroamaan kesken kauden
273	Edit.	HS, Sep 25, 2008	Huipulle jäi tyhjää Etelä-Afrikassa
274		HS, Jan 25, 2009	Ahtisaari korosti rooliaan apartheidin lopettamisessa
275	Edit.	HS, Mar 30, 2009	Kiinan roolin kasvu Afrikassa vaikuttaa myös politiikkaan
276		HS, Apr 22, 2009	Jacob Zuma nousee skandaalien kierteestä Etelä-Afrikan johtoon

277	Edit.	HS, Apr 25, 2009	Norsu piti pintansa Etelä-Afrikassa
278		HS, May 8, 2010	Enää puuttuu pallo
279		HS, May 8, 2010	FIFA: Kisoista tulee turvalliset
280		HS, May 15, 2010	Viimein pois paitsiosta
281		HS, May 29, 2010	Olemme nyt keskiluokkaa
282		HS, May 29, 2010	Harkitsemme maastamuuttoa
283		HS, May 29, 2010	Taas tarvittaisiin Mandelaa
284		HS, Jun 6, 2010	Pallo jalasta
285	Edit.	HS, Jun 6, 2010	Etelä-Afrikka pelaa suurin odotuksin
286	Col.	HS, Jun 16, 2010	Afrikka etsii kipinää jalkapallosta
287		HS, Jul 12, 2010	Etelä-Afrikka näytti muille
288		HS, Jul 23, 2010	MM-krapulaa Etelä-Afrikassa
289	Edit.	HS, Dec 18, 2010	Sateenkaaren tuolla puolen
290		HS, Jun 26 2007	Etelä-Afrikka puuttui vasta pakon edessä AIDS-epidemiaan
291		HS, Mar 29, 2010	Yksi porras ylöspäin
292		HS, Apr 18, 2010	Öljykuume nousee Brasiliassa
293		HS, Apr 24, 2010	Köyhän jyrkänteen väkeä
294		HS, Jun 30, 2010	Brasilia aikoo rajoittaa ulkomaista maanomistusta
295		HS, Oct 2, 2010	Lulan olkapäähän nojaten
296		HS, Nov 12, 2011	Brasilia määräsi rangaistustulleja suomalaiselle paperille
297		HS, Mar 18, 2012	Hyvästi, kriisi!
298		HS, Jun 30, 2012	Kuminkerääjästä tuli Brazilian vihreä ääni
299		HS, Aug 15, 2012	Brasilia selvii likaisen sodan kauhuja
300		HS, Aug 27, 2012	Jättivoimala jauhaa sähköä 44 miljoonalle
301		HS, Dec 16, 2012	Puhdistus Rion rinteillä
302		HS, Dec 28, 2012	Tahtoisitko yöksi Rion slummiin?
303		HS, Jan 18, 2013	Barbosa on Brazilian rötösherrojen painajainen
304		HS, Jan 25, 2013	Brassipojat halutaan hormonin voimin huipulle
305		HS, Jan 28, 2013	Diskopalossa kuoli yli 230
306		HS, Feb 8, 2013	Poliisien mitta täyttyi São Paulossa
307	Edit.	HS, June 3, 2013	Brasiliaa uhkaa taas inflaation aika
308	Edit.	HS, June 21, 2013	Brasilian uusi keskiluokka haluaa vastinetta verorahoilleen
309		HS, June 21, 2013	Talousihmeen kulissit repeilevät
310		HS, June 21, 2013	Piilotettu alkuperä
311	Edit.	HS, Jul 3, 2013	Jalkapalloliitto Fifa panee Brazilian köyhät kyykkyy
312		HS, Jul 12, 2013	Brasilia meni yleislakkoon
313	Col.	HS, Jul 13, 2013	Ro-ro ja ruma jalkapallo
314		HS, Aug 5, 2013	Sademetsien tuhoaminen hidastui
315		HS, Aug 16, 2013	Brasilian jalkapallon MM-kisojen rakennustyöt myöhässä
316		HS, Sep 3, 2013	Brasilia vaatii Yhdysvalloilta selitystä vakoilu-väitteistä
317		HS, Sep 19, 2013	Brasilia näpätty Yhdysvaltoja vakoilusta
318		HS, Oct 9, 2013	Suomen koulutuksesta tuli ase Brazilian opettajalakossa
319		HS, Jan 9, 2014	Rio de Janeiro sai takaisin itseluottamuksensa
320		HS, Jan 21, 2014	Suuruudenhulluutta ennen jalkapallojuhlaa
321		HS, Feb 2, 2014	São Paulon eliitti kulkee helikoptereilla välttääkseen ruuhkat

322		HS, Feb 6, 2014	Nuorten kauppakeskusjuhlat kuohuttavat Brasiliassa
323		HS, Feb 9, 2014	Brasilian musta blokki haluaa estää jalkapallon MM-kisat
324		HS, Feb 12, 2014	Kalliit hinnat riepovat brasilialaisia
325		HS, Apr 5, 2014	Diktatuurin jälkeen vastustajat saivat vallan
326		HS, Apr 8, 2014	Suomalaiset cleantech-yritykset tähyävät Brasilian markkinoille
327		HS, Apr 9, 2014	Protesteja luvassa Brasilian MM-lopputurnauksen aikana
328		HS, Apr 24, 2014	Brasilian pääkaupunki toteutti aikansa utopiaa
329	Col.	HS, Apr 29, 2014	Yöllä kun laukaukset kaikuivat
330		HS, May 17, 2014	Rio de Janeiro käy taistelua faveloista
331		HS, May 27, 2014	Brasiliassa on eniten kotiapu-laisia maailmassa
332		HS, May 30, 2014	Korruptio höystää jalkapallon MM-kisoja
333		HS, Jun 10, 2014	Paljon pelissä
334	Edit.	HS, Jun 13, 2014	Jalkapallon MM-kisat nostivat Brasilian ongelmat valokeilaan
335		HS, Jun 13, 2014	Edes Fifa ei voi pilata brasilialaisten MM-juhlaa
336		HS, Jul 10, 2014	Ei enää ikinä
337		HS, Jul 12, 2014	Rion lähialueilla pelko asuu kulman takana
338	Col.	HS, Jul 21, 2014	Jalkapallokisarit olivat Latinalaisen Amerikan uuden keskiluokan juhlaa
339		HS, Aug 12, 2014	Likaiset olympiavedet
340		HS, Aug 15, 2014	Poliisi tappaa Brasiliassa ilman seuraamuksia
341		HS, Aug 30, 2014	Amazonian puolustaja ja helluntailainen Marina Silva vahvoilla Brasilian vaaleissa
342		HS, Sep 9, 2014	Brasilian öljyjättiä ravistelee korruptio-skandaali
343		HS, Sep 12, 2014	Jalkapallon MM-kisarit olivat pettymys Brasilian seksityöntekijöille
344		HS, Sep 19, 2014	Brasilian talous yskii
345		HS, Oct 4, 2014	Soija polttaa Amazonia
346		HS, Oct 5, 2014	Haastaja Amazonin viidakosta
347		HS, Oct 7, 2014	Brasilian protesti-mieliala ei näy äänestyskopissa
348		HS, Oct 23, 2014	Kylä syytösten puristuksessa
349	Edit.	HS, Oct 26, 2014	Brasilian pitkä nousukiito hiipuu vaaleista huolimatta
350		HS, Oct 26, 2014	Brasiliassa mahtisuvun vesa haastaa entisen kapinallisen
351	Col.	HS, Oct 27, 2014	Vallanpitäjät voittavat vaaleissa
352		HS, Oct 28, 2014	Keskiluokka ratkaisi Brasilian vaalit
353		HS, Oct 31, 2014	Brasilia-buumi hiipui nousukiitoon
354		HS, Nov 11, 2014	Orjien valtakunta
355		HS, Nov 18, 2014	Öljyjätin synkät salaisuudet paljastuvat
356		HS, Dec 4, 2014	Leijojen taistelu Rion taivaalla
357		HS, Dec 11, 2014	HS ajoi Brasilian "takahikiälle" ja löysi käärmeitä, erakkoja ja lapsimorsiamia
358		HS, Dec 12, 2014	Kiduttajat ja murhaajat halutaan oikeuteen Brasiliassa
359		HS, Dec 14, 2014	Intiaanit saivat korvaukseksi maastureita ja pikaveneitä
360		HS, Dec 15, 2014	Jättipato nousee sademetsään
361		HS, Dec 28, 2014	Brasiliassa on pallo hukassa
362		HS, Dec 31, 2014	Halauksia häviäjiltä





Illustration 12 (Appendices): Country Profiles and Geographical Distances

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



- Area: 9,826,675 sq km
- Population: 324,459,463 (2017 est.)
- Federal republic
- Independence: 4 July 1776
- Capital city: Washington, D.C.
- GDP (2016): 18,569,100 US\$MM

FINLAND



- Area: 338,145 sq km
- Population: 5,523,231 (2017 est.)
- Republic
- Independence: 6 December 1917
- Capital city: Helsinki
- GDP (2016): 236,785 US\$MM

BRAZIL



- Area: 8,514,877 sq km
- Population: 209,288,278 (2017 est.)
- Federal republic
- Independence: 7 September 1822
- Capital city: Brasília
- GDP (2016): 1,796,186 US\$MM

SOUTH AFRICA



- Area: 1,219,090 sq km
- Population: 56,717,156 (2017 est.)
- Republic
- Independence: 31 May 1910 (Union of South Africa);  
31 May 1961 (republic declared);  
27 April 1994 (majority rule)
- Capital city: Pretoria (administrative); Cape Town  
(legislative); Bloemfontein (judicial)
- GDP (2016): 294,841 US\$MM

Distance between Washington D.C. and Brasília:



Distance between Washington D.C. and Pretoria:



Distance between Helsinki and Brasília:



Distance between Helsinki and Pretoria:

